Journal article 1493 views
Optimal delegation implications of central bank transparency
,
Phillip Lawler
Economics Letters, Volume: 113, Issue: 1, Pages: 8 - 11
Swansea University Authors:
Jonathan James , Phillip Lawler
Full text not available from this repository: check for access using links below.
DOI (Published version): 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.06.001
Abstract
The interrelationship between monetary regime design and central bank transparency is examined. We find optimal delegation requires the central bank be either: ‘representative’, not choosing to publicly reveal its private information; or ‘ultraconservative’, deciding to be fully transparent.
| Published in: | Economics Letters |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 0165-1765 |
| Published: |
Elsevier
2011
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| Online Access: |
Check full text
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| URI: | https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa6943 |
| Abstract: |
The interrelationship between monetary regime design and central bank transparency is examined. We find optimal delegation requires the central bank be either: ‘representative’, not choosing to publicly reveal its private information; or ‘ultraconservative’, deciding to be fully transparent. |
|---|---|
| College: |
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences |
| Issue: |
1 |
| Start Page: |
8 |
| End Page: |
11 |