Internet Campaigning in an Unfamiliar Context:

A Study of the Internet Campaigns of the Two Major Political Parties in the 2015 Nigerian Presidential Election

Swansea University
Prifysgol Abertawe

BIBOBRA AGANABA

Department of Media and Communication, College of Arts and Humanities

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ABSTRACT:

This thesis addresses the following research question: How can we best understand the effects of internet campaigning on the campaign practices of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) and the All Progressives Congress (APC) in the 2015 Nigerian Presidential election? This research represents an important contribution to the broader study of internet campaigning; widening the theoretical and empirical scope of the literature.

From a theoretical perspective, three major approaches are deployed across the thesis: modernisation, Americanisation, and hybridisation. While all three lenses play an important part in understanding the effect of the internet on Nigerian campaign practices, the hybridisation perspective is particularly important – pointing towards a broader need in the literature to integrate this theoretical emphasis.

From an empirical perspective, over 50 original, elite interviews in Nigeria were conducted with members of both parties' campaign teams and campaign consultants. In analysing these data, the thesis unpacks three sub-questions:

How was internet campaigning adopted and adapted by the campaign teams?

What factors help to explain variations in the internet campaigns practices of the presidential candidates of the PDP and APC?

How did the internet affect the intra-campaign organisational dynamics of the presidential candidates of the PDP and APC?

The analysis across these questions concludes that the importance of the 2015 Nigerian online campaign should not be underestimated – it clearly impacted on campaign practices and organisation. However, the nature of this impact falls far short of a full realisation of the potential impact that the web could have exerted. Understanding this reality requires that close attention be paid to the national and party contexts within which internet campaigning was adopted – meaning that a hybridisation perspective is central to explaining how the internet impacts campaign practices in states such as Nigeria.

DECLARATION AND STATEMENT.

This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.

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STATEMENT 1

This thesis is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated. Where correction services have been used, the extent and nature of the correction is clearly marked in a footnote(s). A bibliography is appended.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AG   Action Group

APC   All Progressive Congress

COG   Commonwealth Observer Group

DP   Dynamic Party

DPN   Democratic Party of Nigeria

EOM   Election Observation Mission

FRCN   Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria

GDM   Grassroots Democratic Movement

GNPP   Great Nigerian People's Party

ICT   Information Communication Technology

INEC   Independent National Electoral Commission

MDF   Midwestern Democratic Front

NAP   Nigerian Advance Party

NCC   Nigeria Communication Commission

NCNC   National Council of Nigeria Citizens

NCPN   National Centre Party of Nigeria

NDC   Niger Delta Congress

NEPU   Northern Elements Progressive Union

NNA   Nigerian National Alliance

NNDP   Nigerian National Democratic Party

NPC   Northern People's Congress

NPF   Northern Progressive Front

NPN	National Party of Nigeria
NPP	Nigerian People's Party
NRC	National Republican Convention
NTA	Nigerian Television Authority
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PDP	People's Democratic Party
PRP	People's Redemption Party
SDP	Social Democratic Party
SMS	Short Message Service
UMBC	United Middle Belt Congress
UNCP	United Nigerian Congress Party
UNIP	United National Independence Party
UPGA	United Progressive Grand Alliance
UPN	United Party of Nigeria
UPP	United People's Party

Chapter One: Introduction

1.1 Introduction to the study

I begin by introducing the political event that lies at the heart of this thesis: the 2015 Nigerian presidential election. This election marked the first time that an incumbent president lost a re-election campaign in Nigeria's history; and this feature marks the 2015 Nigerian presidential election as worthy of sustained academic scrutiny. I note the prevalence of digital campaigning in this election, which, while not unprecedented, marked a relatively accelerated uptake – in line with a dramatic expansion of social media use in the Nigerian political sphere. Following this outline and justification of the thesis subject matter, I conduct a delineation of the concepts and topics studied in this thesis - situating it within a body of research that has explored the intersection of digital media and political campaigns. It is argued that Nigeria offers an unfamiliar context when compared to the political systems that have dominated this literature; and that its study consequently holds the potential to expand our understanding of the internet/campaign nexus. This discussion is crystallised into the central and subsidiary research questions that drive the thesis. A final section outlines the structure of the thesis and explains how the chapters cohere to address these research questions.

1.2 Context of the Study

On the 28th and 29th of March 2015, close to 30 million Nigeria's of the 67 million registered voters cast their ballots in the presidential election (INEC, 2015). In a political system where 'the incumbent always wins', the campaign had been unusually close-fought' (Ross, 2015).

Although there were 14 official candidates in the contest, the election was very much a two-horse race – with the incumbent, Goodluck Jonathan's People's Democratic Party (PDP) facing off against Muhammadu Buhari's newly formed All Progressives Congress (APC). In a country where polling often proves unreliable (ibid.), there was considerable uncertainty about which of these candidates would emerge triumphant as the ballots began to be counted. However, by the night of Tuesday March 31st little doubt remained about the result: Buhari had comprehensively out-polled Jonathan,

racking up over 15.4 million votes, against Jonathan's approximately 12.8 million (INEC, 2015). Even as this result became clear, it was less than certain that a peaceful transition of power would take place. The campaign running up to the vote was marked by harsh, at times violent, rhetoric – with the most notable example coming from the president's wife, Patience Jonathan, who was recorded saying to a crowd that 'anyone that comes and tells you 'change' [the APC's campaign slogan] stone that person' (Ross, 2015, np). Violence had long gone hand in hand with voting in Nigeria, and the previous presidential election saw over 800 die in post-election violence (Mark, 2015). In the event, however, Goodluck Jonathan called Muhammadu Buhari on the evening of March 31st to concede defeat and cement a historical first in Nigeria's electoral history: the presidential incumbent had been unseated by a challenger.

The outcome of the election was described as 'a political earthquake' (Mark & Smith, 2015, np) and the reaction of media and think tanks worldwide was largely laudatory, with Kimenyi (2015, np) arguing that 'Nigerians are to be congratulated for advancing democracy'.

In this thesis, I focus on the campaign that led up to this result. Understanding this election represents an important goal – given its political import. However, in this thesis I zero in on a particular aspect of the campaign – focusing on the two major parties' use of digital media. There are several reasons that led to this choice. In the first place, it reflects a structural change in the use of communications infrastructure across Nigerian society, with internet penetration growing at a prodigious pace from the mid-2000s onwards, as mobile internet access became more and more affordable. According to one estimate, internet penetration in Nigeria leapt from a mere 3.1% in 2006 to 51.1% in 2015 (Internet world stats, 2019). The rapid nature of this uptake is compounded by Nigeria's youth-heavy demographic profile, with Owen and Usman (2015) noting that over 70% of the population is under 30 with a large portion of these young people accessing the internet regularly.

There is already evidence that the APC and PDP undertook internet campaigning during the Nigerian presidential election of 2015. Owen and Usman (2015) observed that an array of new media platforms was used by both parties – including campaign websites and presences on social media sites. This was in continuance of the internet

campaigning practices that were first adopted in Nigerian politics as early as the 2007 elections. Indeed, in 2011, Jonathan declared his candidacy on Facebook and scholars observed that there were ranges of social media platforms used by three major presidential candidates (Abubakar, 2012; Okoro & Nwafor, 2013). However, the scale of political engagement online had grown dramatically in the intervening years. Statistics from Goodluck Jonathan's Facebook account bear out the scale and pace of the growth of politicised web use in Nigeria in the years before the 2015 campaign. Opeibi (2016) notes that Jonathan's account had only 300,000 followers in 2010; this figure had grown to over 2 million by 2015. Felicia (2018) observes that over 13.6 million tweets relating to the presidential and state elections were posted in 2015. As such, rapid growth in both overall and politicized web use among the Nigerian electorate in 2015 created a political opportunity. Understanding how this opportunity was exploited by the APC and PDP is the central goal of this thesis.

It is also important to note the dominance exerted by the PDP in terms of both financial resources and access to traditional media in the 2015 campaign. For instance, Owen and Usman (2015) reports that as much as 2 trillion Naira (equivalent to approximately $10 billion) was spent by the PDP on their campaign. Indications of traditional media dominance include the (government owned) Nigerian Television Authority's decision to air damning documentaries about Buhari and his network during the campaign (European Union Election Observation Mission report, 2015; Commonwealth Observer Group report, 2015). In this context, with traditional modes of electioneering largely closed off, the internet offered significant advantages to challengers and its use is thus likely to help explain the APC's victory.

Yet, while both the market for and the presence of a vibrant internet campaign was noted in some overviews (Owen & Usman, 2015; Orji, 2015), the nature and impact of the internet campaign in the 2015 Nigerian presidential election remains understudied. Scholars such as Felicia (2018) and Opeibi (2016) have investigated the discursive strategies deployed by Nigerian campaign actors on Facebook (with an emphasis on the PDP), while Bartlett et al. (2015) examined the use of social media during and after the campaign, focusing on election results monitoring. These studies, while illuminating, fail to provide much insight into the decisions and dynamics that

can explain how the internet affected campaign practices in this momentous election. With this lacuna in mind, this thesis presents the most comprehensive study to date of the online campaigns of the APC and PDP in the 2015 Nigerian presidential election based on original research material provided by over 50 interviews conducted with campaign elites across the PDP and APC.

In this section, I have argued that this represents a substantively important topic to be addressed. In the next section, I will locate the thesis within a clearly delineated topic area and discipline and discuss how this study, and the case of Nigeria, can help to expand our understanding of how the internet influences political campaigns – a topic which is increasingly central to understanding the conduct of electoral democracy worldwide.

1.3 Delimiting the research topic addressed in this thesis

This research examines the impact of the internet on election campaign practices in modern Nigeria. Given their central role in the democratic process, it is hardly surprising that the study of elections is a staple of several disciplines – most notably the two that most directly inform this thesis – political science and media studies. Farrell (1996) defines election campaigns as 'the process by which a campaign organisation (be it party, candidate or special interest organisation) seeks to maximise electoral gains. It consists of all efforts (promotional or financial) made by the campaign organisation to meet that goal'(p.161). While many of the earliest scholarly accounts of elections from both traditions contain detailed discussions of the unfolding of the campaign leading up to voting day, the systematic study of campaign practices emerged rather later. It was only from the 1980s onward that an ever-growing number of studies began to systematically map and analyse the art of election campaigning (Harrop & Miller, 1987). This study is located firmly within this tradition; it follows Plasser and Plasser's (2002) seminal work by centring the analysis on achieving a more refined understanding of campaign practices. By campaign practices I refer to the means by which campaigns, as defined by Farrell, are conducted and the manner in which they are organised.

As we will see in the next (literature review) chapter – a central theme that runs across the study of campaign practices is their impermanence and responsiveness to change.

Changes in the structure of economies and societies and resultant declines in extent the of loyalty between segments of the electorate and the parties and candidates seeking to represent them have been highly important in this field (See, for instance, Dalton & Wattenberg, 2002). While acknowledging the significance of this insight, this thesis sits closer to those studies, which have focused on the role of changing communications technology and sought to examine how such changes impact on campaign styles.

Drilling further down, this thesis focuses on the role played by the internet in the communication technology/campaign practices nexus. While we may have a common sense understanding of the nature of the internet, from an academic perspective it is a rather broad concept, of which an authoritative definition remains elusive. As Cornfield (2004) makes clear, the terms 'internet' (or, 'the net') and 'world wide web' (or, 'the web') are phrases that are commonly used interchangeably in this area of research. From a technical point of view, there is a distinction to be made between the internet, which is a global network of interconnected servers that facilitates information sharing and exchange, and the web, which represents the portion of the internet that is accessible via web browsers. In this research, the term 'internet' is preferred in formal statements of research questions and key conclusions, as it covers aspects of campaign practice such as voter databases, private communications etc. that are not available on 'the web'. Discussing what the internet is Chadwick's (2006) states that 'the internet is a network of one-to one, one-to-many, many–to-many, and many-to-one local, national, and global information and communication technologies with relatively open standards, protocols, and comparatively low barriers to entry' (p.7). However, the interchangeability of 'internet' and 'web' in common parlance (and among my interview respondents) means that I use both terms over the course of the thesis. Another difficulty with the internet/web concept is that it refers to an extraordinarily dynamic communications technology. Central to the internet effects analysed in this thesis are the role of social media, network effects, and user-generated content. These dynamics were part of a broader evolution of the internet, labelled 'web 2.0', which was characterised via the concept of 'Web 2.0' in 2005 (O'Reilly, 2005). The extent to which such developments represented genuine changes from early iterations of the web and the precise meaning (and level of analytical usefulness) of

the term web 2.0 remain hotly contested a much-contested term (Anderson, 2007a; 2007b). Nonetheless, the emergence of this highly interactive, social media-dominated iteration of the internet has been foregrounded within several recent studies of elections focusing on changes in campaign practices and organisations. Such studies have begun to explore internal communication structures of party and campaign organisations, with focus on internal hierarchies and how internet campaigning can disrupt them (Dommett &Temple, 2018; Gustaffson, 2012; Kreiss, 2012; 2016; Vaccari & Valeriani, 2016).

While recent discussions have speculated on the political implications of 'web 3.0' (Biju, 2016), with artificial intelligence playing an increasingly prominent role in the analysis of political data, the temporal situation of my case study means that the web 2.0 concept and, especially, the role of social media are central to my analysis while the web 3.0 concept is not interrogated in detail.

While the above discussion captures the overarching concepts that inform my inquiry – the deeper contributions of the thesis emerge in application – that is, in seeking to understand how the internet influenced campaign practices in the Nigerian presidential election of 2015. The literature to date is dominated by the study of campaign practices in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member states where changes in campaign practices are evident and especially by American presidential elections. Significant achievements and innovations during Barack Obama's 2008 and 2012 election campaign put America at the forefront in the field of internet campaigning (Jungherr, 2016; Vaccari, 2013). Although there is less consensus on America being an internationally influential pioneer in election campaign practices, the success achieved with the internet by the Obama campaigns and innovative nature of their field practices is widely acknowledged (ibid).

While other developed nations have arguably been less successful in exploiting the potentialities of the internet for political campaigning (Giasson et al., 2019; Jackson & Lilleker, 2009) it is easy when focusing on the American example to assume that internet-driven changes in campaign practices can be ascribed to a process of technologically driven modernization. However, comparative studies show us that, the adoption and adaptation of internet campaigning practices is a non-linear process, and

one that is influenced by a number of factors (Vaccari, 2013). These factors include the electoral system, political culture and party organizational structures (see Chapters 2 and 4 for a deeper discussion). As such, though the internet is widely adopted in contemporary campaigns, its form of adaptation is context specific. These contextual factors are particularly important in understanding the use of the internet in states (such as Nigeria) that deviate significantly from the American case, as the use of the internet is combined with existing national campaign practices, creating new electoral campaign forms (Plasser & Plasser, 2002). Nigeria offers a compellingly unfamiliar political environment for the study of internet campaigning. Unfamiliar in terms of the dearth of literature that examines and explores the use of internet in developing countries and unfamiliar in the nature of campaign strategies that prevail during elections. As such, it is imperative that developing countries such as Nigeria are studied by scholars seeking to understand how the internet is changing campaign practices. Firstly, by profiling the use of the internet in the 2015 presidential campaign in Nigeria, this thesis contributes to the understanding of campaign changes within a wider campaign context. Most of the studies on internet campaigning have concentrated on the adoption and use of the web 2.0 in developed countries, especially America with an absence of a sustained focus on Nigeria and Sub-Saharan Africa more broadly – despite growing penetration of the internet and the increasing importance of political campaigns in the region. The case of Nigeria thus offers deeper insight into the changing practices of political campaigns globally. This dissertation extends the literature on the use of the internet in electoral campaigns, by providing a detailed analysis of presidential campaign in a country with electoral, cultural, political, and legal context that is in deep contrast with that of developed nations. The key insight that this case leads us towards an acknowledgement that, in order to understand the influences of the internet on campaign practices, it is necessary to prioritise the role of context. This presents a different perspective on the questions of how the internet affects modern campaigns and the factors that influence the uptake of internet campaigning. This study will seek to provide better understanding of the interaction between off-line and online politics, and how this has transformed political campaigning in Nigeria.

1.4 Research Question and Approach

In any piece of research, it is important to distil delineating discussions into concrete research questions, which guide the conduct and reporting of the study. In this thesis, the research is aimed at addressing one overarching research question, which is interrogated through three more specific subsidiary questions. These are as follows:

Key Research Question: How can we best understand the effects of internet campaigning on the campaign practices of the PDP and the APC in the 2015 Nigerian Presidential election?

Subsidiary Questions:

(a)   How was internet campaigning adopted and adapted by the campaign teams?

(b)   What factors help to explain variations in the internet campaigns practices of the presidential candidates of the PDP and APC?

 (c)   How did the web affect the intra-campaign organisational dynamics of the presidential candidates of the PDP and APC?

In terms of the approach adopted to address these research questions, this dissertation can be described as a qualitative, nested, comparative case study. The data is qualitative in the sense that it was derived from a series of semi-structured interviews with campaign elites, consultants, and volunteers. The analysis is also qualitative in nature, with three theoretical lenses: modernisation, Americanisation, and hybridisation used to unpack and interrogate the data. The case studies of the APC and PDP are nested in the sense that both pertain to the 2015 Nigerian presidential election, while their analysis is comparative in the sense that key similarities and differences across the two parties are outlined and investigated.

1.5 Thesis structure

In this final segment of the opening chapter, I lay out the overall plan of the thesis and seek to demonstrate how this plan allows for the research questions posed above to be addressed. The main body of the thesis commences in chapter two, which presents an in-depth analysis of the scholarly research that informs this project, outlining the state of the literature across a series of themes that directly speak to the research questions driving this thesis. The goal of this chapter is to organise, synthesise and critique this

extant literature, so that the contribution to knowledge that the project represents can be clearly delineated. In order to do so, the chapter begins by looking at broad accounts of the evolution of political campaigns, contending that an array of scholarly models of this process give considerable attention to changing modes of communication technology as being at the centre of transitions between 'phases' where certain clusters of campaign practices (or campaign styles) can be observed. The chapter then moves on to studies that focus on the functions and uses of the internet within political campaigns, a theme that corresponds to the notion of 'adoption and adaptation' contained in my first subsidiary research question. Next, I look at research on the uptake of internet campaigning, assessing what scholars have uncovered about the factors that encourage or inhibit it. This section corresponds to my second subsidiary research question. I then examine research that explores the influence of internet campaigning on political campaign organizations, a theme that corresponds to my final subsidiary research question. I conclude by noting the extent to which these studies are dominated by OECD states, and make a series of arguments about the contribution to the literature that this case study of Nigerian campaign practices represents.

Chapter three provides an overview of the dynamics of Nigerian politics by building on the assertion made in the previous chapter that a case like Nigeria, which diverges in many ways from the political systems through which the effects of the internet on campaign practices have been explored, requires an emphasis on context. The chapter provides a discussion of the history of electoral campaigning in Nigeria – drawing out a series of historically embedded, recurring themes that are important for understanding Nigerian electoral politics. It does so to provide a context within which the insights and findings of this thesis can be better understood. The chapter presents Nigeria's political culture, exploring Nigerian political history from independence to the fourth republic. Particular attention is given to the literature that speaks to the use of the internet during the fourth republic. Chapter 4 introduces the theoretical framework for the study. It presents a set of concepts and arguments that speak to the research questions and the main objective that animates the subject of this thesis. Three theoretical frameworks for understanding the interplay of communications technology, context, and campaign practices are presented: Modernization, Americanization, and Hybridization, each of which will serve as theoretical lens through which the empirical

data can be analysed. Key to this chapter is that each approach is treated not as competing in the sense of resulting in conflicting hypotheses. Instead, each approach provides us with a different set of analytical emphases and sensitising concepts that can be carried into the interpretation and analysis of the data gathered. It is through this multi-theoretic framework that I am able to arrive at a deeper understanding of the project's overarching research question, as well as generating a range of insights across the three subsidiary questions. Chapter 5 presents the methodological approach chosen to explore the research questions. It provides the choice of the methodological philosophy, the research strategy, the sampling techniques, data collection tools used, piloting, and the choice of thematic analysis adopted for the empirical data analysis. It also describes the process of ethical consideration, and finally the limitation of the research method. With this foundation firmly established, the analysis is divided across three chapters: 6-8. The analysis begins by unpacking the APC's internet campaign, beginning with an in-depth discussion of the challenges and opportunities faced by the party and its candidate, before guiding the reader through the major themes that emerged from the semi-structured interview. Each theme is interrogated through the three theoretical lenses outlined in chapter 4. This format is mirrored in chapter seven, where the focus is on the PDP internet campaign. These cases are then analysed comparatively in chapter eight – noting key similarities and differences across the two campaigns and using the theoretical framework to draw out insights across each of the three subsidiary research questions. Each theme is interrogated through the three theoretical lenses outlined in chapter 4. These findings are then analysed comparatively in chapter eight – noting key similarities and differences across the two campaigns and using the theoretical framework to draw out insights across each of the three subsidiary research questions. A concluding chapter draws these insights together, providing a discussion of the overall understanding generated in response to the overarching research question driving this thesis. It is argued that both modernisation and hybridisation have significant explanatory power. It is further argued that a modernisation perspective may benefit from further iterations of this study, as the PDP seeks to 'catch up' to the APC's campaign practices – but that the role of context, as emphasised by the hybridisation perspective, is likely to continue to be essential for a rounded understanding. The limitations of the study are considered,

most notably the difficulty of eliciting sensitive (and potentially politically damaging) information through the interview method, as well as the limitations of a single election focus. It is argued that future research on this topic should strive to integrate a wider range of methods, including analysis of the digital outputs of Nigerian campaigns, alongside interviews, as well as beginning to develop an over-time perspective by layering developments in subsequent elections onto the findings of this thesis.

Chapter Two: Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the research literature that directly speaks to the questions driving this thesis. The central, overarching research question is as follows:

How can we understand the role of internet campaigning by the PDP and the APC in the 2015 Nigerian Presidential election? In posing this question, the thesis is situated within a long tradition of research on the evolution of political campaigning. As such, this chapter will begin by summarising the insights of a range of scholars who have sought to characterise broad trends in campaigning over time. While these accounts differ regarding the extent of analytical emphasis placed on communications technology, none ignores it entirely, and many emphasise its role. As this discussion will demonstrate, there is a broad consensus across a range of scholars that election campaigns can be mapped over time into various 'ages', 'phases', 'eras' or 'stages'. In the next section of this chapter, the key characteristics of these phases are unpacked, paying particular attention to their treatment of the effects and use of emerging communication technologies. This section culminates in a discussion of the contention that contemporary campaigns are part of a 'fourth phase' of political campaigning, driven by various features of the Web 2.0 internet.

In subsequent sections, the chapter moves towards a narrower set of meso-level questions about the nature, uptake and effects of internet campaigning. This discussion focuses on research interrogating the use of digital campaign tools by political campaigns, rather than research examining the extent to which those usages proved politically advantageous (for an overview of research with an emphasis on the electoral benefits associated with digital campaigning see: Gibson, 2012). This part of the chapter is structured in a manner that aligns with the three sub-questions through which this thesis addresses its over-arching research question:

(a) How was internet campaigning adopted and adapted by the (PDP and APC) campaign teams?

(b) To the extent that the internet campaigns of the PDP and APC varied, what factors help to explain this?

(c) How did the web affect the intra-campaign organisational dynamics of the PDP and APC?

Firstly, an exploration of the literature on the adoption and adaptation of digital technologies by political campaigns is provided. This literature has focused on how campaigns have used the internet and related technologies to achieve key campaign goals. This branch of the literature has evolved alongside the internet itself – and we note that the advent of 'Web 2.0' has been a key inflection point in the insights, theories, and methods within this subfield. Secondly, the literature explaining variation in the uptake of internet campaigning is interrogated. We again note how this literature has shifted in line with the underlying technology that it is exploring and outline a range of factors that this literature has identified as being significant for variation in the uptake of the web by political campaigns. We then examine research relating to the sub-question concerning the impact of internet campaigning on the structure and organisation of election campaigns. In a final section, some important lacunae in the literature are identified, allowing for the contribution of the research contained in this thesis to be specified.

2.2 Exploring the role of communications technology in the evolution of political campaigns.

This study can be located within a body of literature that has sought to characterise the evolution of campaigns. Many scholars have provided frameworks to capture over-time developments in political campaigning (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999; Farrell & Webb, 2000; Norris, 2000; Plasser & Plasser, 2002; 2009; Römmele & Von Schneidmesser, 2016). A common element within this discussion is the notion that, while individual campaigns provide important innovations and variations, major trends and/or patterns in political campaigning can be identified as having occurred in a series of phases (as we will discuss, several nomenclatures have been deployed to convey this insight). As we elaborate in Table 12.1 – these trends and patterns cover a number of dimensions associated with political campaigning – including: the structure and organisation of the campaign; the types of tools and techniques used to communicate with voters; the mechanisms through which campaigns gain feedback from supporters; the nature of the electorate and the communication/targeting strategy that the campaign employs to connect to this electorate. It is important to note that,

given the sequencing involved in this process, campaigns in later phases often incorporate aspects from earlier phases – with, for instances, even the most technologically-advanced campaign continues to employ door-to-door canvassing, yard signs, t-shirts and other such 'hardware' associated with earlier phases (Gibson & Rommele, 2001; Norris, 2000). Changes in communications technology are of central, though not exclusive, importance to nearly all such classificatory systems. As the subsequent discussion will outline, the transition from one phase to another is typically associated with the advent and mass adoption of a major form of communications technology. Certainly, such changes have co-occurred with shifts in the organisation of the economy, the nature of socio-demographic political cleavages, and the availability of new tools for better understanding the mood and desires of the electorate (for example, the advent of survey research and, more recently, 'big data' techniques drawing on the analysis of social media) and consequent emergence of an ever-growing cadre of campaign professionals. Nonetheless, the nature of the communications system that characterises a society at a given stage of technological development is widely acknowledged to have significant repercussions for various aspects of political campaigning. As we will show, the mass adoption of the internet has been central to more recent evaluations of major tendencies across campaigns – indeed, we shall spend some time discussing the contention that changes in the nature of the internet as a communications medium lie at the heart of the most recent campaign phase. The following discussion presents insights from this literature, noting the general features of each stage of campaigning and focusing on the role of emerging and changing communication technologies over time.

