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Epistemic emotions and self-trust
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Swansea University Author: Anna Bortolan
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DOI (Published version): 10.1007/s11097-024-10010-1
Abstract
Epistemic emotions – namely affective phenomena like curiosity, certainty, and doubt – have been claimed to play a key role in epistemic evaluation and motivation, and, relatedly, to be an integral aspect of the epistemic virtues. In this paper I argue that the experience of epistemic emotions is ex...
Published in: | Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences |
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ISSN: | 1568-7759 1572-8676 |
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Springer Nature
2024
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URI: | https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa67195 |
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v2 67195 2024-07-26 Epistemic emotions and self-trust 9931f2ee5e3c744a5af4b5668a6f0f8c 0000-0002-6544-998X Anna Bortolan Anna Bortolan true false 2024-07-26 SOSS Epistemic emotions – namely affective phenomena like curiosity, certainty, and doubt – have been claimed to play a key role in epistemic evaluation and motivation, and, relatedly, to be an integral aspect of the epistemic virtues. In this paper I argue that the experience of epistemic emotions is extensively shaped by self-trust. More specifically, I claim that the set of epistemic emotions that we can undergo, and how these unfold over time, is modulated by the level of trust in one’s abilities as a knower. I do so by drawing on research on epistemic injustice, as well as through the exploration of some features of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and depression. I then argue that the connection between epistemic emotions and self-trust can be best accounted for by conceiving of self-trust, through the framework of philosophical phenomenology, as an affective background orientation which has a structuring role in our cognitive and affective experience. Journal Article Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 0 Springer Nature 1568-7759 1572-8676 Epistemic emotions, epistemic feelings, self-trust, affective background orientations 2 9 2024 2024-09-02 10.1007/s11097-024-10010-1 COLLEGE NANME Social Sciences School COLLEGE CODE SOSS Swansea University SU Library paid the OA fee (TA Institutional Deal) Swansea University 2024-09-04T14:58:04.2584832 2024-07-26T16:45:22.2511421 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences School of Social Sciences - Politics, Philosophy and International Relations Anna Bortolan 0000-0002-6544-998X 1 67195__31257__7f593d985b904460ae5812c6ac61d953.pdf 67195.VoR.pdf 2024-09-04T14:23:57.7332577 Output 926845 application/pdf Version of Record true © The Author(s) 2024. This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC-BY). true eng http://creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/ |
title |
Epistemic emotions and self-trust |
spellingShingle |
Epistemic emotions and self-trust Anna Bortolan |
title_short |
Epistemic emotions and self-trust |
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Epistemic emotions and self-trust |
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Epistemic emotions and self-trust |
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Epistemic emotions and self-trust |
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Epistemic emotions – namely affective phenomena like curiosity, certainty, and doubt – have been claimed to play a key role in epistemic evaluation and motivation, and, relatedly, to be an integral aspect of the epistemic virtues. In this paper I argue that the experience of epistemic emotions is extensively shaped by self-trust. More specifically, I claim that the set of epistemic emotions that we can undergo, and how these unfold over time, is modulated by the level of trust in one’s abilities as a knower. I do so by drawing on research on epistemic injustice, as well as through the exploration of some features of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and depression. I then argue that the connection between epistemic emotions and self-trust can be best accounted for by conceiving of self-trust, through the framework of philosophical phenomenology, as an affective background orientation which has a structuring role in our cognitive and affective experience. |
published_date |
2024-09-02T14:58:02Z |
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11.037056 |