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Optimal Policy Intervention and the Social Value of Public Information

J G James, Phillip Lawler, Jonathan James Orcid Logo

American Economic Review, Volume: 101, Issue: 4, Pages: 1561 - 1574

Swansea University Authors: Phillip Lawler, Jonathan James Orcid Logo

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DOI (Published version): 10.1257/aer.101.4.1561

Abstract

Svensson (2006) argues that Morris and Shin (2002) is, contrary to what is claimed, pro-transparency. This paper reexamines the issue but with an important modification to the original Morris and Shin framework. Recognizing that central banks impact the economy not only indirectly via public announc...

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Published in: American Economic Review
ISSN: 0002-8282
Published: American Economic Association 2011
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URI: https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa5258
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first_indexed 2013-07-23T11:52:06Z
last_indexed 2018-02-09T04:31:25Z
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spelling 2013-11-07T14:42:08.8866954 v2 5258 2011-10-01 Optimal Policy Intervention and the Social Value of Public Information fdacc510bbb2068ab1881cf9f658cdbe Phillip Lawler Phillip Lawler true false fa7a8513c107fea35bc95e4370216ed3 0000-0001-8947-7857 Jonathan James Jonathan James true false 2011-10-01 SGMGT Svensson (2006) argues that Morris and Shin (2002) is, contrary to what is claimed, pro-transparency. This paper reexamines the issue but with an important modification to the original Morris and Shin framework. Recognizing that central banks impact the economy not only indirectly via public announcements, but also directly through policy actions, we consider the social value of public information in the presence of active policy intervention. Our results strengthen Morris and Shin's conclusions considerably: in particular, we find that public disclosure of the central bank's information is unambiguously, i.e., regardless of parameter values, undesirable. (JEL D82, D83, E52, E58) Journal Article American Economic Review 101 4 1561 1574 American Economic Association 0002-8282 31 12 2011 2011-12-31 10.1257/aer.101.4.1561 COLLEGE NANME School of Management - School COLLEGE CODE SGMGT Swansea University 2013-11-07T14:42:08.8866954 2011-10-01T00:00:00.0000000 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences School of Management - Economics J G James 1 Phillip Lawler 2 Jonathan James 0000-0001-8947-7857 3
title Optimal Policy Intervention and the Social Value of Public Information
spellingShingle Optimal Policy Intervention and the Social Value of Public Information
Phillip Lawler
Jonathan James
title_short Optimal Policy Intervention and the Social Value of Public Information
title_full Optimal Policy Intervention and the Social Value of Public Information
title_fullStr Optimal Policy Intervention and the Social Value of Public Information
title_full_unstemmed Optimal Policy Intervention and the Social Value of Public Information
title_sort Optimal Policy Intervention and the Social Value of Public Information
author_id_str_mv fdacc510bbb2068ab1881cf9f658cdbe
fa7a8513c107fea35bc95e4370216ed3
author_id_fullname_str_mv fdacc510bbb2068ab1881cf9f658cdbe_***_Phillip Lawler
fa7a8513c107fea35bc95e4370216ed3_***_Jonathan James
author Phillip Lawler
Jonathan James
author2 J G James
Phillip Lawler
Jonathan James
format Journal article
container_title American Economic Review
container_volume 101
container_issue 4
container_start_page 1561
publishDate 2011
institution Swansea University
issn 0002-8282
doi_str_mv 10.1257/aer.101.4.1561
publisher American Economic Association
college_str Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchytype
hierarchy_top_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_top_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchy_parent_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_parent_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
department_str School of Management - Economics{{{_:::_}}}Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences{{{_:::_}}}School of Management - Economics
document_store_str 0
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description Svensson (2006) argues that Morris and Shin (2002) is, contrary to what is claimed, pro-transparency. This paper reexamines the issue but with an important modification to the original Morris and Shin framework. Recognizing that central banks impact the economy not only indirectly via public announcements, but also directly through policy actions, we consider the social value of public information in the presence of active policy intervention. Our results strengthen Morris and Shin's conclusions considerably: in particular, we find that public disclosure of the central bank's information is unambiguously, i.e., regardless of parameter values, undesirable. (JEL D82, D83, E52, E58)
published_date 2011-12-31T03:06:17Z
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score 11.037581

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