2.2.1 Learning to deal with a mass electorate: The First Phase

The advent of mass enfranchisement in a range of proto-democratic systems was a process that followed uneven trajectories in a range of countries, typically resulting from the removal or diminishment of property qualifications and occurring from the mid to late 19th century (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2000). This structural transformation of the political system obliged political actors to engage in campaigns that involved larger numbers of voters than had heretofore been the case. The common activities and behaviours that emerged in response to this challenge have been referred to by various terms such as 'pre-modern' (Norris, 2000); 'Age 1' (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999); 'the

Newspaper age' (Farrell, 1996); (Farrell & Webb, 2000) and 'stage 1' (Farrell & Webb, 2000). According to Norris (2000), over the course of the 19th century up until the 1950s, campaigns were characterised by their reliance on human capital, which was reflected in decentralised party organisations with power, influence and resources dispersed across local power brokers, upon whom the central campaign teams relied heavily. Campaigning in this phase was decentralised, allowing for individual participation amongst volunteers and party members party who participated in rallies, town hall meetings and door-to door campaign (ibid). Campaigns were physically decentralised with local canvassing, town halls meetings and rallies (Trent & Friendenberg, 2004) as central events. Such events were typically marked by the creation, dissemination, and manifestation of physical markers of loyalty to a party or candidate – including such 'hardware' as rosettes, yard signs, posters, and party/candidate badges, ribbons, and clothing. This person-to-person approach was complimented by information dissemination via a partisan press, toward segments of the electorate anchored by strong partisan loyalty. Norris (2000) describes this stage as a time where political parties dominated the political communication, where parties relied on the traditional party bureaucracies and party volunteers to disseminate information. This phase of campaigning was party-dominated, political parties campaign messages were substantial and readily given coverage in the media (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999). 'Political communication flows ran more with than against the partisan grain and many voters responded accordingly—via selectivity and reinforcement' (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999, p. 212). This argument is further supported by Gibson and Römmele (2001) who stated that the first phase of campaigning were issue based campaigns, based on convictions to ideology, and enabled by a partisan press, with wide support from voters aligned ideologically to the party. In terms of resources and organisation, most accounts argue that campaigns in this period were organised in a largely ad-hoc manner by the party leadership, perhaps with the assistance of a few loyal advisors, who controlled the central campaign theme. Campaign messages were developed by advisors based on conference debates, and informal feedback from grassroots members in local constituencies (Norris, 2000). There was little to no use of survey research, which was only emerging as a viable technique towards the end of this phase, and professional

political consultants were not widely employed (ibid.). Of the various aspects of this first phase of campaigning that have persevered into contemporary campaigning – this dimension of 'amateurism' has fared the worst. As Farrell and Webb (2000) note, the overall trajectory of campaigning has been toward an ever greater professionalisation of the endeavour. Campaigns adopting ad hoc planning and relying on informal advice from non-specialists are usually poorly resourced, candidates or parties, who often have little realistic prospect of election (Sudulich, Wall, & Farrell, 2013). On the other hand, human capital-intensive, face-to-face interactions continue to be an important aspect of contemporary, large scale campaigning (Nielsen, 2012) and forms of partisan media (including, but not restricted to, newspapers) continue to be a primary news source for large numbers of citizens (Semetko, 2010).

2.2.2 Looking good on Television: The Second Phase

The second phase of campaigning is closely associated with the mass adoption of television – indeed Farrell (1996) describes this phase as 'the Television Age'. It is also referred to as the era of the modern campaign (Norris, 2000), as Age2 (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999), as phase 2 (Farrell & Webb, 2000) and as the Second Age (Gibson & Rommele,2001). This campaign phase is broadly understood to have emerged from the mid-1950s (the time at which television emerged as a widespread technology) and to have continued into the mid/late-1980s. At the heart of many of the changes and commonalities in campaigning that characterise this period is the capacity of television to bring a candidate or party leader into the living rooms of millions of voters simultaneously (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999; Norris, 2000). Perhaps unsurprisingly, the television age is largely acknowledged to have led to a focus on the personalities and images of candidates/party leaders, and the dissemination of coherent, nationwide themes that could speak to a wide swathe of the electorate (Farrell, 1996).

Political parties and candidates sought to effectively use television, by seeking to maximize positive coverage in the main media outlets, as well as, in jurisdictions where it was permitted, buying positive coverage by targeting voter contacts via paid television spots (Norris, 2000; Farrell, 2000). At the same time, it became possible to gain increasingly detailed, nationally representative feedback on candidates' images and campaign messages as polling matured as a research technique (Geer, 2004). These developments spurred the need for consultants with specialised skills in the

realms of strategic communication, image building, the production of television spots, conducting research on public opinions, marketing, and campaign management (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999; Norris, 2000; Plasser & Plasser, 2009). These professionals were largely to be found within their party ranks in party centred democracies, while candidate-centred democracies employed the services of consultants outside the parties (Farrell, 2000). The necessity of professional expertise combined with (in some countries) the costs of creating and disseminating television ads marked a shift from grassroots volunteerism to directed campaigns associated with an enhancement of central control in the hands of both political leaders and campaign professionals working out of national offices as well as a tendency towards more sustained, long term planning (Norris, 2000).

These practical and technical campaign changes occurred in tandem with broader changes in the relationship between political parties and the electorate. This can be seen in the transition from the classical mass party as described by Duverger (1959), towards catch-all (Kircheimer, 1969) and electoral-professional (Panebianco, 1988) models – where the appeal of parties was broadened and parties' connections to deeper socio-demographic cleavages were weakened. These developments in party organisation as well as the use of the television arguably strengthened the positions of national leaders and professional advisors and eroded the collective power of activists and volunteers (Norris, 2000; Gibson & Römmele, 2001).

Overall, the innovations and implications of this phase of campaigning continue to reverberate today. In the first place, while there has been a substantial fragmentation of news media – television continues to be of vital importance to any major, national campaign effort (Biocca, 2013). Furthermore, the process of professionalisation of campaigns witnessed in this phase has continued apace. However, further changes were afoot that would continue to challenge the established order of political campaigning.

2.2.3 Welcome to the web: The Third and Fourth Phases

At the heart of the transition from the second to the third phase of campaigning identified as having occurred in the early mid-1990s by a range of scholars (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999; Farrell, 1996; Farrell & Webb, 2000; Gibson & Rommele, 2001; Norris, 2000), were two major changes to the communications environment within which campaigns operated. In the first place, the 'Golden Age of Television' (Young & Perkins, 2006) where leading candidates could command the attention of large segments of the population by dominating political coverage on a small number of national broadcasters was soon supplanted by a growing fragmentation of the medium: as more and more channels emerged, the nature of television as a medium changed. According to Blumler and Kavanagh (1999) 'this phase is marked by a combination of media abundance, ubiquity, reach, and celerity' (p.213). This trend resulted in an increase in media fragmentation and a decrease in the size of political news audiences. In responses, political communication became increasingly diverse and tailored to narrower audiences. The opportunities provided by the proliferation of various channels was also observed with the introduction of the internet, allowing for greater benefits to those who could utilise them effectively. These developments provided both novel opportunities and fresh challenges for campaigns. Many political organisations adopted a more refined marketing logic in the communications strategies, with a shift towards messages disseminated to smaller slices of electorates based on segmentation and narrow casted appeals (Farrell & Webb, 2000; Plasser & Plasser, 2002). 'In a sense, the adoption of interactive technologies represents a return to some of the more localized forms of party communication that characterized the people intensive era' (Norris, 2003, p. 13). The internet appeared to facilitate a bridge between the passive stage of local activism and the national-passive forms of communication favoured in phase two.

According to Mancini and Swanson (1996)

> The fragmentation of social interests and identities and the growing aggregation of citizens into small and medium-sized groups have caused a return to the popularity of microcircuits of communication and interpersonal

forms of communication which television had in many cases debased if not destroyed altogether (p.14)

The professionalisation that emerged during the second stage continued to develop apace in the third stage. Parties established specialised campaign departments, often with a physical decision-making and nerve centre being created in the form of a campaign 'war room' (Dulio & Towner, 2010). The planning and even execution of campaigns moved from being a long-term endeavour to a 'permanent' political function, enmeshed more thoroughly in all aspects of politics (Norris, 2000) and the personalities of leaders and candidates became increasingly central to campaign messaging (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999; Farrell & Webb, 2000; Norris, 2003). These developments transformed political parties, increasing the use of consultants (Plasser & Plasser, 2002), with opposition research by specialists conducted within parties (Farrell, 2000). These professional consultants with expertise in communication and news management would come to exercise similar authority to party leaders in executing their functions (Norris, 2002). The introduction of the internet also allowed for local organising with the local parties in charge of sending emails and organising platforms enabling mobilising support programmes (Norris, 2003). This third stage of campaign has been described as a 'bifurcation' of campaign structure (Gibson and Römmele, 2001, p. 34). Which implies a devolution of the concentration of authority on the central, as authority is centrally controlled albeit spread across various structures at the same time (Zittel, 2009). Howard (2006) elaborates on this theme by arguing that campaigns in the third phase became increasingly nationally coordinated while at the same time becoming more operationally decentralized. Local organisations became more independent from central campaign, using various forms of internet tools such as emails, listservs and intranet forums in mobilising support for parties (Norris, 2003). The third phase of campaigning saw a return to some of the themes of the first stage of campaigning, such as the provision of more information with opportunities for direct communication, faster ways of receiving feedback and allowing for self-publishing, which enables people to contribute to the campaign if they choose to and creating and building relationships for more targeted and personalised messages (Ward et al., 2003).

However, while many of the scholarly accounts of the history of campaigning treat the third phase as an endpoint (in the sense that this was their best approximation of the state of play when writing) there were always arguments that a further transition was in the offing. For example, Norris (2000) argued that it was highly likely that the various use of the web in this era such as the political use of emails, websites, list-servers, user-groups, and party intranets would continue to evolve. What was difficult to foresee at that time, however, was the nature of that evolution.

The term 'web 2.0' captures a set of related technological and usage developments that fundamentally re-shaped the internet as a communications medium from the mid-2000s onwards. While there are many dimensions to this concept (see: Anderson, 2007 and O'Reilly, 2005 for a fuller discussion), at its heart is a combination of a larger number of internet users being able to upload their own content (captured in the notion of 'user generated content') and a focus on networks of connected individuals, who chose to share information amongst themselves (Jackson & Lilleker, 2009). The most prominent outgrowth of this phenomenon is the prominence of social networking sites (SNS). Lilleker et al., (2017) state that 'while a website has become a standard campaign tool, the new election battleground is increasingly found on social media' (p.3). The interactive virtual space of web 2.0 has enabled new forms of participation in campaigns, allowing new forms of sharing and discussions (Bimber, 2014). These changes in the architecture of the internet, and parties' adaptation to the opportunities and challenges that they presented, have led several scholars to assert that we have now entered a new, fourth, campaign phase (Blumler, 2016; Lilleker et al., 2015; Römmele & Von Schneidmesser, 2016; Vergeer, Hermans, & Sams, 2013). In this age of campaigning the internet is paramount in the relationships between political actors, voters and journalists (Lilleker et al., 2015). Contemporary accounts thus view electoral campaigning as being 'internet-assisted' (Nielsen, 2011).

As Blumler (2016) puts it:

> But if there is a fourth age of political communication, its crux must be the ever-expanding diffusion and utilization of Internet facilities – including their continual innovative evolution – throughout society, among all institutions

with political goals and with politically relevant concerns and among many individual citizens (p.26).

In this age of campaigns, campaigns utilise various platforms that use the interface of the web to provide various supports for campaign practices. Some tools are openly available and widely used like emails and certain social networking sites, while others are not and require large resources to build and maintain. Examples are bespoke websites. Nielsen (2011) states that even well-funded political organizations utilise today's relatively open internet which enable campaigns extend their reach and communicate with more people beyond those on their network. Thus, campaigners can target several different audiences, which include browsers who accidently engage with a site, information seekers, those who purposefully go in search of information, issue activists who are specific in their search in order to engage with policy makers and supporters (Koc-Michalska et al., 2014a).

Understanding the implications of this phase for the organisation of political campaigns and the extent of centralisation of power within campaigns is an on-going process. Ward et al., (2003) argue that the use of the internet enabled the decentralisation of campaigns and reduced the control of the campaign headquarters over campaign. This was further reinforced by the emergence of web 2.0, which allowed supporters and activists to participate in campaign activities, further reducing and reconfiguring political campaigns from a centralised point. This has led to several scholars identifying a greater capacity for volunteers and citizens to engage directly with campaigns (Gibson, 2015; Jackson & Lilleker, 2009a; Karlsen, 2013; Kreiss, 2012; Lilleker & Jackson, 2010).

According to Römmele and Von Schneidmesser (2016) 'citizens and voters are no longer merely the object of campaign strategies, in mediatized campaigns; they have become the subjects as well' (p. 430). However, the extent to which this represents an empowerment of citizens and activists is widely debated. As 'campaigns continue to become more professionalized and focused on marketing and branding (Owen, 2018, p. 27) campaigns create 'circumstances within which activists work as brand advocates' (Lilleker & Jackson, 2015, p. 171). This suggests a departure from the more centralised political campaign models of phases 2 and 3 but has unclear implications

for the distribution of power within campaign organisations. Part of this development is a growing overlap between 'digital/new' and 'traditional' media - the fourth phase is characterized by a hybrid communications environment (Chadwick, 2013), where news stories as well as political campaigns take place simultaneously across an array of intersecting media. Nevertheless, Koc-Michalska et al., (2014b, p. 188) states that:

> Political communication and election strategy must, in the age of online social communication, ensure that any single item of content is designed for multiple forms of consumption and disseminated in ways that can be collected by journalists, supporters, or Web browsers alike at multiple communication junctions.

For instance, a major campaign gaffe recorded on television might be further disseminated and supplemented via SNS, or a story or rumour that breaks online may come to dominate coverage in traditional media. Therefore, in this fourth campaign phase a variety of old and new media is used in a hybrid media campaign, with social networks becoming central to a hybrid campaign (Cepernich & Bracciale, 2018). An adjacent concept is that of the hypermedia campaigns (Howard, 2006). The hypermedia campaign, seeks to maximize the use of the different forms of information communication tools, allows for instant transmission and micro-managing messages through social networks and mass media outlets (Howard, 2006). This also changes political actors' campaigners' approach 'from classic political marketing to relationship marketing' (Vaccari, 2013, p. 9). This is further supported by Lilleker & Jackson (2015) who state that hypermedia campaigns encompass both transactional and relationship marketing paradigms, starting from Dean's campaign of 1994 to Obama's campaign of 2008 which provides examples of this form of campaigns.

In this stage of campaigning, the process of content creation has thus become both more and less professionalised at once (Römmele & Von Schneidmesser, 2016). On the one hand, the use of mundane tools such as the various social networking sites, with their default features and emails, do not require certain expertise. The influx of these mundane tools allows for the undoing of long-standing deep-rooted system of party command control to separation of independent and individualised campaigns (Jacobs & Spierings, 2016). On the other hand, the growing reliance on digital media

further leads to a form of 'computational management style in which staffers delegated key managerial, allocative, and design decisions to the results of rigorous and ongoing data analysis' (Kreiss, 2012, p.23).Political campaigners have varying degrees of data sets ranging from data of state voter files and extended to include private and public data sets, which enables better forecasting of voters tendency in supporting a party (Endres & Kelly, 2017). This increased the reliance of consultants in electoral campaigns, with new grade of consultants, who possess skills in data gathering and analytics (Kreiss, 2016; Kreiss & Howard, 2010; Serazio, 2014). At the same time, Kreiss (2016) suggest a 'deprofessionalisation of campaign staff in the attempt to spur knowledge transfer into politics from the technology and commercial sectors and technological innovation' (p. 4). Again, such consultants are typically expensive and require long time horizons to work from – furthering the costs and continuing the 'permanent' nature of campaigning associated with phase 3. These new forms of target communication include collaboration with Facebook, Twitter, Microsoft and Google pioneered during the 2012 United States campaign of Barack Obama and Mitt Romney (Kreiss, 2016; Kreiss & McGregor,2018). This was also demonstrated during the 2017 British election. Parties in the United Kingdom have demonstrated the use of Facebook advertisement, with both the conservatives and labour using this in varying degrees. While labour party was geared towards voters' registration, with the Labour party using 'a new organisational tool, Promote, which allowed local parties to target their own Facebook adverts' (Dommett & Temple, 2018, p.190). The conservative party approach was towards promoting their candidate and smearing the leadership profile of the labour party leader (Dommett & Temple, 2018). The use of these innovative forms of political communication, led to a hybrid mode of organising that is both top-down control and bottom-up empowerment, which is assisted mainly by effective use of various sources data (Vacarri, 2010). To summarise the sweep of this part of the literature, table 2.1 below captures the key lines of inquiry and major trends identified across the four phases discussed. In this table the 'new' aspects of each phase are listed, with an understanding that, as discussed, many of the key developments of earlier phases continue to play a role in new phases.

Campaign Aspect	1st Phase	2nd Phase	3rd Phase	4th Phase
Media	Print media, rallies, face-to-face interactions. Partisan press, local posters and pamphlets, radio broadcasting.	Broadcast television, advertisements, evening news, targeted direct mail	Fragmentation of television stations, campaign and mediated websites, email, online discussion groups, intranets.	Growing prevalence of Web 2.0 internet, SNSs, hybrid media system.
Feedback	Long canvasing and Party meetings	Occasional opinion polls	Focus groups and interactive web sites	Data collected from social media platforms
Campaign events	Local public meetings, whistle-stop leadership tours, canvassing.	News management daily press conferences and controlled photo opportunities.	Extension of news management to capture rolling news coverage in a wider range of channels and online.	Online-SNS based events including virtual appearances and interactions facilitated by SNS capabilities.
Mode/ style	Labour-intensive, interpersonal.	Capital-intensive, mediated and indirect.	Capital–intensive, marketing logic with voters monitored and targeted continuously.	Capital and labour intensive, data driven, narrow cast.
Approach to the Electorate	Stable social and partisan alignment; target audience largely homogenous socially defined groups to be mobilised.	Social and partisan dealignment; target audience extending to the whole population to be persuaded.	Social and partisan dealignment; target audience divided into marketing segments. Consumer orientation to voters.	Social and partisan dealignment; multiple messaging focused on individuals or microsegments. Creating political images and messages that resonate.

Table 2.1: *Key Insights from the Literature on Campaign Practices.*

Source: Adapted from Norris (2003, p.15); Gibson and Rommele (2001, p. 34) Magin et al., (2016, p.3).

2.3 Understanding the role of the internet in political campaigns.

The above section ends the first part of this chapter's review of the literature, which addresses the evolution of campaign practices and discusses the notion that campaigns can be separated into relatively discrete phases with certain traits. With this baseline established, the review now turns to literature that has focused exclusively on the role of the internet in contemporary campaigns. In doing so, we replicate the structure of the three sub-questions that guide this research, breaking the extant literature into: 1) research that bears on the adoption and adaptation of digital tools by campaigns; 2) Research that seeks to explain the influence and variations in the usage of internet campaign tools across and within various countries; 3) research that focuses on understanding how the internet has influenced the organisational dynamics of campaigns.

Given the evolving nature of the internet as a communications medium, it is important to acknowledge that research across all three of these themes has been forced to deal with a rapidly changing technological and political context. This is particularly true in discussion of the various usages to which the internet has been put by campaigns as they adopted and adapted it to their purposes. The next section provides insights on the relationship of campaigns to the evolving use of the internet as a campaign tool.

2.3.1 Adoption and adaptation of the digital campaign tools by political actors.

This section chronicles the development of the web as a campaign tool, with a focus of the patterns of adoption and adaptation of the internet and surrounding technologies to suit the purposes of national election campaigns. The discussion centres on the affordances of the internet and their capacities to influence interaction and communication between politicians and citizens. Several early studies of online campaigning adopted such an approach. For instance, looking at early internet campaigns, Gibson and Ward (2000) outline several novel affordances offered by the internet as a communications technology, noting its capacity for hosting large amounts of information, which could be communicated at great speed and in a range of multimedia formats. They also noted an interesting tension between, on the one hand, the internet's capacity to facilitate greater interactivity and on the other, the absence of constraint on political actors in keeping control of the conveyed messages, due to

the lack of reliance on media actors as communicative intermediaries. Various early studies provided different typologies on the functions of the internet in a political campaign. Foot and Schneider (2006,) identify four practices: 'informing, involving, connecting, and mobilizing' (p.22). Lilleker and Vedel (2013) identified three functions: informing, mobilising and interacting. Bimber and Davis (2003) point to different roles, tailored messages to targeted audiences, engaging supporters, mobilizing volunteers, and raising funds. Gibson and Ward (2000) posit that the web provides broad-based functions of 'information provision, campaigning, resource generation, networking, organization strengthening and promoting participation' (p. 305). These studies demonstrated the broad agreement on the functions of the web in political campaigns. The early use of the internet was mostly to attract the attention and reinforce opinions of those interested in the candidate (Bimber & Davis, 2003). Therefore, digital media and especially campaign websites were largely seen as helpful for 'preaching to the converted' (Norris, 2003, p. 24), but not for changing attitudes. It also included convincing non - supporters and encouraging supporters to participate in the campaign (Bimber & Davis, 2003). The internet allowed for further dissemination of information beyond those interested in politics to a much larger audience through their networks (Norris & Curtice, 2008). This is a further supported by Vaccari (2008b) who argue that the use of political websites reinforces opinions and mobilise supporters. A considerable number of studies reveals that the audiences of party websites are a select audience, comprising of people with partisan interest (Koc-Michalska et al.,2014a; Norris, 2003).

In general, early empirical research on online campaigning mostly focused on campaign websites. Davis (1999) conducted a descriptive study of American candidate websites in 1996 and found that the more popular and established political parties were more likely to offer basic interactive features, such as email addresses on their sites. Subsequently, however, Kamarck's (1999) study on the use of websites in the United States in 1998 found that most candidates did not provide opportunities for interaction. Most campaign sites only contained information on issue position and bibliographic information. Foot et al., (2007) surveyed and analysed the sites of the thirteen presidential candidates that were active in the 2000 American election; and found that these candidates were reluctant to use the web in a participatory manner. The

interaction was mostly of a top–down fashion with interactivity mostly absent. These findings are echoed by further studies conducted in the United Kingdom. During the 1997 general election the use made by political parties of the internet was described as 'truly dire' (Chadwick, 2006, p. 158), concentrating mainly on information provision. Similarly, Ward & Gibson (1998) conducted a content analysis on the online strategy of the 1997 election on party web sites and found that the web was mainly used to provide information. Further studies conducted in the United Kingdom elections of 2001 also lend support to the earlier findings. Ward and Gibson (2003) found that although campaigns created slightly more sophisticated websites compared to 1997, information provision was still largely top-down. These 'websites often acted as little more than static on-line leaflets' (Ward & Gibson, 2003, p.188). Coleman (2001) also aligns with these findings, as his research concluded that the various British parties in the 2001 election embraced the provision of information and neglected the interactivity of the internet. Overall, the early studies point towards more information dissemination and less interaction (Ward et al, 2005; Stromer-Galley, 2000; Norris, 2003; Gibson et al., 2003). This conservatism is in contrast to the opportunity of interactivity which is one of the herald features of the internet. As Stewart, Pavlou and Ward (2002 cited in Druckman et al., 2009, p. 24) suggest: 'the most interesting and novel attribute of the internet is their capability for interactivity, which is becoming increasingly more pronounced with the infusion of more-advanced communication media'. This is not to say that campaigns showed no signs of interactivity, but rather to emphasise a consistent finding that, when it came to websites, information dissemination largely took precedence over interactivity indicating a normalisation of online campaigning.

Studies subsequently began to demonstrate the proliferation of campaign websites that enabled interactivity, whereby information was delivered in more engaging ways and more opportunities provided for more participation by citizens, but little changed in the nature of interaction between voters and politicians (Vergeer, 2013). In 2004, this new form of web was labelled as web 2.0 (O'Reilly, 2005). This marked a turning point for many aspects of the internet and marked a radical shift in its communicative affordances and usages as a campaign instrument. Web 2.0, which emphasizes user-generated content, places greater emphasis on the importance of users' networks of friends and associates, facilitates online collaboration and sharing, allowed for new

types of political networking and participation (Musser & O'Reilly, 2006). Web 2.0 facilitates 'asynchronous or symmetrical conversations taking place within a variety of online environments' (Lilleker & Jackson, 2010, p.72). As Druckman et al., (2009) state 'As new presentation and interactive technologies continue to develop, the tension is between retaining control over the message that visitors receive and the desire to develop an engaging web site that stimulates interest and support'(p. 429). The various forms of engagement allowed by parties and candidates is premised on the use of interactive features. Several studies attempt to understand and classify interaction in online campaigning. These studies demonstrated that interactivity as a concept is complex and multi-faceted (Kiousis, 2002; Bucy, 2004) and can come in the forms of either human or mediated interaction (Stromer–Galley, 2000). Stromer–Galley (2004) referred to these forms of interaction as interactivity-as-product, whereby interaction was with the site and interactivity-as-process reflects a conversation. In an attempt at an all-inclusive definition Kiousis (2002) suggests that:

> Interactivity can be defined as the degree to which a communication technology can create a mediated environment in which participants can communicate (one-to-one, one-to-many, and many-to-many), both synchronously and asynchronously, and participate in reciprocal message exchanges (third-order dependency) (p.372).

How does this translate to online campaign practices? Gibson et al. (2003) developed an early framework that differentiates between information provision and participation features on campaign websites such as calendars and frequently asked questions and participation. They stated that participatory behaviour ranges from site-based interaction between the user and the architecture of the site itself that directs communication with elites. The constant changing sets on interactive online feature and the arrival of new features brought by the development of the web 2.0 makes classification of interactivity a difficult task (Lee, 2013). However, several studies have argued that media interaction was favoured above human interaction because the latter are burdensome to the campaign, candidates fear loss of control of messages and ambiguity over communication (Jackson & Lilleker, 2009a; Lilleker et al., 2011; Stromer-Galley, 2000). As Coleman (2001) puts it, 'letting political opponents loose

on online bulletin boards is a high-risk strategy and political marketing is about winning votes not chatting with the enemy' (p. 681). Furthermore, limited resources in terms of staff and time in monitoring and responding to communication, was also a contributory factor (Jackson, 2003).

Nevertheless, presidential aspirant Howard Dean, during the 2004 US campaign pioneered a more interactive form of campaign with the creation of the Dean's Call for Action Blog (Kerbel & Bloom, 2005) and his campaign's use of meetup.com, a web platform that allowed for interaction, recruitment of volunteers, enabled citizens self-organise on behalf of the campaign and provide feedbacks to the campaign (Hindman,2005). Beyond using Dean's blog and meetup, Dean's campaign manager sought to garner more attention to the campaign by purposefully targeting influential personalities that had personal blogs (Gibson & McAllister, 2006).

 While studies subsequently began to demonstrate the proliferation of campaigns websites that enabled interactivity as product, whereby information was delivered in more engaging ways. For instance, during the 2010 British election, the Labour Party allowed online activists to update elements on their web page. The Conservative blue blog also allowed comments, with BNP being the most interactive and allowed for comments, uploads and the opportunity of sharing (Jackson & Lilleker, 2010). Lilleker & Malagon's (2010) study of the 2007 French election revealed that both Ségolène Royal and Nicolas Sarkozy enabled user participation, although in minor forms, signifying an increase in interactivity from previous elections. Royal had an official campaign website (www.desirsdavenir. org), and a blog which allowed her supporters the 'Ségosphere' (her grassroots online movement, opportunities to contribute to her manifesto (Lilleker & Malagon, 2010; Vaccari, 2008a). Sarkozy's campaign also had a website (www.sarkozy.fr) where some professionals endorsed his candidacy on various videos on his campaign websites, with him also offering virtual meetings with the electorates, enabling him access voters' thoughts on his leadership (Vaccari, 2008a).

