Explaining Chinese FDI in Africa: A Longitudinal Configurational Approach

Integrating Policy Influences to Traditional FDI Motivations

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Abstract

Trump's re-election reshaped US geopolitics and trade policy, with significant implications for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), particularly from state-driven economies like China. Understanding how Chinese policy shapes FDI in geopolitically sensitive regions like Africa is crucial. This paper examines the interplay between traditional FDI motivations and policy influences driving FDI presence or absence in Africa. Adopting configurational theorising, we employ longitudinal, panel fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) across 46 African countries from 2012 to 2018. We find that policy/ political influences are integral to Chinese-FDI motivations. They consistently *enable*, *accommodate*, and *complement* traditional FDI motivations, reducing Multinational Enterprises (MNEs)' risks and entry barriers, while fostering China's long-term control over critical markets and resources. For Chinese-FDI combinations of motivations (pathways) drive FDI. The changes in pathways' strength and geographical coverage are shaped by the presence of political influence and potentially reflect shifts in Chinese political priorities. We contribute to internalisation theory and OLI, by integrating policy/ political drivers into location advantages to explain FDI-motivations. We showcase how Chinese MNEs utilise their ownership advantages to create internationally transferable location advantages, thereby supporting Chinese MNEs and implementing Chinese policy. The longitudinal fsQCA approach to analyse complex, evolving FDI motivations provides new insights into Chinese FDI in Africa. By addressing the nuanced role of economic diplomacy and the Chinese competitive state system, we offer practical implications for policymakers and managers aiming to attract and equitably manage Chinese-FDI, and to predict the future FDI location decisions of China to proactively manage their economic and geopolitical implications.

Keywords: Chinese-FDI motivation, Policy Influence, Configurational Theorising, Longitudinal panel fsQCA, Africa, Economic Diplomacy

Classification: Research Paper

1. Introduction

The second election of Donald Trump as President of the United States marks a pivotal shift in geopolitics and international trade policies, intensifying protectionism and reshaping bilateral state relationships worldwide (Financial Times, 2025). This geopolitical shift has substantial implications for the nature and direction of FDI, particularly from major economies like China, where state-driven policies intertwine with geopolitical objectives (Li *et al.,* 2022c). Within this evolving context, understanding how Chinese policy influences shape the country's FDI decisions in geopolitically sensitive regions such as Africa becomes crucial.

Africa has become a focal point of this trend. Chinese FDI and partnerships in Africa have grown substantially as many African markets are culturally and politically aligned with China (Eom et al., 2017; Brautigam et al., 2018). As Adomako et al. (2024) argue, Africa is a site of major economic opportunity, marked by rising consumer markets (Amankwah-Amoah et al., 2018), resource endowments (Bob-Milliar, 2022), regional integration initiatives (Adomako et al., 2024), and accelerating investment (UNTAD, 2020) while diplomatic and military links to the West and Global South further increase its geopolitical importance (Nachum *et al.*, 2022). However, the context is also shaped by institutional fragility (Adomako et al., 2019; Ahsan et al., 2021), bureaucratic red tape (Adomako et al., 2021), uneven infrastructure (Arikan and Shenkar, 2021), and political volatility (Asongu et al., 2018). This duality means that MNEs operating in Africa must navigate both favourable economic prospects and persistent systemic constraints (Ahworegba et al., 2020; 2021; Kinyondo, 2019; Li et al., 2022b), creating a scenario into which Chinese state policy has become intertwined.

Notwithstanding growing scholarly attention in Africa (Adomako et al., 2024), International Business (IB) scholarship reflects thin coverage of the continent despite longstanding calls for broader regional representation to advance IB theorizing (Arikan and Shenkar, 2021; Thomas et al., 1994). The dominance of Western contexts (Arikan and Shenkar, 2021; Ellis and Zhan, 2011) and the concentration of emerging-economy studies around a small set of large countries, reinforce a structurally limited evidence base. Incorporating African contexts offers a route to widen empirical foundations and generate contextually grounded insights towards extending existing theoretical frameworks beyond Western and BRIC-centric assumptions (Adomako et al., 2017; Oguji et al., 2021).

Gaps remain particularly visible in work on MNEs operating in Africa (Adomako et al., 2024). Existing studies focus mainly on macro-level drivers of MNE location choices (Mol et al., 2017; Teagarden, 2009), overlooking the interplay between institutional complexity and economic diplomacy in shaping MNEs behavior within the continent. Chinese MNEs exemplify this omission. Their decisions reflect a blend of commercial

motives and state-directed strategic aims that existing FDI theories only partially capture. Internalisation theory (Buckley & Casson, 1976) and the OLI paradigm (Dunning, 1977; 1993) emphasise market-seeking, resource-seeking and efficiency-seeking motives, they understate how state policy actively enables, accommodates, or complements these motivations, particularly in institutionally challenging settings (Buckley et al., 2007; Huang et al., 2020; Li et al., 2022c). This gap is significant because Chinese MNEs, often state-owned or state-controlled, operate as channels of broader diplomatic and geopolitical strategies abroad (Cui & Jiang, 2012; Bruton et al., 2021) within a 'competitive state system' different from traditional capitalism. State-to-state agreements (Buckley, 2020), industrial and foreign policies (Li *et al.,* 2022b), initiatives as the 'Belt and Road' and 'Made in China 2025', and government funding, support Chinese MNEs through financing and institutional restructuring that reduces risk and secures commercial and political gains (Buckley, 2020; Li *et al.,* 2018; van Hoorn and Maseland, 2016; Huang *et al.,* 2020). Meanwhile, prior studies (e.g. Cheng & Kwan, 2000; Kolstad & Wiig, 2012; Wang *et al.*, 2012a; Mourao, 2018) typically examine FDI motivations in isolation, yield inconsistent findings, underscoring the absence of an integrated explanation capturing how economic motives and state-led political influence jointly shape investment patterns in Africa.

This paper aims to address this gap by examining how Chinese state policy systematically interacts with market, resource and efficiency-seeking motivations to shape FDI presence or absence across African countries. Specifically, we aim to answer the following research questions: *How do policy influences interact with market, resource and efficiency-seeking motivations to shape the presence or absence of Chinese FDI in African countries? What distinct configurations of motivations and policy explain variation in Chinese FDI across African markets? and How do these configurations evolve over time?* Using a longitudinal configurational approach, we employ fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) on 46 African countries from 2012 to 2018. This enables us to identify how different combinations of motivations form distinct FDI pathways and how these pathways evolve over time, reflecting changing economic and geopolitical priorities.

Thus, we integrate policy influences into FDI motivation theory and provide new insights into the strategic nature of Chinese investment in Africa, illuminating broader implications for IB, economic diplomacy, and the shifting power dynamics characteristic of the current geopolitical era.

This research is important because recipient countries need to better understand how to attract and manage this investment, while Chinese MNEs' competitors and cooperators need to understand what motivates Chinese FDI to better direct their strategies (Bruton *et al.,* 2021; Li *et al,* 2022a). As Sino-American tensions intensify and African economies become central to global growth, understanding whether Chinese FDI is driven

primarily by economic logic or by political strategy has direct implications for IB theory, for African governments seeking to attract sustainable investment, and for Western policymakers concerned about shifting power balances. Clarifying how policy influence interacts with traditional FDI drivers not only advances theory but also informs ongoing debates on whether Chinese FDI represents a development opportunity (Doku *et al.,* 2017), a tool of statecraft (Chen *et al.,* 2024), or both.

While previous studies (Bartels *et al*., 2018; Diallo *et al*., 2018) have conducted FDI analyses in Africa, this paper is also among the first to apply fsQCA with longitudinal measures. This enhances our understanding of why MNEs choose destinations in which they invest and how their choices change over time, identifying how business and policy motivations interact over time. Moreover, previous research treated Africa as a single FDI destination or attempted to identify regional diversities, attributing resource, market or efficiency traits to regions (e.g., Asiedu, 2002; Nachum *et al.*, 2023). Chinese-FDI motivations' interpretation, however, requires integrated exploration of the idiosyncratic nature of individual African nations. We address this by analysing Chinese-FDI across 46 African countries, using longitudinal panel fsQCA to identify causal configurations/ pathways, track their shifts in strength and geographical coverage, reflecting the evolving Chinese political and economic priorities.

This enables the paper to make significant contributions to theory and provides implications for managers and policymakers. First, we advance internalisation theory and the OLI paradigm by illustrating how MNEs' investment decisions can be shaped by the intertwining of commercial and policy logics. In the case of Chinese MNEs in African markets, findings reveal that FDI is not solely driven by traditional market, resource, or efficiency motivations, but also by the imperative to align with and operationalize home-country policy objectives. This duality challenges the conventional assumption in internalization theory that firms expand abroad primarily to minimize market imperfections through hierarchical control. Instead, internalization also functions as a mechanism for managing and exploiting *"non-market and institutional imperfections"*, such as political alignment, debt-diplomacy, and the pursuit of state-led development initiatives. Consequently, internalization extends beyond a purely firm-centric efficiency logic to encompass *"state-firm co-internalization",* where firms integrate economic coordination and policy compliance within their international operations.

