No Cover Image

Journal article 480 views

Inequality in developing economies: the role of institutional development

Adalgiso Amendola, Joshy Easaw, Antonio Savoia

Public Choice, Volume: 155, Issue: 1-2, Pages: 43 - 60

Swansea University Author: Joshy Easaw

Full text not available from this repository: check for access using links below.

Check full text

DOI (Published version): 10.1007/s11127-011-9838-3

Abstract

This paper studies the distributive impact of institutional change in developing countries. Insuch economies, economic institutions, such as property rights systems, may act to preservethe interests of an influential minority, but this depends crucially on the level of politicalequality. For example...

Full description

Published in: Public Choice
ISSN: 0048-5829 1573-7101
Published: 2013
Online Access: Check full text

URI: https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa7896
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
first_indexed 2013-07-23T11:59:44Z
last_indexed 2018-02-09T04:36:35Z
id cronfa7896
recordtype SURis
fullrecord <?xml version="1.0"?><rfc1807><datestamp>2013-11-05T11:40:28.6143390</datestamp><bib-version>v2</bib-version><id>7896</id><entry>2012-02-17</entry><title>Inequality in developing economies: the role of institutional development</title><swanseaauthors><author><sid>4b4b0b76ec82ff557786278e7f172089</sid><firstname>Joshy</firstname><surname>Easaw</surname><name>Joshy Easaw</name><active>true</active><ethesisStudent>false</ethesisStudent></author></swanseaauthors><date>2012-02-17</date><deptcode>BEC</deptcode><abstract>This paper studies the distributive impact of institutional change in developing countries. Insuch economies, economic institutions, such as property rights systems, may act to preservethe interests of an influential minority, but this depends crucially on the level of politicalequality. For example, dominant classes can control key-markets, access to assets andinvestment opportunities, especially if they enjoy disproportionate political power. We testthis hypothesis using cross-section and panel data methods on a sample of low- and middleincomeeconomies from Africa, Asia and Latin America. Results suggest that: (a) increasingthe protection of property rights increases income inequality; (b) such an effect is larger inlow-democracy environments; (c) a minority of countries have developed a set politicalinstitutions capable of counterbalancing this effect.</abstract><type>Journal Article</type><journal>Public Choice</journal><volume>155</volume><journalNumber>1-2</journalNumber><paginationStart>43</paginationStart><paginationEnd>60</paginationEnd><publisher/><issnPrint>0048-5829</issnPrint><issnElectronic>1573-7101</issnElectronic><keywords/><publishedDay>31</publishedDay><publishedMonth>12</publishedMonth><publishedYear>2013</publishedYear><publishedDate>2013-12-31</publishedDate><doi>10.1007/s11127-011-9838-3</doi><url/><notes/><college>COLLEGE NANME</college><department>Economics</department><CollegeCode>COLLEGE CODE</CollegeCode><DepartmentCode>BEC</DepartmentCode><institution>Swansea University</institution><apcterm/><lastEdited>2013-11-05T11:40:28.6143390</lastEdited><Created>2012-02-17T10:23:02.8200000</Created><path><level id="1">Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences</level><level id="2">School of Management - Economics</level></path><authors><author><firstname>Adalgiso</firstname><surname>Amendola</surname><order>1</order></author><author><firstname>Joshy</firstname><surname>Easaw</surname><order>2</order></author><author><firstname>Antonio</firstname><surname>Savoia</surname><order>3</order></author></authors><documents/><OutputDurs/></rfc1807>
spelling 2013-11-05T11:40:28.6143390 v2 7896 2012-02-17 Inequality in developing economies: the role of institutional development 4b4b0b76ec82ff557786278e7f172089 Joshy Easaw Joshy Easaw true false 2012-02-17 BEC This paper studies the distributive impact of institutional change in developing countries. Insuch economies, economic institutions, such as property rights systems, may act to preservethe interests of an influential minority, but this depends crucially on the level of politicalequality. For example, dominant classes can control key-markets, access to assets andinvestment opportunities, especially if they enjoy disproportionate political power. We testthis hypothesis using cross-section and panel data methods on a sample of low- and middleincomeeconomies from Africa, Asia and Latin America. Results suggest that: (a) increasingthe protection of property rights increases income inequality; (b) such an effect is larger inlow-democracy environments; (c) a minority of countries have developed a set politicalinstitutions capable of counterbalancing this effect. Journal Article Public Choice 155 1-2 43 60 0048-5829 1573-7101 31 12 2013 2013-12-31 10.1007/s11127-011-9838-3 COLLEGE NANME Economics COLLEGE CODE BEC Swansea University 2013-11-05T11:40:28.6143390 2012-02-17T10:23:02.8200000 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences School of Management - Economics Adalgiso Amendola 1 Joshy Easaw 2 Antonio Savoia 3
title Inequality in developing economies: the role of institutional development
spellingShingle Inequality in developing economies: the role of institutional development
Joshy Easaw
title_short Inequality in developing economies: the role of institutional development
title_full Inequality in developing economies: the role of institutional development
title_fullStr Inequality in developing economies: the role of institutional development
title_full_unstemmed Inequality in developing economies: the role of institutional development
title_sort Inequality in developing economies: the role of institutional development
author_id_str_mv 4b4b0b76ec82ff557786278e7f172089
author_id_fullname_str_mv 4b4b0b76ec82ff557786278e7f172089_***_Joshy Easaw
author Joshy Easaw
author2 Adalgiso Amendola
Joshy Easaw
Antonio Savoia
format Journal article
container_title Public Choice
container_volume 155
container_issue 1-2
container_start_page 43
publishDate 2013
institution Swansea University
issn 0048-5829
1573-7101
doi_str_mv 10.1007/s11127-011-9838-3
college_str Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchytype
hierarchy_top_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_top_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchy_parent_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_parent_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
department_str School of Management - Economics{{{_:::_}}}Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences{{{_:::_}}}School of Management - Economics
document_store_str 0
active_str 0
description This paper studies the distributive impact of institutional change in developing countries. Insuch economies, economic institutions, such as property rights systems, may act to preservethe interests of an influential minority, but this depends crucially on the level of politicalequality. For example, dominant classes can control key-markets, access to assets andinvestment opportunities, especially if they enjoy disproportionate political power. We testthis hypothesis using cross-section and panel data methods on a sample of low- and middleincomeeconomies from Africa, Asia and Latin America. Results suggest that: (a) increasingthe protection of property rights increases income inequality; (b) such an effect is larger inlow-democracy environments; (c) a minority of countries have developed a set politicalinstitutions capable of counterbalancing this effect.
published_date 2013-12-31T03:09:54Z
_version_ 1763749914597130240
score 11.013371

Similar Items