Lilleker & Vedel (2013) have suggested that perhaps Obama's 2008 campaign took some cues from Royal's. However, many scholars point to the 2008 Obama campaign as a turning point in online campaigning. Watt al et al. (2010) describes it as 'savvy

use of the Internet' (p. 670). Obama's campaign premiered the effective incorporation of information communication technologies during campaigns (Kalnes, 2016). Yet others have argued that his campaign might just be an outlier (Vacarri, 2013). Vacarri (2010) acknowledges that Obama's campaign may serve as a model for imitation, but the impact of his efforts was based on his personality and campaign message which resonated with a large number of electorates and was effective in its coordination with grassroots supporters. Lilleker and Jackson (2015) describes the Obama 2008 and 2012 elections as 'a hybrid model between candidate-centred persuasive communication and party-centred mobilisation tactics' (p.179). This blurs the distinction between party and candidate centred when it comes to the mode of communication. Nevertheless, Obama's 2008 campaign offered an unprecedented form of campaign co-creation in a political campaign (Lilleker & Jackson, 2010; Stromer-Galley, 2014). The Obama campaign seemed to have influenced candidates and party behaviour in various countries. Obama enabled a degree of co-production in the campaign, by allowing users to become involved in producing campaign messages during the election campaign, encouraging users to organise and mobilise volunteers, and discuss issues linked to the candidate through his social networking site (Cogburn & Espinoza-Vasquez, 2011; Talbot, 2008).

In contrast, a contemporaneous study of German online campaigning found that information dissemination was preferred over mobilisation and participatory elements (Schwetizer, 2011). The 2010 British election also demonstrated that though hubs were created by the parties (LibDem Act, My Conservatives and Labour Membersnet) they only allowed user-generated content for party members. Jackson and Lilleker (2009) concluded that UK parties practiced what they refer to as "web 1.5" where communication process is about informing rather than interacting. In Canada, Giasson et al., (2019) found that political party's practice what he refers to as "web 1.75" campaigns, an indication of a more interactivity use and a closer realisation of the effective use of the features of web 2.0. These online organisational hubs allowed limited and different forms of participation. Its use was not as successful as that of Obama, as their social networking sites had few members and less activism. However, comparative studies have shown relatively little variation in the extent of interactivity allowed by online campaigns. For instance, Vacarri's (2013) study of six countries

(Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States) within the period between 2006 and 2010 found a balance between information provision and opportunities for voter participation, with similar design and delivery of websites content. He goes further to suggest that a process of cross-country standardisation in online campaigning is occurring, whereby 'political actors across the Western world feature a "kernel" of core features on their online presence' (Vacarri, 2013, p. 115). This was supported by Lilleker and Jackson's (2011) comparative study of the 2009 European election, which revealed that the websites of countries compared were similar in design, though parties offered differing features.

Similar online campaign practices have been demonstrated across several countries. For instance, the Spanish election of 2008 where Vacarri's (2013) study revealed that the Socialist workers' party (PSOE) built a web platform linked to both party and candidate's websites named La Mirada Positiva (The positive look). On this platform, users could submit policy ideas and address questions to the prime minister. The party also created a cyber-progressive volunteers' platform where supporters could sign up to receive calls for action to help the campaign on the web – for instance, by voting in media online polls or arguing for the party's position on influential blogs. The big party (PP) popular volunteers' section on its website organised an internet contest titled 'Your proposal in thirty seconds,' where participants could submit their self–produced videos, the best of which would eventually become an official campaign advertisement. In Norway, campaigns allowed participation with MyLaborParty, which was created to increase grass-roots support in canvassing and other campaigning efforts. MyLaborParty allowed members and sympathizers the opportunity to choose to participate through the medium at their convenience. However, the party used the medium with its already existing party organisation in engaging and integrating existing members into the campaign (Karlsen, 2013).

The tenor and focus of online campaign studies more recently has sought to acknowledge the growing centrality of social media to political campaigns. Several studies have suggested that while the use of a website is an established mode of campaign, the newest and most prominent means of political campaigns in contemporary times is the use of social media platforms (Cepernich & Bracciale, 2018;

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Enli, 2017; Lilleker et al., 2017). Social media as defined by Kaplan and Haenlein, (2010) refers to a 'group of Internet-based application that build on the ideological and technological foundations of the Web 2.0 and allow the creation and exchange of user-generated content' (p. 60). Social media is further divided into social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter and user-generated contents such as YouTube and Wikipedia (Van Dijck, 2013). These social media platforms have increased greatly in numbers with new technologies such as Ning, Friendfeed, LinkedIn, and Google+ adding to previous platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and Myspace presenting unique affordances and functionality. Studies reveals that the various platforms are different and their design influences political actors' communication strategies (Bosetta, 2018; Karlsen & Enjolras, 2016; Kreiss et al., 2018; Stier et al., 2018). As with the earlier studies of the internet, a range of affordances has been attributed to social media. The prevailing accounts of social media platforms in political campaigns points to the social and technical affordances that facilitates campaign processes within and outside-institutionalized spaces. This results in direct effect such as mobilisation, fundraising and organising, and indirect effects such as inadvertent exposure to news and sources of news to the traditional media (Strandberg, 2013). Several scholars posit that the advantage of the use of social media in political campaigns is that it is cheaper in application, viral, and allows for small parties and their candidates to circumvent the traditional media (Gueorguieva, 2008; Kalnes, 2009; Lilleker & Jackson, 2011; Strandberg, 2013; Vergeer & Hermans, 2013). Jacobs and Spierings (2016) distinguish five key characteristics of social media that create new campaigning opportunities. They noted that 'social media are unmediated, personal, interactive, cheap, easy to use and able to go viral' (p. 20). Similarly, Bor (2014) draws attention to the unmediated nature of social media and their potential virality, but also draws attention to their characteristics in terms of data – highlighting the extent to which SNSs house accessible data about users and their posts over a prolonged time, data that can be captured, manipulated, or which can be replicated by others.

A considerable number of studies have researched the use of social media use in national elections (Andersen & Medaglia, 2009; Aragon et al., 2013; Karlsen & Enjolras, 2016; Lilleker et al., 2011; Strandberg, 2013; Vergeer et al., 2013; Williams

& Gulati, 2013). As the use of social media expanded, more research began to explore diverse sets of social media platforms. Although social media platforms have greatly increased in number, Facebook and Twitter are the most prominent in the literature of political campaigns due to their popularity and large number of users (Pew Research Center, 2016). Scholars have examined the use of Facebook by political parties and their candidates in various national contexts (Andersen & Medaglia, 2009; Borah, 2016; Karlsen, 2011; Larsson, 2015). Others have examined the use of Twitter (Vergeer et al., 2011; Vergeer, 2015). Various typologies have been offered in the studies of social media use in political campaigns. Gissaon et al. (2019) provide three broad goals that are pursued by political campaigns through social media: communication goals, political goals, and marketing goals. These are not mutually exclusive and overlap, yet they provide a concise classification of the goals of campaign strategists in the use of social media. Communication objectives refer to a campaign's desire to broadcast its electoral messages, personalize candidate communications, correct or "spin" coverage of its campaign and attack the campaigns of its opponent. These aspects of social media campaigns are also observed by Karlsen (2009); Vaccari (2010); and Bor (2014). In terms of political goals, social media allows citizens to produce and transmit information, share and distribute commentaries (Bimber, 2014; Copeland & Römmele, 2014; Gibson 2015).This furthers a campaign's ability to extend their reach beyond those on their network (Lilleker et al., 2017; Vaccari & Valeriani, 2015).

The above literature provides the wide range of campaign functions that could be potentiated by the use of the web, albeit with little in the way of focus on non-OECD countries. These functions are not mutually exclusive nor are they exhaustive. While the literature has observed a degree of conformity in the uptake of various forms of online campaigning, there is also much diversity to be explained and we turn to research on this question in the next section.

2.3.2 Explaining variation in the use of digital campaign tools.
As a starting point in this discussion, it is worth reviewing the foundational ontological literature on the impact of digital technologies on politics. This literature comprises a

debate between the proponents of technological determinism and those who argued that social and political forces would condition the nature of the influence of the internet on politics and campaigns. The technological determinism theory is associated with the work of McLuhan (1964) and holds that technology decisively shapes how the societies think, act, and organise themselves. McLuhan's argument focused less on the social significance of the use of the medium and emphasised the capability of the technologies in communicating, arguing the 'medium is the message' (McLuhan's, 1964, p.15). This is in contrast with the social determinist perspective, which argues that some social conditions determine the nature of the use of various technologies (William & Edge, 1996). This argument that the social environment determines the nature and the impact of online tools is supported by other studies, that reveal the use of web tools in a context is determined by social forces which reveal gradual changes rather than radical changes (Vacarri, 2010).For instance, Burt and Taylor (2001) suggest that 'the extent to which technologies are exploited and the ways in which they are appropriated are shaped by the social conditions, philosophies and value systems within which the technologies are immersed' (p .72). Between these antinomies, many different political researchers have conducted studies to determine the various means and ways in which internet might impact the landscape of politics and how context may feed into the entire process have sought to address specific ways in which the internet might shape politics, and how context might play into this process. Such approaches acknowledge both arguments that communication technologies have independent political properties while simultaneously placing their use on political contexts. As Chadwick (2006) puts it 'the politicization of the internet arises from both the nature of the technology itself and existing social and political structures and actions' (p.19). Scholars such as Gibson et al., 2003; Metag and Marcinkowski, 2012; Chen & Smith, 2010; Dolezal, 2015; Sudulich & Wall, 2009) have suggested contextual factors have an impact on the use of the technologies. The emphasis on contextual factors have been highlighted by various scholars. This is further supported by Ward and Gibson (2009) who 'argue that social and political shaping are crucial to understanding the development of an organisation's approach to new technologies' (p. 35). Although there is much agreement that these factors impact the manner in which internet campaigning is undertaken both across and within

political systems, there is little overall agreement in the literature of how, where and why these factors occur. For the most part however, literature explaining he adoption of web campaigning takes the position that campaigners are bound by existing norms, conventions and circumstances that affect the perceived value of the web campaign for them. For instance, Lilleker et al., (2015) argues that 'strategists evaluate the communication tools they find to be appropriate within the context in which they operate and hence the weightings they award to these tools are shaped by a range of factors' (p.762).

Thus, a variety of interconnected factors ranging from national-level, to party-level, to candidate-level have been proposed within the literature as providing a greater understanding of the nature of web adoption. These debates have been significant, as it has paved the way for some research on the complex relationship between technologies and their use. These factors are not mutually exclusive and often overlap.

Looking firstly at national-level factors, which can be helpful in explaining uneven patterns of online campaigning across countries, an array of aspects has been considered in the literature. Such factors can be thought of as systemic – and includes institutional arrangements in particular its electoral system, system of campaign regulation, with regards to finance and access to traditional media, technological development and political culture. An electoral system that allows individuals cast their votes for candidates enjoins a more competitive character of campaign leading to the use of the internet. Examples include the United States of America and Finland. However, recent studies have also demonstrated that party centred, multiparty, proportional representative parliamentary democracies like most European democracies have also revealed candidates' individual campaigns (e.g., Karlsen and Skogerbø, 2015; Koc-Michalska et al., 2014b; Karlsen, 2012). This is also the case for independent candidates, as Gibson and Rommele (2005) suggest 'multi-tie wider platform necessary for electoral innovation and experimentation-with the result that it promotes the faster take up of new campaign practices' (p. 282).

Studies reveal campaign regulations also have an impact of the use of the internet. Campaign Finance regulation that allows for private donations enable the use of the internet. A comparative study by Kiyohara (2018) of the US and three Asian countries

(Japan, Taiwan and Korea) revealed that all four countries demonstrated regulations that allow for the use of the internet. The three Asian countries demonstrated similar regulations that enabled the use of the internet. For example, the Public Official Election Law of Japan which regulates political campaigns allowed the use of the internet by candidates, political parties, and voters during the 2013 election (Kiyohara, 2018). Similarly, in 2012, a restriction on internet campaigning in Korea was lifted enabling more use of the internet for campaign purposes. While there are no specific rules with regards to online campaigning in Taiwan, there was noticeable use of the internet during the election (ibid). This noticeable use of the internet appears to be a global phenomenon.

While the level of internet penetration appeared to be a relevant factor in earlier scholarship that focused on technological usage and found that the diffusion of internet usage was a greater predictor of the use of the internet (Norris, 2001), this is no longer quite the case. This findings was in contrast to the study conducted by Sudulich and Wall (2009) in Ireland, which found that the proportion of internet access within the population was not considered as a determining factor in the use of the web. More recent scholarship reveals the ubiquity of the internet, and the level of internet penetration is no longer as relevant as previous studies had indicated.

A final national-level consideration is the impact of political culture. Kluver (2004) defines political culture as 'the symbolic environment of political practice, shaped by historical experiences and philosophical and religious traditions' (p.439). Thus, political culture determines to a large extent the role and effect of the internet. This was supported by Foot, et al., (2009) cross-national comparative study, which found that technological as well as political culture influences the use and manner in which the web is used. However, Vergeer et al., (2013) reveals that over time, no difference is found between the candidates on the left versus right positioning of parties across time in their use of Twitter. The (online) activities of political competitors have also contributed to parties and candidates engaging in the use of the web in political campaign. Several studies have pointed to using the web as a response to the activities of their political competitors (Ward & Gibson, 1998; Selnow 1998; Sudulich & Wall, 2009). Indeed, Selnow (1998) describes it as a 'me too' effect.

Gibson et al., (2003) argue that, for political parties 'even though parties were uncertain of the tangible benefits, it seems the risk of not having a website and giving your opponents an edge was a great stimulus to moving online.' (p.168)

A final consideration at the party-level relates to the financial and organisational resources that a party can draw on. Studies reveal campaign regulations also have an impact of the use of the internet. Different campaign finance regulation facilitates internet campaigning. These regulations establish how funds can be raised and the limits on fundraising. It also includes the legal restrictions on spending by candidates and parties. The US electoral laws facilitated internet campaigning the most because it allowed for soft money (Stromer-Galley, 2014). Studies have revealed that campaign budgets also determine the use of the web, as parties which allocates more money in its's budget were more likely to use websites (Metag & Marcinkowski, 2012; Sudulich & Wall, 2009; Zittel, 2009). This is truer with technical developments on website, that require more expertise to build and maintain. Thus, parties with lesser financial strength adopted the cheaper option of the freely available social networking sites such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube (Gibson & McAllister, 2015). While these social networking sites are free, the effective use of these tools needs campaign staff to be effective (Vaccari, 2013). Political parties and candidates allow for informal supporter networks, and while some campaigns provide specific forms of tools in enabling support, others benefit from citizen initiating campaign (Gibson,2015) which contributes to the human resources that party and candidates can draw from.

In terms of candidate-level factors, the role of demographics has been extensively researched. The literature demonstrates that there is a strong correlation between age and the adoption of the internet. The factors relating to age can be divided into two aspects, the candidates and the age of the target audiences.

On the one hand, several studies have found younger candidates to be more active online (Carlson & Strandberg, 2005; Dolezal, 2015; Hansen & Kosiara-Pedersen, 2014; Metag & Marcinkowski, 2012; Zittel, 2009). This finding is particularly true regarding the use of social media, both Metag and Marcinkowski (2012) and Dolezal (2015) study found that younger candidates used both Twitter and Facebook to a higher degree than websites. This was further supported by Williams and Gulati's

(2012) study on the United States, which revealed age was not considered a determinant in the use of Facebook. This was further supported by several studies of social media platforms (Larsson & Kalsnes, 2014; Strandberg, 2009, 2013; Vergeer & Hermnas,2013). Although, Dolezal (2015) found the use of personal websites was not restricted to a certain age group, nonetheless, older people above 50 years old tend to use websites more often than younger ones.

On the other hand, the literature reveals that the younger demography is mostly mobilized using social media (Strandberg, 2013**).** Thus, campaigns utilised these tools in persuading and mobilising voters. The use of the internet is no longer a privilege of the younger generations, with social networking sites rapidly gaining appeal across generations. The universality of the web has rendered the age factor irrelevant in recent campaigns.

At the individual level, a considerable body of research has looked at gender, and its effect on campaigning practices, with studies revealing differences in use between men and women. Dolezal (2015) study revealed that male candidates in Austria are much more likely to use the web as tools for their individualized campaigns. This was further supported by other some scholars, whose studies found that the male gender tend to use internet tools more (Metag & Marcinkowski, 2012; Zittel, 2009).In contrast, Carlson (2007) revealed that female candidates used the web to a higher degree than male candidates did. Others argue that gender is no longer a significant factor in considering the use of the internet for campaign purposes in national studies (Hansen & Kosiara-Pedersen, 2014; Metag & Marcinkowski, 2012; Vergeer & Herman, 2012). A further argument is that the internet encourages participation of both the politically active and inactive people. Notably the typical predictors of more active modes of offline participation such as education, class and gender were not significant in predicting an online activity, leading to more mobilisation of supporters beyond reinforcement of their support (Gibson et al., 2005). Studies on candidate-level factors has focused on incumbency and marginality. The findings of various studies point in different directions. Some studies demonstrate that challengers are more likely to use the internet (Carlson, 2007; Carlson & Strandberg, 2012; Strandberg, 2009; Larsson & Kalsnes, 2014), while others have revealed that incumbents are more likely to use

the technology (Gibson & Römmele, 2005; Enli & Skogerbø, 2013). Still other studies note very little difference between incumbents and challengers' use of the Web (Kamarck,2002). However, Dolezal (2015) study found there were differences between incumbents and challengers in the use of personal websites, but none in the use of Facebook and Twitter. Several scholarships have revealed that candidates who were in more marginal seats were more likely to adopt campaign websites (Gibson & Rommele, 2006; Stranberg, 2009; Sudulich & Wall, 2009; Zittel, 2009).Thus, research has demonstrated various factors influences the use of the web in political campaigns.

2.3.3 The effect of the internet on campaign organisational dynamics.

In order to address the subsidiary research question on how the web impacts the structure and management of campaigns, this section presents the literature that speaks to this research question. In the fourth stage of campaigns, campaigns depend on a wide range of internet tools, political consultants, and volunteers in persuading and mobilising a growing number of unpredictable electorates. In this age of campaigning, political parties and their candidates depend on a wide range of internet tools that utilise the interface of the web to provide various supports for campaign practices. This has led to changes in election campaigning and party organisation. The literature offers contrasting views relating to the effect of the web on campaign structures and management. Campaign communication can be nationally coordinated (Farrell & Webb, 2000), as well as decentralised (Kreiss, 2012; Vaccari & Valeriani, 2016; Dommett, 2018; Chadwick & Stromer-Galley, 2016) and each does not necessarily have to be at the expense of the other, leading to a hybrid form of campaign communication (Chadwick, 2013; Kreiss, 2012; Vaccari & Valeriani, 2016; Dommett, 2018). Several studies have demonstrated that the uptake of the web by political parties during campaign furthers the powers of those who have the knowledge and skills in utilising these technologies over the production of messages and the monitoring of campaign activities (Ward et al., 2008; Vacarri, 2008).

Different forms of interaction, engagement and an increase in heterogeneous audiences has led campaign professionals to utilise various media and marketing forms, in producing various content for electorates through enhanced databases (Chadwick, 2013; Kreiss, 2012;2016; Stromer-Galley, 2014).While American campaign had

previously focused on citizens initiated campaigns, enabled by the web, recent times have revealed the focus on the use of various data sources in facilitating more predictive modelling of voters (Gibson, Römmele, & Williamson, 2014).

Professionals engage with voter's data from various sources (commercial data, proprietary data, social network data, and public data) which allows for more enhanced forms of voter targeting. American parties have developed and integrated vast stores of data for better targeting and managing citizens. In its early days, the use of data from sources other than voter's records was mostly pronounced in America and used by major parties. In contemporary times, changes have been observed in the amount, cost, storage and new forms of data analysis (Nickerson & Rogers, 2014).

This influx of professionals with expertise in data analytics plays a prominent role in campaigns and can disrupts the hierarchical power structure of political parties (Chadwick & Stromer-Galley, 2016; Kreiss, 2016). The Obama campaign of 2008 actively managed and monitored campaign's activities. Obama utilised large-scale data analytics and behavioural modelling in an unprecedented form of targeting (Bimber, 2014). Less often mentioned in the literature because it did not achieve the desired result of the Obama campaign was the creation of Narwhal, a probabilistic matching program that sought to integrate data collected from three sources (digital, field and financial) into one database for effective targeting during the 2012 Obama campaign (Kreiss, 2016). During the subsequent election of 2016, 'Trump campaign created a massive database of over 220 million Americans nicknamed Project Alamo used to generate profiles for individual voters' (Owen,2018, p. 41). In addition, technology firms such as Facebook, Twitter, and Google also act as data repositories of user's information, which is used to tailor advertisement. During the 2012 presidential election, both Barack Obama and Mitt Romney campaigns used goggle and Facebook adverts in targeting campaign messages (Kreiss & Mcgregor, 2018). According to Owen (2018) several Facebook analytical tools were used by the Trump team in microtargeting voters. This is not common in European countries, as privacy regulations prevent the use of personal data for campaign purposes (Bimber, 2014; Karlsen, 2009). Beyond online targeting of messages, and similar to the practices of US campaigns, British parties also purchased geographical data from Facebook which

was used to coordinate their grassroot campaigns through phone calls and door-to-door canvassing (Chadwick & Stromer-Galley, 2016; Nickerson & Rogers, 2014). This was also demonstrated during the 2017 British election, both Conservative and the Labour Party invested heavily on Facebook adverts. Both parties purchased geographical audience data from Facebook (Dommett & Temple, 2018). Despite the centralizing force of data analytics and their use of predictive models' professionals in contemporary elections, the campaigns demonstrated decentralised forms of campaigning (ibid). This has manifest itself in a variety of ways in recent times and is discussed in the paragraphs that follows. Earlier studies demonstrate that the internet offers more opportunities for voter-party relationship and challenges the top-down, centralised mode of political campaigning (Norris, 2002; Norris, 2003; Pedersen & Saglie, 2005).

This has become more pronounced, following the emergence of Web 2.0, which allows both party campaigners and citizens in engaging with parties' online infrastructures and self-organising spaces (Vaccari & Valeriani, 2016). Parties have allowed supporters and party members to contribute to their campaign by providing tools that enable citizens to canvass voters through bespoke websites. These forms of support given to volunteers by parties that have been highlighted are clear examples of how parties and candidate provide opportunities for members and volunteers to contribute to their campaign efforts.

Citizens are now able to develop campaigns in support of political parties and their candidates (Dommett & Temple, 2018; Gibson, 2015; Kriess 2012; Penney, 2017; Vaccari & Valeriani, 2016). Some of these collective actions have occurred outside the structure and management of parties and candidate's campaign. Kriess refers to this as 'Networked politics' which involves sustained and coordinated collective coordinated collective action that occurs outside the direct managerial relationship and is premised on the voluntary contributions of supporters (2012, p. 6). For instance, in Norway 'Red Blogger' a group of about 70 bloggers contributed to the campaigns of the Labour party (Karlsen, 2013).

Campaign teams are able to extend their boundaries of communication to include non-partisan voters' online networks as well as peer-to peer networks in encouraging

support for their campaign. Gibson (2015) describes this as 'citizen-initiated campaigning, in which digitally registered supporters who are not necessarily members make use of online tools created by the party or candidate team to campaign both online and offline on its behalf' (p.187).

The British 2017 election demonstrated that both labour and conservatives party used non-party owned digital infrastructure in mobilising support and encouraged voting from new activists (Dommett & Temple, 2017). Innovations such as Momentum's 'My Nearest Marginal App', fundraising sites such as CrowdPac and campaigning hubs like the Progressive Alliance or Campaign Together were seen to empower and connect individuals to contribute to electoral campaigns via non-traditional routes' (Dommett & Temple, 2017, p.194). These various uses of social media allow media allows for different forms of organising and mobilising that were typical were typical of social movements. Chadwick and Stromer-Galley (2016) argue that 'digital media foster cultures of organisational experimentation and a party-as-movement mentality that enable many to reject norms of hierarchical discipline and habitual partisan loyalty' (p. 283). As discussions on social media continue to thrive, the continuous in flux of the use of the web increased non- party membership activities, decreasing the need for formal membership in political parties, and may level the hierarchical order of political parties (Vaccari & Valeriani, 2016).

Gibson et al. (2015) further describes 'these new forms of loose network as leading to a 'hybrid' model of operation that relies on a decentralised structure and floating support base associated with social movements' (p. 186). This allows for diverse forms of organising, combining new forms of organising with older forms, and practicing mobilisation techniques of interest groups and social movements and creating "digital network repertoires of collective action" (Chadwick, 2007, p. 286). This allows for more opportunities for participation (Vaccari, 2010).

This unsteady party membership is most prominent in the United States starting from the failed attempt by Dean's campaign to clinch the presidential campaign and emerging in some political parties in Europe. The U.S demonstrates a prime example of campaign organisation that do not require a formal membership to mobilise and organise campaign activities for political parties, enabled by the web and it's

networking opportunities (Chadwick & Stromer-Galley, 2016; Howard, 2006). Similar traits are now being observed in some European countries, with parties offering various forms of membership and opportunities of party affiliation (Scarrow, 2014). These developments also affect the organisational structures of political parties. As Vacarri, (2010) states:

> This interplay of new political technologies and hybrid organizational developments has thus replaced the dilemma between centralization and decentralization with mechanisms that breed distributed structures that are both scalable and controllable and merge practices drawn from paradigms that were previously believed to be mutually exclusive (p. 330).

This is further supported in a later study, which argues that it will continue to be shaped by the 'tension between control and interactivity' (Chadwick & Stromer-Galley, 2016, p. 285). Thus, resorting to controlled interactivity that allows for a certain degree of autonomy over certain decisions by the new forms of registered members, while retaining the bulk of political powers over key decisions, which could lead to potential tensions in the balance of power within organisations (ibid). Vaccari and Valeriani (2016) also lend their support and contend that new forms of membership could obstruct the power structure of the organisation, which party elites would not find welcoming and are more comfortable with fully registered members of the party rather than these new forms of members. Party elites comparably find it rather plausible to interact within party rank and file than they would with the grass roots who are unpredictable and inevitably uncontrollable (Vaccari & Valeriani, 2016). Nevertheless, while these new technologies allow diversity in membership in organisations and their collective actions, they create more complex views and relationships between elites and participants which have an effect on the organisation (Flanagin, Stohl, & Bimber, 2006).

As Vaccari (2010) suggests:

> As the internet audience continues to grow and as online electioneering achieves increasing political relevance, campaigns are under pressure to develop organizational models that reconcile both their need to access valuable

resources through online engagement and their desire to control such engagement. (p. 332)

Although the use of the internet encourages political participation and increases the role played by volunteers in campaigns, this grassroots support could not be substantial, because they are not involved in the decision-making process of the organisation (Chadwick, 2006). The management of the organisation remains with party leaders and had the authority to directly speak to the electorate (ibid).

