No Cover Image

Journal article 1600 views

Rethinking the Eastward Extension of the EU Civil Order and the Nature of Europe's New East–West Divide

Robert Bideleux

Perspectives on European Politics and Society, Volume: 10, Issue: 1, Pages: 118 - 136

Swansea University Author: Robert Bideleux

Full text not available from this repository: check for access using links below.

Check full text

DOI (Published version): 10.1080/15705850802700066

Abstract

This article begins by arguing that the major benefits of the ongoing eastward enlargement of the European Union (EU) have accrued, not from direct redistributive transfers of income or wealth, but rather through the ‘game-changing’ impact of the recurrently expanding EU on the conduct of political,...

Full description

Published in: Perspectives on European Politics and Society
ISSN: 1570-5854 1568-0258
Published: Abingdon Taylor & Francis 2009
Online Access: Check full text

URI: https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa11324
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
first_indexed 2013-07-23T12:05:23Z
last_indexed 2019-08-23T13:27:53Z
id cronfa11324
recordtype SURis
fullrecord <?xml version="1.0"?><rfc1807><datestamp>2019-08-23T11:23:26.7821081</datestamp><bib-version>v2</bib-version><id>11324</id><entry>2012-06-14</entry><title>Rethinking the Eastward Extension of the EU Civil Order and the Nature of Europe's New East&#x2013;West Divide</title><swanseaauthors><author><sid>c3b880aac6e4c2a1536185702a45d443</sid><firstname>Robert</firstname><surname>Bideleux</surname><name>Robert Bideleux</name><active>true</active><ethesisStudent>false</ethesisStudent></author></swanseaauthors><date>2012-06-14</date><deptcode>FGHSS</deptcode><abstract>This article begins by arguing that the major benefits of the ongoing eastward enlargement of the European Union (EU) have accrued, not from direct redistributive transfers of income or wealth, but rather through the &#x2018;game-changing&#x2019; impact of the recurrently expanding EU on the conduct of political, economic and social life in new and prospective member countries, primarily as a result of their joining a supranational civil order and &#x2018;civil association&#x2019; in which decision-making, policy-making, governance and even relations between states rest increasingly upon the rule of law and largely consensual negotiations between governing elites. The article then goes on to argue that the papable unreadiness and unsuitability of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine and other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) for membership of the EU need not be explained by falling back on highly questionable allegations that they have been sundered from their Western and Central European neighbours by intractable cultural/civilisational differences, and that this somehow makes them in certain &#x2018;essentialist&#x2019; ways &#x2018;less European&#x2019; or &#x2018;less civilized&#x2019; than Western and Central Europe (the home of the Holocaust, lest we forget). Instead, it is argued that the evident unreadiness and unsuitability of the CIS countries for EU membership is primarily a consequence of situational factors, above all the still largely unchecked, unmitigated and profoundly entrenched (albeit not wholly unchallengeable) &#x2018;verticality&#x2019; of power-structures and power-relations in the CIS polities, economies and societies. In Western and Central Europe, conversely, the emergence and recurrent deepening and expansion of the EU has helped to foster and entrench increasingly powerful horizontal power-structures, power-relations and &#x2018;level-playing fields&#x2019; (most conspicuously the Single Market and the extensive and elaborate system of EU law), which powerfully counteract or counterbalance Western and Central Europe&#x2019;s still strong &#x2018;vertical&#x2019; power-structures and the &#x2018;vertical&#x2019; power-relations which they sustain. To be sure, powerful &#x2018;vertical&#x2019; hierarchical power-structures and power-relations exist in the EU as well as in the CIS, but in the CIS they are not (yet) strongly counterbalanced and counteracted by the increasingly powerful and entrenched horizontal power-structures and &#x2018;level-playing fields&#x2019; promoted by the EU countries. Consequently, the fact that Europe&#x2019;s Cold War East-West divide has not (yet) been completely abolished or transcended, but has merely been replaced by a new East-West divide lying a bit further East than before, does not have to be treated as unassailable evidence or &#x2018;proof&#x2019; of the existence of seemingly intractable &#x2018;essential&#x2019; differences between these conspicuously contrasting zones of Europe, nor as justifications for implicitly fatalistic latter-day versions of Western and Central European &#x2018;Orientalism&#x2019; vis-&#xE0;-vis the CIS countries. After all, most of East Central Europe and the Balkans appears to have been successfully (albeit not completely irreversibly) &#x2018;brought in from the cold&#x2019;. Thus there are solid grounds for believing that Europe&#x2019;s new East-West divide can be continually challenged and eventually surmounted by ceaseless concerted efforts to keep on changing or &#x2018;reforming&#x2019; the powerful structures of incentives, opportunities and penalties which govern political, social and economic conduct and inter-state relations in post-Cold War Europe, strongly helped by the vast disparity in income and wealth between the EU countries and the CIS.