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Unconscious inhibition separates two forms of cognitive control

F. Boy, M. Husain, P. Sumner, Frederic Boy Orcid Logo

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Volume: 107, Issue: 24, Pages: 11134 - 11139

Swansea University Author: Frederic Boy Orcid Logo

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DOI (Published version): 10.1073/pnas.1001925107

Abstract

In the human brain, cognitive-control processes are generally consid- ered distinct from the unconscious mechanisms elicited by subliminal priming. Here, we show that cognitive control engaged in situations of response con!ict interacts with the negative (inhibitory) phase of subliminal priming. Thu...

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Published in: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
ISSN: 0027-8424 1091-6490
Published: 2010
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URI: https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa13374
first_indexed 2013-07-23T12:10:05Z
last_indexed 2018-02-09T04:44:04Z
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spelling 2015-06-16T12:44:50.4498392 v2 13374 2012-11-27 Unconscious inhibition separates two forms of cognitive control 43e704698d5dbbac3734b7cd0fef60aa 0000-0003-1373-6634 Frederic Boy Frederic Boy true false 2012-11-27 CBAE In the human brain, cognitive-control processes are generally consid- ered distinct from the unconscious mechanisms elicited by subliminal priming. Here, we show that cognitive control engaged in situations of response con!ict interacts with the negative (inhibitory) phase of subliminal priming. Thus, cognitive control may surprisingly share common processes with nonconscious brain mechanisms. In contrast, our "ndings reveal that subliminal inhibition does not, however, interact with control adaptation—the supposed modulation of cur- rent control settings by previous experience of con!ict. Therefore, although in!uential models have grouped immediate cognitive con- trol and control adaptation together as products of the same con!ict detection and control network, their relationship to subliminal inhi- bition separates them. Overall, these results suggest that the impor- tant distinction lies not between cognitive or top-down processes on the one hand and nonconscious priming mechanisms on the other hand but between responsive (poststimulus) mechanisms that deal with sensorimotor activation after it has occurred and preparatory (prestimulus) mechanisms that are modulated before stimulus arrival. Journal Article Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107 24 11134 11139 0027-8424 1091-6490 Cognitive interference, Automatic processes 31 12 2010 2010-12-31 10.1073/pnas.1001925107 COLLEGE NANME Management School COLLEGE CODE CBAE Swansea University 2015-06-16T12:44:50.4498392 2012-11-27T10:02:45.3773750 Faculty of Medicine, Health and Life Sciences School of Psychology F. Boy 1 M. Husain 2 P. Sumner 3 Frederic Boy 0000-0003-1373-6634 4
title Unconscious inhibition separates two forms of cognitive control
spellingShingle Unconscious inhibition separates two forms of cognitive control
Frederic Boy
title_short Unconscious inhibition separates two forms of cognitive control
title_full Unconscious inhibition separates two forms of cognitive control
title_fullStr Unconscious inhibition separates two forms of cognitive control
title_full_unstemmed Unconscious inhibition separates two forms of cognitive control
title_sort Unconscious inhibition separates two forms of cognitive control
author_id_str_mv 43e704698d5dbbac3734b7cd0fef60aa
author_id_fullname_str_mv 43e704698d5dbbac3734b7cd0fef60aa_***_Frederic Boy
author Frederic Boy
author2 F. Boy
M. Husain
P. Sumner
Frederic Boy
format Journal article
container_title Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
container_volume 107
container_issue 24
container_start_page 11134
publishDate 2010
institution Swansea University
issn 0027-8424
1091-6490
doi_str_mv 10.1073/pnas.1001925107
college_str Faculty of Medicine, Health and Life Sciences
hierarchytype
hierarchy_top_id facultyofmedicinehealthandlifesciences
hierarchy_top_title Faculty of Medicine, Health and Life Sciences
hierarchy_parent_id facultyofmedicinehealthandlifesciences
hierarchy_parent_title Faculty of Medicine, Health and Life Sciences
department_str School of Psychology{{{_:::_}}}Faculty of Medicine, Health and Life Sciences{{{_:::_}}}School of Psychology
document_store_str 0
active_str 0
description In the human brain, cognitive-control processes are generally consid- ered distinct from the unconscious mechanisms elicited by subliminal priming. Here, we show that cognitive control engaged in situations of response con!ict interacts with the negative (inhibitory) phase of subliminal priming. Thus, cognitive control may surprisingly share common processes with nonconscious brain mechanisms. In contrast, our "ndings reveal that subliminal inhibition does not, however, interact with control adaptation—the supposed modulation of cur- rent control settings by previous experience of con!ict. Therefore, although in!uential models have grouped immediate cognitive con- trol and control adaptation together as products of the same con!ict detection and control network, their relationship to subliminal inhi- bition separates them. Overall, these results suggest that the impor- tant distinction lies not between cognitive or top-down processes on the one hand and nonconscious priming mechanisms on the other hand but between responsive (poststimulus) mechanisms that deal with sensorimotor activation after it has occurred and preparatory (prestimulus) mechanisms that are modulated before stimulus arrival.
published_date 2010-12-31T07:40:01Z
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