No Cover Image

Journal article 355 views 269 downloads

The effects of regulatory mechanism on enterprise carbon reduction policies

Xi Zhang, Qingyuan Zhu, Petr Hajek Orcid Logo, Brian Lucey, Mohammad Abedin Orcid Logo

Research in International Business and Finance, Volume: 78, Start page: 102956

Swansea University Author: Mohammad Abedin Orcid Logo

  • 69523.VOR.pdf

    PDF | Version of Record

    © 2025 The Author(s). This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons CC-BY license.

    Download (6.97MB)

Check full text

DOI (Published version): 10.1016/j.ribaf.2025.102956

Abstract

This paper aims to explore the influencing factors for the optimization of regulatory mechanisms in stimulating enterprises’ implementation of carbon reduction policies, by establishing an evolutionary game model involving government, enterprises, independent regulators (IR) and the public. Results...

Full description

Published in: Research in International Business and Finance
ISSN: 0275-5319 1878-3384
Published: Elsevier BV 2025
Online Access: Check full text

URI: https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa69523
first_indexed 2025-05-16T09:25:02Z
last_indexed 2025-06-11T08:22:46Z
id cronfa69523
recordtype SURis
fullrecord <?xml version="1.0"?><rfc1807><datestamp>2025-06-10T15:46:23.9650228</datestamp><bib-version>v2</bib-version><id>69523</id><entry>2025-05-16</entry><title>The effects of regulatory mechanism on enterprise carbon reduction policies</title><swanseaauthors><author><sid>4ed8c020eae0c9bec4f5d9495d86d415</sid><ORCID>0000-0002-4688-0619</ORCID><firstname>Mohammad</firstname><surname>Abedin</surname><name>Mohammad Abedin</name><active>true</active><ethesisStudent>false</ethesisStudent></author></swanseaauthors><date>2025-05-16</date><deptcode>CBAE</deptcode><abstract>This paper aims to explore the influencing factors for the optimization of regulatory mechanisms in stimulating enterprises&#x2019; implementation of carbon reduction policies, by establishing an evolutionary game model involving government, enterprises, independent regulators (IR) and the public. Results show that: (1) six equilibrium points exist satisfying stability criteria, including one ideal state where enterprises implement carbon reduction policies under IR supervision with the complementary force from the public, without government subsidizing. (2) Enterprises&#x2019; positive policy implementation correlates closely with reduced supervision costs and increased economic costs caused by reputational losses, and the reduction in public participation costs can promote enterprises and IR to choose the positive strategy. (3) Enhanced government financial incentives and penalties can facilitate enterprises&#x2019; carbon reduction implementation. This study evaluates multi-player cost-benefit trade-offs, providing evidenced references for the policy making to optimize the regulatory mechanism in China.</abstract><type>Journal Article</type><journal>Research in International Business and Finance</journal><volume>78</volume><journalNumber/><paginationStart>102956</paginationStart><paginationEnd/><publisher>Elsevier BV</publisher><placeOfPublication/><isbnPrint/><isbnElectronic/><issnPrint>0275-5319</issnPrint><issnElectronic>1878-3384</issnElectronic><keywords>Regulatory mechanism; Carbon reduction policies; Evolutionary game theory; The public</keywords><publishedDay>1</publishedDay><publishedMonth>6</publishedMonth><publishedYear>2025</publishedYear><publishedDate>2025-06-01</publishedDate><doi>10.1016/j.ribaf.2025.102956</doi><url/><notes/><college>COLLEGE NANME</college><department>Management School</department><CollegeCode>COLLEGE CODE</CollegeCode><DepartmentCode>CBAE</DepartmentCode><institution>Swansea University</institution><apcterm>SU Library paid the OA fee (TA Institutional Deal)</apcterm><funders>This paper was supported by the Major Program of the National Social Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 23&amp;ZD175), the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 72173096, 72303139, 71873103).</funders><projectreference/><lastEdited>2025-06-10T15:46:23.9650228</lastEdited><Created>2025-05-16T10:11:53.8596360</Created><path><level id="1">Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences</level><level id="2">School of Management - Accounting and Finance</level></path><authors><author><firstname>Xi</firstname><surname>Zhang</surname><order>1</order></author><author><firstname>Qingyuan</firstname><surname>Zhu</surname><order>2</order></author><author><firstname>Petr</firstname><surname>Hajek</surname><orcid>0000-0001-5579-1215</orcid><order>3</order></author><author><firstname>Brian</firstname><surname>Lucey</surname><order>4</order></author><author><firstname>Mohammad</firstname><surname>Abedin</surname><orcid>0000-0002-4688-0619</orcid><order>5</order></author></authors><documents><document><filename>69523__34455__6263baa79ddc47669dc17f02105f84b7.pdf</filename><originalFilename>69523.VOR.pdf</originalFilename><uploaded>2025-06-10T15:43:16.1453247</uploaded><type>Output</type><contentLength>7305305</contentLength><contentType>application/pdf</contentType><version>Version of Record</version><cronfaStatus>true</cronfaStatus><documentNotes>&#xA9; 2025 The Author(s). This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons CC-BY license.</documentNotes><copyrightCorrect>true</copyrightCorrect><language>eng</language><licence>http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/</licence></document></documents><OutputDurs/></rfc1807>
