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Recognition and social freedom

Paddy McQueen Orcid Logo

European Journal of Political Theory, Volume: 21, Issue: 1, Pages: 89 - 110

Swansea University Author: Paddy McQueen Orcid Logo

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DOI (Published version): 10.1177/1474885119871856

Abstract

In this paper I develop an account of social freedom grounded in intersubjective recognition, which I term the “normative authorisation” account. According to this model, a person enjoys social freedom if she is recognised as a discursive equal who can engage in justificatory dialogue with other soc...

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Published in: European Journal of Political Theory
ISSN: 1474-8851 1741-2730
Published: SAGE Publications 2022
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URI: https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa52051
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last_indexed 2024-11-14T12:02:37Z
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spelling 2024-09-24T10:13:21.6182320 v2 52051 2019-09-24 Recognition and social freedom 4e2ee88771eac4a88ad1bc294afec919 0000-0001-9696-8654 Paddy McQueen Paddy McQueen true false 2019-09-24 SOSS In this paper I develop an account of social freedom grounded in intersubjective recognition, which I term the “normative authorisation” account. According to this model, a person enjoys social freedom if she is recognised as a discursive equal who can engage in justificatory dialogue with other social agents about the appropriateness of her reasons for action. I contrast this with Axel Honneth’s theory of social freedom, which I label the “self-realisation” account. Within this model, the affirmative recognition of others is required in order to achieve a positive relation-to-self and hence freedom. I highlight several issues with this account, which challenge the relationship Honneth draws between social recognition and freedom. I demonstrate that the normative authorisation account avoids these problems. I also show how it captures some basic features of our everyday, normative interactions. Finally, I suggest that the account fits well with recent work on epistemic injustice. Specifically, it shows that establishing the social conditions of freedom requires ensuring epistemically-just social relations. In sum, the normative authorisation account is an explanatorily powerful, inclusive theory of social freedom that fits well with wider accounts of justice and freedom. It represents the most promising way of construing social freedom in terms of interpersonal recognition. Journal Article European Journal of Political Theory 21 1 89 110 SAGE Publications 1474-8851 1741-2730 Axel Honneth; recognition; relational autonomy; Robert Pippin; social freedom 1 1 2022 2022-01-01 10.1177/1474885119871856 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1474885119871856 COLLEGE NANME Social Sciences School COLLEGE CODE SOSS Swansea University 2024-09-24T10:13:21.6182320 2019-09-24T08:19:08.4322280 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences Paddy McQueen 0000-0001-9696-8654 1 0052051-08102019170644.pdf 52051.pdf 2019-10-08T17:06:44.9770000 Output 137045 application/pdf Accepted Manuscript true 2019-10-07T00:00:00.0000000 true eng 55 Claire Burnes 0000-0001-7381-7845 claire.burnes@Swansea.ac.uk
title Recognition and social freedom
spellingShingle Recognition and social freedom
Paddy McQueen
title_short Recognition and social freedom
title_full Recognition and social freedom
title_fullStr Recognition and social freedom
title_full_unstemmed Recognition and social freedom
title_sort Recognition and social freedom
author_id_str_mv 4e2ee88771eac4a88ad1bc294afec919
author_id_fullname_str_mv 4e2ee88771eac4a88ad1bc294afec919_***_Paddy McQueen
author Paddy McQueen
author2 Paddy McQueen
format Journal article
container_title European Journal of Political Theory
container_volume 21
container_issue 1
container_start_page 89
publishDate 2022
institution Swansea University
issn 1474-8851
1741-2730
doi_str_mv 10.1177/1474885119871856
publisher SAGE Publications
college_str Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchytype
hierarchy_top_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_top_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchy_parent_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_parent_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1474885119871856
document_store_str 1
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description In this paper I develop an account of social freedom grounded in intersubjective recognition, which I term the “normative authorisation” account. According to this model, a person enjoys social freedom if she is recognised as a discursive equal who can engage in justificatory dialogue with other social agents about the appropriateness of her reasons for action. I contrast this with Axel Honneth’s theory of social freedom, which I label the “self-realisation” account. Within this model, the affirmative recognition of others is required in order to achieve a positive relation-to-self and hence freedom. I highlight several issues with this account, which challenge the relationship Honneth draws between social recognition and freedom. I demonstrate that the normative authorisation account avoids these problems. I also show how it captures some basic features of our everyday, normative interactions. Finally, I suggest that the account fits well with recent work on epistemic injustice. Specifically, it shows that establishing the social conditions of freedom requires ensuring epistemically-just social relations. In sum, the normative authorisation account is an explanatorily powerful, inclusive theory of social freedom that fits well with wider accounts of justice and freedom. It represents the most promising way of construing social freedom in terms of interpersonal recognition.
published_date 2022-01-01T13:55:08Z
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