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Analysis of IoT-Based Load Altering Attacks Against Power Grids Using the Theory of Second-Order Dynamical Systems

Subhash Lakshminarayana, Sondipon Adhikari, Carsten Maple

IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, Volume: 12, Issue: 5, Pages: 4415 - 4425

Swansea University Author: Sondipon Adhikari

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DOI (Published version): 10.1109/tsg.2021.3070313

Abstract

Recent research has shown that large-scale Internet of Things (IoT)-based load altering attacks can have a serious impact on power grid operations such as causing unsafe frequency excursions and destabilizing the grid’s control loops. In this work, we present an analytical framework to investigate t...

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Published in: IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
ISSN: 1949-3053 1949-3061
Published: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 2021
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URI: https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa56703
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first_indexed 2021-04-20T07:47:15Z
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spelling 2021-09-23T11:55:59.7698569 v2 56703 2021-04-20 Analysis of IoT-Based Load Altering Attacks Against Power Grids Using the Theory of Second-Order Dynamical Systems 4ea84d67c4e414f5ccbd7593a40f04d3 Sondipon Adhikari Sondipon Adhikari true false 2021-04-20 FGSEN Recent research has shown that large-scale Internet of Things (IoT)-based load altering attacks can have a serious impact on power grid operations such as causing unsafe frequency excursions and destabilizing the grid’s control loops. In this work, we present an analytical framework to investigate the impact of IoT-based static/dynamic load altering attacks (S/DLAAs) on the power grid’s dynamic response. Existing work on this topic has mainly relied on numerical simulations and, to date, there is no analytical framework to identify the victim nodes from which that attacker can launch the most impactful attacks. To address these shortcomings, we use results from second-order dynamical systems to analyze the power grid frequency control loop under S/DLAAs. We use parametric sensitivity of the system’s eigensolutions to identify victim nodes that correspond to the least-effort destabilizing DLAAs. Further, to analyze the SLAAs, we present closed-form expression for the system’s frequency response in terms of the attacker’s inputs, helping us characterize the minimum load change required to cause unsafe frequency excursions. Using these results, we formulate the defense against S/DLAAs as a linear programming problem in which we determine the minimum amount of load that needs to be secured at the victim nodes to ensure system safety/stability. Extensive simulations conducted using benchmark IEEE-bus systems validate the accuracy and efficacy of our approach. Journal Article IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid 12 5 4415 4425 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 1949-3053 1949-3061 1 9 2021 2021-09-01 10.1109/tsg.2021.3070313 COLLEGE NANME Science and Engineering - Faculty COLLEGE CODE FGSEN Swansea University 2021-09-23T11:55:59.7698569 2021-04-20T08:44:20.6134107 Faculty of Science and Engineering School of Engineering and Applied Sciences - Uncategorised Subhash Lakshminarayana 1 Sondipon Adhikari 2 Carsten Maple 3
title Analysis of IoT-Based Load Altering Attacks Against Power Grids Using the Theory of Second-Order Dynamical Systems
spellingShingle Analysis of IoT-Based Load Altering Attacks Against Power Grids Using the Theory of Second-Order Dynamical Systems
Sondipon Adhikari
title_short Analysis of IoT-Based Load Altering Attacks Against Power Grids Using the Theory of Second-Order Dynamical Systems
title_full Analysis of IoT-Based Load Altering Attacks Against Power Grids Using the Theory of Second-Order Dynamical Systems
title_fullStr Analysis of IoT-Based Load Altering Attacks Against Power Grids Using the Theory of Second-Order Dynamical Systems
title_full_unstemmed Analysis of IoT-Based Load Altering Attacks Against Power Grids Using the Theory of Second-Order Dynamical Systems
title_sort Analysis of IoT-Based Load Altering Attacks Against Power Grids Using the Theory of Second-Order Dynamical Systems
author_id_str_mv 4ea84d67c4e414f5ccbd7593a40f04d3
author_id_fullname_str_mv 4ea84d67c4e414f5ccbd7593a40f04d3_***_Sondipon Adhikari
author Sondipon Adhikari
author2 Subhash Lakshminarayana
Sondipon Adhikari
Carsten Maple
format Journal article
container_title IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
container_volume 12
container_issue 5
container_start_page 4415
publishDate 2021
institution Swansea University
issn 1949-3053
1949-3061
doi_str_mv 10.1109/tsg.2021.3070313
publisher Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
college_str Faculty of Science and Engineering
hierarchytype
hierarchy_top_id facultyofscienceandengineering
hierarchy_top_title Faculty of Science and Engineering
hierarchy_parent_id facultyofscienceandengineering
hierarchy_parent_title Faculty of Science and Engineering
department_str School of Engineering and Applied Sciences - Uncategorised{{{_:::_}}}Faculty of Science and Engineering{{{_:::_}}}School of Engineering and Applied Sciences - Uncategorised
document_store_str 0
active_str 0
description Recent research has shown that large-scale Internet of Things (IoT)-based load altering attacks can have a serious impact on power grid operations such as causing unsafe frequency excursions and destabilizing the grid’s control loops. In this work, we present an analytical framework to investigate the impact of IoT-based static/dynamic load altering attacks (S/DLAAs) on the power grid’s dynamic response. Existing work on this topic has mainly relied on numerical simulations and, to date, there is no analytical framework to identify the victim nodes from which that attacker can launch the most impactful attacks. To address these shortcomings, we use results from second-order dynamical systems to analyze the power grid frequency control loop under S/DLAAs. We use parametric sensitivity of the system’s eigensolutions to identify victim nodes that correspond to the least-effort destabilizing DLAAs. Further, to analyze the SLAAs, we present closed-form expression for the system’s frequency response in terms of the attacker’s inputs, helping us characterize the minimum load change required to cause unsafe frequency excursions. Using these results, we formulate the defense against S/DLAAs as a linear programming problem in which we determine the minimum amount of load that needs to be secured at the victim nodes to ensure system safety/stability. Extensive simulations conducted using benchmark IEEE-bus systems validate the accuracy and efficacy of our approach.
published_date 2021-09-01T04:11:51Z
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score 11.012924

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