spelling 2025-06-10T15:46:23.9650228 v2 69523 2025-05-16 The effects of regulatory mechanism on enterprise carbon reduction policies 4ed8c020eae0c9bec4f5d9495d86d415 0000-0002-4688-0619 Mohammad Abedin Mohammad Abedin true false 2025-05-16 CBAE This paper aims to explore the influencing factors for the optimization of regulatory mechanisms in stimulating enterprises’ implementation of carbon reduction policies, by establishing an evolutionary game model involving government, enterprises, independent regulators (IR) and the public. Results show that: (1) six equilibrium points exist satisfying stability criteria, including one ideal state where enterprises implement carbon reduction policies under IR supervision with the complementary force from the public, without government subsidizing. (2) Enterprises’ positive policy implementation correlates closely with reduced supervision costs and increased economic costs caused by reputational losses, and the reduction in public participation costs can promote enterprises and IR to choose the positive strategy. (3) Enhanced government financial incentives and penalties can facilitate enterprises’ carbon reduction implementation. This study evaluates multi-player cost-benefit trade-offs, providing evidenced references for the policy making to optimize the regulatory mechanism in China. Journal Article Research in International Business and Finance 78 102956 Elsevier BV 0275-5319 1878-3384 Regulatory mechanism; Carbon reduction policies; Evolutionary game theory; The public 1 6 2025 2025-06-01 10.1016/j.ribaf.2025.102956 COLLEGE NANME Management School COLLEGE CODE CBAE Swansea University SU Library paid the OA fee (TA Institutional Deal) This paper was supported by the Major Program of the National Social Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 23&ZD175), the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 72173096, 72303139, 71873103). 2025-06-10T15:46:23.9650228 2025-05-16T10:11:53.8596360 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences School of Management - Accounting and Finance Xi Zhang 1 Qingyuan Zhu 2 Petr Hajek 0000-0001-5579-1215 3 Brian Lucey 4 Mohammad Abedin 0000-0002-4688-0619 5 69523__34455__6263baa79ddc47669dc17f02105f84b7.pdf 69523.VOR.pdf 2025-06-10T15:43:16.1453247 Output 7305305 application/pdf Version of Record true © 2025 The Author(s). This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons CC-BY license. true eng http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
title The effects of regulatory mechanism on enterprise carbon reduction policies
spellingShingle The effects of regulatory mechanism on enterprise carbon reduction policies
Mohammad Abedin
title_short The effects of regulatory mechanism on enterprise carbon reduction policies
title_full The effects of regulatory mechanism on enterprise carbon reduction policies
title_fullStr The effects of regulatory mechanism on enterprise carbon reduction policies
title_full_unstemmed The effects of regulatory mechanism on enterprise carbon reduction policies
title_sort The effects of regulatory mechanism on enterprise carbon reduction policies
author_id_str_mv 4ed8c020eae0c9bec4f5d9495d86d415
author_id_fullname_str_mv 4ed8c020eae0c9bec4f5d9495d86d415_***_Mohammad Abedin
author Mohammad Abedin
author2 Xi Zhang
Qingyuan Zhu
Petr Hajek
Brian Lucey
Mohammad Abedin
format Journal article
container_title Research in International Business and Finance
container_volume 78
container_start_page 102956
publishDate 2025
institution Swansea University
issn 0275-5319
1878-3384
doi_str_mv 10.1016/j.ribaf.2025.102956
publisher Elsevier BV
college_str Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchytype
hierarchy_top_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_top_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchy_parent_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_parent_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
department_str School of Management - Accounting and Finance{{{_:::_}}}Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences{{{_:::_}}}School of Management - Accounting and Finance
document_store_str 1
active_str 0
description This paper aims to explore the influencing factors for the optimization of regulatory mechanisms in stimulating enterprises’ implementation of carbon reduction policies, by establishing an evolutionary game model involving government, enterprises, independent regulators (IR) and the public. Results show that: (1) six equilibrium points exist satisfying stability criteria, including one ideal state where enterprises implement carbon reduction policies under IR supervision with the complementary force from the public, without government subsidizing. (2) Enterprises’ positive policy implementation correlates closely with reduced supervision costs and increased economic costs caused by reputational losses, and the reduction in public participation costs can promote enterprises and IR to choose the positive strategy. (3) Enhanced government financial incentives and penalties can facilitate enterprises’ carbon reduction implementation. This study evaluates multi-player cost-benefit trade-offs, providing evidenced references for the policy making to optimize the regulatory mechanism in China.
published_date 2025-06-01T05:27:10Z
_version_ 1851369592941707264
score 11.089572

Similar Items