Second, this study also advances scholarly understanding of FDI by re-specifying how internalisation theory and the OLI paradigm operate in state-capitalist contexts. Our findings illustrate state-policy influences to MNEs' decisions not merely as an external institutional condition but as an integral component of OLI advantages. Each of OLI pillars is entwined with state-mediated dynamics to compose 'location-specific

advantages' (Buckley & Hashai, 2009). The ownership advantages of Chinese MNEs often derive not only from proprietary assets but also from *"policy-based endowments"*, such as preferential financing, diplomatic backing, or guaranteed access to projects under China's broader geopolitical strategy. The location advantages of African markets, in turn, are *"policy-constructed"* through bilateral agreements, infrastructure-for-resource deals, and development cooperation, which alter the conventional calculus of locational attractiveness. Finally, the internalization advantage reflects a hybrid logic. Firms internalize operations not only to reduce transaction costs but also to safeguard strategic coherence with national objectives abroad. In summary, these insights indicate that the international expansion of Chinese MNEs represents a hybrid internalization process, one that integrates commercial rationality with policy imperatives, thereby extending the explanatory power of internalization theory and enriching the OLI paradigm for contexts where state-firm interactions are institutionally embedded and strategically coordinated.

Third, with previous research focusing on individual FDI motivations (e.g., Chen & Kwan, 2000; Buckley *et al.*, 2007; Ramasamy *et al.*, 2012; Lu *et al.*, 2014), little is known about how motivations interact, affecting FDI as a system. However, IB research is inherently configurational (Fainshmidt *et al.,* 2020), emphasising how conjunctural factors explain outcomes. This study applies configurational theorising to FDI motivations. We contribute by rethinking extant theory (Fainshmidt *et al.*, 2020), showing how motives' configurations lead to high-FDI presence/ absence, producing contributions that can be integrated into existing models (Buckley *et al.*, 2018).

Fourth, longitudinal results show FDI pathways evolve over time. Fluctuations indicate that political influence drives short-term entry strategies but may weaken in importance as infrastructure and economic ties deepen, while policy disinterest perpetuates FDI disinterest. This contributes a nuanced view of how policy interacts with FDI motivations over time, providing a framework to study their role in global investment systems and highlighting the adaptive nature of internalisation strategies in response to shifting global and local dynamics.

Finally, results highlight the context-specific nature of FDI motivations, moving beyond traditional generic theories. Pathways differ across affluent markets with strong infrastructure and access to resources, in politically aligned but underdeveloped markets, and in hybrid cases. This underscores how local contexts shape FDI decisions, reinforcing the value of configurational theorising in FDI research. Furthermore, findings reveal nuanced dimensions of market-seeking motivations, emphasising that market potential and market volume have different influences on FDI.

To maximise fsQCA's benefits in explaining the complex Chinese FDI phenomenon, we use Furnari et al.'s (2021) configurational theorising framework, based on a three-stage iterative process: **scoping** (identifying relevant conditions forming configurations), **linking** (analysing how conditions interconnect), and **naming** (labelling configurations to highlight overarching, higher-level themes).

2. Theoretical framework: FDI motivation Configurational Conceptualisation

2.1 Theoretical Underpinnings

In their literature review paper, Luo & Zhang (2016) highlight institutional theory (North, 1990), the resource-based view (RBV) (Barney, 1991), internalisation theory (Buckley & Casson, 1976), the springboard perspective (Luo & Tung, 2007), and organizational learning theory mostly through the LLL model (Mathews, 2006) as the five dominant theories in the study of EM MNEs. Our research aim is to provide a comprehensive framework integrating firm-level and state-driven dynamics shaping Chinese FDI in Africa. Institutional theory (North, 1990) emphasizes legitimacy while RBV (Barney, 1991) focuses on firm-specific assets. Both the springboard perspective (2007) and the LLL model explore how emerging market MNEs gain knowledge from experience to adapt, improve performance, and achieve long-term advantages. Internalisation theory (Buckley & Casson, 1976), through the eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1977), allows for the inclusion of China's state-created ownership advantages, such as the development of political links through infrastructural projects and loans to the host country, and the conversion of these into location-specific advantages through policy influence. The eclectic paradigm can also be extended to capture how political ties, infrastructure investments, and bilateral agreements reduce risks and entry barriers, turning high-risk African markets into viable opportunities. By incorporating policy and diplomacy into location advantages, the OLI framework explains how Chinese MNEs leverage political assets and state support to secure long-term access and control over resources, mitigate liability of foreignness, and align commercial strategies with national geopolitical goals—something the other four theories alone could not sufficiently capture.

Internalisation theory (Buckley & Casson, 1976) is mostly used to explain FDI location decisions (Buckley, 2018; Narula & Pineli, 2019). It assumes that companies base investment location decisions on market imperfections and reduced transaction costs, using internal hierarchies to internalise transaction costs in imperfect markets (Buckley & Casson, 1976). Dunning (1977) expanded on this with the eclectic paradigm, emphasising ownership, location, and internalisation advantages. Buckley (2018) looked at the interplay between location and internalisation advantages to explain FDI from emerging markets. Core to 'location advantage' is the comparative

cost of market-specific inputs (e.g., resources, labour) and the cost of trade barriers between markets, including tariffs and transportation costs (Buckley & Hashai, 2009).

Location is important within this paradigm, as location-specific assets combined with MNEs' ownership advantages create 'location-specific advantages' ¬ market-specific and internationally immobile assets (Buckley & Hashai, 2009). MNEs choose locations to access these unique endowments or resources (Narula & Pineli, 2019). Dunning (1977; 1993) proposed four FDI motivations: market, efficiency, resource and strategic asset-seeking (interpreted as knowledge-asset-seeking by Buckley & Hashai, 2009). Subsequent work examined their interaction with institutional, risk, and ownership influences (Ahworegba *et al.*, 2020; 2021; Aluko *et al.,* 2024). Emerging market MNEs, however, often have dissimilar motives to those of developed market MNEs, being motivated to invest to compensate for ownership advantages they lack (Wang *et al.,* 2012b). Past literature links their FDI motives to advanced technology access to improve their company-specific assets through technology access or to gain location advantages abroad for production (Yoo & Reimann, 2017).

Lest we forget, political and institutional factors are embedded within the motives and behaviour of EMNEs, converting country-specific advantages into firm-specific ones and vice versa (Li *et al.*, 2022c). Governments use diplomacy and debt and aid programs to boost their country's MNEs' competitiveness (Li *et al.*, 2022b), often employing MNEs to fulfil its national and diplomatic goals (Li *et al.*, 2022c).

Buckley *et al.* (2007), followed by Clegg & Voss (2018), questioned traditional FDI theory's ability to elucidate Chinese-FDI's motivations, given that China's institutional imperfections allow state-owned enterprises access to low-cost funding for high-risk investments, with political influence shaping corporate decisions (Ahworegba *et al.,* 2021). With the state playing a significant role in FDI decision-making (Cui & Jiang, 2012; Wang *et al.*, 2012a), decisions are made at a higher level compared to MNEs in other parts of the world, creating both ownership advantages and potential disadvantages. This urges us to consider policy influences on investment motivation. Institutional theory posits that institutions, including government, can confer or withhold legitimacy on business actions (Child & Tsai, 2005), with Yan *et al.* (2018) examining emerging markets' regulations to support FDI, Wei *et al.* (2015) exploring government incentives, paths, and support for Chinese MNEs' internationalisation, and Pinto *et al.* (2017) illustrating government support as an idiosyncratic institutional characteristic, shaping companies' strategies abroad.

Research on Chinese FDI motivations (e.g., Cheng & Kwan, 2000; Buckley *et al.*, 2007; Morch *et al.*, 2008; Ramasamy *et al.*, 2012; Lu *et al.*, 2014) has highlighted host-country institutions' role (Kolstad & Wiig, 2012; Ahworegba *et al.*, 2021) but lacks a comprehensive view of political drivers in China's rise as a global

investor (Bruton *et al.,* 2021) and competitor (Buckley, 2020). However, to fully elucidate Chinese FDI, policy influence must be conceptualised as core to FDI motivation (Buckley *et al.*, 2018), as government-business interdependence is particularly strong (Wei *et al.,* 2015).

2.2. Scoping the framework for analysis

In this first stage, we scope important conditions and explain how they relate to other discussed conditions.

2.2.1. Market-Seeking FDI

Previous research (e.g., Kolstad & Wiig, 2012; Ramasamy *et al.*, 2012) found positive links between FDI and market size. Market-seeking motivations, usually measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, strongly influence FDI flows, other variables being "highly sensitive to small alterations" (Chakrabarti, 2001: p. 108). Larger markets support efficient resource use and economies of scale and scope (Buckley *et al.,* 2007). Market-seeking motivation links to traditional trade drivers, such as access to distribution networks and export facilitation (Buckley *et al.*, 2007), with FDI positively related to market growth, due to its link to profit generation (Buckley *et al.*, 2007). Thus, market-size measures should be used to reflect market-seeking motivation.

However, Chinese-FDI market-seeking motives in Africa are not only influenced by market-size and market-growth dimensions. Chinese companies often use 'frugal' innovations to develop low-cost products for low-income consumers (Buckley *et al.*, 2018). This approach enables them to tap into new customer pools that complement or supplement their local customer bases (Hong *et al.*, 2019). Therefore, imports from China would also be an appropriate measure for market-seeking motivation.

2.2.2. Resources-Seeking

Internalisation theory asserts a positive relationship between resource endowment and FDI (Buckley *et al.*, 2007). However, previous research provided inconclusive results on the importance of natural resources as FDI drivers (Shan *et al.*, 2017). While Blomkvist and Drogendijk (2013) and Cheung *et al.* (2012) found insignificant links (Shan *et al.*, 2018), others (Kolstad & Wiig, 2012; Ramasamy *et al.*, 2012; Ross, 2015) viewed resources as the primary Chinese-FDI motivation in developing markets. Buckley *et al.* (2007) found China's FDI motivated by natural resources in high (political) risk countries, contrary to Cheung *et al.* (2012) and Kolstad & Wiig (2012), who found the opposite regarding political risk.