2.4 Contribution of the research to the literature.

Despite the increasing number of studies on the use of the web for political campaigns, there is undoubtedly a gap existing in the literature reviewed that demonstrates that most of the research conducted around the use of the web by political parties and their candidate have been located in the United States of America and Europe. Studies of political campaigns in sub-Saharan Africa make up a comparatively tiny segment of the literature and this study will contribute to redressing this imbalance. First and foremost, this thesis represents a novel and detailed empirical account of digital campaigning in a country outside of the OECD: allowing for an enhanced understanding of digital campaigning in Nigeria. To date, few studies have been conducted on the use of the web in Nigerian election campaigns and its impact on campaign structure and management. The literature on the use of digital media has mostly focused on the use of social media and consolidation of democracy in Nigeria. The literature on Nigeria has demonstrated a significantly different political dynamic than most western societies. Several studies have largely focused on the use of the web in facilitating political participation, enabling citizens' engagement in the discourse of socio-political and economic issues and in expressing their views, support mobilisations (Abubakar, 2012; Aduloju, 2016). Regional studies have examined users' perception on the use of social media (Apuke & Apollos, 2017; Chinedu-Okeke, 2016), social media usage in political campaigns by various stakeholders (Smyth & Best, 2013). and citizens' and civil society's ability to monitor election and shed light on acts of electoral malpractices (Alokpa, 2017; Bailard & Livingston, 2014; Bartlett, et al; 2015; Smyth & Best, 2013).

This thesis also provides an opportunity to develop greater theoretical nuance and a better interrogation of the generalisability of key insights from the literature. In particular, it brings to the fore an emphasis to the role of context in conditioning the nature and role of digital campaigns in national elections. This contribution is a function of the case at the heart of the thesis – with Nigerian politics offering notable departures from many of the assumptions underlying campaign studies in OECD countries. It is also reflected in the theoretical emphasis placed on hybridisation, alongside theories of modernisation and Americanisation. Overall, the contribution of this thesis to the literature is both a systematic application of the insights of internet campaign scholarship to an under-studied, substantively important case (Nigeria) and a consideration of how the nuances of the Nigerian 2015 case reflect back on the concepts and theories prevalent within this scholarship.

2.5 Chapter Summary

The chapter is structured in a manner that provides an understanding of the use of the internet and its impact on campaign dynamics. The chapter begins by summarising the insights of a range of scholars who have sought to characterise broad trends in campaigning over time. The key characteristics of these phases are unpacked, paying particular attention to their treatment of the effects and use of emerging communication technologies. It then proceeds to the more specific and narrower set of meso-level questions about the nature, uptake and effects of internet campaigning. Firstly, it provides the literature on the adoption and adaptation of digital technologies by political campaigns. This literature focused on how campaigns have used the internet and related technologies to achieve key campaign goals. This branch of the literature has evolved alongside the internet itself – and we note that the advent of 'Web 2.0' has been a key inflection point in the insights, theories, and methods within this subfield. Secondly, it provides the literature explaining variation in the uptake of internet campaigning. We again note how this literature has shifted in line with the underlying technology that it is exploring and outline a range of factors that the literature has identified as being significant for variation in the uptake of the web by political campaigns. The chapter then proceeds to elaborate on the impact of internet campaigning on the structure and organisation of election campaigns. In a final section, some important lacunae in the literature are identified, allowing for the contribution of the research contained in this thesis to be specified.

Chapter Three: The Dynamics of Nigerian Political Campaigns

3.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a discussion of the history of electoral campaigning in Nigeria. It does so to provide a context within which the insights and findings of this thesis can be better understood. Nigeria is a federal state compromising of 36 states and a federal capital territory, Abuja. In Nigeria general elections have been conducted nine times as at the time of writing following the 1959 election which ushered in an independent Nigeria on the 1st of October 1960. At independence, Nigeria was a Federal State with three Regions: Northern, Western, and Eastern and formally became a republic upon the constitutional amendment of 1963. In 1963, a new Mid-Western Region was formed from the Western Region. The dominance of three ethnic groups was accentuated by the regional concentration of the Hausa/Fulani in the North, the Yoruba in the West and the Ibos in the East. Each of these regions comprised of several ethnic groups, whereby an ethnic group and their elites were predominant by numerical strength. Furthermore, the constitution granted a great deal of autonomy to these regions.

The pluralist nature of Nigeria shapes and conditions intense competition, conflict and struggles by contending classes of people for the office of the president and the constitutional structure of federalism allows for centralised power on a president, rendering the executive office more coveted and leading to intense competition. Identity-based politics focused on ethnicity, region, language, religion and class have been significant in the struggles for political power and control of states in Nigeria. This heterogeneous nature of Nigeria expresses itself in political parties lacking in ideology that proliferate the political arena in search of political power (Omotola, 2009). There are few significant programmatic differences between parties, with parties seemingly more interested in gaining power (Diamond, 1980; Joseph, 1987; Post & Vicker,1973, Sklar,1965). Sectional interests flourish under the mechanism of patron-client networks (Joseph, 1987). This further exaggerates ethno-regional cleavage politics and leads to violence and all sorts of campaign misdemeanours such as vote buying, physical intimidation from militants, as well as interference from the

Courts and the formation of political parties expressed in its heterogeneous nature in Nigeria. A chronology of critical events in Nigeria's political development from amalgamation in 1914 to 1960 is provided in Table 3.1 below

Table 3.1: Chronology of critical events in Nigeria's political development from amalgamation in 1914 to 1960.

Date	Details of Events
1st January 1914	The Amalgamation of the Northern and Southern protectorates, establishing Nigeria.
Clifford's Constitution of 1922	Introduction of indirect elections led to the formation of political parties.
Richard's Constitution of 1946	Elections into the legislative assemblies three regional assemblies in the North, West and East.
Macpherson's Constitution of 1951	Introduction of federalism led to an establishment of two-tier system of government Indirect elections into the two houses of representative at the federal level and the regional House of Assembly.
Lyttleton's Constitution of 1954	Adoption of a Federal Constitution, with the establishment of one central government and three regional government.
In the year 1957	A Parliamentary system of government, a Nigerian Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was as the head of Government and Governor General head of State.
In the year 1959	A Federal election
In the year 1960	Nnamdi Azikiwe became the first Head of Government, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa remained as the Head of state.

Adapted from Abia (2003)

In line with the expectations of Nigerians of an independent Nation, the Governor-General dissolved the Federal House of Representatives and fixed the date of 12th December 1959 for the Federal election. It also ushered in the secret ballot voting system for all registered adults throughout the Federation, except for the North, which only allowed adult males (Abia, 2003; Mackintosh, 1966). The 1959 election was crucial as it ushered in a newly elected government that could boast of being the first

elected government of Nigeria as an independent Sovereign state. During this time, twenty-four parochial political parties bound together by tribe, region and religious biases had indicated interest in contesting in the Federal elections, with three parties namely the Northern People's Congress (NPC), National Council of Nigerian Citizen (NCNC) and Action Group (AG) forming alliances with various other parties in each region in pursuit for victory at the polls (Abia, 2003; Mackintosh,1966; Schwarz, 1965). N.P.C was predominantly Muslim based with a Northern leader of Ahmadu Bello, the AG was a mix of Christians and Muslims under the leadership of Chief Awolowo, while N.C.N.C was mostly made up of Christians led by Nnamdi Azikwe. There was an underlying tribal tension amongst the regions, and it was further exacerbated as each region sought to garner the spoils of independence (Post & Vicker, 1973; Schwarz, 1965). There were similarities in the campaign practices of the parties mostly that of the NCNC and AG, which appeared to have a socialist ideology, unlike the NPC, which was a conservative and elitist party (Omotola, 2009). There were also differences as will be highlighted below. First, I turn to the similarities of the campaign practices of the three major political parties and then to the differences in campaign practices, starting from the NPA, to the NCNC and finally, the AG.

The campaign practices of these political parties were reminiscent of the traditional campaigns of the nationalist movements. Tours were undertaken by party leaders and the presidential candidates, wherein party literatures, gifts with party slogans and party logos were distributed (Mackintosh, 1966). Of major importance were private and public meetings between party leaders, influential personalities and electorates (Post, 1963). All political parties sought audiences with local opinion leaders, who had significant influence on opinions of the electorates in their communities. These leaders' main theme of discussion always revolved around 'The Tribe' and what they regarded as important (Post, 1963). Tribal sentiments were more important campaign messages than policy. During these private meetings, it is suggested that patron-client relationships were agreed upon and formed.

Nonetheless, there were significant differences in the political party's approach in campaigning. The Northern People's Congress' (NPC) official campaign was restricted to the North, this was mainly because of the provision of the 1957

constitution which allowed for representations based on population, and thus having the highest population, it was assured of more representation (Mackintosh, 1966; Schwarz, 1965). Furthermore, they realised that as a party which had restricted its membership to only the people from the north, it did not expect to win votes from any other tribe but the North (Post,1963; Schwarz,1965). This could not be the case with the other two major parties, the AG and NCNC who realised that victory could only be assured by consistent and determined efforts at campaigning in other regions. Each of these political party's manifesto was a blueprint of their intentions if voted for. On the 3rd of October, the manifesto of the NCNC and Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) in alliances was published (Post, 1963). The NCNC's campaign was launched under the title of 'Operation Follow Zik' (Post, 1963, p. 327). The campaign was decentralised, based mostly on the personality of Azikiwe with campaigns in different regions using different slogans. The campaign during the various tours and meetings enunciated that the NCNC led by Dr Azikiwe, was foremost in demanding and fighting for independence and just like the NPC, it did not push for more regions, but promised a transition to socialism (Post,1963). However, the NCNC unambiguously stated that provisions of amenities in different regions will be dependent on the support they got from these regions. Dr Okpara the leader of the NCNC was quoted to have said, 'I will give you all the amenities you require, but you must first vote for me. Bounty of war is always shared after the war' (Mackintosh, 1966, p. 525).

The AG launched the most intensive, organised and expensive campaign ever in the history of Nigeria, under the theme 'Operation Destiny' (Post ,1963, p.309). The AG's 14 points manifesto and a good number of speeches by its candidate and leaders were the most published of all other parties, mainly because of the number of newspapers it controlled (Post, 1963). In addition, the AG provided money, vehicles and other resources to its allies the ITP and UMBC in support of their campaign (Mackintosh, 1966). The AG introduced a novel campaign method, an aeroplane for skywriting. The aeroplane was used for 'Skywriting and Trail Signs' in which the message "Vote Awo, Vote AG" trailed the light aircraft. This it hired from the firm employed by the conservative party for the British General Election (Post, 1963). Helicopters were used to fly party leaders to rallies, distribute party literatures and gifts with suitable slogans,

varied to suit the certain areas. Chief Awolowo's use of the helicopter was an advantage over the other parties as he was not hampered by the poor condition of the roads. He was thus able to hold more meetings than any other candidate and showcase how modern and how well suited the party was to be at the helm of government (ibid).

The institutions under the various governments of the different regions-mainly the courts and the police-, where used to establish their influence through manipulations in reinforcing their campaigns and obstructing that of their opponents (Schwarz, 1965). The NPC was not kind to the opposition and used the native authorities to suppress and intimidate other party leaders and their supporters (Mackintosh, 1966). The native authority which granted and refused permission for rallies and meetings were used as tools to the benefit of the NPC (ibid). In the North, the district heads, often NPC candidates, revoked and refused to grant permission for meetings, and even when permission was granted, it was mostly inconveniently situated (Post,1963). Likewise, the courts were used to pronounce judgement against members of AG which had formed alliances with United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) and other minor parties, and NEPU who had formed an alliance with the NCNC. These people were sentenced to jail, fined and caned for addressing public meetings without permission granted by the native authority. For example, in an effort to supress the coalition between AG and UMBC, an attempt was made to arrest the president of United Middle Belt Congress Joseph Tarka, a very popular young man, on the grounds of instigating his younger sister into leaving her husband - an NPC leader and National Assembly member (ibid). He was convicted by the Gboko mixed court and sentenced to six months imprisonment. However, he appealed and was granted bail and eventually got the case dismissed by the colonial government (Post, 1963).

This was not the case for other members who were not as popular as Tarka, neither did they have the legal assistance which he had. Consequently, they were arrested and imprisoned on various charges during the campaign period. The message of the NPN was clear 'any man who opposed the power that be could expect trouble' (Post 1963, p. 294). In the West, there were also examples of abuse of powers in restricting campaign activities. For example, in the hometown of Chief Awolowo, the government placed a ban on campaign rallies 24 hours before an NCNC scheduled

procession. They also complained of alleged victimization and arrest of their supporters. The East was the least controversial, with political parties being allowed to campaign subject to getting authorisation by the police mainly because the police was controlled by the Federal government rather than the regional government (Post, 1963).

 These activities culminated into various violent incidences in different parts of the country. There were reported cases of alleged use of thugs in interrupting campaign activities in different towns, motorcades were stoned at, riots broke out upon hearing that particular parties were deprived of permits in holding political rallies (Post 1963; Schwarz, 1965). These resulted in bodily harm as people were hospitalised and arrested. Both NCNC and AG agreed that, they as political parties were victimized in the North (Post, 1963). Although, there were repeated meetings of leaders to appeal to their supporters and the British Governor General, it did not prevent violence from playing a significant role in the campaign. Subsequently, these political leaders demanded that the Governor General to bring into force the constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights that was agreed upon at the 1958 constitutional conference to protect their supporters (Abia, 2003; Post, 1963). In addition, to the tours and meetings, the press also served as channels of communications by which politicians propagated their messages and marketed their candidate. However, the impact on ownership on mass media largely reflects their coverage of issues. Accordingly, newspapers were used to report campaign activities, publish malicious content and make caricatures of opponents.

However, Post (1963) stated that in 1959, there were relatively limited access to radios and television; consequently, it was not widely used for political process. He further stated that very few people came in contact with the candidates and with the high rate of illiteracy both in English and Vernacular, the effect of these published material on political consciousness was infinitesimal. Therefore, as alluded to earlier, opinion leaders, served as a more efficient channel through which campaign messages were disseminated.

During the 1959 federal elections, there were still no framework on party finance and no restriction placed on the limits of campaign expenditures (Adeyi, 2008).

Consequently, political parties raised funds through various means. First, through their party structure, political parties raised funds by receiving membership fees from members and the selling of party cards and party regalia. Second, they received donations of money and vehicles for campaigns from businesspersons, mostly those who had been awarded government contracts. These people made a return and paid £10 into party funds and those seeking to secure the nomination of the party and tickets to contest elections (Mackintosh,1966). It was generally expected that Ministers, legislators and members of public boards, if appointed under the platform of the party would pay 10 percent of their salaries into party funds. Political parties also got loans, the most likely source would be either the expatriate firms established in the country or else other foreign business interests seeking an initial entry into the country. These major parties in the regions could have secured loans in the form of government contracts for various development projects (Adeyi, 2008; Sklar, 1965).

With no laid down procedures, it was alleged that the NCNC's campaign expenses were funded through the illegal conduct of its party leaders through the manipulating banking procedures of the ACB, which was owned by the Eastern Region government. This discovery was a result of the pronouncement of the court in response to the suit instituted by some aggrieved members (Adeyi, 2008). The AG's campaign expenses were funded by businessmen who had enjoyed party patronage and were returning the favour. This was highlighted in the investigation of the 1962 Coker commission of inquiry set up by Tafawa Belewa administration which investigated the management of the public funds of the Western government from 1954 till 1962. In the North, it was alleged by the opposition parties that the NPC government used money from government coffers to induce the traditional rulers and district officers in organising and constituting the electoral college (ibid).

The extant literature reveals that the adoption of secret ballot in the East established money politics in the region (Sklar, 1966). The public treasury was used to induce support from the opposition leaders in secret. to mobilise support for the NCNC and educate them on how to vote for the NCNC (ibid). In the West, tax payment by adults was a prerequisite to exercising one's franchise. The AG, being a member of the ruling party, and in control of the government coffers, used this money as well as money

from rich party members to pay the taxes of adults and receipts were used as voter's cards for the party (Adeyi, 2008). Although the campaign was characterised by violence, it did not determine the results of the election. The voting pattern in 1959 election revealed that the major parties won most of the seats in their strongholds. The N. P. C. won 79 seats in the North out of 92 seats. The NCNC won the majority seats of the Eastern Region; A.G won the majority of seats in the Western region. Subsequently, in January 1960 the newly elected members of the Federal house of representatives made a resolution for Nigeria's political independence on the 1st of October (Ubaku et al., 2014) (See result in the Appendix A Table 1).

3.2 Nigeria's First Republic (1960-1966)
The first elections under self-governance were conducted between 1964 and 1965 within a multiparty system, which significantly influenced the nature of electoral competition. In the same vein, the structure of social cleavages of regionalism, ethnicity, class and constitutional structure of federalism and party system influenced the campaigns of these political parties. According to Jinadu (1985) 'Nigeria's federalism is based on ethnic and not geographical diversities; it tends to exacerbate centrifugal forces in the country' (p. 72).

Choudhry (2008) and Whitaker (1987) stated that the flawed federal structure of the unequal tripartite division representing the major ethnic divisions of the Hausa, Yoruba and the Igbos heightened regional and cultural polarisation. Other scholars such as Sklar (1965) argue that beyond the federal structure, ethnic competition within these regions became the basis of political race. The acquisition of a certain kind of lifestyle determined by political office, led to party leaders equating their private interest with that of the community (Diamond, 1988). Thus, being part of the party led to the attainment of a certain status inside of class relation and the attainment of wealth, jobs and others benefits, which was distributed to those who supported the party (Diamond, 1988; Post & Vickers, 1973). 'While the political parties cut across regions, the machinery of government—the system of governmental power, including the power of patronage—is largely and basically regionalised' (Sklar, 1965, p. 205). These political parties use resources from the government for personal purposes and create patronage relationship through their use (Sklar, 1979).

This is supported by Howoritz (1985) who noted that patronage, coercion and the appointment of seats worked together to over-represent the regional majorities (p. 603). The tone of the campaigns, which had been set from the struggle for independence was marred with intimidation from the police, the courts, party supporters and the eruption of violence (Mackintosh,1966). The political parties had muddled policies and were engaged in smear campaigns. The channels of communications by which politicians propagated their messages and marketed their candidates were under the provisions of a legal system and regulations whose conditions affected campaign practices of the first republic. Political alliances were forged, on the one hand, the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) which comprised of an alliance between the NCNC, AG, and Northern Progressive Front (NPF) and a coalition which was formed earlier between the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) and United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC). On the other hand, there was the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) and its alliances, NPC, Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), Mid-West Democracy Front (MDF), Lagos State United Front, Dynamic party, the Republican Party, and most elements of the Niger Delta Congress (Mackintosh, 1966; Schwarz,1965). Although, one of the dominant parties the NPC, seemed to be an elitist and conservative party, AG and the NCNC (also dominant parties) gave the impression of being both progressive and welfarist and the lack of clarity in ideological disposition can further be found in the pattern of alignment between parties (Omotola, 2009). However, these alliances were beneficial to all parties, as smaller parties formed alliances with bigger parties to receive benefits while the bigger parties were also able to succeed in receiving supports in their strong holds (Emelifeonwu, 1999).

Political campaigns were conducted using the following channels of communication: touring of the different regions mainly by road, meetings held in either town halls or open fields, newspaper captions of political messages, radio, and TV allotment of airtime for advertisements, and the distribution of pamphlets and posters. The UPGA led by the NCNC and its allies targeted voters in multiple regions. During rallies and meetings, these political parties conveyed tailored messages to their supporters and

segmented demographic affiliations in the different regions to mobilise them around particular issues that related to specific electoral purposes. This was about the Northern, the Eastern, the Western and the Mid-West region, which was created in 1963 (Post & Vickers, 1973).

Similar to the 1959 election, the native authority police and local courts were used as accomplices by the political parties in depriving their opponents of the fundamental rights of freedom of speech, movement and associations in the various parts of the country. In the Northern Region, UPGA encountered resistance and violence in the North from scores of different forces such as the police, native courts and political thugs. Dr Okpara, the leader of UPGA, sought to tour the west in an attempt to disseminate his party's views to the people. His first effort in delivering a lecture at the University of Ife was refused by the university authorities, and consequently, the campaign team had to move the venue to the University of Ibadan (Schwarz, 1965; Post & Vickers, 1973). Similarly, his wife was also refused permission to hold a scheduled meeting at the Ilesha Town Hall (Post & Vickers, 1973).

Time and again, there were reported cases of arrest and warnings issued out by the police to party supporters. Lawyers were not exempted from intimidation by the government. The level of violence was so profound that Mr Adeyemi, a coroner, was quoted to have said 'that the political situation in Western Nigeria is such that no leading politician can go out without being armed for self-defence, and that his carrying a few dangerous weapons will not be out of place' (Mackintosh, 1966, p. 577).

The spate of violence led to a peace accord signed on the 23rd of October 1964 by party leaders, in an attempt to put a stop to the persistent forms of violence that had marred the political campaigns (Mackintosh, 1966). However, just two days after the peace accord, Dr Okpara and his campaign team were accosted on their way to a campaign rally, on the alleged order of the district council, but due to the intervention of the Nigerian police, the campaign rally took place as scheduled (Iwuji, 1978; Mackintosh, 1966). Campaigning in the Eastern region was less controversial but similar to the 1959 federal election. The NCNC fought on its record in the East, and it capitalised on deep resentment about the way Ibos in the North had been threatened,

just like the minority in Calabar-Ogoja – Rivers area. It also stressed the need for more states and for the release of Chief Awolowo (Mackintosh, 1966).

The NCNC averred that the people of the North were oppressive, feudalistic, reactionary, denied women equal rights and tried to control all the power and patronage in the authority of the Federal Government (Mackintosh, 1966). On the other hand, the leader of NNA Sir Abubakar and his colleagues did not tour the other regions. Its allied parties took on the responsibility of campaigning in the different regions (Post & Vickers, 1973). Alliances were forged for access to power. As earlier stated above, the geographical division of the regions gave an edge to the Northern part, due to its high population and large surface area ensured that the Northern region had the majority of seats in the House of Representatives. The NNA campaigned on ethnic lines. For example, instead of the creation of new states, they campaigned on adequate ethnic representation in the Federal public service (Mackintosh,1966). Nevertheless, the minor groups, such as the Midwest Democratic Front (MDF) and Niger Delta Congress (NDC) which were associated with the Mid West Region held on to their own specific position and supported the notion that voting NNA would bring about the creation of more states. In the same vein, the NNDP, a member of the NNA's alliance, advocated in their campaigns along tribal lines- victory to them will inevitably lead to more Yoruba in the Federal Government and more favourable treatment to the West (Schwarz, 1965). The NNA used their manifesto to communicate to the electorate about their policies on economic development, roads, health and education in very general terms. The NNA also used posters to appeal to the people in the North. On display were such appeals: 'which is the best way to vote? The answer is simple - NPC. Today you are proud to be a Northerner, NPC fought for you. We believe in Unity with Dignity. We talk less and act more. To achieve realities. This is NPC' (Mackintosh, 1966, p. 573).

As part of their campaign rhetoric, UPGA attacked Hausa-Fulani domination and said that the North had too many of the pickings of the federation. In the West, the AG proclaimed that the NNDP had sold out to the traditional enemies of the Yoruba and that all the region's troubles stemmed from the overthrow of the AG and the imprisonment of Chief Awolowo (Schwarz, 1965). UPGA posited that the Northern

region had the most significant gains from the Nigerian federation and advocated for the creation of more states for a fair share of resource allocation between states (ibid.).

It asserted that the NNDP alliance with the NNA was a commitment against the Yoruba resulting in a crisis in the region, one of such crises was the imprisonment of Chief Awolowo (ibid). UPGA claimed that the constitutional courts were accomplices in impeding their political activities. In addition to these modes of campaign practices, pamphlets were used. For example, 'Upgaiasm' was a pamphlet designed mainly to criticise the Ibos as the foundation of all the wrongs in the Federation, a tribe that should be eschewed entirely (ibid). The proclivities of the press were influenced by its ownership. Each regions was dominated by a political party with partisan press at their disposal (Olayiwola,1999).These media outlets were used to present the manifestos of the parties and published speeches.

There was no regulation of party funding in place as such; party financing was done through membership contributions, especially salary deductions from those who had been elected to the House of Representatives and donations from well-wishers and sympathisers of political parties. Other fundraising ventures organised by political parties included the selling of political party logos and literature (Mackintosh, 1966; Sklar, 1963). The elections took place on the 30th of December 1964, with some regions in the East, Mid-West and Lagos going to the polls on a later date due to boycotts. The disputed results reaffirmed the trend from the 1959 federal elections. Each region polled the highest votes from their dominant areas. The voting patterns in the first republic of Nigeria demonstrates how ethnicity proved a decisive factor in voting. The NPC won a total of 134 seats, all from the North. NCNC was shown to be a predominantly an Eastern party, winning 89 seats, including some seats from other regions. AG had the most regionally diverse support base – it won 73 seats, gained from within and outside its dominant region (Sklar,1963). Some scholars such as Nwolise (2007) and Olayiwola (1991) have attributed the failure of the first republic and the impetus to take over the reign of government by the military to the level of violence during the Western region election. Others have attributed it to the nature of the federal structure with its unequal three regions, which was created by the former

colonial government and the nature and the behaviour of political elites also contributed to the failure of the first republic Emelifeonwu (1999).

3.3 Nigeria's Second Republic (1979 – 1983)

The 1979 constitution introduced the adoption of the American-style presidential system of government, replacing the parliamentary system of government which had featured under the Independence Constitution of 1960 and the Constitution of the First Republic (1963-66) (Campbell, 1994).The second republic was ushered in by dissolving the constituent assembly after 13 years (1966-1979) of military rule and signing of Decree No 25, which endorsed the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria into Law (Abia, 2003).The decree gave birth to freedom of assembly and freedom of association. This signified an end of an epoch and moved the wheels of political party formation in motion across the country. Upon removing the restrictions placed on political parties and their activities, General Obasanjo stated:

> let the game of politics be played according to the laid-down rules. Let all players be good sportsmen. No matter the result of the competition, let all players remain friendly and without bitterness, look forward to another competition. Let the players, the spectators and the umpires all resolve to make the competition fair and just. Let all Nigerians show commitment in bringing about a civil rule through the process of peaceful and fair election (Oyediran,1981, p.16 cited in Osaghae,1989, p. 56).

