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Social preferences on networks

Sarah Rezaei Orcid Logo, Stephanie Rosenkranz, Utz Weitzel, Bastian Westbrock Orcid Logo

Journal of Public Economics, Volume: 234, Start page: 105113

Swansea University Author: Bastian Westbrock Orcid Logo

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DOI (Published version): 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105113

Abstract

Social preferences are a powerful determinant of human behavior. We study their behavioral implications within the context of a network game. A key feature of our game is the existence of multiple equilibria that widely differ in terms of their payoff distributions. Determining which equilibrium is...

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Published in: Journal of Public Economics
ISSN: 0047-2727
Published: Elsevier BV 2024
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URI: https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa67534
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last_indexed 2024-11-25T14:20:22Z
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spelling 2024-10-28T14:59:53.0726194 v2 67534 2024-09-02 Social preferences on networks 40408e9de92daaa653357f6b40ed66fd 0000-0002-8303-0808 Bastian Westbrock Bastian Westbrock true false 2024-09-02 SOSS Social preferences are a powerful determinant of human behavior. We study their behavioral implications within the context of a network game. A key feature of our game is the existence of multiple equilibria that widely differ in terms of their payoff distributions. Determining which equilibrium is most plausible is thus a key concern. We show that introducing social preferences into the game can resolve the problem of equilibrium multiplicity. However, the selected equilibria do not necessarily yield more efficient or egalitarian payoff distributions. Rather, they just reinforce the inequality that is already inherent in a network structure. We validate these predictions in an experiment and discuss their implications for managerial practice and behavior in larger networks. Journal Article Journal of Public Economics 234 105113 Elsevier BV 0047-2727 Social preferences, Network games, Public goods 1 6 2024 2024-06-01 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105113 COLLEGE NANME Social Sciences School COLLEGE CODE SOSS Swansea University Another institution paid the OA fee 2024-10-28T14:59:53.0726194 2024-09-02T16:30:42.8515404 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences School of Social Sciences - Economics Sarah Rezaei 0000-0002-1542-4098 1 Stephanie Rosenkranz 2 Utz Weitzel 3 Bastian Westbrock 0000-0002-8303-0808 4 67534__32753__00b13249f663485eabcffcdd595c539d.pdf 67534.VoR.pdf 2024-10-28T14:58:33.4280997 Output 1896519 application/pdf Version of Record true © 2024 The Author(s). This is an open access article under the CC BY license. true eng http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
title Social preferences on networks
spellingShingle Social preferences on networks
Bastian Westbrock
title_short Social preferences on networks
title_full Social preferences on networks
title_fullStr Social preferences on networks
title_full_unstemmed Social preferences on networks
title_sort Social preferences on networks
author_id_str_mv 40408e9de92daaa653357f6b40ed66fd
author_id_fullname_str_mv 40408e9de92daaa653357f6b40ed66fd_***_Bastian Westbrock
author Bastian Westbrock
author2 Sarah Rezaei
Stephanie Rosenkranz
Utz Weitzel
Bastian Westbrock
format Journal article
container_title Journal of Public Economics
container_volume 234
container_start_page 105113
publishDate 2024
institution Swansea University
issn 0047-2727
doi_str_mv 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105113
publisher Elsevier BV
college_str Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchytype
hierarchy_top_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_top_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchy_parent_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_parent_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
department_str School of Social Sciences - Economics{{{_:::_}}}Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences{{{_:::_}}}School of Social Sciences - Economics
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description Social preferences are a powerful determinant of human behavior. We study their behavioral implications within the context of a network game. A key feature of our game is the existence of multiple equilibria that widely differ in terms of their payoff distributions. Determining which equilibrium is most plausible is thus a key concern. We show that introducing social preferences into the game can resolve the problem of equilibrium multiplicity. However, the selected equilibria do not necessarily yield more efficient or egalitarian payoff distributions. Rather, they just reinforce the inequality that is already inherent in a network structure. We validate these predictions in an experiment and discuss their implications for managerial practice and behavior in larger networks.
published_date 2024-06-01T05:18:34Z
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score 11.089572

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