China's rise as a global manufacturer has created an immense demand for resources, leading Chinese MNEs to strategically seek stable energy supplies, oil reserves, and other raw materials (Orazgaliyev, 2020). China has increased its investment in African oil and mining industries, as it lacks the necessary resources

domestically to support its growth (Ramasamy *et al.*, 2012). China buys more than one-third of Africa's oil, getting coal from South Africa, iron from Gabon, timber from Equatorial Guinea and copper from Zambia (Ighobor, 2013). To secure long-term access and control of critical resources, China engages in commercial diplomacy in Africa through trade, assistance, and investment deals (Economy & Levi, 2014). However, while *"Chinese investments have contributed to the growth of many receiving economies… these investments frequently neglect socioeconomic and financial sustainability and may result in high-level indebtedness and transfer of control over strategic-assets and resources"* (European Commission, 2019: p. 4).

2.2.3. Efficiency-Seeking

Efficiency-seeking FDI is triggered by companies seeking lower-cost production locations (Buckley *et al.,* 2007), which reflects MNEs' aim to sustain production efficiency by accessing affordable production factors abroad (Hong *et al.*, 2019). Applying the 'Made in China-2025' policy, China is looking to move low-wage, low-cost, and lower-quality Chinese products' production outside China (Golub *et al.*, 2018). With labour and energy costs rising in China, its low-cost manufacturers are seeking low-transaction-cost alternatives in Africa (Golub *et al.*, 2018).

However, efficient production units require infrastructure, often unavailable in Africa (Golub *et al.*, 2018). Many African states had their infrastructure developed as a result of Chinese-FDI (Larue, 2019). Examples span from Mozambique's transportation networks to the pan-African highway network, to facilitate production and logistics for Chinese MNEs (Li *et al.*, 2022b). Combined with low labour costs, these infrastructure investments satisfy efficiency-seeking motivations.

2.2.4. Strategic-Asset-Seeking

The Strategic-asset-seeking FDI motivation is linked to knowledge-creation fuelling MNEs' growth (Yoo & Reimann, 2017) and improving MNEs' weak home-based innovation and production activities (Hong *et al.*, 2019; Kim *et al.,* 2025). Buckley *et al.* (2007), exploring the applicability of Dunning's (1993) FDI-motivation framework for Chinese-FDI, found that *the strategic-asset seeking motivation is not supported*. Indeed, it is unreasonable to link strategic-asset-seeking motivations to knowledge creation and acquisition, and therefore this set of motivations will not be part of our analysis on FDI to Africa.

2.2.5 Policy Influences

Policy-makers' intervention (at central and local levels) within FDI motivation systems has to be discussed (Sutherland *et al.*, 2020), as institutional pressures can lead Chinese-FDI to be driven by political pressures to "fly

the flag" (Wang *et al.*, 2012b), and given that decisions are influenced/ made at a higher-level in comparison to MNEs in other places of the world. Actually, Chinese-FDI interlinks to international relations and networks developed at business and diplomatic levels between China and host-countries (Kong *et al.*, 2020). Evidence on how the Chinese state and its policy affects Chinese FDI is offered by Wang & Liu (2022) who find that state-owned Chinese MNEs are encouraged to invest more along the Belt and Road routes. Lu *et al.* (2018) also reveal that Chinese MNEs adopt fewer risk-mitigation strategies in Africa, particularly in locations where Chinese foreign aid is high. However, key questions posed in previous studies require further clarification and more theoretical backing (Ado & Su, 2016).

To develop these links, China finances major *infrastructure projects* via 'Angola model' systems combining infrastructure development with oil and other minerals' acquisition (Foster *et al.*, 2008). Generally, Chinese enterprises have largely pursued a neocolonial strategy of resource extraction, channelling this effort through extensive infrastructure projects (Jauch, 2011). Kong *et al.* (2020) identify construction, human, and relational capital as the main contributors to Chinese MNEs' success in foreign markets. Wang *et al.* (2012a) find that Chinese-FDI positively correlates with favourable home-government regulatory policy and state-ownership. Economy & Levi (2014) found, however, that China's acclaimed diplomacy is not tailored for different regions, applying similar trade support practices it uses in Africa in Latin America and the Caribbean, with much less success. Nevertheless, the FDI motivations of Chinese MNEs in Africa need to be explored through a state-enabled lens in foreign markets, for risk-mitigation and/or political diplomacy purposes.

2.3 Developing propositions: Linking

Most analyses of Chinese FDI motivations rely on traditional econometric methods, examining market, resource, and efficiency-seeking motivations separately through regression analysis (e.g., Hu *et al.,* 2021). However, contradictory findings suggest that FDI is a causally complex phenomenon, where isolated motivations provide an incomplete picture. This study seeks to evaluate how motivations combine in intricate, sometimes conflicting ways, exploring equifinality—where multiple pathways can lead to the same outcome (Furnari *et al.,* 2021)

2.3.1. Conceptual framework:

Based on literature scoping, stage one of configurational theorising (Furnari *et al.*, 2021), the overarching framework in Figure 1 is used in the linking stage to develop propositions.

Figure 1 Here

Figure 1 shows the conditions that could be related to Chinese FDI, individually, but more particularly, in conjunction with others. The potentially pivotal role of policy influence is then indicated in the diagram by its position at the centre.

2.3.2. Propositions

The second stage of configurational theorising is linking (Furnari *et al.*, 2021). This explains how different conditions link. Since most IB phenomena are inherently configurational, proposition development and empirical design should align with this reality (Fainshmidt *et al.*, 2020). FsQCA "*enables researchers to more adequately theorise and empirically examine causal complexity*" (Misangyi *et al.*, 2017: p. 257). Given policy influences' importance:

> *Proposition 1: High-FDI presence requires Chinese government-policy influence to work together with other conditions, as presence of one condition is not sufficient to explain high Chinese-FDI.*

Previous research paid limited attention to efficiency-seeking as a driver of Chinese FDI in Africa, given China's historically low labour costs and its role as a global hub for efficiency-seeking FDI (Buckley *et al.,* 2007). However, as labour and energy costs in China rise, low-cost manufacturers are now turning to Africa for even more affordable alternatives (Golub *et al.,* 2018). This shift has made efficiency-seeking FDI a key motivator for Chinese firms in Africa (Buckley *et al.,* 2007; Hong *et al.,* 2019).

Labour-resource-seeking FDI is conceived as export-replacing, since it replaces the firm's local production with outputs produced abroad (Hong *et al.*, 2019). This view does not, however, consider Chinese-FDI's institutional/ political influences and African markets' contextual idiosyncrasies. The 'Made in China 2025' policy is focusing on smart manufacturing and high-tech industries, aiming to locate low-cost/ lower-quality Chinese products' production outside China (Golub *et al.*, 2018). Countries selected for this must also handle supply chain complexities, as products are often targeted for African markets. Consequently, we expect links between market-seeking, efficiency-seeking, and state/policy motivations, where Chinese firms produce in Africa to meet local demand and align with government objectives. Thus,

> *Proposition 2: Strong conditions of market and efficiency-seeking motivation complement each other in combination with Chinese government political influence, to explain presence of high Chinese-FDI.*

While a positive relationship between natural resource endowment and FDI has been proposed (Buckley *et al.,* 2007), research remains inconclusive on natural resources' significance as an FDI motivator (Shan *et al.,* 2018; see section 2.1.2). Natural resource endowment alone may not be sufficient to attract FDI, as Chinese FDI often depends on economic diplomacy and networks, involving infrastructure projects and loans to secure long-term resource access and control (Economy & Levi, 2014).

These investments have spurred growth in many recipient economies but also led to high indebtedness and shifts in resource control, often involving trade-offs in finance, trade, and infrastructure (European Commission, 2019: p. 4). Reuters (2017) reports *"China will loan Guinea $20 billion over almost 20 years in exchange for concessions on bauxite, intended to bind developing world in a Chinese sphere of geopolitical influence. Money will be spent on much-needed infrastructural development across the country, including roads and highways construction and a project for extending the port of Conakry- a roads-for-minerals formula that China often uses to gain access to Africa's resources".* Financial Times (2017) reports *"China wants to control, to become a world power. African governments are taking on so much debt that they will be in economic and political hock to Beijing".*

Hence,

Proposition 3a: Conditions of presence of resource and market-seeking motivation with presence of Chinese government political influence complement each other to explain the presence of high Chinese-FDI.

Proposition 3b. Conditions of resource-seeking motivation and absence of conditions of efficiency-seeking motivation/ infrastructure, in combination with Chinese government political influence complement each other to explain the presence of high Chinese-FDI.

Previous work highlights the role of central and local state policymakers in shaping FDI motivations (Sutherland *et al.*, 2020), and how business-diplomatic networks foster trade between China and FDI destinations (Kong *et al.,* 2020). Kong *et al.* (2020) identify structural, human, and relational capital as key FDI regulators. China also leverages diplomacy to establish trade agreements supporting global FDI (Economy & Levi, 2014). Thus, Chinese FDI motivations often combine with diplomatic purposes, aiming to enhance political influence, strengthen economic governance, and secure durable partnerships (Li *et al.,* 2018; Economy & Levi, 2014). Therefore,

Proposition 4: A combination of market and Chinese state/ policy influence are highly important conditions for presence of high Chinese-FDI.

