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From parliamentary pay to party funding: The acceptability of informal institutions in advanced democracies

Nicole Bolleyer, Siim Trumm Orcid Logo

European Journal of Political Research, Volume: 53, Issue: 4, Pages: 784 - 802

Swansea University Author: Siim Trumm Orcid Logo

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DOI (Published version): 10.1111/1475-6765.12051

Abstract

While direct state funding of political parties has been a prominent theme in cross-national research over the last decade, we still know little about party strategies to access state resources that are not explicitly earmarked for partisan usage. This paper looks at one widespread but often overloo...

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Published in: European Journal of Political Research
Published: 2014
URI: https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa23320
first_indexed 2015-09-16T02:08:37Z
last_indexed 2018-02-09T05:02:01Z
id cronfa23320
recordtype SURis
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spelling 2016-04-16T19:46:23.8213797 v2 23320 2015-09-15 From parliamentary pay to party funding: The acceptability of informal institutions in advanced democracies c1a51e60fa144fc233c7e44771c772f6 0000-0002-2508-3346 Siim Trumm Siim Trumm true false 2015-09-15 SOSS While direct state funding of political parties has been a prominent theme in cross-national research over the last decade, we still know little about party strategies to access state resources that are not explicitly earmarked for partisan usage. This paper looks at one widespread but often overlooked informal party practice: the ‘taxing’ of MP salaries, i.e., the regular transfer of fixed salary shares to party coffers. Building on notions of informal institutions developed in work on new democracies, our theoretical approach specifies factors that shape the acceptability of this legally non-enforceable intra-organizational practice. It is tested through a selection model applied to a unique data set covering 124 parties across 19 advanced democracies. Controlling for a range of party- and institutional-level variables, we find that the presence of a taxing rule and the collection of demanding tax shares are more common in leftist parties (high internal acceptability) and in systems in which the penetration of state institutions by political parties is intense (high external acceptability). Journal Article European Journal of Political Research 53 4 784 802 Informal institutions, party funding, parliamentary salaries, party-state relations 31 12 2014 2014-12-31 10.1111/1475-6765.12051 COLLEGE NANME Social Sciences School COLLEGE CODE SOSS Swansea University 2016-04-16T19:46:23.8213797 2015-09-15T16:35:50.9968683 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences School of Culture and Communication - Politics, Philosophy and International Relations Nicole Bolleyer 1 Siim Trumm 0000-0002-2508-3346 2
title From parliamentary pay to party funding: The acceptability of informal institutions in advanced democracies
spellingShingle From parliamentary pay to party funding: The acceptability of informal institutions in advanced democracies
Siim Trumm
title_short From parliamentary pay to party funding: The acceptability of informal institutions in advanced democracies
title_full From parliamentary pay to party funding: The acceptability of informal institutions in advanced democracies
title_fullStr From parliamentary pay to party funding: The acceptability of informal institutions in advanced democracies
title_full_unstemmed From parliamentary pay to party funding: The acceptability of informal institutions in advanced democracies
title_sort From parliamentary pay to party funding: The acceptability of informal institutions in advanced democracies
author_id_str_mv c1a51e60fa144fc233c7e44771c772f6
author_id_fullname_str_mv c1a51e60fa144fc233c7e44771c772f6_***_Siim Trumm
author Siim Trumm
author2 Nicole Bolleyer
Siim Trumm
format Journal article
container_title European Journal of Political Research
container_volume 53
container_issue 4
container_start_page 784
publishDate 2014
institution Swansea University
doi_str_mv 10.1111/1475-6765.12051
college_str Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchytype
hierarchy_top_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_top_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchy_parent_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_parent_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
department_str School of Culture and Communication - Politics, Philosophy and International Relations{{{_:::_}}}Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences{{{_:::_}}}School of Culture and Communication - Politics, Philosophy and International Relations
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description While direct state funding of political parties has been a prominent theme in cross-national research over the last decade, we still know little about party strategies to access state resources that are not explicitly earmarked for partisan usage. This paper looks at one widespread but often overlooked informal party practice: the ‘taxing’ of MP salaries, i.e., the regular transfer of fixed salary shares to party coffers. Building on notions of informal institutions developed in work on new democracies, our theoretical approach specifies factors that shape the acceptability of this legally non-enforceable intra-organizational practice. It is tested through a selection model applied to a unique data set covering 124 parties across 19 advanced democracies. Controlling for a range of party- and institutional-level variables, we find that the presence of a taxing rule and the collection of demanding tax shares are more common in leftist parties (high internal acceptability) and in systems in which the penetration of state institutions by political parties is intense (high external acceptability).
published_date 2014-12-31T06:45:29Z
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