Journal article 988 views
Optimal Policy Intervention and the Social Value of Public Information
American Economic Review, Volume: 101, Issue: 4, Pages: 1561 - 1574
Swansea University Authors:
Phillip Lawler, Jonathan James
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DOI (Published version): 10.1257/aer.101.4.1561
Abstract
Svensson (2006) argues that Morris and Shin (2002) is, contrary to what is claimed, pro-transparency. This paper reexamines the issue but with an important modification to the original Morris and Shin framework. Recognizing that central banks impact the economy not only indirectly via public announc...
| Published in: | American Economic Review |
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| ISSN: | 0002-8282 |
| Published: |
American Economic Association
2011
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| Online Access: |
Check full text
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| URI: | https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa5258 |
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| Abstract: |
Svensson (2006) argues that Morris and Shin (2002) is, contrary to what is claimed, pro-transparency. This paper reexamines the issue but with an important modification to the original Morris and Shin framework. Recognizing that central banks impact the economy not only indirectly via public announcements, but also directly through policy actions, we consider the social value of public information in the presence of active policy intervention. Our results strengthen Morris and Shin's conclusions considerably: in particular, we find that public disclosure of the central bank's information is unambiguously, i.e., regardless of parameter values, undesirable. (JEL D82, D83, E52, E58) |
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| College: |
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences |
| Issue: |
4 |
| Start Page: |
1561 |
| End Page: |
1574 |