3. Method, data, and initial calibration

Analysis precedes configurational theorising's final stage, naming (Furnari *et al.*, 2021). Methods, data and processes need to be outlined and justified, prior to results' presentation, from which discussion and naming can be derived.

3.1. Method

The configurational approach has several advantages. First, traditional regression models identify importance of individual conditions, rather than conditions' combinations (Deng *et al.*, 2019), known as conjunctional causation, where conditions only have effect in conjunction with other conditions, but not individually (Woodside, 2013). Second, Structural Equation Modelling cannot account for potential equifinality, where more than one causal combination of conditions can lead to same outcome (Fiss *et al.*, 2013). Third, neither can deal with asymmetrical relationships (Fiss *et al.*, 2013), where causal configurations for outcome presence differ from those for outcome absence. FsQCA is able to deal with all three, helping researchers to incorporate causal complexity into their models (Ragin, 2008; Misangyi *et al.*, 2017). Kraus *et al.* (2018: p. 33) concluded fsQCA is becoming increasingly popular because it can capture such complexity, generating nuanced, configurational, nation-specific findings, creating value for academics and policymakers by providing detail that can assist future research into those nations.

The configurational approach, explaining how order emerges from conditions' combinations (Meyer *et al.,* 1993), relies on set theory, combinatorial logic, fuzzy-set theory, and Boolean minimization to identify combinations of conditions that may be necessary or sufficient for an outcome (Kent & Olsen, 2008). FsQCA, uses an inductive approach to reveal configurational relationships between conditions (such as resource, market, efficiency, and policy) and outcomes (FDI) (Schneider & Wagemann, 2010). This study applies fsQCA with longitudinal panel data (Garcia-Castro & Ariño, 2016; Misangyi *et al.,* 2017; Beynon *et al.,* 2020a), enabling longitudinal set-theoretic research, representing one of its earliest applications in IB.

3.2. Sample and Data Collection: Chinese-Africa FDI data

Table 1 presents the proxies for motivations and outcomes, with examples from similar studies and data sources.

Table 1 Here

Chinese FDI to each African country serves as our outcome measure, using a per capita metric to account for country size and enable comparisons. Imports per capita (pc) into China from each African country proxy resource-seeking motivation. Market-seeking is measured by two conditions: Gross National Income pc (GNI_pc), indicating consumer income levels, and Exports pc representing the Chinese products/services' volume exported to the market. The Logistics Performance Infrastructure index (LPI-Infr) serves as an efficiency-seeking proxy, as quality infrastructure supports operational efficiency. Revenue of Chinese construction projects require local authority endorsements (Cheng & Kwan, 2000) and is proxying for political ties between China and the host-market. Another political ties proxy considered was Chinese Loans towards the host-country. However, this was not used in the final analysis, as we found a strong and significant positive correlation between Chinese Loans and Construction Projects *(Spearman's rho = 0.604, sig .000 < 0.01)*, indicating that the two were relatively interchangeable, and should not be used simultaneously in fsQCA. The data set includes 46 African countries with at least one year of complete data. Eight countries—Cape Verde, Djibouti, Seychelles, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia, South Sudan, Swaziland (Eswatini), and Western Sahara—have no available observations. The data period covers 2012, 2014, 2016, and 2018, yielding 163 country-year observation, introducing a longitudinal aspect to the analysis. Figure 2 details the breakdown of available country-year observations.

Figure 2 Here

Each map in Figure 2 illustrates country-year observations. Dark-shaded countries have data included for that year. Light grey-shaded countries indicate partial data availability, with other years included in the analysis. White-shaded areas denote countries excluded from the analysis entirely due to a lack of required data across all years (footnote 2). Totally, 163 country-year observations are analysed.

3.3. Calibration

Employing fsQCA involves calibrating original scaled values into fuzzy membership scores, here using the Direct method (Ragin, 2008; Andrews *et al.,* 2016) to identify qualitative anchors. Fuzzy sets define qualitative states by assessing degrees of membership, from full to non-membership (Fiss, 2007). We based fuzzy membership scores on theoretical rationales, empirical justifications, and sample data distribution. Appendix A provides a detailed process description and graphical representations of membership functions (Figure A1).

3.4. Necessity Analysis

Initial necessity analysis followed Ragin (2008), considering consistency of a set relation indicating that a condition is necessary for an outcome (Beynon *et al.*, 2020b). Table 2 presents consistency and coverage for each condition (and its negation) to outcome (and its negation), following Schneider & Wagemann (2010) to be considered against known acceptable (upper) threshold values. A 0.900 threshold was applied (Beynon *et al.*, 2021). Summary statistics at the table's bottom indicate that no condition (or its negation) is necessary for the outcome or its negation.

Table 2 Here

3.5. Sufficiency Analysis

With no necessary conditions identified, we proceed to sufficiency analysis of the dataset (Beynon *et al.,* 2021; Andrews *et al.,* 2016). First, we construct a "truth table", centred around the strong membership based configurational details[1]. Table 3 presents this truth table, including required frequency and consistency thresholds, which guide further consideration of identified configurations (also see Figure B1 in Appendix B).

Table 3 Here

In Table 3, each row considers a case's configuration, conditions describing country-year observations in strong membership terms. With five conditions, there are 32 ($= 2^5$) possible configurations, but only 30 are shown in Table 3, with two (Cnfgs 13, 23) not shown since they have no country-year observations associated with them. Beyond 0 and 1 condition descriptors for each configuration given, further columns show number of cases associated with configurations, in total, and by year of observation (totals of columns should match that number of dark-grey shaded countries given in Figure 2), also shown are fsQCA based specific consistency scores to high-FDI presence and absence.

Consistency values in Table 3 measure the configuration's association to outcome and to not-outcome. A consistency threshold (further exposited in Appendix B) asserts a level of strength of association required for their specific further consideration. A consistency threshold should account for not enabling a configuration to simultaneously be associated with outcome and not-outcome (ambiguous outcome association) (Andrews *et al.,* 2016). Using the frequency threshold (5), configurations with less than this number of cases associated with it are struck through. For remaining configurations, those failing the consistency threshold here (0.915 - for FDI and

[1] Strong membership is a condition's membership score to either 0 or 1 based on whether it is membership value is ≤ 0.5 (so considered 0) or > 0.5 (so considered 1) (Beynon *et al.,* 2020a).

~FDI) are struck through. Those remaining are then further considered, broken down by whether associated with high-FDI presence/ absence (details shown in bottom row of Table 3)[2].

Finally, options for which solution forms to consider are discussed. Rihoux & Ragin (2009: p. 181) define i) complex solution as a "*minimal formula derived without aid of any logical remainders*", ii) parsimonious solution, conversely, is a "*minimal formula derived with aid of logical remainders, without evaluation of their plausibility*" (ibid.: p. 183), and iii) intermediate solution (Douglas *et al.*, 2020) which would include 'easy' counterfactuals (configurations for which no empirical evidence is available (remainders) but which are possible), consistent with existing empirical and theoretical knowledge (Ragin, 2008), also considered. Because of the exploratory nature of this study, as well as the longitudinal nature of the data,[3] in authors' opinion, no 'easy' counterfactuals could be identified, the intermediate solution therefore equates to the complex solution in this study (see Andrews *et al.*, 2016; 2019; Douglas *et al.*, 2020).

The complex solution is discussed for strict accuracy (Wagemann & Schneider, 2010), prioritising discussion surrounding the complex solution (Cooper & Glaesser, 2016), as in Beynon *et al.* (2016), Pickernell *et al.* (2019) and Beynon *et al.* (2020a, b). Following Andrews *et al.* (2016), complex and parsimonious solutions are generated and reported (Table 4) for sufficiency analysis. Along with identified conditions' combinations (pathways) representing concomitant configurations, technical details in forms of associated configuration indexes, consistency and coverage, values, are reported (see Ragin, 2008, for further details).

In Table 4, the circle notation employed is adapted from Ragin & Fiss (2008) considering the complex solution with a parsimonious solution. Solid and open circles denote conditions' presence/ absence (no circle- 'doesn't matter'), whilst large and small size indicates core (in complex and parsimonious solutions) and peripheral (in complex solution), respectively.

Table 4 Here

Table 4 demonstrates the fsQCA's value, indicating conjunctional causation, where conditions only have an effect in conjunction with other conditions, but not on their own, all the (complex solution) pathways include (presence/ absence) at least four conditions. Equifinality exists, there being three pathways for high-FDI presence and four pathways for high-FDI absence. Finally, asymmetry exists, with only two of seven pathways, one for

[2] We have also included the PRI-score, measuring proportional reduction in inconsistency. Its role is limited here since we have assured already no configuration is associated with both the outcome and not-outcome. However, following Mello (2022) there are no PRI-scores of configurations considered to an outcome/not-outcome below 0.5 which would cause concern.

[3] The longitudinal issue also impacts given the possibility of the potentially pivotal role of the politicy motivation to change over time adding complexity to the identification of any easy counterfactuals.

presence of high (outcome) and absence of high (not-outcome) FDI, namely COFDI1 and CNFDI3, being mirror images of one another.