Five political parties met the set requirements established under section 202 and 203 of the constitution of Nigeria (Abia, 2003; Howoritz,1985). Those that met Federal electoral commission (FEDECO) criteria and registered were: The Great Nigerian People's Party (GNPP), National Party of Nigeria (NPN), the Nigerian People's Party (NPP), People Redemption Party (PRP) and the United Party of Nigeria (UPN) (Abia, 2003; Akinola, 2014; Osaghae, 1989). The political players in the first republic also played similar roles in the second republic, nonetheless parties tried to distinguish themselves with them manifestoes (Akinola, 2014; Howoritz,1985). Diamond (1982) and Omotola (2009) asserts that these political parties classified themselves based on certain ideologies they did not conform to these ideologies and emphasised ethnicity more than policies, even though they provided blueprints of their policies in there

manifestoes. For example, the NPP and GNPP were most similar in ideology being liberal with a belief in a mixed economy; the NPN was conservative, elitist and believed in the free market; the PRP was leftist, populist and advocated for a social revolution with income redistribution; the UPN was socialist in belief and advocated for free education and health care.

The military government placed stringent requirements through the Electoral Decree of 1977, and the new Constitution of 1979 which sought to institutionalise political organisation, by stipulating the conditions for winning an election and the composition of a national government (Akinola,2014; Diamond,1982). Political parties had to demonstrate that their organisational structure transcended ethnic and regional lines and strived to promote national unity and prohibit ethnic discrimination (Akinola,2014; Howoritz,1985; Joseph,1981).

A constitutional requirement, was also stated that in order to win the presidency, the candidate for the presidency must not only win the majority of votes, but had to win two-third votes of the 19 newly created states by the military government (Akinola,2014).The creation of states was an attempt to impede the dominion of the most populous Northern part and also subdue the power of the three-majority ethnic group by providing states for minority ethnic groups within these groups (Jinadu,1987).

> The Federal system was 'to break up the hegemony of Nigeria's largest ethnic groups, decentralize ethnic conflict, disperse development activity, foster cross-cutting cleavages, expose intra-ethnic divisions, facilitate inter-ethnic alliances, and in general contain the powerful centrifugal forces inherent in Nigeria's ethnic composition. (Diamond, 1987, pp. 210-211)

Indeed, the creation of the states was to give a proper ethnic population spread. However, Diamond (1987) argues that the state creation will not essentially decentralise power but might centralise power as states would probably become weaker and may not lead to a transfer of resources to the countries. Ikpe (2009) argued that the resultant effect was the emergence of new majorities and minorities which fostered ethnic polarisation and intensified the struggle for control of the centre, with class being an exclusive line of cleavage across common ethnicity.

Despite the conditionality put in place by the military government to compel for political party composition to transcend ethnic and regional lines and strive to promote national unity and prohibit ethnic discrimination, as the campaign unfolded it was apparent that though they met the requirements, each political party had a regional, if not ethnic, core and was bereft of ideology. For example, NPN attempted to incorporate the electoral provisions with its own informal structure by coming up with the method of zoning (Joseph, 1987). Though the constitution attempted political accommodation through the requirement that appointments and recruitment into public positions reflect federal character which is the diversity of the population within the territorial jurisdiction of each level of government (Ejobowah, 2008), Howoritz (1985) argues that it further led to more fragmented ethnic party system. The NPN attempted to incorporate the electoral provisions of federal character with its own informal structure by coming up with the method of 'zoning' where control within the party is distributed amongst the four zones of the country (Diamond, 1987; Joseph, 1981). The position of the presidency was allocated to the North, the vice presidency went to the East and the chairman of the party would be from the West (Joseph, 1981). The strategy clearly masked the deep-rooted ethno-regional cleavages that had plagued Nigerian politics. The arrangement was expected to take into consideration the balance of power within the aspiring candidate from different ethnic groupings.

Unlike in the previous republic, whereby funding of campaigns was entirely left to the political parties, the government contributed to the financing of the campaign (Adeyi, 2008). Furthermore, similar to the first republic, political campaigns were conducted using the following channels of communication: touring of the different regions, mainly by road, private and public meetings in town halls or open fields, pamphlets and posters. The legal powers of the institutions, such as the police in each state were also granted powers in controlling the licensing of political rallies (Akinola, 2014). However, due to the imperious presence of the military, they were not many narrated incidences of violence (Malu, 2006; Ojo, 2014). The general elections that ushered in the second republic were not devoid of malpractices. Just like in the first republic, the second republic too experienced campaign practices characterised by the use of police, courts and thugs to intimidate rival parties (Diamond, 1982). Opponents of various parties suffered victimisation from the police, party thugs and manipulation of

electoral results by polling agents (Ojo, 2014). However, due to the ubiquitous presence of the military, they were not many incidences of violence (Ibid). Alhaji Shehu Shagari, the leader of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), was declared the winner of the election based on the court's interpretation of a two-third win of the 19 states (Akinola, 2014). See result in Appendix A Table 2.

While the military government supervised the 1979 presidential election, the 1983 elections were in the control of the civilian government. The 1983 presidential elections witnessed the participation of a newly created party the National Advance Party (NAP) with five other political parties, which had previously contested in the 1979 general election (Akinola, 2014). Of considerable importance during the second republic was the discovery of oil, which led to an increase in revenue accrued to the federal government, leading to an intense struggle for the office of the president (Ikpe, 2009).

Accordingly, sectional interest was often mobilised via long standing patron-client relationship referred to in the Nigerian context as a system of reward (Post & Vicker, 1973) and politics of prebendalism (Joseph, 1987). These patrons mobilised support for control of state powers for their personal benefit and their community (Ikpe,2009; Joseph, 1983; Post & Vickers 1973; Sklar,1979). Politicians as patrons used public resources as a campaign strategy to mobilise support (Diamond, 1987).

This is consistent with the argument of Oyewole and Ikpe (1994) cited in Ikpe (2009) who state that 'when a pluralist state is weak and lacking in autonomy, like Nigeria is, the ruling class becomes factionalized, and the most advantaged of the factions strives to establish, maintain and recreate its domination'(p.688) .The party in power controlled the government-owned print and electronic media under their jurisdictions, and they became the mouthpieces of the political parties which wielded control over them during the elections (Olayiwola,1991).

The stringent requirement of the constitution, which required 25 percent geographic-spread vote for victory by parties, led to all sorts of fraud which ultimately led to the military intervention by a military coup of 31 December 1983 (Ejobomah, 2008). Just like in the first republic, the second republic experienced campaign practices characterised by the use of police, courts and thuggery to intimidate the rivalry parties.

The creation of more states intensified electoral competition. The government also contributed to the financing of the campaign. Similar to the first republic, there were recorded cases of electoral malpractices, opponents of various parties experienced victimisation from the police, party thugs and the manipulation of electoral results by polling agents (Ugoh, 2004). In the same vein, the political inclination of the press was still dependent on management and ownership. The press bias was again on full display, instigating the embers of tribalism, regionalism and ethnicity. During the campaign epoch, all political parties had their own press, and they utilised them for their benefit. However, the ruling party went beyond their press and controlled the reporting of the government-owned media. The press was enclaved in the complexities of partisan politics and never any nearer to preparing the people on the challenges of contemporary presidential system of government and largely contributed to the proliferation of tribalism, sectionalism and ethnic promulgation. This led to fragmentation and disintegration, which further shook the foundation of unity and stability of the Federal state of Nigeria. There were various assertions of unethical practices of journalism such as some media practitioners being paid by certain politicians to publish unverified reports, disseminate false statements, and make reports of attendance in conferences. In addition, the effect media ownership was evident during the 1983 Nigerian election, as these television and radio stations became the mouthpiece of the political parties to which their owners were affiliated too (Olayiwola, 1991). While some accounts indicated that the NPN, the incumbent government won the election, the election result was disputed, and violence erupted upon the declaration of the electoral results. amid allegation of electoral malpractices, leading to another military takeover. Consequently, the election result is not provided in this study.

3.4 Nigeria's Third Republic (1985-1993)

The short-lived third Republic maintained the presidential system of government with a military-imposed two-party system of government (Omotola, 2009). The Social Democratic Party (SDP), which was presumed to be centre-left, and the National Republican Convention (NRC), which was centre-right. However, there was no noticeable ideological difference between the two parties (Lewis, 1994; Omotola, 2009; Oyediran & Agbaje, 1991). The SDP, mostly perceived as a rebirth of the UPN

and offshoots of the PRP, GNPP and NRC, while NRC was the renaissance of the NPN. What was more interesting during this period was the fact that the entire structure and process of the two political parties were controlled and monitored by the government (Malachy, 2012). Membership into these two political parties was open to every citizen of Nigeria subject to some restrictions. The military conducted voters' registration in 40 days, and distributed ten million membership cards, which was fairly evenly divided between the two parties (Read,1991). The third republic also witnessed the introduction of an open ballot system, whereby photographs of candidates where placed on the ballot papers to enable voting by illiterate voters (ibid). By implication, this suggests that the military government sought normalisation, equity and made attempts in reducing the chances of violence during, and after elections. The principle of zoning re-emerged in the third republic, with the party structures designed in a way that allowed for ethno-regional characteristics to exist. Badejo (1997) 'asserts that it seemed to be an emerging consensus that it was time to elect a president from the South' (p.185).

The SDP heeded to the agreement, while the NRC did not. Both candidates were said to have close ties with the military head of state (Lewis, 1994). Abiola being from the south provided an opportunity to upturn the Northern elites' dominance in the executive branch of the government (Lewis, 1994). Hence, Abiola chose as his running mate Babagana Kingibe, a northern Muslim to appease their interest (ibid). The presence of the military ensured that the electoral campaign did not experience the level of violence and intimidation that preceded the third republic (Lewis,1994). Political rallies and processions took place upon the approval of the police commissioner. Guidelines were also provided for campaigning 'through the electronic media": "The objective of politics on radio and television shall essentially, therefore, be to sensitise the public on the significant nature of their decision so that they can make the right choice in giving Nigeria the government it desires' (Read,1991, p.189). The guidelines provided for equal opportunities for both parties to air their views on government-owned broadcast stations and these broadcasts were restricted to one hour a week in each station and must be by a party representative who was allowed ten minutes uninterrupted time to speak to the viewers. It also witnessed the first ever nationally televised debate between presidential candidates. It was suggested that

Abiola's performance during the debate garnered him votes that ensured his victory at the polls. In addition to the televised debate, Abiola employed the use of television jingles, using popular lyrics as a rallying tune in mobilising support (Alozie, 2011). Initially funding for the political parties were provided by the government as stipulated by the decree which also put a restriction in the amount an individual could contribute to the political party (Read, 1991).'The decree imposed various restrictions upon electoral campaigns, including a limit of expenditure of 80 kobo per voter by each party; if this was exceeded a fine of N10,000 was payable by the party leader, treasurer and chairman jointly' (Read, 1991 p.189). However, the political parties circumvented the rules and regulations laid down by the military government (constitutions and manifestos) and manipulated these instruments of law to fit their political agendas which were on ethno-region-religious grounds (Lewis, 1994).

The nature and composition of the political politics in the second republic was like the political parties of the third republic, through the manipulation of the constitutions and manifestoes prepared and supervised by the military government. For example, the NRC mirrored the NPC of the second republic, as the patrons of the NPC were still active in the background.

The election of June 12, 1993 election was significant in various ways starting with the choice of presidential candidates. The June 12, 1993 was perhaps the most significant, and a contrast to previous elections that had revealed an electoral behaviour based on ethnic connotation. It was also the first time that a Southern candidate Abiola, was presumed the winner of the presidency in a democratic process, by securing overwhelming support beyond his strong hold the south , but also from the North, defeating his opponent in his home state (Moveh, 2010) .

Despite what appeared to have been a controlled and smooth transition to civilian rule, General Ibrahim Babangida annulled the presidential elections of 1993 (Osumah & Ikelegbe, 2009). One of the grounds of annulment was the allegations of political parties spending 2.1 billion Naira during the elections (Yaqub, 2001).

3.5 Nigeria's Fourth Republic (1999 – To date)

At the time of writing, Nigeria's Fourth Republic has witnessed five general elections in 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015. (See Appendix A Table 3-7). This section will not discuss the features of the previous general elections, which are very important in their own right. Instead, the objective of this section is to explore the campaign practices of the All-Progressives Congress (APC) and the People's Democratic Party (PDP) during the 2015 election.

The 2015 Nigerian presidential election was historic, as it marked the first time since the country gained independence in 1960, where an opposition political party, the All-Progressives Congress (APC) emerged as a winner, after defeating the incumbent government of the PDP at the polls (Mustapha, 2017). During the 2015 election, there were 28 registered political parties, with 14 fielding candidates. However, the contest was mainly between the People's Democratic Party (PDP) and the All-Progressives Congress (APC). In 1997, a group of prominent Nigeria' referred to as G18, and later referred to as G34 as the number increased started the process of the formation of the political party known as the People's Democratic Party (PDP) (Katsina, 2016). The PDP became part of one of many political parties which re-emerge in the fourth republic, having been earlier denied the opportunity of registering as a political party by the by National Electoral Commission of Nigeria (NECON) under the late military head of state Sani Abacha (Enemuo, 1999; Katsina, 2016). The PDP has been the dominant party in Nigeria in the 16 years since the formation of the fourth republic, having secured electoral victory at the polls at the national, state, and local levels during the 1999 election and three consecutive presidential elections except for the 2015 election and the recent election in 2019. This one – party dominance, prevails in a federal structure due to the centralization of power around the office of the president (Van De Walle, 2003). The PDP's incumbent position has being its successful management of the economic and political interest of different patrons from different ethnicity (Kendhammer, 2010). Its success in maintaining membership and securing power is through effective informal bargains and accommodations brokered by elites in distributing party spoils (appointments, bureaucratic posts, financial incentives) upon ensuring electoral victories. (Kendhammer, 2010). This fosters campaigns along ethnic lines, as elites mobilise supports from their base to remain politically relevant.

The APC, the primary challenger amongst other political parties during the 2015 general election, was established in 2013. Its emergence as a political party was through an alliance forged by the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), the All-Nigeria People's Party (ANPP), and a faction of the All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) (Owen & Usman, 2015). The early membership of the APC's membership boasted of some previous PDP members which included the likes of the former Vice-President Atiku Abubakar (1999–2003) and seven governors (Owen & Usman, 2015). The defection of these 'Big men' amongst other prominent political leaders provided the impetus of a viable opposition party. This defection of members contributes to the weak institutionalisation of political parties in Nigeria (Aduku & Umoru, 2014; Omotola, 2009; 2010). This defection of 'Big men' is also reflected in its membership base, as members of these political parties are anchored by similar interest as those of their party leaders - 'power and money. The 2015 election took place amidst corruption, insecurity and defection from the PDP, including the failure of the incumbent president to keep to the zoning formula (Animashu, 2015; Egobueze & Ojirika, 2017; Olayoade, 2015; Orji, 2015).

The emergence of the incumbent President, Goodluck Jonathan, a southern Christian, for a second tenure as the presidential candidate of the 2015 election overturned the zoning formula (Owen & Usman, 2015).The PDP's constitution provides for a rotation and zoning of political power between the geopolitical zones, in order for different ethnic groups to have a chance at the presidential seat. In 2011, the death of President Umaru Musa Yar'adua, created the opportunity for Goodluck Jonathan to run for the office of the presidency, making many party members claim that the 'zoning' formula of the PDP had been broken (Owen & Usman, 2015). Good luck Jonathan emergence as the presidential candidate, following the endorsement by some party leadership was viewed as a violation of the formula put in place for presidential candidate's emergence (Owen & Usman, 2015). Even though the vice-presidential candidate of the People's Democratic Party Alhaji Mohammed Namadi Sambo was from the North, this power-sharing arrangement ossified patronage networks.

The candidate selection of the APC was in direct contrast to that of the PDP, as the presidential aspirants had to go through a contest, with Muhammadu Buhari polling in 3430 votes, while Dr Rabiu Kwankwso, Alhaji Atiku Abubakar, Owelle Rochas

Okorocha and Sam Nda-Isaiah got a total of 974, 954, 624 and 10 votes respectively (Adigun, 2017). Though the process was described as democratic (Owen and Usman, 2015), others described it as a 'horse trading convention' (Adigun, 2017, p.18) as claims where made of vote buying (Omotola & Nyuykonge, 2015) a significant feature in Nigeria's elections.

The APC presented a Northerner General Muhammadu Buhari (rtd) as their presidential candidate. He was a former military dictator who was overthrown in a coup in 1985 and had unsuccessfully contested for the office of the presidency under the auspices of different political parties in 2003, 2007 and 2011, Prof. Yemi Osinbajo a Christian from the South-West, a Christian was chosen as his vice-presidential candidate. This choice of candidates represented the north/south, Muslim /Christian divide in the long trajectory of Nigeria's political campaign dynamics. In the fourth republic, certain media houses are owned by politicians, activists, and businesspersons. Some of these media houses are identified with certain political parties. e.g A Nigerian television station, Africa independent television (AIT) produced an uncomplimentary documentary, 'the Real Buhari' that depicted the presidential candidate of the APC in an uncomplimentary form. The APC also had television stations, with affiliation to certain members of their parties such as Television Continental (TVC) and online media such as Sahara Reporters.

According to the 2015 European Union Election Observation Mission report (EUEOM), during the 2015 election, the PDP and APC carried out large-scale rallies employing different strategies like public rallies, vehicle motorcades with loudspeakers, political gatherings, door-to-door visits, billboards and posters to communicate with the electorates, in all 36 states and the federal capital territory Abuja. The power of PDP's incumbency manifested itself in various forms, campaigns are meant to start 90 days before an election as provided the amended electoral Act of 2010. While the electoral Act is meant to control the activities of political parties, it does not extend to the parties' internal mobilisation strategies (Omotola & Nyuykonge, 2015). Thus, there were cases of violation of this provision. For instance, one clear example of the violation of this rule was by a group, Transformation Ambassadors of Nigeria (TAN) which campaigned in all the regions of the country claiming to

encourage Jonathan to context in the 2015 national election (Omotola & Nyuykonge, 2015).

The police force which is centralised and solely under the authority of the president was also used in restricting political opponents' freedom and denying the APC access to prime public spaces in both PDP and APC controlled states. For example, 'the PDP's presidential campaign was permitted to use the stadium in Calabar and Cross Rivers States for rallies, while the APC presidential candidate was refused entrance'. (EUEOM, 2015, p. 20). Media bias and unfair coverage also characterised the 2015 elections campaign. 'The publicly owned media outlets, especially broadcast media, were clearly partisan' (EUEOM, 2015, p. 4). These government media station directors are appointed by the president, consequently their impartiality is questioned as evidence has shown the ruling party has unbridled access to its facilities. The- evening news especially on the National Television Authority was biased towards the ruling party (Commonwealth Observer Group Report, 2015). The EU Election Observation Mission (EOM) 2015 and Commonwealth Observer Group Report (2015) reports show that the government-owned Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) and Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN), the two leading media networks with the broadest coverage, both provided extensive coverage to the PDP and its candidate. 'PDP's total 84% coverage APC received 11% on NTA, and on FRCN PDP"s 78% contrasts with ACP's 13%'(EU EOM, 2015, p. 10).

Though the constitution allows for paid advertisement, the PDP dominated the air waves due to its financial resources (ibid).The campaign practice literature of Nigeria in the fourth republic emphasises the importance of money, identity, patronage, control over people and violence (Omodia, 2010; Omotola, 2013; Yagboyaju, 2015) while others suggest that parties resort to nascent sentiments attached to religion, ethnicity and regions (Lewis, 2007; Azeez, 2004; Ibeanu, 2012). Unlike in the first republic, political parties in this era did not own media outlets. Nevertheless, politicians affiliated to certain political parties claim ownership and these newspapers provided coverage to political parties whose candidate aligned with them (Nwammuo et al., 2015). Furthermore, privately owned media stations also succumbed to the wishes of political elites who were willing to pay for their services (Jibo & Okoosi-Simbine, 2003). Several scholars (Animashau, 2015; Emetumah, 2016; Orji, 2015; Omotola &

Nyuykonge, 2015; Owen & Usman, 2015) observed the use of different arrays of new forms of media platforms during the 2015 presidential election campaign. Various young people contributed to the campaign using their social media platforms in campaign and monitoring the situation room established for the campaign (Owen & Usman, 2015). This was in a continuance of the practices that was first adopted during the 2007 general election where blogs were used as a tool for mobilisation (Ifukor, 2010).

Similarly, during the 2011 elections, scholars observed that there was a range of social media platforms used by the three major presidential candidates. Significantly, in 2011 President Good luck Jonathan's announced his ambition to contest for the office of the presidency on Facebook (Abubakar, 2012; Okoro & Nwafor, 2013; Oyenuga, 2015). Some scholar notes that the campaigns of political parties in 2015 were not issue based, but more of smear campaigns. However, Sule et al. (2015) argue that unlike the previous election, where parties resorted to the politics of identity-based on religion, ethnic and regions, campaigns were based on issues.

Owen and Usman (2015) observe that the PDP'S campaign started with policies and was issue based but that these took the back seat as the campaign progressed. For example, the PDP's campaign was primarily concerned with attacks on Buhari's democratic credentials, health and relatives, even going as a far as broadcasting a highly controversial documentary of Buhari on African independent television (AIT) news channel. The APC's campaign was not too different from that of the PDP, it still emphasised change and the security challenges that the PDP government had failed to address (Orji, 2015).

Campaigning in Nigeria has always been money driven; it was reported that the sum of 2 trillion ($10 billion) was spent by the PDP during the 2015 presidential elections (Owen & Usman, 2015). Another report claimed, during a fundraising dinner organised by the PDP, the campaign was able to raise more than 22 billion Naira for president Goodluck Jonathan's campaign (Ukase, 2015). While there are no reports on the total amounts spent by the APC, the APC pioneered various means of crowd funding, from ringtones such as 'APCGMBPYO' ringtone online, premium Short Message Service (SMS) and e-transactions of payments to some bank accounts online

through mobile phones and laptops and selling of scratch cards (Premium times, 2015). 'The Gen. Muhammadu Buhari Campaign Organisation on Wednesday received N64 million to add to the initial N54 million realised in December to fund his campaign in the 2015 general election' (Vanguard, 2015, np). This was the first time in Nigeria's electoral history that a presidential candidate attempted to raise funds from crowdsourcing.

> We want to show that Nigeria is a civilized country where things can be done differently and that change is upon us", says Babatunde Fashola, the Director of the party's Campaign Fundraising Team and Governor of Lagos State, "the intention was to democratize campaign funding in the country and to operate a transparent and accountable fundraising and management
>
> (Governor Fashola, of Lagos State, cited in Onalaja, 2015, np).

This attempt to crowd source using the mobile ringtone was put to an end by a ban from the Nigerian communications commission (NCC). A Federal High court sitting in Lagos overturned the decision and order the NCC and the telecommunication service provider to pay the sum of 500 million in damages to the APC (Orji, 2018). Although various constitutional and legal instruments are meant to guide the financing of political parties in Nigeria, the literature on funding of political parties in Nigeria shows vast sums of money beyond the constitutional provisions during campaigns. This is because of the weak regulatory framework which allows for abuse of its rules.

The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) which provides the regulation and monitoring of political party's registration, voter's registration and conducting elections in Nigeria is characterised by weak institutionalisation and lack of autonomy (Omotola, 2010). The presidents have control over the composition and appointment of the head of the commission, including its funding which is subject to the authorisation of the presidency. This is susceptible to abuse by political contenders (ibid). Extant literature also posits that the influence of incumbency and money leads to electoral fraud such as vote rigging in collusion with the institutions saddled with the administration of the electoral processes (Aduku & Umoru, 2014).

During this period, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) initiated the use of the Automated Fingerprint System (AFIS), which was to help in identifying

voters and reduce the possibilities of multiple voters' registrations (Igbokwe-Ibeto, et al., 2016). Beyond that, was also 'the introduction of Permanent Voters Card (PVC) and the electronic smart card reader (SCR) to check the authenticity of the card and its owner is perhaps the best ICT innovation used in the conduct of the 2015 elections' (Igbokwe-Ibeto, et al.,2016. p.5).

The cleavages that had plagued previous elections found their way into the 2015 elections. Just like previous elections, parties resorted to the politics of identity, based on religion, ethnicity and smear campaigns and not based on issues (Omotola & Nyuykonge, 2015; Owen & Usman, 2015). Campaign rhetoric were divisive in continuance of established forms of electoral campaigns. Below is an example of a religious rhetoric quote made by the former vice-presidential candidate of the PDP during a rally in Minna a state in Nigeria. 'Our Chairman, Adamu Mu'azu, is a Muslim; the Director General of the Campaign Organization, Adamu Ali is also a Muslim. I am a Muslim. It is only our presidential candidate that is a Christian' Setelou (2017, p. 85). The PDP'S presidential candidate was seen going to churches to receive endorsements from highly revered pastors, in his bid to seek votes from the Christian community while his deputy Alhaji Namadi Sambo met with the Muslims imams to canvass for votes.

During the 2015 presidential campaign, it was observed that an array of new forms of media platforms was used. This was in continuance of the practices that were first adopted during the 2007 and 2011 general elections. During the 2011 presidential elections scholars observed that there were a range of social media platforms used by the three major presidential candidates. As earlier noted, President Good luck Jonathan declared his intention to seek re-election in 2011 on Facebook (Abubakar, 2012; Okoro & Nwafor, 2013; Oyenuga, 2015).

In 2015, the use of the web was prominent. Political parties utilised various social media and created pages in support of their campaigns. The APC in particular relied on volunteers in running their social media campaign and in monitoring results in an established situation room (Owen & Usman, 2015). During the 2015 presidential election, the APC and PDP adopted the internet extensively for several functional uses. This was particularly emphasized by the APC, mainly due to its status as a challenger,

without the support of the government owned infrastructures and financial resources. Like previous elections, a peace accord was organised and signed by the presidential candidates to urge their supporters to desist from violence and not incite such actions through their choice of words and actions (Commonwealth Observer Group report, 2015). Nonetheless, the 2015 presidential election also witnessed its own share of violence just like in the previous elections. For example, there were report of attacks on the both the PDP and APC's presidential convoy and his supporters (Commonwealth Observer Group report, 2015).

