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Dworkin's Morality and its Limited Implications for Law

Bebhinn Donnelly-Lazarov

Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, Volume: 25, Issue: 1, Pages: 79 - 95

Swansea University Author: Bebhinn Donnelly-Lazarov

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Abstract

In his account of adjudication, Ronald Dworkin makes the case that judicial engagement with morality is a necessary feature of legal practice and so of law itself. This paper examines the nature and implications of this claim. It argues (a) that Dworkin is concerned with a form of engagement between...

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Published in: Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence
ISSN: 0841-8209
Published: 2012
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URI: https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa7116
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last_indexed 2018-02-09T04:34:56Z
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spelling 2014-03-24T13:12:28.0983714 v2 7116 2012-02-14 Dworkin's Morality and its Limited Implications for Law 6dbd693e537ece98e6999449784e69de Bebhinn Donnelly-Lazarov Bebhinn Donnelly-Lazarov true false 2012-02-14 LLPC In his account of adjudication, Ronald Dworkin makes the case that judicial engagement with morality is a necessary feature of legal practice and so of law itself. This paper examines the nature and implications of this claim. It argues (a) that Dworkin is concerned with a form of engagement between law and morality that is insufficient to make morality count as part of law in virtue of it and (b) that the sort of engagement with morality that Dworkin identifies turns out to support only the notion that judicial acts have moral meaning or import of some sort. Dworkin’s key interpretive claim that adjudication entails offering a positive moral justification for the practice of law is undermined by the type of moral engagement he properly identifies. Journal Article Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 25 1 79 95 0841-8209 16 1 2012 2012-01-16 http://www.law.uwo.ca/research/the_canadian_journal_of_law_and_jurisprudence/2012_January.html COLLEGE NANME Legal Practice & Graduate Diploma Law COLLEGE CODE LLPC Swansea University 2014-03-24T13:12:28.0983714 2012-02-14T11:03:39.6870000 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences Hilary Rodham Clinton School of Law Bebhinn Donnelly-Lazarov 1
title Dworkin's Morality and its Limited Implications for Law
spellingShingle Dworkin's Morality and its Limited Implications for Law
Bebhinn Donnelly-Lazarov
title_short Dworkin's Morality and its Limited Implications for Law
title_full Dworkin's Morality and its Limited Implications for Law
title_fullStr Dworkin's Morality and its Limited Implications for Law
title_full_unstemmed Dworkin's Morality and its Limited Implications for Law
title_sort Dworkin's Morality and its Limited Implications for Law
author_id_str_mv 6dbd693e537ece98e6999449784e69de
author_id_fullname_str_mv 6dbd693e537ece98e6999449784e69de_***_Bebhinn Donnelly-Lazarov
author Bebhinn Donnelly-Lazarov
author2 Bebhinn Donnelly-Lazarov
format Journal article
container_title Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence
container_volume 25
container_issue 1
container_start_page 79
publishDate 2012
institution Swansea University
issn 0841-8209
college_str Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchytype
hierarchy_top_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_top_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchy_parent_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_parent_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
department_str Hilary Rodham Clinton School of Law{{{_:::_}}}Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences{{{_:::_}}}Hilary Rodham Clinton School of Law
url http://www.law.uwo.ca/research/the_canadian_journal_of_law_and_jurisprudence/2012_January.html
document_store_str 0
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description In his account of adjudication, Ronald Dworkin makes the case that judicial engagement with morality is a necessary feature of legal practice and so of law itself. This paper examines the nature and implications of this claim. It argues (a) that Dworkin is concerned with a form of engagement between law and morality that is insufficient to make morality count as part of law in virtue of it and (b) that the sort of engagement with morality that Dworkin identifies turns out to support only the notion that judicial acts have moral meaning or import of some sort. Dworkin’s key interpretive claim that adjudication entails offering a positive moral justification for the practice of law is undermined by the type of moral engagement he properly identifies.
published_date 2012-01-16T03:08:48Z
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