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Affectivity and the distinction between minimal and narrative self

Anna Bortolan Orcid Logo

Continental Philosophy Review, Volume: 53, Issue: 1, Pages: 67 - 84

Swansea University Author: Anna Bortolan Orcid Logo

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DOI (Published version): 10.1007/s11007-019-09471-y

Abstract

In the contemporary phenomenological literature it has been argued that it is possible to distinguish between two forms of selfhood: the “minimal” and “narrative” self. This paper discusses a claim which is central to this account, namely that the minimal and narrative self complement each other but...

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Published in: Continental Philosophy Review
ISSN: 1387-2842 1573-1103
Published: Springer Science and Business Media LLC 2020
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URI: https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa53370
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last_indexed 2023-01-11T14:30:55Z
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spelling 2022-12-02T18:34:16.6350461 v2 53370 2020-01-27 Affectivity and the distinction between minimal and narrative self 9931f2ee5e3c744a5af4b5668a6f0f8c 0000-0002-6544-998X Anna Bortolan Anna Bortolan true false 2020-01-27 SOSS In the contemporary phenomenological literature it has been argued that it is possible to distinguish between two forms of selfhood: the “minimal” and “narrative” self. This paper discusses a claim which is central to this account, namely that the minimal and narrative self complement each other but are fundamentally distinct dimensions. In particular, I challenge the idea that while the presence of a minimal self is a condition of possibility for the emergence of a narrative self, the dynamics which characterise narrative selfhood do not have a structuring effect on minimal self-experience. I do so by drawing on both classical and contemporary phenomenological literature to show that at least certain forms of affective experience are complex phenomena in which minimal and narrative forms of selfhood are deeply entwined. More specifically, I claim that, due to their evaluative character, intentional and non-intentional affective states convey a pre-reflective experience of constitutive aspects of the narrative self. This enables me to argue that minimal and narrative selfhood are phenomenologically inextricable. Journal Article Continental Philosophy Review 53 1 67 84 Springer Science and Business Media LLC 1387-2842 1573-1103 Affectivity; Minimal self; Narrative self; Self-consciousness; Phenomenology; Emotions; Feelings 1 3 2020 2020-03-01 10.1007/s11007-019-09471-y COLLEGE NANME Social Sciences School COLLEGE CODE SOSS Swansea University 2022-12-02T18:34:16.6350461 2020-01-27T16:35:53.3175682 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences School of Culture and Communication - Politics, Philosophy and International Relations Anna Bortolan 0000-0002-6544-998X 1 53370__16561__4ece32327c3044cabef02a248802b950.pdf Bortolan2019_Article_AffectivityAndTheDistinctionBe.pdf 2020-02-11T15:13:01.4091541 Output 694005 application/pdf Version of Record true © The Author(s) 2019. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License true eng https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
title Affectivity and the distinction between minimal and narrative self
spellingShingle Affectivity and the distinction between minimal and narrative self
Anna Bortolan
title_short Affectivity and the distinction between minimal and narrative self
title_full Affectivity and the distinction between minimal and narrative self
title_fullStr Affectivity and the distinction between minimal and narrative self
title_full_unstemmed Affectivity and the distinction between minimal and narrative self
title_sort Affectivity and the distinction between minimal and narrative self
author_id_str_mv 9931f2ee5e3c744a5af4b5668a6f0f8c
author_id_fullname_str_mv 9931f2ee5e3c744a5af4b5668a6f0f8c_***_Anna Bortolan
author Anna Bortolan
author2 Anna Bortolan
format Journal article
container_title Continental Philosophy Review
container_volume 53
container_issue 1
container_start_page 67
publishDate 2020
institution Swansea University
issn 1387-2842
1573-1103
doi_str_mv 10.1007/s11007-019-09471-y
publisher Springer Science and Business Media LLC
college_str Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
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hierarchy_top_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchy_parent_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_parent_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
department_str School of Culture and Communication - Politics, Philosophy and International Relations{{{_:::_}}}Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences{{{_:::_}}}School of Culture and Communication - Politics, Philosophy and International Relations
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description In the contemporary phenomenological literature it has been argued that it is possible to distinguish between two forms of selfhood: the “minimal” and “narrative” self. This paper discusses a claim which is central to this account, namely that the minimal and narrative self complement each other but are fundamentally distinct dimensions. In particular, I challenge the idea that while the presence of a minimal self is a condition of possibility for the emergence of a narrative self, the dynamics which characterise narrative selfhood do not have a structuring effect on minimal self-experience. I do so by drawing on both classical and contemporary phenomenological literature to show that at least certain forms of affective experience are complex phenomena in which minimal and narrative forms of selfhood are deeply entwined. More specifically, I claim that, due to their evaluative character, intentional and non-intentional affective states convey a pre-reflective experience of constitutive aspects of the narrative self. This enables me to argue that minimal and narrative selfhood are phenomenologically inextricable.
published_date 2020-03-01T19:51:43Z
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score 11.04748

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