</abstract><type>Journal Article</type><journal>Perspectives on European Politics and Society</journal><volume>10</volume><journalNumber>1</journalNumber><paginationStart>118</paginationStart><paginationEnd>136</paginationEnd><publisher>Taylor &amp; Francis</publisher><placeOfPublication>Abingdon</placeOfPublication><issnPrint>1570-5854</issnPrint><issnElectronic>1568-0258</issnElectronic><keywords>European Union, Eastward enlargement, supranational civil order, civil association, East-West divide, essentialism, Orientalism</keywords><publishedDay>30</publishedDay><publishedMonth>4</publishedMonth><publishedYear>2009</publishedYear><publishedDate>2009-04-30</publishedDate><doi>10.1080/15705850802700066</doi><url>https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15705850802700066</url><notes></notes><college>COLLEGE NANME</college><department>Humanities and Social Sciences - Faculty</department><CollegeCode>COLLEGE CODE</CollegeCode><DepartmentCode>FGHSS</DepartmentCode><institution>Swansea University</institution><apcterm/><lastEdited>2019-08-23T11:23:26.7821081</lastEdited><Created>2012-06-14T15:38:35.2328599</Created><path><level id="1">Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences</level><level id="2">School of Culture and Communication - Politics, Philosophy and International Relations</level></path><authors><author><firstname>Robert</firstname><surname>Bideleux</surname><order>1</order></author></authors><documents/><OutputDurs/></rfc1807>
spelling 2019-08-23T11:23:26.7821081 v2 11324 2012-06-14 Rethinking the Eastward Extension of the EU Civil Order and the Nature of Europe's New East–West Divide c3b880aac6e4c2a1536185702a45d443 Robert Bideleux Robert Bideleux true false 2012-06-14 FGHSS This article begins by arguing that the major benefits of the ongoing eastward enlargement of the European Union (EU) have accrued, not from direct redistributive transfers of income or wealth, but rather through the ‘game-changing’ impact of the recurrently expanding EU on the conduct of political, economic and social life in new and prospective member countries, primarily as a result of their joining a supranational civil order and ‘civil association’ in which decision-making, policy-making, governance and even relations between states rest increasingly upon the rule of law and largely consensual negotiations between governing elites. The article then goes on to argue that the papable unreadiness and unsuitability of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine and other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) for membership of the EU need not be explained by falling back on highly questionable allegations that they have been sundered from their Western and Central European neighbours by intractable cultural/civilisational differences, and that this somehow makes them in certain ‘essentialist’ ways ‘less European’ or ‘less civilized’ than Western and Central Europe (the home of the Holocaust, lest we forget). Instead, it is argued that the evident unreadiness and unsuitability of the CIS countries for EU membership is primarily a consequence of situational factors, above all the still largely unchecked, unmitigated and profoundly entrenched (albeit not wholly unchallengeable) ‘verticality’ of power-structures and power-relations in the CIS polities, economies and societies. In Western and Central Europe, conversely, the emergence and recurrent deepening and expansion of the EU has helped to foster and entrench increasingly powerful horizontal power-structures, power-relations and ‘level-playing fields’ (most conspicuously the Single Market and the extensive and elaborate system of EU law), which powerfully counteract or counterbalance Western and Central Europe’s still strong ‘vertical’ power-structures and the ‘vertical’ power-relations which they sustain. To be sure, powerful ‘vertical’ hierarchical power-structures and power-relations exist in the EU as well as in the CIS, but in the CIS they are not (yet) strongly counterbalanced and counteracted by the increasingly powerful and entrenched horizontal power-structures and ‘level-playing fields’ promoted by the EU countries. Consequently, the fact that Europe’s Cold War East-West divide has not (yet) been completely abolished or transcended, but has merely been replaced by a new East-West divide lying a bit further East than before, does not have to be treated as unassailable evidence or ‘proof’ of the existence of seemingly intractable ‘essential’ differences between these conspicuously contrasting zones of Europe, nor as justifications for implicitly fatalistic latter-day versions of Western and Central European ‘Orientalism’ vis-à-vis the CIS countries. After all, most of East Central Europe and the Balkans appears to have been successfully (albeit not completely irreversibly) ‘brought in from the cold’. Thus there are solid grounds for believing that Europe’s new East-West divide can be continually challenged and eventually surmounted by ceaseless concerted efforts to keep on changing or ‘reforming’ the powerful structures of incentives, opportunities and penalties which govern political, social and economic conduct and inter-state relations in post-Cold War Europe, strongly helped by the vast disparity in income and wealth between the EU countries and the CIS. Journal Article Perspectives on European Politics and Society 10 1 118 136 Taylor & Francis Abingdon 1570-5854 1568-0258 European Union, Eastward enlargement, supranational civil order, civil association, East-West divide, essentialism, Orientalism 30 4 2009 2009-04-30 10.1080/15705850802700066 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15705850802700066 COLLEGE NANME Humanities and Social Sciences - Faculty COLLEGE CODE FGHSS Swansea University 2019-08-23T11:23:26.7821081 2012-06-14T15:38:35.2328599 Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences School of Culture and Communication - Politics, Philosophy and International Relations Robert Bideleux 1
