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From Consensus to Fracture: Reagan, the Contras, and the Politics of Intelligence Oversight
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Luca Trenta ,
Douglas B. Atkinson
American Politics Research
Swansea University Author:
Luca Trenta
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DOI (Published version): 10.1177/1532673x261443526
Abstract
Congress has a long history of deference to the Executive with regard to foreign policy and the intelligence community. During the Cold War in particular, Congress often wished to be kept at arm’s reach from covert operations conducted by Democratic and Republican presidential administrations. Yet i...
| Published in: | American Politics Research |
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| ISSN: | 1532-673X 1552-3373 |
| Published: |
SAGE Publications
2026
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| Online Access: |
Check full text
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| URI: | https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa71720 |
| Abstract: |
Congress has a long history of deference to the Executive with regard to foreign policy and the intelligence community. During the Cold War in particular, Congress often wished to be kept at arm’s reach from covert operations conducted by Democratic and Republican presidential administrations. Yet in the 1980s, Members of Congress began to assert themselves over the Reagan administration’s covert operation to provide aid and weapons to the contras in Nicaragua. We articulate a theory showing how backbenchers moved intelligence committee members away from deference and into a more polarized, adversarial posture. We then investigate the mechanisms of this theory with a novel dataset of speeches of Members of Congress, 1981-1983, on the topic of Nicaragua. We find that intelligence committee members’ rhetoric began to shift towards the rhetoric of backbenchers as more revelations about the covert operation are made public. These findings suggest that the modern confrontational attitude of Congress toward the intelligence agencies has its roots in the 1980s, rather than the 1990s, and demonstrate a new mechanism by which Congress oversees the executive. |
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| Keywords: |
covert operations, Congress, partisan polarization, intelligence |
| College: |
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences |
| Funders: |
British Academy SRG21/211237 |