3.6 Chapter Summary

The chapter has presented both historical and nascent developments in the political campaign system of Nigeria from post-colonial, independence and post independent political campaign practices. The chapter contextualised Nigerian political system, regulations and voter participations and engaged with current discourses on political campaign practices. Nigeria is home to diverse ethnicities, religion, and regions. Nigeria adopted federalism in 1946, thereafter a shift was observed when it took the path of centralisation involving subdivisions from four regions to 12 federal state in 1967, then 19 in 1976, 21 in 1987, 30 in 1991 and 36 in 1996. Nonetheless, the creation of states promoted the emergence of identity forms of politics, making the race for the control of presidency even more fierce. The chapter identified four republics, and during these stages, Nigeria has witnessed major differences and similarities in the nature and practice of political campaigns. In the first republic, political parties had their own press which they utilised for their own benefit. The party in power went beyond political party owned press to controlling the reporting and press time of government-owned media. The press was involved in the complexities of partisan politics. There were multiple incidences of electoral malpractice, vote rigging, police brutality and manipulation of results by polling station agents. In the second republic, much of what took place during political campaigning in first republic was replicated and campaign practices were characterised by the use of police, courts and thuggery to intimidate opponents. There were recorded cases of electoral malpractices, police violence, party thugs and rigging of election results. Televisions and radio stations became the mouthpieces of the political parties, which wielded control over them during the elections, signifying the influence of media ownership on political

communications in Nigeria's 1983 general elections. In the third republic, elections were stage managed by the military government which came up with standardisation of political system and regulations. They created a two-part system which was state funded and ensured that each political party had a constitution and manifesto. Despite all the standards and regulations put in place, the political parties were able to circumvent these regulations and promoted agendas which characterised regional alignment. The other notable development was the first ever debate between presidential candidates. What epitomised the whole voting pattern was the expectation of hope of good governance from one of the candidates MKO Abiola, and this led Nigerians of all ethnicities and religions to vote for him. Finally, the fourth republic saw three elections in the run-up to the focus of this thesis, the 2015 presidential election political campaign. During the periods of election in the fourth republic the campaigns moved from traditional ways of campaigning to incorporation of the internet at a larger scale than before. Political campaigns were characterised not only by public rallies, vehicle motorcade with loudspeakers, political gatherings, billboards and posters but also social media. The state/regional identities that had gained currency was developed around the six geopolitical zones was divided in 1996 to share and rotate federal power and resources – North East, North West, North central, South West, South East, and South-south. This has further created several cleavages. Taken together, the Nigerian political campaign has evolved since independence. However, it has been beset by violence related campaign malpractices. Nonetheless, the political campaign landscape has drastically changed from exclusively traditional methods of campaigning to an inclusive form where almost all political parties fuse technology into mainstream campaign systems even though the extent differs from one political party to the other based on various factors.

Chapter Four: The Theoretical Framework: Concepts and Interpretations

4.1 Introduction

This chapter introduces the theoretical framework for the study. It seeks to develop a set of concepts and arguments that speak to the research questions and the main objective of the thesis. As indicated in Chapter One, the focus of this thesis is on two major political parties in Nigeria; the People's Democratic Party (PDP) and the All Progressive Congress (APC) together with their presidential candidates, Dr Goodluck Jonathan and General Muhammad Buhari respectively. This chapter presents three theoretical frameworks: modernisation, americanisation, and hybridisation, each of which will serve as a lens through which the empirical data gathered will be analysed. This chapter proceeds as follows: the first section explores the theory of modernisation, the second presents the theory of Americanisation, and the third will focus on the theory of Hybridisation. It also presents other associated concepts. Finally, it draws conclusion on the following series of nested and inter-related research questions about the presidential elections campaign of the PDP and the APC in Nigeria in 2015.

4.2 Modernisation as an approach to the study of internet campaigning

Proponents of the theory of modernisation posit that the impact of the internet on campaign communication can be understood as 'structural changes on the macro-level (Media, technologies, social structure) leads to an adaptive behaviour on the micro-level (parties, candidates and journalist), resulting in gradual modifications of traditional styles and strategies of political communication' (Plasser & Plasser, 2000, p. 17). These notable changes in political communication occur over time mostly in western democracies (Esser & Pfetsch, 2004). As discussed in the literature review, scholars who embrace the notion of campaign modernisation agree that campaigning has undergone several stages and/or eras. Several scholars have offered a discussion of modernisation as an alternative to americanisation (Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Bowler & Farrell, 1992; Swanson & Mancini, 1996). These scholars agree that the concept of modernisation postulates that changes in politics, society and media systems are

caused by both exogenous and endogenous factors (Mancini, 1999; Norris, 2007). These modernised trends of campaigning occur in varied forms in different contexts (Swanson & Mancini, 1996).

Examining the conceptualisation behind modern campaign models offers valuable insight into the shifts taking place. Limitations exist in the concept of modernisation, lying mostly in the diversity and lack of uniformity to campaign practices; this makes discerning the concept difficult, especially given the wholesale application of the modern model to campaigning. In essence, whenever the modern model is assigned to a campaign, there will still be variances and nuances.

Swanson and Mancini (1996) provide an account of some of the key elements of modern campaigning, providing a model where practices grow organically out of the modernisation process. While these keys elements have been identified, its use varies in different context. These changes in campaign practices are reflective of institutional, organizational, legal, cultural and campaign regulations (Karlsen, 2010). As a result, traditional forms persist and continue to develop in the changing context, sometimes taking new functions.

Nevertheless, Stromback & Kiousis (2014) identify ten macro trends as constituting contemporary elements of campaign practices. These trends all reflect the underlying contention of the modernisation approach, that campaigns evolve in response to structural changes to media systems. I argue first that we are sensitised in our empirical analysis by a sub-set of factors consequent of the modernisation approach. A first macro trend is continuity in the centrality of television to modern campaigns. Television, which is arguably the most essential feature of the second age or era of campaigning practices (Blumler & Kavanagh,1999; Norris, 2000) remains an important feature of contemporary campaigns (Lilleker,2014; Plasser, 2009; Stromer-Galley, 2014). Even though there are changes in political campaign practices, most countries still make use of the television for information (Norris, 2000; Plasser, 2009). The television remains an important mass media and a source of information (Lilleker & Vedel, 2013; Stromback & Kiousis, 2014). In modern campaigns, less consideration is placed on political parties and more on individuals (Stromback & Kiousis, 2014).

The importance of television places candidates and campaign messages as the focus of strategic marketing in each party.

While television has contributed to a centralisation of the campaign, it has not deferred local campaigning, which has had an impact on party organisation (Farrell, 1996). Consequently, granting more autonomy to individual politicians. This is more evident in presidential systems of government, which are candidate-focused (Gibson & Rommele, 2005; Lilliker & Vedel, 2003). Swanson and Mancini (1996) describe personalization as the 'centre-piece of marketing' (p.251). Even in countries with party-based electoral systems and powerful and productive party organisations, campaigning tends to focus increasingly on the personality of the top candidates (Norris, 2000). Kriesi (2012) asserts that the realignment of voters and the commercialisation of media systems are the two processes most clearly driving the phenomenon of the personalisation of politics. The relevance of the use of the television has long been evident, starting with the Nixon-Kennedy debate, and they remain relevant in contemporary campaigns.

In contemporary campaigns the advent of the use of social media, has further accelerated the growing personalisation of election campaigns (Enli & Skogerbo, 2013; Hermans & Vergeer, 2013). Campaigns have become more concerned with individual preferences and design messages to appeal to a niche of citizens (Lilleker, 2014). This narrowcasting is enabled by the ever-expanding and fragmenting media environment which offers more media choices (Stromback & Kiousis, 2014). Nevertheless, its impact is dependent on how divided and polarized the electorates are (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999).This growth in the number of different media channels has consequently resulted in a decrease in the audience for one specific channel due to audience's enthusiasm and liking (Stromback & Kiousis, 2014). This media diversity has given birth to greater choice for media consumers; information on the news can now be pursued through a variety of media forms.

The rapid diffusion of new media choices on offer provide much greater variability in the content of available information' (Bennet & Iyengar, 2008, p. 717). Describes this process of abundance of information as stratamentation (stratification and fragmentation at the same time). In consequence, while news consumers can engage

only with those topics in line with their interests, they are also exposed to news inadvertently. The abundance and diversity of information providers makes it difficult in identifying an individual's media use. Overall, then, the 'new political communication environment is also more porous, fragmented and antithetical to the final word on any subject' (Blumler & Coleman, 2015, p. 120). According to Stromer-Galley (2014), methods of persuasion in the mass-communication era, were not the same as they are in the present networked communication environment. In the network age, a campaign must consider messaging across more channels and must take into consideration the affordance of each new channel while recognising that groups of people are interconnected across those channels.

Furthermore, the growing fragmentation of audiences, as discussed in the previous subsection, also makes it difficult for campaign strategist to form a coherent message for a broad-based political agenda. This provided the background logic for micro-targeting, (Stomback & Kiousis, 2014). Micro-targeting identifies as many voter segments as possible and modifies campaign messages all the way down to the level of individual voters (Murray, 2010; Raynaud & Turcotte, 2016; Stomback & Kiousis, 2014). It is argued that the segments of groups most targeted are those who show interest in politics, show political loyalties or are susceptible to persuasion, (Lilleker, 2014, p. 189).The effect of microtargeting is the deliberate act of mobilising supporters rather than undecided voters (Lilleker, 2014).

One emerging micro-targeting technique is data mining. Which uncovers unseen patterns in data using both human and software resources (Murray & Scime, 2010). The use of data by political parties is not a new phenomenon, however the ease at which data can be collected and distributed, over time improved, and firms the basis of most campaign messages (Howard, 2005). Nevertheless, microtargeting technique has been more prominent during American political campaigns, with both Democratic and Republican parties investing heavily in their use (Howard, 2005) and having databases of registered voters for effective targeting (Stomback & Kiousis, 2014). Campaigns have gone beyond data mining to predictive data mining (Sides et al., 2012).Related to these, are narrowcasting, which are attempts by political parties and

candidates to get specific information to niche voter-groups in a society, without attempting to persuade undecided voters (Raynauld & Turcotte, 2016).

Modernisation theory recognises the development in media and marketing techniques (Stomback & Kiousis, 2014). The availability of different media offers more opportunities for tailored messages based on individual preferences (Ibid). This narrowcasting has been enabled greatly with the use of social media platforms, particularly Twitter and Facebook, which allows for direct and indirect communication. The posts of politicians can be rebroadcasted by followers, reaching out to people who do not directly follow those politicians, thus helping to amplify their messages. Vaccari and Valeriani (2015) describe this as a form of direct and indirect communication to primary and secondary audiences. The direct audience refers to "one-step flow of communication" (Bennett & Manheim 2006), while indirect communication refers to the 'two-step flow' hypothesis of Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955). This is further supported by Stromer-Galley (2014) and Kreiss and Welch (2015), both identify the two step flow of targeting and drawing of energised super-supporters who are mobilised for the purposes of sharing information with their friends and co-workers to promote the candidate's agenda and/or organise fund raising activities for the campaign.

The modernisation theory makes us aware that the process of campaigning is mostly run by experts with different specialism, contributing their expertise to the campaign. The ever-increasing changes in political campaigns reveals changes in campaign professionalisation, with modern professionalisation been qualitatively different from previous campaigns based on 'specialisation and displacement' (Scammell, 1998, p. 4). Earlier, consultants with experts in conducting opinion polls, using the internet and computer software, and conducting programmes for television and advertising, constituted the bulk of campaign experts (Scammell, 1998). This is also supported by Mancini (2007) who suggest that in defining campaign strategy, the expertise of professionals are pursued. More recently, political consultants handle more responsibilities and are grouped into three main categories 'strategist, specialist, and vendor'(Caccciotto, 2017, p. **56**). Thus, the influx of these professionals may lead to some form of displacement, with party strategists been replaced by non-party

professional strategists who become increasingly central to campaigning (Scammell, 1998). For example, in the United States, professionalisation is characterised by external professionals who are mostly employed by political candidates for a fee (Negrine et al., 2007), as opposed to most European parties which are characterised by internal professionals- party members with specialised skills employed to perform various tasks. If such parties require the services of external consultants, the professionals they engage are typically consultants who share the party ethos and whose primary responsibilities and obligations are to the party.

Campaigns are increasingly using marketing strategies and tactics in framing their programs and policies to address voters' needs and wants (Lees-Marshment, 2012). These marketing techniques has been enhanced greatly, going through various stages and process based on huge amounts of data, message testing and targeting to a specific set of electorates (Thorsten Koch, 2011). Political parties and their candidates' campaign for votes using various means such as emails, telemarketing and social media (Gibson & Rommele, 2009). Campaign makes use of various research methods to make decisions on campaign techniques and process. These various means and methods of micro targeting campaigning, influences campaign decision on what candidates and parties offer voters. The emergence of digital media raised the capacity of marketing specialist material to segment voters, developing varied communication routes to the electorate. In collaboration with multi-national media companies such as Google, social media has not just been a method of communication but also of tracking and gathering the internet user's behavioural data, which has furthered the ability to frame campaign messages, (Kriess & McGregor, 2018). Parties with sales-oriented strategies utilise discoveries from market intelligence to develop messages that persuade voters, without having to change their policies (Lees-Marshment, Strömbäck, & Rudd, 2010).

The key aspects of modernisation theory, as outlined above, can be discussed in terms of their application to the research questions at both the national and party levels. The insights will be collected into a series of foci for an analytic discussion of the research question. At the national level, one might initially expect that both campaigns studied in this thesis should focus on candidates' personalities and personal qualities. Because

the pressures influencing developments are relatively constant across the national scene, and because the campaign being studied is presidential, we would expect to observe this emphasis across both campaigns in their digital strategy. A further trend that we would expect to see affecting both campaigns is an increase in the fragmentation of media through which major political campaigns communicate with their voters – in line with the uptake of such technologies at the population level. While 'traditional' media – most notably television – is expected to remain an important aspect of the communication mix, we would expect first and foremost that campaigns will also seek to exploit the affordances of various web-based communication platforms.

However, the extent to which these affordances are exploited, most notably the more advanced notions of micro-targeting and narrowcasting, varies across campaigns. This is likely to be the case for two reasons. Firstly, parties' support bases and sets of persuadable voters are likely to differ in their degree of engagement with digital platforms and their response to heterogenous messages. Such differences are particularly likely in Nigerian politics, as outlined in our discussion of the Nigerian political context, where strong regional divides in partisan support bases are a key characteristic of the political system. Secondly, because incorporating such techniques requires prioritising a digital approach in campaign structure and resourcing, we might anticipate variation according to the degree of campaign professionalisation and the extent to which external consultants are influential in campaign strategy. Furthermore, the use of micro-targeting is dependent on the existing laws on data gathering.

These considerations point towards a more general expectation that the degree to which both more advanced web potentialities and the broader consequences of campaign professionalisation will vary across the campaigns being studied, for instance, market-oriented and sales-focused approaches. This is because both of these aspects are heavily influenced by the manner in which campaign organisations are structured and how campaign resources are deployed. While modernisation might point toward national trends pushing the campaigns toward uniformity in these regards, there is reason to suspect that existing political culture and organisational structures will vary significantly across parties and affect the dynamics by which

modernisation processes affect campaign outputs and organisation. Such variation is likely to militate against uniform modernisation – at least in the immediate term. The next section of this chapter presents the theory of americanisation and its elements, again examining the national and party-level implications of this theoretical lens, furthering my analysis of the role of the internet in the 2015 Nigerian presidential election campaign.

4.3 Americanization as an approach to the study of internet campaigning

The term Americanisation points to several paradigms. Van Elteren (2006) states that 'Americanization in all its manifestations and interpretations refers to the real and purported influence of one or more forms of Americanisation on some social entity, material objects, or cultural practice' (p.3). Many proponents of Americanisation as a model for understanding campaign practices argue that it implies a flattening out or standardisation of campaign practices – as new, powerful tools, methods and organisational models developed in America diffuse across other electoral democracies (Negrine & Papathanassopoulos, 1996; Scammell, 1998; Swanson & Mancini, 1996). Even more nuanced accounts of Americanisation, which acknowledge that various contextual factors can condition the transmission of American innovations, are still fundamentally concerned with the reception of campaign practices, rather than their transformation. According to Boas (2016), the theory of Americanisation makes the same claim as that of modernisation regarding the existence of stages or eras that characterise changes in campaign styles and practices, but differs from modernisation to the extent that it identifies the US as the origin of such practices. As such, he describes Americanisation as a variant of Modernisation,

while Farrell (1996) sees the concept of Americanisation as 'a surrogate for modernisation' (p.123). Xifra (2011) argues that the term Americanisation cannot be underestimated, because of certain campaign practices whose origin can be traced to practices that emerged first during American elections. However, Negrine and Papathanassopolous (1996) state that the adoption of American campaign practices in countries is a direct response to how developed a country is. Consequently, Americanisation is experienced in different ways and forms, it could be a transformation of campaign practices from the traditional methods to a more modern

form of campaign (Negrine & Papathanassopoulos,1996) and can either drive or occur along with a professionalisation of campaign practices (Negrine et al.,2007; Mancini, 1999). The similarity in campaign practices in various countries is brought through the employment of the services of American consultants (Scammell, 1997). For most scholars, Americanisation refers to America being the pioneer and archetype of certain political campaign practices (Negrine, 1996; Plasser, 2002; Butler and Ranney,2005; Farrell, 1998). This definition is supported by most campaign scholars, and the domain of relevance of the concept of Americanisation within this discussion is limited to techniques and practices within political campaigns. According to Schulz (2014) states that 'the notion of Americanisation in its simple variant supposes the adoption and imitation of the style and strategy of US American election campaigns' (p. 68). Baines et.al (2001) note that the transferability of campaigns practices occurs through an interactive process. This is supported by Blumler & Gurevitch (2004) who states that Americanisation:

> Can imply a direct imitation of American styles and practices; it can be based on selective importation and adoption of such practices, or it can involve adaptation of American practices to an existing set of practices, assimilating new modes of operation into older ones (p. 400)

According to Plasser and Plasser (2002) there two approaches to the diffusion of American campaigns, the 'shopping' and the 'adoption' models. The adoption model echoes the above-discussed notion of a 'standardisation of global campaign. which is 'the gradual phase -out of country specific traditional campaign styles and their substitution by capital -intensive media and consultant -driven campaign practices' Plasser & Plasser, 2002, p. 19).While the shopping model entails a 'country specific supplementation of traditional campaign practices with select features of the American style of campaigning'(Plasser & Plasser, 2002, p. 19). Which leads to a hybridisation process. This hybridisation process will be discussed further in the next section.

As such, the Americanisation thesis is more flexible with regard to the role and significance of national and party context than it might initially appear. Consequently, there are strong reasons to anticipate that the digital practices and innovations developed during American presidential campaigns should exert a powerful influence

over campaign practices in democratic systems across the globe. According to Kavanagh (1995) America is 'a source of innovation in campaign techniques' (p.227). These are occurring in a context of rapid change in the communicative environment, giving actors who can seize the potentialities of digital tools a robust set of advantages when it comes to both generating and targeting campaign resources while putting campaigns that fall behind at substantial risk. They are also marked by extremely high campaign spends, making such innovations feasible. The spectacular achievements and innovations of the Obama campaign marked Americans as world leaders in the field of digital campaigning. Indeed, the argument of the influence of America on electoral campaigns cannot be neglected, most notably the success story of the Obama campaign. According to an Americanisation framework – these overarching reasons and success stories, explain why campaigns across the world tend to resemble those in America. The concept of Americanisation allows this thesis to focus on the communicative practices of campaigns.

This thesis seeks some recent purchase on the possibilities of American influence, by exploring the elements of Americanisation. As stated above, our focus here is restricted only to developments within campaign communication. The concept of Americanisation emerged during the mass media age with several scholars identifying optimisation, and cultivation of continuous relationships with dedicated supporters through digital network'(pp.5-6).

Owen (2018) identifies six primary characteristics of American election in the Internet era: 'voter-digital engagement; the technology driven campaign, hyper-personalised campaigning, campaign professionalisation; extensive polling and horserace media coverage characterised by negativity and incivility' (p.29). Some of these features emerged following the use of the internet, such as 'technology-driven campaigning; voter-digital engagement; hyper-personalised campaigning' (Owen, 2018, p. 29). The other features existed and were practised in the age of mass media, these are expanded campaign professionalisation; extensive polling and horserace media coverage characterised by negativity and incivility. These traits are further explored in the paragraphs that follow. The use of the internet is no longer a novelty and has become typical in every electoral cycle (Owen, 2018). A considerable amount of literature

published on the use of the internet as a campaign tool maintains that the internet has evolved into a repertory of communication platforms, such as website, blogs, social media and apps commonly referred to as digital media forms parts of everyday media (Bimber,2014; Hendricks & Denton 2010; Owen, 2018; Stromer-Galley, 2014). Wave after wave of campaigns have experimented and used the web for campaign purposes starting from the rudimentary use during the Clinton campaign of 1992, up until the innovative us of Dean's campaign in digital fundraising and grassroots mobilisation in 2004, which provided a prototype for Obama's 2008 campaign. Obama's campaign introduced new waves of technical innovation adhering to the big ideas of web 2.0 and social media platforms which permitted a range of co-production, interactions and engagements (Vaccari, 2010; Lilleker & Jackson, 2010). A significant number of studies indicate the successful use of the internet by the Obama campaign in multifaceted ways in informing and engaging voters, widening participation, mobilising support and fundraising (Lilleker et al., 2011).

According to Lilleker and Jackson (2014)

> Due to the social adaptation to platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, users of the platforms are able to befriend, like or follow parties and candidates and then have input into campaign communication. Campaigns are becoming co-created, official communication can sit alongside interjections from a variety of users of digital environments, journalists, academics, activists, satirists and voters who offer their own voice to the conversation (p.169)

These intersections of various sources of information is also exhibited in the news flow (Chadwick, 2011). However, studies have shown that this is subject to the willingness of traditional media to incorporate information from social networking sites (Anstead & O'loughlin, 2015; Chadwick, 2013). These practices were also profound during the 2016 American election, with Trump campaign providing the media with content through his Twitter page. Beyond the candidates using these platforms, volunteer and activist have also contributed to the campaign. Owen (2018) suggests that 'citizens active engagement with digital media is one of the most distinctive aspects of the American campaign in the Internet era' (p.37). Contemporary American digital campaigns are harnessing the power of Katz & Lazarsfeld's (1966) two-step flow,

whereby voters are actively participating in campaigns by calling and talking to neighbours and sharing videos in social media spaces. Similarly, candidates have used the internet to generate interest in their supporters to actively participate in their campaigns (Stromer-Galley, 2014). The digital media offers opportunities to citizens without much-specialised knowledge in it to participate in campaign process; allowing citizens participate in the campaign process independently from the campaign organisation and party (Gibson, 2015; Kreiss, 2016; Owen, 2018). These supporters are not necessarily formal membership and act as floating support base (Chadwick, 2007). This argument is further supported by Howard's (2006) study of the use of the internet by United States candidates, which demonstrated that citizens were more involved in the campaign process.

A number of scholars have argued that the process of voter-engagement has led to a change in organisational structure (Chadwick, 2007; Kreiss, 2012; 2016). The use of the internet on political campigns have revealed that political campaigns, can be more professionalised allowing for both 'centralisation and decentralisation' of campaign process (Tidy, 2015, p. 46). As Bimber (2014) puts it, 'the innovation introduced by the Obama's organisations in 2008 and 2012 represented an adaptation to the digital media environment in the context of the unusual electoral arrangements of the US in which communication is both candidate-centric and citizen-centric at the same time' (p. 146). For example, the use of mybarackobama.com (My Boo) in 2008 and the Barack Obama Dashboard in 2012, a national online platform for organising volunteers to support offline social network of friends allowed citizens to create accounts on these platforms, host volunteers and set up geographic and affinity-based groups of supporters and create fund raising events (Bimber, 2014; Stromer-Galley, 2014).

Nielsen (2012) refers to this as networked politics, while Kreiss (2012) describes it as the network of parties, where different actors voluntarily co-ordinate and engage voters to participate in the campaign. A growing number of studies found similar imitations of such American campaign practice. In the United Kingdom, the Conservative Party campaign of 2010 developed 'my conservatives.com' online engagement platform, which closely resembled Obama's mybarackobama.com, although failed to achieve

success like that of Obama's (Campbell, 2009). Similarly, in France, candidate François Hollande created an ambitious internet-based voter contact program modelled on Obama's that aimed at visiting five million households (Issenberg, 2012). This has been discussed in more detail in the literature review chapter.

Although the Obama campaigns encouraged volunteers to initiate self-organised campaigns for the campaign, the campaign team offered assistance to these voluntary initiatives bu offering certain trainings (Kreiss, 2016). A study conducted by Gibson (2015) examined how citizens were allowed to campaign independent of the campaign team, what she refers to as citizen-initiated campaign in the United Kingdom. Her findings indicate that citizen-initiated campaign was evident in the UK, though not as successful as that of Obama's campaign and concentrated in larger parties that were financially constrained. Presidential campaigns in America have revealed successful message targeting (Owen, 2018).

Several studies have pointed to the increasing level of tailored messaging facilitated by advances in data mining and analytics in American campaigns (Bimber, 2014; Kreiss,2016; Owen,2018). Database micro-targeting started in 2004 and was successfully utilised during the 2008 and 2012 Obama campaign (Stromer-Galley, 2014).The Obama team engaged with data on voters from various sources (commercial data, proprietary data, social network data, public data) which allowed for more enhanced forms of voter targeting. The Obama campaigns also paid for advertisement on technology firms such as Facebook, Twitter, and Google (Kreiss, 2016). A number of Facebook analytical tools was such as 'custom audiences, audience targeting options, lookalike audiences and brand lift' were used by the Trump campaign team in voter targeting (Owen, 2018, p. 41).

The concept of professionalisation has different directions, and different scholars have examined various factors that underpin the professionalisation of political parties. Green & Smith (2003) contend that 'professionalisation encompasses a broad array of interrelated phenomena, ranging from the methods in which campaigns are conducted to the specialisation of tasks' (p.322). Owen (2018) refer to professionalisation as the central role played by political consults in the process of campaigns. The growing use of sophisticated campaigns tools demands, in turn, the increasing need for experts,

whose skills and expertise are required to meet the changing nature of campaign practices (Farrell,1996; Karlsen, 2009). Extant literature has demonstrated that political parties and campaign organisations are made to hire either internal or external campaign staff to work as consultants. The effective use of digital tools by the political parties in America has brought about a central role by professionals during campaigns.

Different forms of political consultants have emerged, from the early days of script writing, pollsters and opposition researchers to experts in old and new media analysis and data analysis. These professionals coordinate the media and voter-initiated campaign operations (Kreiss, 2016; Owen, 2018; Nielsen, 2012). These experts take paramount roles in the planning of the campaign and are considered as part of top campaign officials (Jungherr, 2016) making decisions concerning resources and campaign content (Kreiss, 2016; Owen, 2018; Nielsen, 2012).

The media reports of American campaigns fuelled by polls reports led to corresponding horserace journalism. American electorates are mostly informed and greatly influenced in their choice of candidates by horse-race campaign reports, which informs the electorates on candidates' positions on polls (Mutz,1995).

The development in digital technology led to a corresponding increase in the use of polls and the ubiquity of horserace journalism, borne out of the ease of sampling opinions on various platforms at little cost (Owen, 2018). Owen (2018) notes that polling data that supports press reports of campaigns are rapid, unpredictable, and unreliable mainly due to personal technology challenging established sample procedures.

The 2004 American election appears to have marked a transition, with the expansion in the scope of polling data, using automated polls and internet surveys (Jacobs & Shapiro, 2005). This age of cell phone has made it very difficult to have good random polling and representative sample of the voter as opposed to the time of landline age (Owen, 2018). However, for campaigns, Kreiss (2016) states that there are two dimensions to the use of polls by parties and candidates. Firstly, polls are used internally to make decisions on electoral strategies, targeting and messaging. Secondly, it is used externally as a means of communication. Campaigns carry out polls to influence the coverage of the press, thereby speaking to citizens, activists and

potential donors. American campaigns have been inherently negative and more so in the internet age, as the internet provides a range of platforms that can be used in delivering these negative advertisements (Owen, 2018).

