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Affectivity and the distinction between minimal and narrative self
Continental Philosophy Review, Volume: 53, Issue: 1, Pages: 67 - 84
Swansea University Author:
Anna Bortolan
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DOI (Published version): 10.1007/s11007-019-09471-y
Abstract
In the contemporary phenomenological literature it has been argued that it is possible to distinguish between two forms of selfhood: the “minimal” and “narrative” self. This paper discusses a claim which is central to this account, namely that the minimal and narrative self complement each other but...
| Published in: | Continental Philosophy Review |
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| ISSN: | 1387-2842 1573-1103 |
| Published: |
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
2020
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| Online Access: |
Check full text
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| URI: | https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa53370 |
| Abstract: |
In the contemporary phenomenological literature it has been argued that it is possible to distinguish between two forms of selfhood: the “minimal” and “narrative” self. This paper discusses a claim which is central to this account, namely that the minimal and narrative self complement each other but are fundamentally distinct dimensions. In particular, I challenge the idea that while the presence of a minimal self is a condition of possibility for the emergence of a narrative self, the dynamics which characterise narrative selfhood do not have a structuring effect on minimal self-experience. I do so by drawing on both classical and contemporary phenomenological literature to show that at least certain forms of affective experience are complex phenomena in which minimal and narrative forms of selfhood are deeply entwined. More specifically, I claim that, due to their evaluative character, intentional and non-intentional affective states convey a pre-reflective experience of constitutive aspects of the narrative self. This enables me to argue that minimal and narrative selfhood are phenomenologically inextricable. |
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| Keywords: |
Affectivity; Minimal self; Narrative self; Self-consciousness; Phenomenology; Emotions; Feelings |
| College: |
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences |
| Issue: |
1 |
| Start Page: |
67 |
| End Page: |
84 |