4. Results and Discussion

Table 5 Here

Table 5 highlights that political influence is the strongest and most consistent condition, present in all high-FDI pathways and absent in all but one absence of high-FDI pathways. Reducing Chinese MNEs' entry costs, it acts as an *accommodating*, *complementary*, or *enabling* effect rather than a primary reason for FDI, becoming significant only in combination with other factors. The only other consistently impactful motivation is resource-seeking, appearing in two of three high-FDI pathways and absent in two of four absence of high-FDI pathways. Market-seeking and efficiency-seeking appear inconsistently, suggesting that political and resource-seeking motivations are core, with other drivers being more reliant in combination with one or both core motivations. These findings support Proposition 1, confirming that high-FDI presence require political motivation to work together with other conditions, as one condition's presence is not sufficient to explain high Chinese-FDI.

Only configuration 1 (absent all conditions) is associated with more than one pathway (configuration 1 associated with three of four high-FDI absence pathways). This suggests distinct patterns exist for high-FDI presence pathways, whereas high-FDI absence is shaped by broader recurring patterns. We identified seven overarching configurations (and a higher-level pattern for pathways CNFDI1, CNFDI2 and CNFDI3). Conducting the naming stage of configurational theorising (Furnari *et al.*, 2021), later grouped and named through configurational theorising (Furnari *et al.,* 2021). Table 6 shows the country–pathway associations across 2012–2018.

Table 6 Here

4.1. Pathways towards the Outcome: High-FDI presence

The COFDI1 pathway highlights market and efficiency motivations, supported by political ties. This pathway indicates that high-FDI is driven by a combination of market motivation and operational efficiency with political alignment having a *complementary* role. High-Exports_pc indicate an engaged market, while high-LPI reflects strong infrastructure and supply chain efficiency, reducing costs and enhancing productivity for efficiency-driven FDI. High project revenues suggest strong bilateral relations. This group is named "Outsourcing and Market Development Clients" for Chinese FDI, where locally produced Chinese products are mostly absorbed by the

domestic and regional markets. Political links between China and these markets also support efficiency-seeking FDI. This aligns with Proposition 2, which suggested that strong market and efficiency-seeking motivations, when combined with political influence, produce high Chinese-FDI. However, this support is partial: in the high-FDI absence pathway CNFDI4 ("Market Resistors"), strong market and efficiency drivers exist but still fail to generate investment because political alignment is missing. This contrast underlines that complementary relationships between market- and efficiency-seeking motivations hold only in certain contexts; in others, the two operate as substitutes rather than complements. Ghana consistently appears in the COFDI1 pathway, reflecting Tang's (2016) findings on rising Chinese manufacturing investments aimed at efficiency, with production primarily serving local and regional markets. For political links Tang (2016: p. 4) highlights *"China viewed Ghana as a close socialist friend, offering Ghana a number of aid projects and concessional and commercial loans for infrastructure construction".* Kenya is China's new outsourcing and market partner, since moving from high-FDI absence pathways to COFDI1 in 2016 and 2018 (joined by Cote d'Ivoire).

China's investment in the Republic of Congo and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been noted as significant (Jansson, 2009; 2013), with DRC receiving 30% and Congo 9% of Chinese FDI in 2012 (Doku *et al.,* 2017). Jansson (2009; 2013) and Samata & Dzaka-Kikouta (2013) link such investments to Official Development Assistance and foreign policy. However, our findings exclude them from high-FDI presence pathways for 2012, likely due to the FDI_pc metric used. Congo appears in the 'Outsourcing and Market Development Clients' pathway (2018), while DRC is associated with high-FDI absence pathways, diverging from the expected 'Raw Materials Security' group.

The COFDI2 pathway (Trade Satellites) highlights resource and market-driven motivations supported by political ties in countries with low purchasing power and efficiency. Established trade relationships are evident in imports and exports, with construction projects reinforcing ties, stabilizing supply chains, and securing goods access. Absence of high-GNI_pc reduces market attractiveness for direct consumer-focused investments shifting FDI to sectors like resource extraction or low-cost production. Weak logistics infrastructure highlights operational environment inefficiencies. However, construction projects address these gaps while ensuring long-term resource access. These countries, often resource-rich but market-poor, purchase low-cost Chinese goods and offer low-wage production opportunities and critical resources access. This aligns with China's policy to relocate low-cost production to Africa (Golub *et al.,* 2018), positioning these countries as 'Trade Satellites' for Chinese FDI. Guinea, resource-rich but underdeveloped in market power and infrastructure, exemplifies this model. Infrastructure and political links, key to China's competition strategy in Africa (Buckley, 2020), help Chinese

MNEs secure resources while enhancing China's control over them. This pathway represents *politically accommodated, trade-reinforced FDI*, focusing on leveraging trade relationships and supported projects to compensate for low market attractiveness and logistical inefficiencies. It reflects an investment strategy driven by long-term political objectives rather than short-term economic returns.

Pathway 3 (COFDI3) focuses on resource-seeking FDI with political ties, but limited export orientation described as 'Raw Material Security' FDI. These countries have market potential (high-GNIpc) yet untapped, relying heavily on raw materials and facing risks like the resource curse (Li *et al*., 2022b). Construction projects address inefficiencies and develop links *enabling* long-term access and control over critical resources. This pathway includes oil producers like Sudan, Angola, and Cameroon, as well as copper and cobalt producers like Zambia. Africa serves as China's second-largest crude oil supplier, with Angola, Republic of Congo, and South Sudan among the top providers (Gouvea *et al.,* 2020). Demand for copper and cobalt, essential for electric car batteries, is to rise tenfold by 2050 (World Bank, 2017). Chinese MNEs strategically invest in countries like Zambia (extensive Chinese loans), Angola, Cameroon and Sudan, leveraging political ties to secure energy and mineral resources. China invests less in Nigeria (the world's largest oil producer) and DRC (the largest copper and cobalt producer), both linked to high-FDI absence pathways, due to weak political ties and the dominance of Western investors. Results offer strong support for Proposition 3a, which argued that resource, market, and policy motivations complement one another to explain FDI. At the same time, the pathway nuances this proposition: in some cases (absence of high-GNI_pc), market-seeking is tied to exports of basic goods, while in others (high-GNI_pc, as in COFDI3), market-seeking is linked to serving wealthier consumer groups directly. Both COFDI2 and COFDI3 also lend partial support to Proposition 3b, since resource-seeking motivations combine with weak efficiency conditions but are enabled by political influence to still produce high-FDI. The COFDI3 pathway (Raw Material Security) further confirms the centrality of resource-seeking complemented by political ties. Here, Chinese FDI is directed at resource-rich but institutionally fragile contexts, again reinforcing the role of policy alignment in making these investments feasible.

Political/ policy motivations are consistently present in all high-FDI pathways, confirming Chinese presence in Africa is driven by strategic interaction among FDI, trade and economic cooperation (Biggeri & Sanfilippo, 2009; Sanfilippo, 2010). Infrastructure development combined with loans secure access to resources, ports, railways, and highways, solidifying China's role as a crucial political and economic partner in host countries.

4.2. Pathways towards Non-Outcome: High-FDI absence

Pathways 4-6 (Table 5) represent an overarching pattern of Chinese 'FDI disinterest.' Pathway four (CNFDI1) reflects underdeveloped markets lacking resources, market potential, and efficiency factors, with political influence being irrelevant. Pathway 5 (CNFDI2) is distinguished from pathway four by the absence of political ties, resources, and market potential, rendering efficiency motivations irrelevant. Rwanda and the Central African Republic (CAR) consistently appear in this pathway across all observation years. Pathway 6 (CNFDI3) describes markets lacking political influence and market potential, making resources irrelevant for high-FDI. DRC and CAR are consistently assigned here. These pathways underscore the varying degrees of Chinese FDI disinterest, shaped by the interplay of resource availability, market potential, efficiency considerations, and political influence.

Whilst countries like DRC have been discussed as FDI destinations, this analysis indicates relatively low investment levels, likely due to limited Chinese political influence. Dzaka-Kikouta & Bitemo (2010) highlighted quality infrastructure and skilled human capital as key FDI drivers. From 1980–2002, many resource-rich African markets were unattractive for manufacturing FDI, underscoring the strategic role of China's infrastructure investments post-2000 (Samata & Dzaka-Kikouta, 2013). Our findings confirm that inadequate infrastructure, resources, market potential, and political influence result in minimal Chinese FDI presence.

Pathway 7 (CNFDI4) markets show strong market potential and efficiency but limited Chinese political influence. This may explain the irrelevance of resource-seeking (despite several of these countries being resource-rich), leading to high Chinese-FDI absence. These countries, named "Resistors" to Chinese influence, include South Africa, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and Nigeria (in certain years), showcasing key FDI attractors—market, resources, and efficiency—not being able to attract high-FDI levels without the existence of strong political ties with China. Taken together, all three high-FDI pathways provide strong evidence for Proposition 4, which argued that market-seeking motivations combined with political/policy influences explain Chinese FDI presence. The contrasting CNFDI4 ("Market Resistors") pathway, where market drivers exist without political influence, underscores this point by showing why investment fails to materialize in politically misaligned but otherwise attractive markets.

4.3. Longitudinal Analysis

Exploring panel data, the paper employs techniques introduced by Garcia-Castro & Ariño (2016) (details in Appendix C). In panel fsQCA, the overall fsQCA shown in Table 4 is used alongside BECONS and WICONS

measures, (Figures 3 and 4), to evaluate the temporal nature of analysis across years (BECONS) and at country (WICONS) level, supporting the geographical spread of pathways across years evaluated in Table 6.