As an analytic lens, Americanisation offers substantial overlaps with modernisation. Many of the trends that it draws attention to, such as enhanced professionalisation and hyper-targeting, represent dynamics discussed in the modernisation section as experienced in American politics. Again, we see an expected national trend of the use of the web as a means of campaign communication which intersects with traditional media. We see an emphasis on targeted communications with groups of voters and even individual voters. We see a focus on the growing professionalisation of political campaigns – albeit with a stronger emphasis on the role of consultants (and, especially consultants associated with American campaigns) as a vector through which American-generated innovations are diffused. It is this emphasis on America as both an example and a source of diffusion of campaign innovation that marks Americanisation out from modernisation. There is an interesting tension here, because while modernisation takes a wider perspective on the factors that might drive campaign innovation in ICT usage, Americanisation brings the role of political culture through more strongly (by its focus on a single, American culture). So, the emphasis on the importance of polling in the delivery of 'horse race' campaign coverage and the role of negative campaigning and incivility, points toward a less mechanical, more culturally embedded conception of campaigning. As such, it is unsurprising that adaptions of the Americanisation approach such as Plasser & Plasser's (2002) 'shopping model' have outlined how political culture and the decisions of political actors may condition the extent to which the America-generated campaign innovations are diffused in campaigns outside of the USA.

Taken in the round, these considerations points towards Americanisation as a lens that leads us to look for distinctively American innovations – most notably in the use of digital campaign communications to influence mainstream media coverage, to facilitate and (to some extent) control supporters' engagement with campaigns, to engage with individual-level data to produce hyper-targeted campaign messaging, and to disseminate negative content about opponents. However, the Americanisation

approach also points toward the likelihood of both national, common differences (driven by national political culture) and party-level variation (depending on the extent and nature of parties' 'shopping' from the above list of American digital technology campaign practices).

In the next sub-section, we will focus on an approach that has given far greater analytical priority to the country and party-level factors that might cause departures from the type of uniformity that might be expected in more rigid versions of both the modernisation and Americanisation literatures reviewed so far in this chapter, namely the perspective of hybridization.

4.4 The hybridization perspective as an approach to the study of internet campaigning

Hybridisation as a perspective, hybridity entails three different sets of claims: empirical (hybridisation happens), theoretical (acknowledging hybrid as an analytical tool) and normative (a critique of boundaries and valorisation of mixtures, under certain conditions, in particular relations of power (Pieterse, 2001, p.238). Thus, hybridity is a process that occurs and appears in different forms as transformation occurs allowing for the mix of the old with the new (Pieterse, 2001). In the context of political communication, hybridisation is defined as the 'merger of country and culture-specific campaign practices with selected transnational features' (Esser & Strömbäck, 2013, p. 292). This thesis seeks to explore hybridisation primarily as an analytical tool, but also to draw out the empirical consequences as it pertains to the thesis research question. Questions of the normative implications of this perspective, while relevant, are not a core focus in this thesis and are therefore left to one side in this discussion. In consonance with the framework of modernisation, 'hybridisation of campaign practices stands in this context for a media-driven and marketing -oriented campaign style which, however, needs to be oriented in no way exclusively on the American role model' (Plasser, 2009, p. 27).

The framework of hybridisation places analytical emphasis on a national context in examining the process of innovation diffusion (Esser & Strömbäck, 2012; Karlsen, 2009; Nord, 2006; Plasser & Plasser, 2002). These innovative campaign practices will be adapted, based on candidates and party leaders' interests, coupled with available

resources (Vacarri, 2013). As countries response to changes in campaign practices differently based on national factors, they demonstrate distinct campaign practices specific to national context (Anstead, 2016). This is supported by Nord (2006) who notes that while Swedish parties have demonstrated campaign practices similar to that of American campaign practices, these practices cannot be a complete replica of American campaign practices due to existing laws and regulations, and voters perceptions of its use. Gunther and Mughan (2000) also reached the same conclusion and go further by adding the behaviour of strategic elites to these considerations. Hybridisation perspective provides a framework that emphasises several 'contextual factors such as the electoral system, the legal environment regulating the campaign, the party system and the media system' (Karlsen, 2009, p. 184) that affect the nature of the use of the internet. He further stated that the nature of campaigning varies not only across countries but also across different parties. while political parties have mostly bought into the form of American campaign practices, these practices are adapted in forms that align with cultural and institutional practices (karlsen, 2013).

In the quest to develop an understanding of how hybridisation of a political campaign is conceptualised by various political parties transnationally, this thesis adopts contextual factors as benchmarks that can be analysed to unpack how context affects the integration of ICTs into campaign practices. Esser and Stromback (2012) present the following contextual factors as important for the transnational adoption of campaign practices. Their first consideration is the political system of a country, which refers to the constitutional system of government, electoral system, and the party system. A government system can be either presidential, semi-presidential or parliamentary in nature – there is also a distinction to be made between federal and unitary states. These systems of government offer incentives towards the forms of campaigns practices. On the one hand, presidential government system allows for candidate centred campaigns, which focuses more on the personalities of the leaders of the party and the candidate (Esser & Stromback,2012; Plasser & Plasser,2000; Karlsen,2009). Its federal system promotes decentralised campaigns, capturing the ethno regional political structure discussed in the chapter on the Nigerian context. This system of government offers more incentives for strategies of candidate-money and media-driven forms of modern and post-modern campaigns than, for example, a

unitary parliamentary system (Plasser & Plasser, 2000). On the other hand, Farrell and Webb (2000) and Poguntke and Webb (2005) both contend that post-modern campaigns are leading to a focus on individuals even in a parliamentary system of government – so the difference here might be more a matter of degree than a binary distinction. It has been argued that the electoral system of a country has a considerable effect on campaign practices (Plasser & Plasser, 2000; Sudulich & Trumm, 2019). The type of party also appears to be a factor that influences the adoption of campaign practices (Esser & Stromback, 2012). They suggest that candidates in multi and two parties adopt modern campaigns techniques as they seek to appeal to various audience. However, two party systems are more apposite to the use of these modern campaign techniques, than multi party systems as these parties can challenging themselves and do not need to address ideological and other differences in their formed alliances (Esser & Stromback, 2012).They go further and distinguished between two types 'leader platform parties' and 'traditional-rich programmatic parties'(Esser & Stromback, 2012, p 296). While traditional rich parties are have a strong support base, where support can be drawn from, leader platform parties would most likely adopt modern forms of campaigning as members of these parties are focused on individuals with voters' alliance more on candidates and winning election are their primary concern (Esser & Stromback, 2012). However, this distinction is not stark and there is a mix of party types. Studies have revealed the concentration on leadership personalities in both presidential and parliamentary systems of government (Poguntke & Webb, 2005). Another feature of electoral systems that fosters modern campaign elements is the process of the selection of the candidates, (i.e., direct elections of presidents, parliamentarians, or holders of public office) are likely to encourage professionalized, media-centered campaigns (Plasser & Plasser, 2002). The availability of diverse media forms and media channels influences the use of modern campaign practices. In societies where the television is the primary source of news when compared to newspapers, modern and post-modern campaign are promoted (Esser & Stromback, 2012; Swanson & Mancini, 1996). Likewise, the diffusion of the internet and the type of internet applications with which users engage varies considerably across different world regions and individual states (Wu & Wall, 2019). In terms of mass media, ownership patterns are a key variable to account for in the use

of modern forms of campaigns. The form of ownership of the media has patterns on the nature and use of the internet. Plasser and Plasser (2000) conceptualise the forms of media organisation as exclusively private and commercial ownership, and a combination of state-owned public service and private TV stations, or only state-owned public channels. Though in most European countries the structure of media ownership is both private and public, the public media are more issued based in their broadcast (Esser & Stromback, 2012). Modern campaign associated with countries that allow for private ownership of the media rather, than a state-owned media outlet (Esser & Stromback, 2012).

The evolving media environment provides the opportunities for different forms of targeted communication (Plasser & Plasser, 2000). Traditional campaign practices of door-door, face to face or rallies will be less utilised if parties have an unlimited opportunity to buy airtime for political adverts or broadcast (Plasser & Plasser, 2000). Likewise, the degree of access to the media is significant, as countries where the access to the media can and is been restricted by the incumbent government, leaves the opposition party with little opportunities or options of utilising state owned and controlled media (Plasser & Plasser, 2000).

In certain societies, where the standard of professional journalism is not applied consistently, and journalist are not independent from the government's control, this can have an effect on campaign strategies (ibid). In countries where there are restrictions placed on broadcasting networks along with an incumbent government reigning power over broadcast coverage, campaigns are mostly pre-modern propagandas, while societies with an independent media allow for an expensive post-modern form of campaign. While there are campaign regulation, the nature of its enforcement differs, as campaigns can be strictly, moderately and minimally regulated (Dobber et al.,2017). The nature and the enforcement of regulation with regards to advertisements is also a determinant in the possibilities of campaign embracing modern forms of campaigning. In systems where there are restriction on television adverts and the amount of time allow by the public mass media, all contribute in the decision to embark on these modern forms of campaign practices (Esser & Stromback, 2012; Plasser & Plasser, 2002). Modern campaigns are most likely in

countries with unrestricted access to paid advertising on commercial channels. Beyond the resrction on sdvertisemnt and the rules of pwnership of the media, several scholars have also highlighted certain regulation that inspire modern forms of campaigning, these regulations include: the length of time allowed for electoral campaign, the opportunities; the rules on campaign funding (i.e private or public funding); the limits placed on campaign donations and the disclosure of campaign funding (Esser & Stromback, 2012; Plasser & Plasser, 2002; Swanson & Mancini, 1999). Campaigns that have big budgets are most likely able to run a more professionalised campaign, as they can afford to involved the use of more television broadcast and hired consultant that can direct the campaign.This in contrast with campaign that are labour intensive as the depend mostly on the support of members and volunteers. These difference between a candidate- and a party-centred campaign also influences the degree of professionalisation of a campaign (Norris, 2000; Plasser, 2000). In Europe, where campaigns are mostly party-centred, campaign professionals are mostly employed as full-time employees and less as part-time campaign consultants, (Farrell, 1996). This is in contrast to most candidate centred campaigns, such as the United State, where campaign professionals are employed as independent consultants (Plasser, 2000). Political consultants with their expertise have become increasingly important, taking roles beyond mere providing specific services, to being part of the campaign organisations decision making process (Jungherr, 2016). Furthermore, the frequency and timing of the elections is also a contribution factor to the adoption of contemporary campaign practices. In societies where campaigns are permanent (a prime example is the United States), Ornstein & Mann (2000) allude to the growing industry of political consultant and campaign management systems. This trend of campaign consultants and management is also found in countries where elections are conducted frequently. In societies where elections are less frequent, there is no significant growth in the use of political consultants, and their duties are mostly advertising and public relations functions. The available campaign funds is a significant factor, and the willingness of the parties to embrace new-style techniques (Farrell, 2002; Plasser & Plasser, 2002; Schmitt-Beck, 2007). Lilleker and Lees-Marshment (2005) state that rules and system have an impact on the behaviour of parties and their ability to use political marketing.

The political culture also provides a contextual condition in which campaigns takes place. Precursors to modern and post-modern campaign practices such as 'low turnout, low levels of identification with political parties, low level of trust in political actors and institutions, low level of party membership, high level of volatility, as well as weak cleavage and community ties, and low social capital' (Esser & Stromback,2012, p. 298).These factors affect countries indifferent ways, while Western European counties previously could boost of high turnout, this is not the case in other countries in Latin America. Eastern Europe and Africa, as voters in these countries demonstrate less trust in their democracy (Esser & Stromback, 2012). Furthermore, there is also a decline in the part membership. The growing decrease in the number of party membership is well documented in the literature (Scarrow, 2014). These has further spurred the employment of the services of professional consultants in directing sophisticated campaigns in both presidential and parliamentary systems. However, this is less so in parliamentary systems of government (Esser & Stromback, 2012).

Esser and Stromback (2012) also regards Lijphart (1999) classification of consensus -oriented cultures as significant in placing a higher value on accommodation and balancing interest and competitive culture that are enablers of confrontation and negative campaign approaches. Swanson and Mancini (1996) also propose a category of political culture, differentiating between deep rooted democracies, democracies under stress and nascent transformed regimes have an effect on the uptake of modern campaigns. Candidates and parties in newer democracies, tend to distinguish themselves from established campaign practices by proactively applying more modern campaign practices (Swanson & Mancini, 1996).

The political situation and campaign events also have an effect on the form of campaign practice. Campaigners considers environmental conditions, national issues, culture and critical events (Esser & Stromback, 2012). Significant incidents create an attitude that could activate specific campaign strategies (Kriesi, Bernhard & Hanggli, 2009). The distinctive circumstances of each election also contribute to the style and tone of individual and party campaigns (Dermody & Hanmer-lloyd, 2006). Advanced forms of campaigning are more pronounced in developed countries than in less developed countries, as a result of various factors such people's less allegiance to

particular parties, changes in social strata and the level of social inequalities in societies (Esser & Stromback, 2012).

As an analytic lens, the theory of hybridisation differs from both Americanisation and modernisation as it sets out to discover changes in campaign practices as conditioned by several contextual factors. The analysis will be guided by the notion that hybridisation places emphasis on the integration of contemporary campaign practices with country and party-level factors. This thesis will explore the possibility of how internet recombines external and internal campaign practices within the context of 2015 Nigerian presidential election campaign. These factors form the framework, which allows this thesis to examine the nature of campaign practices both at the party level and the national level.

The hybridisation perspectives set out to discover the extent to which certain contextual factors informs party and candidate's behaviour during the 2015 Nigeria in presidential election. The campaign practices of APC and PDP will be drawn into the discussion in an attempt to explore the nature of campaign practices in examining the role of ICTs in the campaign practices of two presidential candidates and the variances between them.

4.5 Delimiting the field: Associated theory of professionalisation.

As outlined above, the three-fold theories of Modernisation, Americanisation and Hybridisation provided the framework to examine the research questions as opposed to the more frequently used notion of professionalized campaigns (Farrell and Webb, 2000; Negrine et al., 2007; Norris, 2000) for a number of reasons explored in this section. The concept of professionalized campaigns has been central to discussions on changes in campaigns practice. However, the concept remains ambiguous, encompassing different processes, with several scholars defining it in terms of specialisation of tasks and- the use of specialists in conducting campaigns (Lilleker & Negrine, 2002).

Gibson and Römmele (2001; 2009) proposed the party-centred theory of professionalised campaigning by operationalising the concept of 'campaign professionalisation' and offering CAMPROF index which identifies 10 dependent variables in assessing parties professionalisation. These include the 'use of

telemarketing, use of direct mail, presence of an internal Internet communication system, email 'sign-up' or subscription list for regular news updates, outside campaign headquarters, continuous campaigning, use of outside public relations/media consultants, use of computerized databases, use of opinion polling, conducting opposition research'(Gibson & Römmele, 2009, p. 269).In the same vein, Gibson and Römmele (2009) further identified six party-specific independent variables: 'Vote-maximization as a primary goal; right-wing ideology; centralized internal structure; high level of resources; external shock; and internal event that determine the level of professionalisation' (p. 282).

The party-centred theory of professionalised campaigning by Gibson and Römmele (2001, 2009) was slightly adjusted by Strömbäck (2009) to eleven dependent variables in a modified professionalised campaign index in examining the Swedish election. The study found that parties demonstrated a varied use of professionalised campaign indicators. This result lends support to the party-centred theory of professionalised campaigning. Another four-country comparative study by Tenscher et al., (2012) also presents an empirical test of the party-centred theory of professionalization. They developed broader indexes in measuring professionalisation. They differentiate between two dimensions in the campaign: campaign structures and campaign strategy. Tenscher et al., (2012) presents eight items as consisting of the campaign structure, which are 'the size of the election campaign budget, 'the size of the campaign staff, the degree of centralization of the campaign organization, the degree of externalization, the differentiation of internal communication structures, the nature and degree of feedback, the degree of opposition research, and the duration of the campaign' (p.149) . The "campaign strategy" index consists of seven items 'the degree of audience targeting, the degree of narrowcasting activities, the relevance of paid media, the relevance of free media, the relevance of talk shows, the degree of event and news management, and the degree of personalization'(Tenscher et al., 2012, p.149). The study found that campaign practices in the different countries revealed similarities in campaign in both dimensions.

While these studies present strategies for measuring professionalisation, they neither present the reason for the diffusion of campaign practices nor allow the study to

understand the effect of the internet on campaign practices. At the same time, professionalisation is a concept that can be accommodated within the three theoretical lenses outlined above. As such, professionalisation is a concept that informs the analysis in this thesis but is not treated as a theoretical lens in and of itself.

4.6 Chapter Summary

This chapter presents the theory of modernisation, Americanisation and Hybridisation as lens in order to understand the role of the internet in the 2015 presidential campaigns of the APC and the PDP. As the word Americanisation implies, it suggests the influence of a practice pioneered in America. The theory of Americanisation is quite significant in the study of the practices of internet campaigning. While several scholars have questioned the use of Americanisation, the literature cannot ignore the effect of the successful use of the internet in elections, which serves   as pioneers of substantive innovation in campaign practices. Starting from Dean's campaign, to Obama, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, and the unsuccessful bid by Bernie Sanders to be the presidential aspirant of the 2016 American election.   These campaigns have been observed and written about, with certain campaign elements and strategies adopted by candidates and parties globally. This thesis seeks some recent purchase on the possibilities of American influence by exploring the elements of Americanisation.

The study builds upon Owen's (2018) classification of the characteristics of American election in the Internet era: voter-digital engagement; the technology driven campaign, hyper-personalised campaigning, campaign professionalisation; extensive polling and horserace media coverage characterised by negativity and incivility.

These serve as benchmarks in examining the effect of the internet on the campaign practices of the presidential campaign of the APC and the PDP in the 2015 Nigerian presidential election. The thesis seeks to identify the characteristics of Internet campaigning during the 2015 Nigeria election that are fundamental to the notion of the "Americanization". The study considers which features of the American internet campaign practices have transcended into Nigeria's electoral campaign practices and if it could be attributed to an imitation of the American campaign practices.

The theory of modernisation also provides a lens that allows the study to explore the effect of the internet on the 2015 Nigerian campaign practices. The notion of modernisation refers to structural changes in media, technologies and social structure which leads to an adaptive behaviour by political parties and their candidates. Scholars who embrace the notion of campaign modernisation agree that campaigning has undergone several stages and presupposes a linear form of adoption of the internet.

It has been suggested that the pressures influencing developments in the use of the internet are presumed to be relatively constant across national elections scene in western democracies. Thus, it is presumed that this modern form of campaigning is expected to be observed across the campaigns of the APC and the PDP in their digital strategy. Nonetheless, while modernisation might point toward national trends pushing the campaigns toward uniformity in these regards, there is reason to suspect that existing political culture and organisational structures will both vary significantly across parties and affect the dynamics by which modernisation processes affect campaign outputs and organisation. Such variation is likely to militate against uniform modernisation – at least in the immediate term. In using the modernisation theory as a lens, the study examines the campaign practices against the identified macro trends as constituting contemporary elements of campaign practices as identified above. Looking at the key aspects of modernisation theory outlined above, it will be discussed in terms of their application to the research questions.

Finally, the theory of hybridisation contends that several contextual factors which determines the integration of the features of contemporary and American campaign practices. and scholars have revealed that campaigns have been observed in America and have been emulated in different forms. leading to these campaign practices to be termed Americanisation. In consonance, the framework of modernisation also presupposes a change in campaign practices that employ the use of modern campaign tools and appears to be similar with campaign practices observed globally, however, it acknowledges contextual factors in determining the nature of campaign practices. While both modernisation and hybridisation contend that several contextual factors determine the integration of the features of contemporary campaign practices, hybridisation allows this study to discuss the terms of the application of these

campaign practices in the Nigerian 2015 presidential election and the extent to which it is infused with traditional campaign practices. It allows the study to present the form of use and its effect. The analysis is guided by the notion that hybridisation places emphasis on the integration of contemporary campaign practices with country and party-level factors. As an analytic lens, the theory of hybridisation differs from both Americanisation and modernisation as it sets out to discover changes in campaign practices, conditioned by several contextual factors.

The three interrelated theories offer a broad understanding of the development of campaign communication, by focusing on the nature of internet campaigning in the 2015 Nigerian presidential election. The theories allow this study to examine how campaigns practices were utilised in the campaign, and contextual factors affects the use of the internet. In summary, Americanisation served as a template for campaign practices, modernisation presents modern trends in campaign and hybridisation allows for the fusion of modern campaigns with existing campaign practices. These theories will be used to discuss the terms of their application and the extent to which their affordances are exploited at national elections.

Chapter Five: Methodological Approach

5.1 Introduction

This chapter explains the methodological approach adopted in this study. The study focused on the use of the internet by the presidential candidates of the People's Democratic party and the All progressive Congress. This chapter discusses the overall research approach adopted in the thesis. It addresses the research strategy and its suitability for selecting, collecting and analysing data in answering the research questions. As well as the overall research strategy, the chapter explores the specifics of how it was put into action, discussing sampling techniques, data collection tools used, ethical considerations, and experience of fieldwork experience. The chapter also explains the process of data management and analysis, before providing a discussion of the limitations of the methodological approach. The chapter ends with a summary.

5.2 Methodological Approach

This section addresses the research strategy and its suitability for selecting, collecting and analysing data in answering the research questions. In order to address the research aim, the study adopts an interpretivist approach. Bryman (2016) noted that 'interpretivism is founded upon the view that a strategy is required that respects the differences between people and the objects of the natural sciences and therefore requires the social scientists to grasp the subjective meaning of social action' (p.26). This methodological approach allowed the study to explore how the electoral campaign was conducted using the internet, from those that were involved in internet campaigning. It focused on the understanding and perspective of the electoral campaign process through the meaning assigned to it by the interviewees.

Existing studies have demonstrated the importance of this approach (Dommett, 2018; Jungherr,2016; Kreiss 2012b, 2014; Stormer-Galley, 2014; Vacarri, 2010). These studies provide a broad indication of trends in the use of the internet and their significance in political campaigns. Although these studies have been carried out within slightly different contexts, with a focus on Western democracies with varying electoral systems, they exemplify the significance of the qualitative approach to the study. The case study generated empirical data through semi-structured interviews. This was considered most appropriate in answering the research questions. The technique of semi-structured interviews was designed to achieve a degree of

comparability across interviews, while also allowing for interactive discussion and the opportunity to probe the interviewees for clarification and a better understanding of the reasoning behind the use of the internet by the campaign. Several scholars have posited that interviews provides more depth and can generate more nuances and understanding in a study (Mason, 2002; Rubin & Rubin, 2011).

5.3 Case Selection

As explained in detail within Chapter One, this study is focused upon the use of the internet during the 2015 presidential campaign of the candidates of the People's Democratic party and the All progressive Congress. During the 2015 presidential election of Nigeria, there were 26 registered political parties in Nigeria. However, after due process, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) responsible for conducting elections in the country declared fourteen candidates to have qualified to participate in the presidential elections (Tukur, 2014). The election result revealed that the APC and the PDP received the higher number of votes. (See Appendix A, Table 7 for the 2015 election results). The electoral result in part informed the choice of the unit of analysis in the case study, as well as the research question highlighted in chapter one. While the case study is nested focusing on both the APC and PDP, the analysis is comparative, in the sense that key similarities and differences across the two parties are outlined and investigated. The following sections will provide in detail the mechanism of the research process.

5.4 Fieldwork process

The field research was carried out in Abuja, the capital city of Nigeria. I had to travel to Nigeria as there was simply no alternative to face to face interviews as I did not get any response to the few emails, I requesting interviews. I chose to concentrate my effort in one location, Abuja, mainly because the respondents I interviewed were resident in Abuja. Abuja also served as the national headquarters when the campaign was ongoing. Also, most of the respondents frequently visited the capital city and I was fortunate enough to have been granted interviews while they were in the capital city. The first field research was conducted over a period of three months between June and September 2017. During this time, most of the respondents where in Abuja as the period coincided with a change in the national leadership of the People's Democratic Party, which attracted a lot of party members into Abuja, including members of former

President Jonathan's campaign team. As for the APC, most of the campaign team members had taken up political positions in the administration of the APC government and resided in Abuja.

In conducting a semi structured interview, the first issue was getting access to the respondents I had identified. To maximise my opportunities, I pursued different routes in gaining access. My first undertaking, upon arriving at the research field was to go to the secretariat of both parties with a letter of introduction which provided an overview of the nature of the study. This was important, as it provided the targeted respondents with the details and the importance of the study (Lilleker, 2003).Upon receiving the letters at the party secretariats, the APC replied by issuing me an authorisation letter, requesting and encouraging party members to accommodate the request of the research. In the same vein, the PDP acknowledged the letter of introduction written by my supervisor with an official stamp. (See Appendix B: Fig. 1and 2 for respective copies of the letters). The letters obtained from the party secretariat facilitated the research as it enabled me approach most of the respondents who granted me opportunity to interview them. As Fontana and Frey (1994) stated that the manner in which a person presents herself and the impression on the respondent is vital to the success of a study. Beyond the letters I obtained from the party, I was introduced by certain high-profile politicians, which assisted greatly in securing interviews. I was fortunate enough to personally know someone in the presidential campaign team of the APC, so I exploited my familiarity with this person and got him to introduce me to certain people.

 On many occasions, I requested that these respondents make some calls to others whom they had identified as possible interviewees to schedule meetings. In some cases, I asked that they provide phone numbers of people I could interview so I could schedule a meeting. Following these high-profile politicians seeking audience on my behalf, I was met with some positive response. Nonetheless, I still encountered some challenges. This did not come as a surprise as I was very aware of the challenges, I would face in assessing audiences from these respondents. I experienced several challenges in seeking audiences and the process of getting appointments and conducting the interview was very tasking. In one instance, I went to an office and I

spent three days waiting from 8.30 to 6.00pm. On the third day, someone recognised me from the first day when I was told to wait at the waiting room to be called upon for the interview, and he led me into the office of the respondent. Nonetheless, I used it to my advantage and when he apologised for keeping me waiting, I told him it was fine and I would greatly appreciate it if he could place some calls to some people I wanted to interview and he acted accordingly. This is quite normal in seeking audiences with high profile people as they are not easily approachable, one of the reasons is that they usually have people who tend to serve as their gatekeepers. Members of the presidential council were well-known political elites who had held political offices, some were serving Governors and Senators and others had held such positions at different times. The unequal power relations that existed between me and my prospective respondents were evident in the study. This is well documented in the literature (eg Harvey, 2011; Lilleker, 2003). This was more pronounced in the case study, as I appeared to be a young female researcher. However, the nature of the power dynamics is fluid and context dependent (McEvoy, 2006). Nigeria is a patriarchal society, and the 'male space' of politics (Mackay, 2004, p.112) was pronounced in the study, as the majority of respondents were male. This was something of an advantage to me to, because I think in most cases I was granted interviews because of my gender as the respondents, where more willing to accommodate me as opposed to if I was a male researcher. While there are challenges in women interviewing men (Gill & Maclean, 2002) I encountered little of this, the only instance where I was a bit uncomfortable, I was told to meet the respondent at a hotel. However, the interview was conducted at the lobby.

