Journal article 12 views
The individuation of mathematical objects
Synthese, Volume: 205, Start page: 6
Swansea University Author: Rob Fraser
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DOI (Published version): 10.1007/s11229-024-04814-6
Abstract
Against mathematical platonism, it is sometimes objected that mathematical objects are mysterious. One possible elaboration of this objection is that the individuation of mathematical objects cannot be adequately explained. This suggests that facts about the numerical identity and distinctness of ma...
Published in: | Synthese |
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ISSN: | 0039-7857 1573-0964 |
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Springer Nature
2024
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URI: | https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa68644 |
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2025-01-03T12:11:23.4348588 v2 68644 2025-01-03 The individuation of mathematical objects b672bd356b55dba1f5d104300a083215 0000-0002-1475-1863 Rob Fraser Rob Fraser true false 2025-01-03 SOSS Against mathematical platonism, it is sometimes objected that mathematical objects are mysterious. One possible elaboration of this objection is that the individuation of mathematical objects cannot be adequately explained. This suggests that facts about the numerical identity and distinctness of mathematical objects require an explanation, but that their supposed nature precludes us from providing one. In this paper, we evaluate this nominalist objection by exploring three ways in which mathematical objects may be individuated: by the intrinsic properties they possess, by the relations they stand in, and by their underlying 'substance'. We argue that only the third mode of individuation raises metaphysical problems that could substantiate the claim that mathematical objects are somehow mysterious. Since the platonist is under no obligation to accept this thesis over the alternatives, we conclude that, at least as far as individuation is concerned, the nominalist objection has no bite. Journal Article Synthese 205 6 Springer Nature 0039-7857 1573-0964 Identity ; Individuation; Grounding; Mathematical objects; Mathematical platonism 23 12 2024 2024-12-23 10.1007/s11229-024-04814-6 COLLEGE NANME Social Sciences School COLLEGE CODE SOSS Swansea University Another institution paid the OA fee The first author acknowledges funding from UKResearch and Innovation, under the UK government’s Horizon Europe funding guarantee, Grant/AwardNumber: EP/X026949/1. 2025-01-03T12:11:23.4348588 2025-01-03T11:58:39.9788539 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences School of Social Sciences - Politics, Philosophy and International Relations Bahram Assadian 0000-0001-9104-310X 1 Rob Fraser 0000-0002-1475-1863 2 |
title |
The individuation of mathematical objects |
spellingShingle |
The individuation of mathematical objects Rob Fraser |
title_short |
The individuation of mathematical objects |
title_full |
The individuation of mathematical objects |
title_fullStr |
The individuation of mathematical objects |
title_full_unstemmed |
The individuation of mathematical objects |
title_sort |
The individuation of mathematical objects |
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b672bd356b55dba1f5d104300a083215 |
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b672bd356b55dba1f5d104300a083215_***_Rob Fraser |
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Rob Fraser |
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Bahram Assadian Rob Fraser |
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Synthese |
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205 |
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2024 |
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Swansea University |
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0039-7857 1573-0964 |
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10.1007/s11229-024-04814-6 |
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Springer Nature |
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Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences |
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Against mathematical platonism, it is sometimes objected that mathematical objects are mysterious. One possible elaboration of this objection is that the individuation of mathematical objects cannot be adequately explained. This suggests that facts about the numerical identity and distinctness of mathematical objects require an explanation, but that their supposed nature precludes us from providing one. In this paper, we evaluate this nominalist objection by exploring three ways in which mathematical objects may be individuated: by the intrinsic properties they possess, by the relations they stand in, and by their underlying 'substance'. We argue that only the third mode of individuation raises metaphysical problems that could substantiate the claim that mathematical objects are somehow mysterious. Since the platonist is under no obligation to accept this thesis over the alternatives, we conclude that, at least as far as individuation is concerned, the nominalist objection has no bite. |
published_date |
2024-12-23T08:37:24Z |
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1821393965086146560 |
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11.048171 |