Figure 3 Here

Figure 4 Here

Inspection shows where there is inconsistency across BECONS graphs. BECONS are generally stable but broadly show a slight reduction in consistency of all pathways over time (slightly more for high-FDI presence, suggesting fluctuations in countries associated with that pathway). This implies high-FDI presence strategies may be prone to change, whilst high-FDI absence strategies are slightly more stable although reducing in intensity overtime. Athreye *et al.* (2021) observed a change in Chinese-FDI pattern after the 2008 financial crisis. Results identify that Chinese-FDI patterns in Africa may be about to change direction again, reflecting a change of direction of Chinese policy, Sino-American trade tensions, China's economic growth slowdown, and rising African debt vulnerabilities, altering Chinese FDI patterns (Chen *et al,* 2024).

For WICONS the first notable observation is commencement of inconsistent results (WICONS < 1.000 within rank-ordered values), which for COFDI1 correspond to around 25 countries, for COFDI2 to around 32 countries, and for COFDI3 to around 37 countries (Figure 3). Results on the right side of the graphs are significant as they highlight countries that, across observed years, do not consistently align with a specific causal pathway. This broadly indicates strong consistency for approximately 30-40 of the included countries. The other countries have different levels of inconsistency across years observed. Interpretation is similar for the high-FDI absence (Figure 4), but with different sets of countries labelled with WICONS < 1.000.

5. Conclusion

5.1 Theoretical Contributions

This study advances internalisation theory and the OLI paradigm by demonstrating how MNEs' investment decisions can be shaped by the intertwining of commercial and policy logics. In the case of Chinese MNEs in African markets, findings reveal that FDI is not solely driven by traditional market, resource, or efficiency motivations, but also by the imperative to align with and operationalize home-country policy objectives. This duality challenges the conventional assumption in internalization theory that firms expand abroad primarily to minimize market imperfections through hierarchical control. Instead, internalization also functions as a mechanism for managing and exploiting *"non-market and institutional imperfections"*, such as political alignment, debt-diplomacy, and the pursuit of state-led development initiatives. Consequently, internalization

extends beyond a purely firm-centric efficiency logic to encompass *"state-firm co-internalization",* where firms integrate economic coordination and policy compliance within their international operations.

This study also advances scholarly understanding of FDI by re-specifying how internalisation theory and the OLI paradigm operate in state-capitalist contexts. Our findings demonstrate that state-policy influence should be treated not as an external institutional condition but as an integral component of OLI advantages. Each OLI pillar is infused with state-mediated dynamics to compose 'location-specific advantages' (Buckley & Hashai, 2009). Ownership advantages of Chinese MNEs often derive not only from proprietary assets but also from "policy-based endowments", such as preferential financing, diplomatic backing, or guaranteed access to projects under China's broader geopolitical strategy. Location advantages in African markets, are likewise "policy-constructed" through bilateral agreements, infrastructure-for-resource deals, and partnerships development, which alter the conventional locational attractiveness logic. Internalization advantage reflects a hybrid logic: firms internalize operations not only to reduce transaction costs but also to safeguard strategic coherence with national objectives abroad. Together, these mechanisms conceptualise international expansion of Chinese MNEs as a hybrid internalization process, that integrates commercial rationality with policy imperatives, extending the explanatory power of internalization theory and enriching the OLI paradigm for contexts where state-business interactions are institutionally embedded.

This reconceptualisation further demonstrates that firms can internalise political assets alongside economic assets to mitigate risk and secure market access, transforming otherwise high-risk environments into viable opportunities. By embedding policy as an endogenous determinant of MNE behaviour, the study expands the scope of internalisation and OLI theory to account for state–market interdependence in emerging-economy systems.

Finally, the configurational and longitudinal evidence introduces a dynamic dimension to FDI theorising. By revealing that configurations of economic and political motivations shift over time, the study challenges the static assumptions of internalisation theory and proposes that OLI advantages are temporally contingent and policy-responsive. Configurational theorising thus reframes FDI motivations as *systemic and conjunctural* rather than additive, offering a framework for analysing how interacting conditions jointly produce investment outcomes.

We also offer a set of more specific contributions. First, despite the crucial role of policy/ political influence within the Chinese competition system, policy influence alone cannot drive FDI, but rather works as a critical *complementary, accommodating, enabling* or *hindering* factor**.** We add to previous studies by identifying

that policy influence facilitates *interdependencies* between motivations, ensuring that otherwise insufficient drivers (e.g., low logistics performance) are still actionable, reduce entry barriers, mitigate Chinese MNEs' investment risks, and securing long-term control over critical markets and resources.

Second, we see that the role of policy influences in FDI pathways evolves over time, adapting to changing geopolitical and economic contexts. The longitudinal analysis suggests fluctuations in high-FDI presence pathways, indicating that political influence drives short-term entry strategies but may weaken in importance over time as infrastructure and economic ties stabilize. Conversely, in high-FDI absence pathways, a consistent lack of political ties suggests that policy disinterest perpetuates FDI disinterest. These two insights contribute to a nuanced understanding of how policy influences interact with FDI motivations, providing a framework to study their role in global investment systems, highlighting the adaptive nature of internalization strategies in response to shifting global and local dynamics.

Third, the configurational approach highlights the context-specific nature of FDI motivations, moving beyond traditional theories. Pathway COFDI1-"Outsourcing and Market Development Clients", focuses on affluent markets with strong infrastructure, Pathway COFDI3-"Raw Material Security", on resource access in politically aligned yet underdeveloped markets, and Pathway COFDI2- "Trade Satellites", represents a middle ground. This shows how local contexts, whether considered economically or geopolitically significant or not, influence FDI decisions, emphasizing the importance of configurational analysis in FDI research. Dunning's (1993) FDI motivation set's conceptualization has to be adjusted towards illustrating an integrated motivation system, as the system as a whole (or at least conjunctional elements of it), rather than individual elements, generate outcomes, regarding high-FDI presence/ absence. Motivation combinations are location-specific, adjusted according to the idiosyncratic nature of each market, or each set of similar markets, shaping themselves around political/ policy influence.

Finally, findings reveal nuanced dimensions of market-seeking motivations in the pathways, emphasizing *market potential* and *market volume*. These dimensions have different influences on FDI decisions. Market potential is an important component of market-seeking motivation. However, there are pathways where the presence of market potential is not sufficient to attract FDI (pathway CNFDI7-Market Resistors), and others where market potential is present but seems not to be the primary motivation for investment (pathway COFDI2). Export volume also indicates the market capacity to absorb foreign production, either as a destination for low-end products, or as a means to establish bilateral trade to support resources acquisition.

Overall, the study moves beyond extending existing theory to reconfigure its core assumptions, introducing political influence as a constitutive, not contextual, element of internationalisation logic.

5.2. Implications for Practice

Policymakers and managers must recognize that diplomacy and political ties are central to Chinese high-FDI levels, as investment decisions by Chinese state-owned or state-controlled MNEs are influenced beyond the corporate level. These MNEs leverage ownership advantages and political ties to access location-specific assets and establish competitive advantages. This fosters long-term links with local markets, while China expands its economic and political influence and strengthens its role in global governance. FDI, loans, and infrastructure investments function as tools of state-led strategy, aligning economic objectives with political goals, such as securing trade routes and critical resources. Policymakers should address concerns around debt sustainability and resource dependency by negotiating terms that protect national interests while leveraging Chinese FDI for economic growth. FDI diversification can mitigate over-reliance on Chinese investments. To align Chinese FDI with sustainable development, African countries must adopt a clear and strategic approach to their partnership with China.

5.3 Limitations, and Future Research

The study highlights limitations and future research directions. While it covers a key period in Chinese MNEs' FDI development, the findings are likely time-specific. Longitudinal analysis shows changing motivation patterns among Chinese MNEs, with implications for government policy in home and host countries. Future research should explore ongoing changes in Chinese FDI in Africa, focusing on the role of government policies and their effects. Methodologically, techniques like panel fsQCA are still developing and require refinement. For instance, consistency value heatmaps provide granular insights but need further improvement for clarity. Finally, while our analysis integrates key FDI motivations with policy influences, it does not include a wider set of macroeconomic and institutional variables such as governance quality, corruption indices, or political stability. Whilst these factors are undoubtedly relevant for shaping investment decisions, their inclusion would have oversaturated the configurational model used. Instead, we focused on a set of conditions such as GNI per capita, trade flows, and infrastructure quality, as macroeconomic proxies aligned with established FDI motivation frameworks. We recognize this as a limitation and recommend that future research extend our model by incorporating a broader range of institutional dimensions to deepen understanding of how macro-level conditions interact with policy influences to shape Chinese FDI patterns in Africa.

5.4 Concluding Remarks

Concluding, this research scrutinises the Chinese FDI motivation system. We unravel the linkage between policy influences and FDI motivation, and its implications for IB, for the global economy and for the future economic and political state of many African markets which find themselves tied into the Chinese sphere of influence. We note changing motivation patterns of the Chinese competition system, with important implications for government policy regarding future Chinese investment costs and benefits. Consequently, the degree to which political influence becomes important in economies covered by the Market Resistors pathway will be an important future China-Africa relations indicator. This paper has offered a full fsQCA elucidation. It has also illustrated the mechanisms that can provide a unified approach for Chinese-FDI location choice, scrutinising Chinese FDI motivation in Africa to reconceptualise Dunning's (1993) FDI motivation framework, and show how combinations of motivations and policy influence explain presence or absence of high Chinese-FDI.

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Appendix A - Calibration

One fsQCA employment feature is the fuzzification requirement of the considered conditions and outcome (Ragin, 2008). The fuzzy values established exist over the 0 to 1 domain. The Direct method employed for the fuzzification process follows Andrews *et al.* (2016) and Beynon *et al.* (2018), whereby initial probability density functions are found for each condition and outcome, from which three qualitative anchors sets are accrued ($x^{\perp}$ - Lower-threshold, x^{X} - crossover-point, x^{T} - upper-threshold), see Figure A1.

