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Environmentally Conscious Fishing Communities and Fishing Quota Negotiations: The Impact of Environmental Externalities

Ilias Asproudis Orcid Logo, Eleftherios Filippiadis Orcid Logo

Journal of Public Economic Theory, Volume: 27, Issue: 6, Start page: e70093

Swansea University Author: Ilias Asproudis Orcid Logo

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DOI (Published version): 10.1111/jpet.70093

Abstract

This paper uses a Nash bargaining model for analyzing negotiations between a fishing community and a vessel over fishing quotas and wages, for a given Total Allowable Catch imposed by the regulator. The analysis considers the environmental awareness of the community and whether the entire quota allo...

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Published in: Journal of Public Economic Theory
ISSN: 1097-3923 1467-9779
Published: Wiley 2025
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URI: https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa71200
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last_indexed 2026-02-07T05:28:41Z
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spelling 2026-02-06T11:54:56.3440661 v2 71200 2026-01-06 Environmentally Conscious Fishing Communities and Fishing Quota Negotiations: The Impact of Environmental Externalities da7667a22ea7ad12af360650b733406f 0000-0002-8332-1832 Ilias Asproudis Ilias Asproudis true false 2026-01-06 SOSS This paper uses a Nash bargaining model for analyzing negotiations between a fishing community and a vessel over fishing quotas and wages, for a given Total Allowable Catch imposed by the regulator. The analysis considers the environmental awareness of the community and whether the entire quota allotment is being leased, to examine how environmental externalities, unrelated to fishery sustainability, affect wages, employment, and social welfare. It is argued that if the maximum number of quotas is leased to the vessel, a system of transferable fishing rights is a vehicle for pure transfer payments from the vessel to the community, in the form of higher wages and leased quota revenues. In this context, employment level and social welfare are not affected by the fishing communities' environmental consciousness. However, if less than the maximum number of quotas is leased to the vessel, both wages and revenues from leased quotas are higher, while employment is lower when the community is environmentally conscious compared to when it is not. In such case, social welfare is higher when the community is environmentally conscious provided that the inverse demand for fish does not decline too sharply relative to the rate at which marginal pollution damages increase. Finally, it is shown that the strictness of the Total Allowable Catch regulations impacts both the community's well-being and the vessel's profitability. Journal Article Journal of Public Economic Theory 27 6 e70093 Wiley 1097-3923 1467-9779 bargaining, environmental protection, fishing community, fishing quotas 31 12 2025 2025-12-31 10.1111/jpet.70093 COLLEGE NANME Social Sciences School COLLEGE CODE SOSS Swansea University Another institution paid the OA fee This work is part of a project that has received funding from University of Macedonia Research Fund under the Basic Research 2023 funding program. The publication of this article in OA mode was financially supported by HEAL-Link. 2026-02-06T11:54:56.3440661 2026-01-06T19:09:33.1817590 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences School of Social Sciences - Economics Ilias Asproudis 0000-0002-8332-1832 1 Eleftherios Filippiadis 0000-0002-6238-253x 2 71200__36202__2b9d1c3bede544d49dac0b62a51b6a9e.pdf 71200.VOR.pdf 2026-02-06T11:47:23.4252385 Output 1050327 application/pdf Version of Record true © 2025 The Author(s). This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License. true eng http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
title Environmentally Conscious Fishing Communities and Fishing Quota Negotiations: The Impact of Environmental Externalities
spellingShingle Environmentally Conscious Fishing Communities and Fishing Quota Negotiations: The Impact of Environmental Externalities
Ilias Asproudis
title_short Environmentally Conscious Fishing Communities and Fishing Quota Negotiations: The Impact of Environmental Externalities
title_full Environmentally Conscious Fishing Communities and Fishing Quota Negotiations: The Impact of Environmental Externalities
title_fullStr Environmentally Conscious Fishing Communities and Fishing Quota Negotiations: The Impact of Environmental Externalities
title_full_unstemmed Environmentally Conscious Fishing Communities and Fishing Quota Negotiations: The Impact of Environmental Externalities
title_sort Environmentally Conscious Fishing Communities and Fishing Quota Negotiations: The Impact of Environmental Externalities
author_id_str_mv da7667a22ea7ad12af360650b733406f
author_id_fullname_str_mv da7667a22ea7ad12af360650b733406f_***_Ilias Asproudis
author Ilias Asproudis
author2 Ilias Asproudis
Eleftherios Filippiadis
format Journal article
container_title Journal of Public Economic Theory
container_volume 27
container_issue 6
container_start_page e70093
publishDate 2025
institution Swansea University
issn 1097-3923
1467-9779
doi_str_mv 10.1111/jpet.70093
publisher Wiley
college_str Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchytype
hierarchy_top_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_top_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchy_parent_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_parent_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
department_str School of Social Sciences - Economics{{{_:::_}}}Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences{{{_:::_}}}School of Social Sciences - Economics
document_store_str 1
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description This paper uses a Nash bargaining model for analyzing negotiations between a fishing community and a vessel over fishing quotas and wages, for a given Total Allowable Catch imposed by the regulator. The analysis considers the environmental awareness of the community and whether the entire quota allotment is being leased, to examine how environmental externalities, unrelated to fishery sustainability, affect wages, employment, and social welfare. It is argued that if the maximum number of quotas is leased to the vessel, a system of transferable fishing rights is a vehicle for pure transfer payments from the vessel to the community, in the form of higher wages and leased quota revenues. In this context, employment level and social welfare are not affected by the fishing communities' environmental consciousness. However, if less than the maximum number of quotas is leased to the vessel, both wages and revenues from leased quotas are higher, while employment is lower when the community is environmentally conscious compared to when it is not. In such case, social welfare is higher when the community is environmentally conscious provided that the inverse demand for fish does not decline too sharply relative to the rate at which marginal pollution damages increase. Finally, it is shown that the strictness of the Total Allowable Catch regulations impacts both the community's well-being and the vessel's profitability.
published_date 2025-12-31T05:34:41Z
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score 11.096068

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