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The British Labour Government and the development of Chevaline, 1974–79

Kris Stoddart Orcid Logo

Cold War History, Volume: 10, Issue: 3, Pages: 287 - 314

Swansea University Author: Kris Stoddart Orcid Logo

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DOI (Published version): 10.1080/14682741003679375

Abstract

Between 1974 and 1979 the British Labour Government, led first by Harold Wilson and then by James Callaghan, developed a programme of improvements to the British Polaris Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) system initiated during Wilson's first government between 1964 and 1970. This Pol...

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Published in: Cold War History
ISSN: 1468-2745 1743-7962
Published: Informa UK Limited 2010
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URI: https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa57345
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first_indexed 2021-07-20T10:18:46Z
last_indexed 2021-07-21T03:21:36Z
id cronfa57345
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spelling 2021-07-20T11:18:49.0117915 v2 57345 2021-07-15 The British Labour Government and the development of Chevaline, 1974–79 b794dd4728d670a0bc8584c634b74426 0000-0003-4996-6482 Kris Stoddart Kris Stoddart true false 2021-07-15 CSSP Between 1974 and 1979 the British Labour Government, led first by Harold Wilson and then by James Callaghan, developed a programme of improvements to the British Polaris Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) system initiated during Wilson's first government between 1964 and 1970. This Polaris improvement programme was known from 1974 onwards as Chevaline. Chevaline offered Britain an indigenous solution to meet the ‘Moscow Criterion’ – the requirement that British strategic missiles had to be capable of penetrating Moscow's ‘Galosh’ Anti-Ballistic missile defence system (ABM) even in the absence of US support. This came during a time of economic austerity in a changing strategic environment which led Labour to explore nuclear cooperation with the French. It also led to calls from within the party to renounce nuclear weapons through unilateral disarmament. This article will shed fresh light on the bitter internal debates that ensued and how a select band of senior ministers responded to this dilemma. Journal Article Cold War History 10 3 287 314 Informa UK Limited 1468-2745 1743-7962 1 8 2010 2010-08-01 10.1080/14682741003679375 COLLEGE NANME Criminology, Sociology and Social Policy COLLEGE CODE CSSP Swansea University 2021-07-20T11:18:49.0117915 2021-07-15T13:23:30.7351281 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences School of Social Sciences - Criminology, Sociology and Social Policy Kris Stoddart 0000-0003-4996-6482 1
title The British Labour Government and the development of Chevaline, 1974–79
spellingShingle The British Labour Government and the development of Chevaline, 1974–79
Kris Stoddart
title_short The British Labour Government and the development of Chevaline, 1974–79
title_full The British Labour Government and the development of Chevaline, 1974–79
title_fullStr The British Labour Government and the development of Chevaline, 1974–79
title_full_unstemmed The British Labour Government and the development of Chevaline, 1974–79
title_sort The British Labour Government and the development of Chevaline, 1974–79
author_id_str_mv b794dd4728d670a0bc8584c634b74426
author_id_fullname_str_mv b794dd4728d670a0bc8584c634b74426_***_Kris Stoddart
author Kris Stoddart
author2 Kris Stoddart
format Journal article
container_title Cold War History
container_volume 10
container_issue 3
container_start_page 287
publishDate 2010
institution Swansea University
issn 1468-2745
1743-7962
doi_str_mv 10.1080/14682741003679375
publisher Informa UK Limited
college_str Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchytype
hierarchy_top_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_top_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchy_parent_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_parent_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
department_str School of Social Sciences - Criminology, Sociology and Social Policy{{{_:::_}}}Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences{{{_:::_}}}School of Social Sciences - Criminology, Sociology and Social Policy
document_store_str 0
active_str 0
description Between 1974 and 1979 the British Labour Government, led first by Harold Wilson and then by James Callaghan, developed a programme of improvements to the British Polaris Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) system initiated during Wilson's first government between 1964 and 1970. This Polaris improvement programme was known from 1974 onwards as Chevaline. Chevaline offered Britain an indigenous solution to meet the ‘Moscow Criterion’ – the requirement that British strategic missiles had to be capable of penetrating Moscow's ‘Galosh’ Anti-Ballistic missile defence system (ABM) even in the absence of US support. This came during a time of economic austerity in a changing strategic environment which led Labour to explore nuclear cooperation with the French. It also led to calls from within the party to renounce nuclear weapons through unilateral disarmament. This article will shed fresh light on the bitter internal debates that ensued and how a select band of senior ministers responded to this dilemma.
published_date 2010-08-01T04:13:01Z
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score 11.017731

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