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Strategic Complementarity, Stabilization Policy and the Optimal Degree of Publicity

Jonathan James Orcid Logo, Phillip Lawler

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Volume: 44, Issue: 4, Pages: 551 - 572

Swansea University Authors: Jonathan James Orcid Logo, Phillip Lawler

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DOI (Published version): 10.1111/j.1538-4616.2012.00501.x

Abstract

This paper examines the welfare implications of public information dissemination within a model in which information is heterogeneous across agents and where a strategic complementarity is present. The focus of the analysis is on how the presence of stabilization policy affects the case for transpar...

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Published in: Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
ISSN: 0022-2879
Published: wiley 2012
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URI: https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa6944
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first_indexed 2013-07-23T11:56:54Z
last_indexed 2018-02-09T04:34:37Z
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spelling 2013-11-07T14:41:42.3964204 v2 6944 2012-01-29 Strategic Complementarity, Stabilization Policy and the Optimal Degree of Publicity fa7a8513c107fea35bc95e4370216ed3 0000-0001-8947-7857 Jonathan James Jonathan James true false fdacc510bbb2068ab1881cf9f658cdbe Phillip Lawler Phillip Lawler true false 2012-01-29 ECON This paper examines the welfare implications of public information dissemination within a model in which information is heterogeneous across agents and where a strategic complementarity is present. The focus of the analysis is on how the presence of stabilization policy affects the case for transparency. In considering this issue, it extends James and Lawler's (2011) contribution by incorporating an alternative payoff function and by employing a different representation of public disclosure. The study’s key finding is that the conclusions drawn in its precursor are robust to these modifications: specifically, in the presence of optimally-designed policy intervention zero transparency maximizes welfare. Journal Article Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 44 4 551 572 wiley 0022-2879 22 5 2012 2012-05-22 10.1111/j.1538-4616.2012.00501.x COLLEGE NANME Economics COLLEGE CODE ECON Swansea University 2013-11-07T14:41:42.3964204 2012-01-29T15:37:31.1400000 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences School of Management - Economics Jonathan James 0000-0001-8947-7857 1 Phillip Lawler 2
title Strategic Complementarity, Stabilization Policy and the Optimal Degree of Publicity
spellingShingle Strategic Complementarity, Stabilization Policy and the Optimal Degree of Publicity
Jonathan James
Phillip Lawler
title_short Strategic Complementarity, Stabilization Policy and the Optimal Degree of Publicity
title_full Strategic Complementarity, Stabilization Policy and the Optimal Degree of Publicity
title_fullStr Strategic Complementarity, Stabilization Policy and the Optimal Degree of Publicity
title_full_unstemmed Strategic Complementarity, Stabilization Policy and the Optimal Degree of Publicity
title_sort Strategic Complementarity, Stabilization Policy and the Optimal Degree of Publicity
author_id_str_mv fa7a8513c107fea35bc95e4370216ed3
fdacc510bbb2068ab1881cf9f658cdbe
author_id_fullname_str_mv fa7a8513c107fea35bc95e4370216ed3_***_Jonathan James
fdacc510bbb2068ab1881cf9f658cdbe_***_Phillip Lawler
author Jonathan James
Phillip Lawler
author2 Jonathan James
Phillip Lawler
format Journal article
container_title Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
container_volume 44
container_issue 4
container_start_page 551
publishDate 2012
institution Swansea University
issn 0022-2879
doi_str_mv 10.1111/j.1538-4616.2012.00501.x
publisher wiley
college_str Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchytype
hierarchy_top_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_top_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchy_parent_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_parent_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
department_str School of Management - Economics{{{_:::_}}}Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences{{{_:::_}}}School of Management - Economics
document_store_str 0
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description This paper examines the welfare implications of public information dissemination within a model in which information is heterogeneous across agents and where a strategic complementarity is present. The focus of the analysis is on how the presence of stabilization policy affects the case for transparency. In considering this issue, it extends James and Lawler's (2011) contribution by incorporating an alternative payoff function and by employing a different representation of public disclosure. The study’s key finding is that the conclusions drawn in its precursor are robust to these modifications: specifically, in the presence of optimally-designed policy intervention zero transparency maximizes welfare.
published_date 2012-05-22T03:08:35Z
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score 11.037603

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