Figure A1 Here

In Figure A1, for each graph a pdf is constructed, 5^{th}, 50^{th} and 95^{th} percentiles are identified, shown by vertical dotted lines, denoting the respective lower-threshold ($x^{\perp}$), crossover-point (x^{X}) and upper-threshold (x^{T}) qualitative anchors, the curved dashed line then gives the subsequent fuzzy membership function (with right y-axis). Each of these graphs, including the established qualitative anchors, were inspected by the authors and considered appropriate (see Andrews *et al.*, 2019, for example of where changes were made premised on expert opinion). The authors felt the longitudinal nature of the data, with a country having multiple inclusions in the considered data also impacted on the ability to instruct a change to the established qualitative anchors.

Appendix B – Frequency and Consistency Thresholds

Within fsQCA sufficiency analysis is important to consider the frequency and consistency thresholds (Ragin, 2008), in the association of configurations to the outcome, not-outcome or neither (as exposited in the truth table in Table 3). Evidence supporting this consideration are reported in Figure B1.

Figure B1 here

In Figure B1a, the cumulative sum of cases is shown on groups of configurations, as the next largest number of cases associated with a configuration (in strong membership terms) are added to the previous sub-total. The largest number of cases associated with a configuration is 23 (Cnfg 3-Table 3), followed by 18 (Cnfg 30) and so on (see left y-axis), so cumulative scores start from 23, 41 (23+18) and so on (see right y-axis). Figure B1a enables understanding of frequency threshold choice impact (examples of 60% and 80% of cases (the two horizontal lines shown) are shown. Applying a frequency threshold first means possible different configuration sets to consider regarding consistency. In Figure B1b, the x-axis gives the possible frequency thresholds to be

considered. The left y-axis identifies the lowest consistency threshold, post frequency threshold choice which assures no ambiguous association of a configuration to both high-FDI presence (outcome) and absence (not-outcome). The right y-axis gives the percentage of cases retained in further consideration subject to frequency and consistency thresholds. Retaining as large a number of cases as possible in subsequent analysis, Figure B1b suggests a frequency threshold of 5 cases (x-axis), and consistency threshold of 0.915 (left y-axis) would be satisfactory, with 63% of cases subsequently further considered.

Appendix C - Longitudinal Analysis

Three measures, all of which involve consistency formulae, are used to examine various subsets of the country-year dataset. POCONS consist of all country-year observations, this measure corresponding to the presented consistency values associated with each causal pathway in Table 4. BECONS consist of specific year observations, whilst WICONS consist of specific country observations. BECONS and WICONS details are separately found for each of the pathways from complex solutions associated with each outcome (High-FDI presence/ absence), to evaluate consistency over-time and for countries (see Table 4 and Figures 3 and 4).

For each pathway, a BECONS value is calculated per considered year, irrespective of how many country-year observations are associated with a year. The corresponding POCONS values both in numerical terms and as a horizontal dashed line are shown. WICONS (within consistency) results are at country level. They describe how consistent the specific causal pathway is for a given country. This consistency is affected by whether a country is described in strong membership terms with one or more pathways in the years it is present in the dataset. Relevant WICONS values are rank ordered plotted.

Figure 1: Conceptual Framework

Figure 2. Map and year-based breakdown of included country-year observations in China-Africa FDI dataset.[4, 5]



Figure 3. BECONS and WICONS results for the outcome

BECONS – Outcome



[4] There are two island-countries included in this analysis, not shown in clear detail in presented maps, these are Mauritius (2012, 2014, 2018) and Comoros (2012, 2014, 2016).

[5] There were eight countries for which no country-years observations were available, Cape Verde, Djibouti, Seychelles, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia, South Sudan, Swaziland (Eswatini), and Western Sahara.

WICONS – Outcome



Figure 4. BECONS and WICONS results for the not-outcome

BECONS – Not-Outcome



WICONS – Not-Outcome



Figure A1. Calibration of Conditions



Figure B1. Frequency and consistency threshold impact graphs



Table 1 Operationalisation and data sources

Outcome		Scale	Proxy for	Example in previous literature	Data Source
FDI_pc	Chinese-FDI per capita flow to African countries	US$, unadjusted/ Host Country Population	NA	Cheng and Kwan, 2000 ;Kolstad and Wiig, 2012;Wang *et al.*, 2012a;Mourao, 2018	Statistical Bulletin of China's OFDI published by China's MOFCOM
Conditions		**Scale**	**Proxy for**	**Example in previous literature**	**Data Source**
Imports_pc	Chinese Imports from Host African Country per capita	US$, unadjusted/ Host Country Population	Resource-seeking	Buckley *et al.*, 2007 ;Ramasamy *et al.*, 2012	UNComtrade
Exports_pc	Chinese Exports to Host African Country per capita	US$, unadjusted/ Host Country Population	Market-seeking	Buckley *et al.*, 2007; Ramasamy *et al.*, 2012	UNComtrade
GNI_pc	Gross National Income per capita	Current International $	Market-seeking	Lu *et al.*, 2014; Piperopoulos et al 2018; Ramasamy *et al.*, 2012	World Bank Development Indicator
LPI-Infr	Logistic Performance Index-Infrastructure	Overall LPI score of country - scale is [1 to 5], 1 (worst) to 5 (best)	Efficiency-seeking	Wagner, 2004 (partial); Halaszovich and Kinra, 2018	World Bank-LPI Global Rankings
Construction Projects _pc	Gross Annual Revenues of Chinese Companies' Construction Projects in Africa	US$, unadjusted/ Host Country Population	Political/ Policy Influence	Cheung *et al.*, 2012	National Bureau of Statistics of China
Chinese Loans*	Chinese Loans to African Host Countries	US$, unadjusted	Political/ Policy Influence	Li *et al.*, 2022b	Chinese Loans to Africa Database. Retrieved from http://bu.edu/gdp/chinese-loans-to-africa-database

* The variable was not entered in the final analysis, as there is a significant positive correlation between Chinese Loans and Construction Projects pc, signifying that the two variables can be used interchangeably, but not simultaneously in fsQCA.

Table 2. Necessity analysis results for FDI Flow (FDI and ~FDI).

Condition		FDIpc_Flow			
		FDI (high-FDI_pc presence)		~FDI (high-FDI_pc absence)	
		Con	Cov	Con	Cov
Imports_pc	con	0.788	0.760	0.658	0.679
	not-con	0.667	0.646	0.768	0.795
Exports_pc	con	0.764	0.719	0.665	0.670
	not-con	0.649	0.644	0.721	0.766
GNI_pc	con	0.726	0.724	0.627	0.670
	not-con	0.669	0.626	0.742	0.743
LPI-Infr	con	0.700	0.687	0.707	0.743
	not-con	0.738	0.702	0.703	0.715
Construction Projects_pc	con	0.805	0.783	0.652	0.678
	not-con	0.669	0.642	0.791	0.813
Descriptive Statistics	Min	0.649	0.626	0.627	0.670
	Max	0.805	0.783	0.791	0.813

Table 3. Chinese-Africa FDI dataset's Truth Table (original 163 country-year observations)