title Rethinking the Eastward Extension of the EU Civil Order and the Nature of Europe's New East–West Divide
spellingShingle Rethinking the Eastward Extension of the EU Civil Order and the Nature of Europe's New East–West Divide
Robert Bideleux
title_short Rethinking the Eastward Extension of the EU Civil Order and the Nature of Europe's New East–West Divide
title_full Rethinking the Eastward Extension of the EU Civil Order and the Nature of Europe's New East–West Divide
title_fullStr Rethinking the Eastward Extension of the EU Civil Order and the Nature of Europe's New East–West Divide
title_full_unstemmed Rethinking the Eastward Extension of the EU Civil Order and the Nature of Europe's New East–West Divide
title_sort Rethinking the Eastward Extension of the EU Civil Order and the Nature of Europe's New East–West Divide
author_id_str_mv c3b880aac6e4c2a1536185702a45d443
author_id_fullname_str_mv c3b880aac6e4c2a1536185702a45d443_***_Robert Bideleux
author Robert Bideleux
author2 Robert Bideleux
format Journal article
container_title Perspectives on European Politics and Society
container_volume 10
container_issue 1
container_start_page 118
publishDate 2009
institution Swansea University
issn 1570-5854
1568-0258
doi_str_mv 10.1080/15705850802700066
publisher Taylor & Francis
college_str Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchytype
hierarchy_top_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_top_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
hierarchy_parent_id facultyofhumanitiesandsocialsciences
hierarchy_parent_title Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
department_str School of Culture and Communication - Politics, Philosophy and International Relations{{{_:::_}}}Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences{{{_:::_}}}School of Culture and Communication - Politics, Philosophy and International Relations
url https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15705850802700066
document_store_str 0
active_str 0
description This article begins by arguing that the major benefits of the ongoing eastward enlargement of the European Union (EU) have accrued, not from direct redistributive transfers of income or wealth, but rather through the ‘game-changing’ impact of the recurrently expanding EU on the conduct of political, economic and social life in new and prospective member countries, primarily as a result of their joining a supranational civil order and ‘civil association’ in which decision-making, policy-making, governance and even relations between states rest increasingly upon the rule of law and largely consensual negotiations between governing elites. The article then goes on to argue that the papable unreadiness and unsuitability of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine and other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) for membership of the EU need not be explained by falling back on highly questionable allegations that they have been sundered from their Western and Central European neighbours by intractable cultural/civilisational differences, and that this somehow makes them in certain ‘essentialist’ ways ‘less European’ or ‘less civilized’ than Western and Central Europe (the home of the Holocaust, lest we forget). Instead, it is argued that the evident unreadiness and unsuitability of the CIS countries for EU membership is primarily a consequence of situational factors, above all the still largely unchecked, unmitigated and profoundly entrenched (albeit not wholly unchallengeable) ‘verticality’ of power-structures and power-relations in the CIS polities, economies and societies. In Western and Central Europe, conversely, the emergence and recurrent deepening and expansion of the EU has helped to foster and entrench increasingly powerful horizontal power-structures, power-relations and ‘level-playing fields’ (most conspicuously the Single Market and the extensive and elaborate system of EU law), which powerfully counteract or counterbalance Western and Central Europe’s still strong ‘vertical’ power-structures and the ‘vertical’ power-relations which they sustain. To be sure, powerful ‘vertical’ hierarchical power-structures and power-relations exist in the EU as well as in the CIS, but in the CIS they are not (yet) strongly counterbalanced and counteracted by the increasingly powerful and entrenched horizontal power-structures and ‘level-playing fields’ promoted by the EU countries. Consequently, the fact that Europe’s Cold War East-West divide has not (yet) been completely abolished or transcended, but has merely been replaced by a new East-West divide lying a bit further East than before, does not have to be treated as unassailable evidence or ‘proof’ of the existence of seemingly intractable ‘essential’ differences between these conspicuously contrasting zones of Europe, nor as justifications for implicitly fatalistic latter-day versions of Western and Central European ‘Orientalism’ vis-à-vis the CIS countries. After all, most of East Central Europe and the Balkans appears to have been successfully (albeit not completely irreversibly) ‘brought in from the cold’. Thus there are solid grounds for believing that Europe’s new East-West divide can be continually challenged and eventually surmounted by ceaseless concerted efforts to keep on changing or ‘reforming’ the powerful structures of incentives, opportunities and penalties which govern political, social and economic conduct and inter-state relations in post-Cold War Europe, strongly helped by the vast disparity in income and wealth between the EU countries and the CIS.
published_date 2009-04-30T03:13:02Z
_version_ 1763750111628754944
score 11.0372095

Similar Items