Electoral Institutions and Intraparty Cohesion

Matakos, Konstantinos; Savolainen, Riikka; Troumpounis, Orestis; Tukiainen, Janne; Xefteris, Dimitrios

doi:10.1086/731286

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Electoral Institutions and Intraparty Cohesion

Konstantinos Matakos, Riikka Savolainen

, Orestis Troumpounis, Janne Tukiainen, Dimitrios Xefteris

Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics, Volume: 2, Issue: 4, Pages: 883 - 916

Swansea University Author: Riikka Savolainen

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DOI (Published version): 10.1086/731286

Abstract

By utilizing unique data capturing candidates’ ideological positions in Finnish municipal elections and leveraging exogenous changes in council size at different population thresholds as a proxy for electoral rule disproportionality and the expected advantage to the election winner, we identify a po...

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Published in:	Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics
ISSN:	2832-9368 2832-9376
Published:	University of Chicago Press 2024
Online Access:	Check full text
URI:	https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa65736

first_indexed	2024-04-14T17:31:42Z
last_indexed	2025-07-01T05:13:30Z
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spelling	2025-06-30T15:33:25.0116088 v2 65736 2024-03-04 Electoral Institutions and Intraparty Cohesion ebbf9320052d317dbd373b3999c398f7 0000-0002-0651-6548 Riikka Savolainen Riikka Savolainen true false 2024-03-04 SOSS By utilizing unique data capturing candidates’ ideological positions in Finnish municipal elections and leveraging exogenous changes in council size at different population thresholds as a proxy for electoral rule disproportionality and the expected advantage to the election winner, we identify a positive effect of council size on party cohesion. We propose the following mechanism: if a more diverse set of candidates is electorally appealing but less efficient in serving policy-related goals, parties face weaker incentives to maintain cohesion in institutional settings, such as smaller councils, which reward higher vote shares more generously. Journal Article Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics 2 4 883 916 University of Chicago Press 2832-9368 2832-9376 Electoral systems; ideological heterogeneity; party cohesion; proportional representation; regression discontinuity design 30 11 2024 2024-11-30 10.1086/731286 COLLEGE NANME Social Sciences School COLLEGE CODE SOSS Swansea University Another institution paid the OA fee This research is funded by the European Union (Tukiainen, European Research Council, INTRAPOL, grant 101045239). 2025-06-30T15:33:25.0116088 2024-03-04T18:18:22.9661452 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences School of Social Sciences - Economics Konstantinos Matakos 1 Riikka Savolainen 0000-0002-0651-6548 2 Orestis Troumpounis 3 Janne Tukiainen 4 Dimitrios Xefteris 5 65736__32824__497c2be4a9ce4be4ad0a0f7a247b2f88.pdf 65736.VOR.pdf 2024-11-01T15:39:28.8688832 Output 575360 application/pdf Version of Record true © 2024 The University of Chicago. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0), which permits non-commercial reuse of the work with attribution. true eng https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
title	Electoral Institutions and Intraparty Cohesion
spellingShingle	Electoral Institutions and Intraparty Cohesion Riikka Savolainen
title_short	Electoral Institutions and Intraparty Cohesion
title_full	Electoral Institutions and Intraparty Cohesion
title_fullStr	Electoral Institutions and Intraparty Cohesion
title_full_unstemmed	Electoral Institutions and Intraparty Cohesion
title_sort	Electoral Institutions and Intraparty Cohesion
author_id_str_mv	ebbf9320052d317dbd373b3999c398f7
author_id_fullname_str_mv	ebbf9320052d317dbd373b3999c398f7_***_Riikka Savolainen
author	Riikka Savolainen
author2	Konstantinos Matakos Riikka Savolainen Orestis Troumpounis Janne Tukiainen Dimitrios Xefteris
format	Journal article
container_title	Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics
container_volume	2
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container_start_page	883
publishDate	2024
institution	Swansea University
issn	2832-9368 2832-9376
doi_str_mv	10.1086/731286
publisher	University of Chicago Press
college_str	Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
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hierarchy_parent_title	Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
department_str	School of Social Sciences - Economics{{{_:::_}}}Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences{{{_:::_}}}School of Social Sciences - Economics
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description	By utilizing unique data capturing candidates’ ideological positions in Finnish municipal elections and leveraging exogenous changes in council size at different population thresholds as a proxy for electoral rule disproportionality and the expected advantage to the election winner, we identify a positive effect of council size on party cohesion. We propose the following mechanism: if a more diverse set of candidates is electorally appealing but less efficient in serving policy-related goals, parties face weaker incentives to maintain cohesion in institutional settings, such as smaller councils, which reward higher vote shares more generously.
published_date	2024-11-30T06:37:33Z
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Electoral Institutions and Intraparty Cohesion

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