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Selves hijacked: affects and personhood in ‘self-illness ambiguity’

Anna Bortolan Orcid Logo

Philosophical Explorations, Volume: 25, Issue: 3, Pages: 1 - 20

Swansea University Author: Anna Bortolan Orcid Logo

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DOI (Published version): 10.1080/13869795.2022.2093393

Abstract

This paper investigates from a phenomenological perspective the origins of self-illness ambiguity. Drawing on phenomenological theories of affectivity and selfhood, I argue that, as a phenomenon which concerns primarily the ‘personal self’, self-illness ambiguity is dependent on distinct alterations...

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Published in: Philosophical Explorations
ISSN: 1386-9795 1741-5918
Published: Informa UK Limited 2022
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URI: https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa59717
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first_indexed 2022-03-28T14:08:46Z
last_indexed 2023-01-11T14:41:11Z
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spelling v2 59717 2022-03-28 Selves hijacked: affects and personhood in ‘self-illness ambiguity’ 9931f2ee5e3c744a5af4b5668a6f0f8c 0000-0002-6544-998X Anna Bortolan Anna Bortolan true false 2022-03-28 APC This paper investigates from a phenomenological perspective the origins of self-illness ambiguity. Drawing on phenomenological theories of affectivity and selfhood, I argue that, as a phenomenon which concerns primarily the ‘personal self’, self-illness ambiguity is dependent on distinct alterations of affective background orientations. I start by illustrating how personhood is anchored in the experience of a specific set of non-intentional affects – i.e. moods or existential feelings – alterations of which are often present in mental ill-health. Also through the exploration of the phenomenology of acute and long-term anxiety, I suggest that self-illness ambiguity originates in the presence of moods or existential feelings that are in tension with the ones that structure the person’s experience prior to the onset of the illness or when its symptoms are not experienced. More specifically, I claim that due to their ability to ‘block’ or ‘suspend’ some of the person’s affective and cognitive responses, such affective orientations may unsettle one’s self-defining evaluative perspective, leading to uncertainty and doubting about one’s personal self. Journal Article Philosophical Explorations 25 3 1 20 Informa UK Limited 1386-9795 1741-5918 Self; personhood; moods; existential feelings; self-illness ambiguity 27 7 2022 2022-07-27 10.1080/13869795.2022.2093393 COLLEGE NANME Politics, Philosophy and International Relations COLLEGE CODE APC Swansea University 2023-12-19T14:04:27.6906788 2022-03-28T15:07:31.5698787 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences Anna Bortolan 0000-0002-6544-998X 1 59717__24783__278b125bbcf246a3ba2d82067cac4a74.pdf 59717.pdf 2022-08-01T09:54:21.1422285 Output 1885328 application/pdf Version of Record true © 2022 The Author(s). This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License true eng http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
title Selves hijacked: affects and personhood in ‘self-illness ambiguity’
spellingShingle Selves hijacked: affects and personhood in ‘self-illness ambiguity’
Anna Bortolan
title_short Selves hijacked: affects and personhood in ‘self-illness ambiguity’
title_full Selves hijacked: affects and personhood in ‘self-illness ambiguity’
title_fullStr Selves hijacked: affects and personhood in ‘self-illness ambiguity’
title_full_unstemmed Selves hijacked: affects and personhood in ‘self-illness ambiguity’
title_sort Selves hijacked: affects and personhood in ‘self-illness ambiguity’
author_id_str_mv 9931f2ee5e3c744a5af4b5668a6f0f8c
author_id_fullname_str_mv 9931f2ee5e3c744a5af4b5668a6f0f8c_***_Anna Bortolan
author Anna Bortolan
author2 Anna Bortolan
format Journal article
container_title Philosophical Explorations
container_volume 25
container_issue 3
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publishDate 2022
institution Swansea University
issn 1386-9795
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doi_str_mv 10.1080/13869795.2022.2093393
publisher Informa UK Limited
college_str Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
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hierarchy_top_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_top_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
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hierarchy_parent_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
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description This paper investigates from a phenomenological perspective the origins of self-illness ambiguity. Drawing on phenomenological theories of affectivity and selfhood, I argue that, as a phenomenon which concerns primarily the ‘personal self’, self-illness ambiguity is dependent on distinct alterations of affective background orientations. I start by illustrating how personhood is anchored in the experience of a specific set of non-intentional affects – i.e. moods or existential feelings – alterations of which are often present in mental ill-health. Also through the exploration of the phenomenology of acute and long-term anxiety, I suggest that self-illness ambiguity originates in the presence of moods or existential feelings that are in tension with the ones that structure the person’s experience prior to the onset of the illness or when its symptoms are not experienced. More specifically, I claim that due to their ability to ‘block’ or ‘suspend’ some of the person’s affective and cognitive responses, such affective orientations may unsettle one’s self-defining evaluative perspective, leading to uncertainty and doubting about one’s personal self.
published_date 2022-07-27T14:04:28Z
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score 11.013731

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