Cnfg	Imports_pc	Exports_pc	GNI_pc	LPI-infr	Construction Projects_pc	No.	2012	2014	2016	2018	Consistency | PRI score			
											FDI		**~FDI**	
1	0	0	0	0	0	13	4	2	2	5	0.865	0.252	**0.931**	0.617
2	0	0	0	0	1	7	2	2	2	1	0.906	0.227	**0.969**	0.743
3	0	0	0	1	0	23	8	5	6	4	0.813	0.120	**0.956**	0.792
~~4~~	~~0~~	~~0~~	~~0~~	~~1~~	~~1~~	~~4~~	~~0~~	~~2~~	~~1~~	~~1~~	~~0.928~~	~~0.300~~	~~0.960~~	~~0.611~~
~~5~~	~~0~~	~~0~~	~~1~~	~~0~~	~~0~~	~~1~~	~~0~~	~~0~~	~~0~~	~~1~~	~~0.949~~	~~0.338~~	~~0.974~~	~~0.662~~
~~6~~	~~0~~	~~0~~	~~1~~	~~0~~	~~1~~	~~4~~	~~2~~	~~1~~	~~1~~	~~0~~	~~0.937~~	~~0.326~~	~~0.970~~	~~0.674~~
~~7~~	~~0~~	~~0~~	~~1~~	~~1~~	~~0~~	~~3~~	~~0~~	~~1~~	~~2~~	~~0~~	~~0.941~~	~~0.305~~	~~0.974~~	~~0.695~~
~~8~~	~~0~~	~~0~~	~~1~~	~~1~~	~~1~~	~~1~~	~~0~~	~~0~~	~~1~~	~~0~~	~~0.959~~	~~0.485~~	~~0.961~~	~~0.515~~
~~9~~	~~0~~	~~1~~	~~0~~	~~0~~	~~0~~	~~2~~	~~0~~	~~0~~	~~1~~	~~1~~	~~0.960~~	~~0.455~~	~~0.967~~	~~0.545~~
~~10~~	~~0~~	~~1~~	~~0~~	~~0~~	~~1~~	~~3~~	~~0~~	~~2~~	~~1~~	~~0~~	~~0.959~~	~~0.459~~	~~0.962~~	~~0.493~~
~~11~~	~~0~~	~~1~~	~~0~~	~~1~~	~~0~~	~~3~~	~~1~~	~~0~~	~~1~~	~~1~~	~~0.938~~	~~0.295~~	~~0.972~~	~~0.685~~
~~12~~	~~0~~	~~1~~	~~0~~	~~1~~	~~1~~	~~3~~	~~1~~	~~1~~	~~0~~	~~1~~	~~0.955~~	~~0.449~~	~~0.963~~	~~0.551~~
~~14~~	~~0~~	~~1~~	~~1~~	~~0~~	~~1~~	~~2~~	~~0~~	~~0~~	~~1~~	~~1~~	~~0.967~~	~~0.685~~	~~0.927~~	~~0.307~~
15	0	1	1	1	0	8	1	3	3	1	0.915	0.304	**0.963**	0.696
16	0	1	1	1	1	6	1	1	2	2	**0.945**	0.652	0.896	0.344
17	1	0	0	0	0	9	2	3	2	2	0.908	0.384	**0.933**	0.547
~~18~~	~~1~~	~~0~~	~~0~~	~~0~~	~~1~~	~~2~~	~~1~~	~~0~~	~~1~~	~~0~~	~~0.951~~	~~0.604~~	~~0.925~~	~~0.389~~
~~19~~	~~1~~	~~0~~	~~0~~	~~1~~	~~0~~	~~1~~	~~0~~	~~0~~	~~0~~	~~2~~	~~0.954~~	~~0.485~~	~~0.957~~	~~0.515~~
~~20~~	~~1~~	~~0~~	~~0~~	~~1~~	~~1~~	~~1~~	~~0~~	~~0~~	~~1~~	~~0~~	~~0.949~~	~~0.548~~	~~0.938~~	~~0.452~~
21	~~1~~	~~0~~	~~1~~	~~0~~	~~0~~	~~2~~	~~0~~	~~0~~	~~0~~	~~2~~	~~0.946~~	~~0.390~~	~~0.965~~	~~0.610~~
~~22~~	1	0	1	0	1	6	1	2	3	0	**0.931**	0.610	0.890	0.381
24	~~1~~	~~0~~	~~1~~	~~1~~	~~1~~	~~3~~	~~1~~	~~0~~	~~0~~	~~2~~	~~0.946~~	~~0.640~~	~~0.904~~	~~0.360~~
~~25~~	~~1~~	~~1~~	~~0~~	~~0~~	~~0~~	~~2~~	~~0~~	~~1~~	~~0~~	~~1~~	~~0.957~~	~~0.480~~	~~0.960~~	~~0.520~~
~~26~~	1	1	0	0	1	6	1	2	1	2	**0.942**	0.619	0.903	0.362
~~27~~	~~1~~	~~1~~	~~0~~	~~1~~	~~0~~	~~2~~	~~1~~	~~1~~	~~0~~	~~0~~	~~0.942~~	~~0.344~~	~~0.970~~	~~0.656~~
28	~~1~~	~~1~~	~~0~~	~~1~~	~~1~~	~~1~~	~~0~~	~~1~~	~~0~~	~~0~~	~~0.951~~	~~0.594~~	~~0.929~~	~~0.406~~
29	~~1~~	~~1~~	~~1~~	~~0~~	~~0~~	~~2~~	~~1~~	~~0~~	~~1~~	~~0~~	~~0.918~~	~~0.405~~	~~0.942~~	~~0.578~~
30	*1*	*1*	*1*	*0*	*1*	*18*	*5*	*5*	*4*	*4*	*0.896*	*0.691*	*0.758*	*0.283*
31	1	1	1	1	0	11	3	3	1	4	0.886	0.374	**0.923**	0.576
32	1	1	1	1	1	14	3	5	3	3	**0.923**	0.718	0.794	0.244
fsQCA threshold details			Frequency Threshold ≥ 5 (121)		Consistency Threshold ≥ 0.915 (10, 103)						4 (32)		6 (71)	

Table 4. Sufficiency Analysis: Conditions' configurations against FDI pc presence (FDI) and absence (~FDI)

	FDI				~FDI			
Complex Solution	1-COFDI1	2-COFDI2	3 COFDI3		4-CNFDI1	5-CNFDI2	6-CNFDI3	7-CNFDI4
Imports_pc		●	●		⊖	⊖		
Export_pc	●	●	⊖		⊖	⊖	⊖	●
GNI pc	●	⊖	●		⊖	⊖	⊖	●
LPI-infr	●	⊖	⊖		⊖		⊖	●
Construction Projects pc	●	●	●			⊖	⊖	⊖
Configurations (in strong membership terms)	16, 32	26	22		1, 2	1, 3	1, 17	15, 31
Consistency*	0.910	0.942	0.931		0.923	0.904	0.898	0.922
PRIscore*	0.641	0.619	0.610		0.641	0.663	0.570	0.633
Raw Coverage*	0.461	0.347	0.317		0.444	0.523	0.457	0.401
Unique Coverage*	0.188	0.069	0.035		0.030	0.078	0.034	0.137
Solution Consistency, PRI score, Coverage	0.904, 0.664, 0.600				0.869, 0.634, 0.733			
Parsimonious Solution	POFDI1	POFDI2	POFDI3		PNFDI1	PNFDI2		
Configurations (in strong membership terms)	16, 32	26	22		1, 2	1, 3, 15, 17, 31		
Consistency*	0.874	0.931	0.935		0.813	0.894		
PRIscore*	0.592	0.590	0.637		0.558	0.583		
Raw Coverage*	0.583	0.434	0.426		0.791	0.551		
Unique Coverage*	0.186	0.027	0.016		0.295	0.054		
Solution Consistency, PRI score, Coverage	0.870, 0.596, 0.691				0.803, 0.553, 0.846			

* The consistency and coverage values are over the whole data set of cases (not just from those configurations shown associated in strong membership terms)

Table 5: Pathways naming and relationship between conditions

Pathway	Conditions	Higher-Level Attributes	Name	Relationship between the conditions
1-COFDI1	Exportspc+GNIpc+LPI+ Construction Projects_pc	Market+Efficiency+ Political Links	Outsourcing and Market Development Clients	Policy/ Political Influences *complementing* a strong and efficient market
2-COFDI2	Importspc+Exportspc-GNIpc-LPI+Construction ProjectsPc	Resource+Market-Market Potential-Infrastructure+Political Links	Trade Satellites	Policy/ Political Influence and bilateral trade *accommodating* resource acquisition and control
3-COFDI3	Imports-Exportspc+GNIpc-LPI+Construction ProjectsPc	Resource-Market vol-Market Potential-Efficiency+Political Links	Raw Material Security	Policy/ Politics Influence *enabling* resource acquisition and control
4-CNFDI1	-Importspc-Exportspc-GNIpc-LPI	-Resource-Market-Efficiency	Underdeveloped	Political Disinterest
5-CNFDI2	-Importspc-Exportspc-GNIpc-Construction Projectpc	-Resource-Market-Political Links	Indifferent	
6-CNFDI3	-Exportspc-GNIpc-LPI-Construction Projectspc	-Market-Efficiency-Political Links	Nascent Raw Material	
7-CNFDI4	Exportspc+GNIpc+LPI-Construction Projectspc	Market+Efficiency-Political Links	Resistors	Lack of Political Influence *hindering* market and efficiency driven FDI

Table 6: Pathways towards presence/ absence of High-FDI absence pc: Countries per year of FDI

Year	Pathways towards high-FDI pc presence			Pathways towards high-FDI pc absence			
	1 - COFDI1: Outsourcing and Market Development Clients	**2 - COFDI2: Trade Satellites**	**3 - COFDI3: Raw materials Security**	**4 - CNFDI1: Underdeveloped**	**5 - CNFDI2: Indifferent**	**6 - CNFDI3: Nascent Raw Materials**	**7 - CNFDI4: Market Resistors**
				Chinese Disinterest			
2012	Ghana Namibia Botswana Mauritius	Liberia	Sudan	Ethiopia Kenya Rwanda Burundi Burkina Faso Comoros	Senegal Madagascar Ethiopia Tanzania Malawi Rwanda Burundi CAR Niger Burkina Faso Cote D'Ivoire Guinea Bissau	Ethiopia Dem.Rep Congo Burkina Faso Sierra Leone Burundi Rwanda	South-Africa Egypt Tunisia Morocco
2014	Ghana Namibia Botswana Angola Algeria Mauritius	Togo Mozambique	Sudan Zambia	Niger CAR Madagascar Comoros	Madagascar Mali Burkina Faso CAR Rwanda-Malawi Burundi	Madagasca-Zimbabwe CAR DemRep Congo Guinea-Bissau	Egypt Libya Tunisia Nigeria South Africa Senegal
2016	Ghana Namibia Botswana Algeria Kenya	Guinea	Angola Zambia Cameroon	Chad Ethiopia Madagascar Guinea-Bissau	Mali Niger Tanzania Rwanda Burundi Madagascar Comoros Guinea-Bissau	Madagascar DR.Congo Sierra-Leone Guinea-Bissau	South-Africa Egypt Tunisia Morocco
2018	Côte-D'Ivoire Ghana Congo Kenya Mauritius	Guinea Liberia		Niger Chad CAR Madagascar Guinea-Bissau Burundi	Madagascar Malawi Rwanda Burundi CAR Niger Burkina-Faso Mali Guinea-Bissau	Madagascar DR.Congo Sierra-Leone CAR Niger Guinea-Bissau Burundi	South-Africa Egypt Nigeria Morocco Tunisia