Being Nigerian also helped in the course of my interview as I am familiar with the Nigerian culture and I knew how to present myself in a manner that was culturally acceptable. Harvey (2011) states that researchers should be able to adapt to situations to suit the respondents. In one instance, I was mistaken for someone's daughter, I played the part as a young girl and accorded him the respect I would to an elderly man. I only corrected the impression after the interview. According to Dexter (2006) 'What may be suicidal or impractical for one interviewer or in one situation may be feasible or even the best way to proceed for another interviewer or in another situation' (p .31). For instance, I knew that even though I had obtained a letter from the party secretariat

that sending it via emails might not be as effective as seeking a face to face encounter and presenting the letter. I also knew that a phone call from political colleagues would serve my purpose better. As Dexter (2006) stated, cultural differences affect the manner which the interviewer approach the interviewee and knowing a bit about the interviewee is recommended. Thus, before every interview I read about my respondents in other to know how best to present myself beside being a researcher, in most cases talking about football was a good way to break the ice.

Hermann (2001) cited in McEvoy (2006) differentiates between a researcher who is an 'insider' and 'outsider'. He describes an insider as one who is resident in the research field and identifies as part of the population, while as the as the word outsider implies someone not from the research field. During the study, I had to take into consideration my own possible bias as someone who has experienced first-hand the nature of campaign practices and aware of the history of election campaigning in Nigeria. The desire to be in-depth in this study required that I probe statements for clarification. I emphasised the independence of the research from any conflict of interest and the research was for academic purposes only.

The period of three months provided enough time to schedule appointments for the interviews. The interviews were guided by the prepared interview guide. The invitation letter provided a summary and purpose of the interview encouraged the participants to raise any questions relating to the research. Before commencing each interview, informed consent was obtained from each participant, specifying the time allowed for withdrawal of consent. In each interview, I encouraged the participant to discuss and provide as much information as they could on the questions posed for the research. The interviews lasted between 45 and 60 minutes. The interview had to be within this time period as I predicted any time longer than that would yield a negative response. An instance this was demonstrated was when I sought to interview a particular respondent and he told me he could only give me 30 minutes. While these could be read, I generally read them to the respondents. As I proceeded to read them to the respondent. I was interrupted with a reminded that I would only give me 30 minutes so I should get on with the important questions, and even though the interview was not as long as I wanted , he also recommended someone I could interview and

asked his secretary to make a phone call to get me an interview. In general, I observed that the interviews I conducted with the political elites were usually shorter than those of volunteers and campaign staffers. I conducted 53 interviews during my first trip to the field. Thirty-three of these respondents were aligned to the APC and included members of the APC presidential campaign council, consultants of the APC, volunteers and campaign staffers. The remaining 20 respondents were aligned to the PDP and included members of the presidential campaign council, consultants, volunteers and campaign staffers.

The second field research was undertaken a year after, in the summer of 2018, I was able to secure 5 more interviews, with two persons affiliated to PDP and three from the APC. All interviews were audio recorded. The interviews were conducted mostly in the respondent's office, and others in less formal settings, when I interviewed volunteers. At the end of each interview, I asked the participants for corroborative evidence and any other individual who they believed to be suitable for the study. All the interviews that I conducted were recorded and in certain cases notes were taken during the interviews. The recorded interviews were promptly transcribed and stored. All interviews conducted were regarded as confidential, and all the names of key informants were withheld. In masking the identity of all respondents, it makes it difficult in identifying individual participants, ensuring the anonymity of the participants. While some respondents did state they did not mind been quoted, these were mostly persons on the presidential campaign council, I decided against it to ensure that participants gave unreserved, transparent statements to eliminate the possibility of post rationalisation guiding their statements.

As Yin (1994) suggest anonymity serves to protect the real case and its participants, thus, in assuring the respondents of anonymity, I sought to protect the respondents form any backlash, and controversy that may arouse form granting me the interview. Elections in Nigeria are often controversial, thus in other to know the dynamics of the campaign, anonymity was paramount, as the respondent could freely express their views on the nature of the process. Also, in choosing to protect the identity of the respondent, I was certain that issues would not be raised upon the production of the thesis. Yin (1994) stated that the issuance of the final report may

affect the subsequent actions of those studied, thus anonymity is best. I reminded respondent that the transcript would be available upon their request and they were also given a time to withdraw their participation in the research if they wish too. I only got one request for a transcript and there was no request for withdrawal from the study. As stated by Lancaster (2017) reminding respondents of the opportunity of going through the transcript after the interview was a means of developing trust between me and the respondent. I felt that in seeking to established trust with them, it allowed my respondents lets their guard down and spoke about the process of the campaign process unguarded.

5.5 Data Management and Analysis

The study adopted thematic analysis as its approach to the data analysis. Thematic analysis is a method for identifying, analysing, and reporting patterns (themes) within data. After gathering the empirical data for the study. I incorporated the insights from Spencer et al., (2013) five-step process involved in data management, which included: 'Familiarisation, constructing an initial thematic framework; indexing and sorting, reviewing data extracts, data summary and display' (p. 282). I familiarised myself with the data, after transcribing the recorded interview into a word document, I re-read the transcript repeatedly to gain a better understanding of the data. Starting from the first research question, each unit of analysis was addressed separately, starting from the responses given in respect of the campaign of the APC and the PDP, the data was re-read and the responses on the questions on adaptation and adoption of the internet was addressed first. This was followed by the extent to which the internet campaigns of the PDP and APC varied, and the factors that help to explain it. Lastly, the study addressed how the web affected the intra-campaign organisational dynamics of the PDP and APC. Looking at these responses from the perspective of different respondents (the political elites, to volunteers and staffers) provided a broad understanding of the perception of the use of the internet. After that, I proceeded in constructing an initial thematic framework derived from the research questions. The data that were interpreted as similar in meaning where grouped together and these were developed into themes and subthemes. I referred to them as indexing and sorting as described by Spencer et al., (2013). A further repeat reading of the transcript took place, and the

data was relabelled in a more interpretive manner. This enabled me to identify linkages between themes identified. This is displayed in chapter 7 and 8 of this study.

As stated above, the analysis of the study began by looking at each case differently and developing themes and then comparing both. Braun and Clark (2006) suggest that a researcher must make an argument in relation to the research question, looking at patterns throughout the data and theorising about what informed patterns on the data. As I began to develop higher-order concepts and attempt to explain patterns and linkage within the data, three theoretical lenses: modernisation, americanisation, and hybridisation were used to unpack and interrogate the data. The theories are presented in chapter 4 and further analysed and discussed in chapter 8. These three theories provided broad alternative explanations for an understanding of the use of the internet in an unfamiliar context.

Figure 5. 1*: Formal Analysis Process*

Source: Spencer et al., (2013, p. 281)

The study used triangulation in addressing the validity of the research themes and findings. I achieved this by involving a reasonable number of respondents in the study, these numbers of respondents provided different perspectives on the phenomenon in study. The number of participants provided the study with various perspectives about themes identified through conceptual and empirical data analysis, which provided a

realistic and richer result after data analysis and offered an opportunity to add to the validity of the findings. I also used the process of peer debriefing to strengthen the accuracy of the interpretation of the study. This process involved presenting my finding to peers and allowed them to ask questions about the study so that the interpretation will echo with people other than me. Again, it is important to bear in mind that the interviews took place the year following this result, meaning that there was quite a different dynamic to the more triumphalist sentiments of the APC interviewees as would be revealed in (chapter 6). Perhaps because of a 'blame game' dynamic, members of the presidential campaign council of the PDP were both more difficult to secure interviews with and somewhat more guarded in their responses to me. Again, I seek to use my interpretive and reflective skills to minimize this unevenness of experience, without losing the texture and insight of the data that I gathered.

5.6 Semi-structured interview design

Before proceeding to the field, a pilot study was conducted. The pilot study was used to test the research design before the actual research was embarked on. This involved pre-testing the research tool such as data collection (Bryman, 2016). The interview guide was subjected to critical review from my supervisor, colleagues and some peers and their input was taken into consideration. The first interview was conducted via Skype, to test the appropriateness of the interview guide, and this enabled me assess the minutes spent in conducting the interview, how the questions posed was received, and provided me with the opportunity to identify and make corrections to the interview guide. Other interviews were conducted via the internet, using Facebook messenger and Skype. Subsequently, the remaining were carried out via face to face in Nigeria. The interviews online were mostly volunteering with the exception of two members who were members of the presidential campaign council team.

Upon choosing the semi structured interview as best fit in generating empirical data, the choice of personnel to be interviewed was initially obtained via newspaper publication. The list was further narrowed down based on the relevance of the title and position individuals occupied in the campaign, and how best I perceived an individual would fit in providing insights to the research questions posed. Thus, the study focused on securing interviews with these set of people. Nonetheless, upon arriving at the

research location more names, some of whom did not appear on the list were further recommended by some respondents for interview. These people where accordingly approached for further interviews.

In conducting the field work, each interview followed an interview guide designed for the research. I developed a detailed interview guide based on the literature on internet campaigning. I also had a summary, with a brief list of memory prompts of the essential areas to be explored. The nature of the semi-structured interviews allows for flexibility in questioning that allows the researcher to explore the response of the respondents by further probing and the responses from participants guide the subsequent questioning (Bryman, 2016). The semi-structured interview was useful in generating rich data through the in-depth exploration of research participants' views (Ibid).

5.7 Chapter Summary

The chapter has demonstrated the research approach. It proceeds with an outline of the research question and the subsidiary questions. It presents the case selection and the units of analysis chosen for the research. The chapter laid out the option of other research approach and justified the choice of the qualitative approach. The chapter also revealed the practical realities of the interview process in the field location, thereafter it presents the process of data management and the analysis and it justifies the reason of the adoption of a thematic analysis as the process of data analysis.

Chapter Six: The All Progressives Congress (APC) Internet Campaign in the 2015 Presidential Election.

6.1 Introduction

This chapter presents key findings relating to the APC's utilisation of the web during the 2015 Nigerian presidential election. The APC candidate, Muhammadu Buhari ultimately won the election, and he served a term as Nigeria's President between 2015 and 2019. He was re-elected to this office in 2019, meaning that a nuanced and scholarly understanding of the dynamics of the APC's approach to political campaigning is highly important for making sense of the conduct of politics in today's Nigeria. The result also informs the process of interpretation that data undergoes in this chapter. The aphorism that 'success has many fathers, but failure is an orphan', is apposite here and will inform our discussion of the PDP's presidential candidate. Because of the success of the presidential candidate of the APC, there is a danger that respondents might be overly optimistic or positive about the use of the web and the efficiency with which the web team was integrated into the overall campaign team. The opposite is the case when it comes to the PDP analysis in the next chapter.

The data analysed in this chapter was collected through review of party and campaign documents and semi-structured interviews with the party elites, volunteer activists (with a focus on those activists who took part in the digital campaign) during the 2015 Nigerian presidential election campaign. The data was collected and subjected to a rigorous analysis using a multi-stage, theoretically informed, thematic analytical approach outlined in the methodology chapter of this thesis. The results of this process are presented in this chapter.

Firstly, in order to provide the broader context that is necessary in order to make sense of the interview and documentary evidence from an interpretive standpoint, The study provide a section on the party's presidential candidate, Muhammadu Buhari. The study presents his political history and involvement in a previous military regime in Nigeria as well as his core brand of 'change' based around anti-corruption, efficacy in matters of security, and administrative efficiency. We then provide a background of the APC – focusing on its historical development, which helps to explain its organisational structure going into the 2015 election cycle, as well as some of the tensions that this

structure was likely to face. Though Nigeria operates a presidential system of government which places emphasis on the candidate, it is not so clear cut because the party's organization plays an important role and holds a seemingly parallel authority. With this context established, the thesis discusses the overarching perceptions of the APC's elites and activists of web campaigning – focusing on its nature, drivers, and political significance in the 2015 Nigerian presidential elections. We then move into a more focused discussion of the concrete uses to which the web was put to use by the candidate of the APC over the course of the campaign, before outlining the factors that affected the uptake of the web and its various functionalities by the Buhari campaign. Finally, the study examines the material that bears on how the adoption of digital campaign tools affected the campaign structure and the management of the campaign as a whole. We conclude with a summary of the major insights generated through this analysis and before teeing up the chapter on the PDP's digital campaign.

A small note on presentation is apposite at this point. Direct quotes from respondents are indented in the text. Where a series of direct quotes are provided under the same theme by different actors, they are separated by an ellipsis. The ethical protocol for this research meant that actors are not directly identified, but we do distinguish senior party officers, members of presidential campaign council, consultants, campaign staffers, activists and politically involved citizens in order to give the quotes the requisite degree of context.

6.2 The APC's Background

The APC was formed via a merger of Nigeria's three biggest opposition parties: Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), All Nigerian People's Party (ANPP), and a breakaway faction of the All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA) in 2013 (Mahmud, 2015). The APC also attracted high-level defectors from the ruling PDP – including five state governors, a former PDP Party Chairman and members of both houses of the National Assembly. This 'new PDP' faction 'defected en masse to the APC, citing irreconcilable differences within the "old" PDP' (ibid.: 6). Such a multiplicity of stakeholders, as well as Nigeria's federal political system (as described in the Nigerian context chapter), implies a multi-level party organisational structure for the APC, and this is indeed the case. Formally, the APC operated on a seven-level party organisation, namely: 1) The national, 2) a series

of sub-national 'zones' 3) the states 4) the senatorial districts 5) local government areas 6) wards 7) polling units. As we can see in Figure 6.1, below, which is based on a close reading of the APC constitution, the formal organisation of the party is designed so that there is a plural, widespread distribution of power within the party across and between these levels.

APC STRUCTURE

Figure 6. 1: The Structure of All Progressive Congress

Source: Adapted from the APC Constitution, 2013

However, as elaborated in the Nigerian context chapter, the office of president is highly powerful within Nigerian politics. This leads to a high degree of interference from and concentration of powers in the office of the presidential candidate. From a practical perspective, this means that the de jure and de facto loci of power in the party can be quite different – and often parallel lines of power and authority can co-exist within Nigerian party organisations. The integration of digital campaigning practices into the APC's organisational structure is a good illustration of this phenomenon. The APC emphasized that after the formation of the party, there was an established ICT department in the national office with staffs dedicated to the daily function of the party. Nonetheless, my identification of key respondents to discuss the campaign with revealed that the presidential candidate had his campaign committee and maintained several separate online teams with various professionals and volunteers contributing to the campaign. In terms of resources, personnel dedicated to the party's e-campaigning were already employed by the APC, such as a webmaster, and a web editor prior to the election. These professionals were responsible for maintaining the party's online presence www.apc.ng.com as well as their presence in the various social media platforms.

6.3 Buhari And His Campaign Message

In 2015 Muhammadu Buhari was neither a young man nor a political outsider. Born in 1942 and following an extensive military career, he had come to power in a *coup d'état* and ruled Nigeria between December 1983 and August 1985 (Mahmud, 2015). He came to power amidst reports of corruption and justified his coup on the premise that the government was corrupt, and the military had taken over the reins to clean up the disarray. During that time, one of his major policy initiatives was a 'war against indiscipline' with implementation ranging from minor humiliations for underperforming civil servants (BBC, 2019) to the death penalty for counterfeiting or arson (Clifford, 1984). It is therefore unsurprising that Buhari thus had a rather dour, serious profile with the Nigerian public. His second stint as head of state and first entry into democratic politics was in 2003, thereafter in 2007 and 2011 where he unsuccessfully contested for the seat of the presidency. He had been unsuccessful in his previous three runs for president and drew his power base from the less

economically advantaged section of Northern Nigeria, known as the *talakawa* (BBC, 2019). His choice of running mate, Yemi Osinbajo, a younger, more sprightly presence and a Christian pastor for Southern Nigeria dovetailed well with both Buhari's personality and support base (BBC, 2019).

The APC's overarching campaign message was 'change' and its candidate was Muhammadu Buhari. This message was disseminated through various media from the traditional media (television, radio, newspaper) to the more recent media forms of the web and myriad social media platforms. During the previous election in 2011, Buhari maintained personal accounts on various social media platforms. However, they were not as active as those of his then opponent Good luck Jonathan. However, during the 2015 elections, Buhari's page and that of his supporters were visibly more active than that of the PDP's presidential candidate. The Buhari campaign team developed a campaign website specifically for him - www.thisisbuhari.com. This provided a wide array of comprehensive information to visitors, offering what one interviewee describes as 'game changing' levels of detail on the party's platform and activities during the campaign, as well as serving as a source of information distribution regarding rallies, meetings, and other campaign events. Beyond the campaign websites, various social media platforms where used, namely: Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, which were also used to disseminate his campaign messages and information. Visitors to these social networking websites interacted with the campaign team through comments and discussions.

One might be forgiven for noting a slight incongruity between candidate and message, given Buhari's age, military bearing, and historical role in Nigerian politics. Here we will discuss this disjuncture, again with the goal of placing the analysis in within a context that allows the reader to understand key findings (chapter 8).

Because of the APC'S formative background as a coalition of opposition parties, allied with the economic, administrative, and security issues that plagued Goodluck Jonathan's administration (Ademilokun, 2015; Ekpo et al., 2016; Onuoha & George, 2016) – the theme of change was an obvious one for the APC to pursue in 2015. This was clearly a message that had strong mobilising potential among the Nigerian population, for instance, one of our respondents below discussed the APC's volunteer

base as being largely comprised of 'people who were committed to change'. Mbutor (2016) indicated that the theme of change emerged from a visit by Barack Obama campaign strategist David Axelrod, during the build-up to the 2015 election, butI was unable to confirm this with my respondents. Regardless of how the campaign message was chosen, General Muhammadu Buhari was an unusual candidate to carry this theme forward. Following the emergence of Buhari as the party's presidential candidate, there was a duly constituted presidential campaign council. In Nigeria's candidate-centred system, it is unsurprising that the PDP sought to undermine Buhari's personal credibility – and accusations of Buhari's ill-health, lack of a secondary education certificate, and acceptance of large payments for speeches across the world were all widely believed to have originated from the PDP throughout the campaign (Mahmud, 2015). However, Buhari's age, his past, his strict military bearing and his over-reliance on a Northern power base were all offset and made resonant with his 'change' message by a combination of a re-packaging of the Buhari's brand and a series of clever strategic decisions. In the first place, Buhari (2015, p, 2) explained his coming to power through a *coup d'état* and subsequent conversion to democracy in the following passage of a widely noted 2015 Chatham House speech in London:

> As you all know, I had been a military head of state in Nigeria for 20 months. We intervened because we were unhappy with the state of affairs in our country. We wanted to arrest the drift. Driven by patriotism, influenced by the prevalence and popularity of such drastic measures all over Africa and elsewhere, we fought our way to power. But the global triumph of democracy has shown that another and a preferable path to change is possible. It is an important lesson I have carried with me since, and a lesson that is not lost on the African continent.

This re-branding was successful, but also made possible by a lack of egregious or visible personal corruption during Buhari's tenure. His supporters christened him 'Sai Baba' a Hausa word which means only Baba can save us.

One member of the APC's campaign staff noted, in a comment that echoed the sentiment of several other respondents:

> Our candidate wasn't a difficult product to market, Nigerians were tired of leaders who had served in the past and preoccupied themselves with stealing public assets, nobody doubted the personal integrity on the part of our candidate. He once held the position of the presidency and had not stolen public funds…

The campaign organisation felt that in branding the candidate as changed and one who had embraced the tenets of democracy was to emphasise his stance on corruption and his past record on the issue of corruption as a marketing strength of the presidential candidate. A member of the presidential campaign council stated:

> So more than half of the job had been done by the candidate who had brought a rare commodity to the race - something that others did not have. Which is personal integrity, so it wasn't difficult to emphasise these attributes on the social media platforms. He had a unique selling point.

The campaign appeared to concentrate on the personality of the candidate. The campaign assumed that the candidate's credential of being honest was a selling trait. The narrative supports the view of personalisation of campaigns/ politics. This relates to the personalisation of politics that speaks to the Americanisation of campaign practices. This focus on the personality of the presidential candidate, was a great part of the core message of the campaign. This is more apparent in Nigeria as political parties are devoid of ideology.

Buhari focused heavily on corruption from the very beginning of his campaign. Nigeria's long struggle with corruption had continued throughout Goodluck Jonathan's tenure, with many arguing that he largely ignored or tacitly accepted corrupt practices, and Ekpo et al. (2016) reporting that 'cases of embezzlements, misappropriation, and diversion of public funds characterized his tenure in office'. (p.68). With this frame in mind, Buhari's rather dour public demeanour promised a president who would have the will and nature required to address Nigeria's problems of corruption.

A similar case could be made with regard to the difficulties faced by the Jonathan regime in dealing with the Northern Nigerian *Boko Haram* insurgency. Furthermore, as we will show the campaign actively used the web to disseminate images and videos that showed their candidate in a softer light, providing a more rounded image for Buhari. As pointed out in the chapter which presented the dynamics of Nigeria politics, many factors converge in electoral victory. In this instance, the party and its machinery play an important role. As elaborated in the Nigerian context chapter, the office of the president is highly powerful within Nigerian politics. This leads to a high degree of interference from and concentration of powers in the office of the presidential

candidate. The following comment by the Director of the campaign organisation captures the campaign committee and the party dynamics.

As a director of the campaign stated:

> The national chairman of the APC is the national leader of the campaign. the presidential candidate was the chairman of the campaign as well as the chairman of the party.

Perhaps what is less understood in this statement is who had the ultimate say between the party and the campaign committee. This is not surprising because the campaign committee was made up of very influential politicians, who had at several times held various political positions. The APC had only been created prior to the general election and while PDP could boast of resources which were centralised around the presidency accrued over time by virtue of his position, the presidential candidate of the APC could not command such resources and thus, while he was the presidential candidate, he couldn't exercise as much power as his counterpart. This highlights the difficulty in having a coordinated campaign approach.

In this section, contextual issues surrounding the APC, its candidates and key campaign messages have been established. We now move to a discussion of how the evidence gathered for this thesis bears on key aspects of the use of the web in the 2015 Nigerian presidential election campaign. We begin by discussing broad perceptions of the role of the web in Nigerian electoral campaigning among respondents associated with the APC.

6.4 Perceptions of the role and necessity of web campaigning for the APC

The findings from the analysis of the interview data points to several themes, which are discussed as follows: The study found that the APC regarded the use of the web as inevitable and necessary in any major electoral campaign in contemporary Nigeria. A considerable number of respondents are agreed on the role and necessity of the web as an enabling tool in political campaigning for the APC. For them, being online and on social media was necessary and part of modern Nigerian electioneering. Two members of the presidential campaign council describe the extent to which the decision to have a strong online campaign and one that integrated a social media presence, was one that required little reflection:

It is not as if we sat down and decided that the internet should be used, it naturally follows because you can't run a successful campaign, by excluding any communication platforms …

The comment describes the view that the internet was as good as being a norm and the use of the web was a realistic decision by the party to embrace the affordance of the internet for the purpose of getting votes. This appears in line with modernisation theory, 'structural changes on the macro-level (media, technologies, social structure) leads to an adaptive behaviour on the micro-level (parties, candidates and journalist), resulting in gradual modifications of traditional styles and strategies of political communication' (Plasser & Plasser, 2000, p. 17). No reference was made of imitating the campaign practices of American presidential candidates.

The primary purpose of campaigns is to get votes and because we wanted votes, we were exploring all the avenues that has an inflow of people in Nigeria.

The focus of the party on vote maximation can be seen as the driving force in the use of the web. Following the growth of internet, it was inevitable that the web would be used as a campaign tool. As a respondent commented:

the social media community has grown astronomically and over 60% of these people on these platforms Facebook, Twitter were between the ages of 18-60, with some having accounts in two or three platforms. So, we thought we can pull out votes from these communities…

As such, there existed a prevailing norm of the ineluctability of digital campaigning for a campaign with designs on electoral success in the Nigeria of 2015 among members of the APC campaign staff. As another director in the presidential campaign council team commented:

No party can afford not to use the internet as a tool for campaign and electioneering because that has become the order of the day, first, even beginning from the process of nominations we have computerized our system, our networks to the extent that the delegates to the election were in our system. We have even started accrediting our members using the internet…

This view is supported by a cross-section of members of the campaign council team, one of who noted the extent to which the party both devoted resources to its online presence and integrated its digital campaign into the day-to-day planning of the campaign's media strategy:

> We had a digital team and a digital editor, we had groups, which focused on the broadcast media, the print media and public relations, we had a group focused on social media.

This depicted the ad-hoc committee formed for the purpose of the campaign. It alludes to the extent in which the campaign sought to professionalise its campaign. While American campaigns are considered professionalised, a growing trend of campaigns becoming professionalised is widely acknowledged. Campaign organisations consciously seek out specialist and experts in various aspects of the campaign to provide efficient services in furtherance of the campaign.

A member of the presidential campaign council described the campaign team:

> We had a campaign team, mostly media practitioners who had been recruited into the media team of the campaign… as director, I chaired over meetings and I led the group. They came from different backgrounds, broadcast, radio, TV, newspaper and of course the Web, so the digital team had the specific responsibility of day to day monitoring and also our involvement in all of the social media platforms that we were operating on.

One member of the party campaign staff made similar comments, noting that:

> The number of internet users was an indication of a good sign to adopt the use of the web. This was enhanced by the availability of smart phones. The number of Nigerians who are mobile subscribers stands at 150 million. This increased the appetite for these smart phones by Nigerians, coupled with the low cost in purchasing data bundles, necessitated the campaign council to utilise these social networking sites that were available on these applications found on devices as a campaigning tool…

The opinion on the use of the internet seemed to be unanimous, and this is not surprising in view of the fact that a sizeable number of people had access to the internet. Reasoned in this way, the decision of utilising the internet become a rational choice based on vote maximization and not according to an Americanised trend.

This notion of the necessity of having a strong digital presence, including a presence on social media, was supported by APC campaign professionals as being so evident that no meaningful opposition to it emerged in the party's hierarchy points to some extent, to the power of 'modernisation' approaches to the evolution of campaign practices. However, although such views are widely held within the organisation, opinions on the most important form of communication vary, as one of the respondents remarked:

> The level of internet penetration is skewed towards the urban areas which is mostly populated with literates, who are conversant with the functionalities of the internet and so the use of these tools had to be supplemented with the traditional forms of campaigns. For me, the radio remains the most important form of information dissemination in the rural areas.

So, while, there was a clear understanding of the necessity of using the internet, the respondents demonstrated a clear understanding of a digital divide that exists in Nigeria. This demonstrates the necessity of integrating both new and old media in a hybrid form of communication. As such, while the necessity of having some form of digital campaign infrastructure was largely accepted, disagreement about its primacy and relationship with other types of media based on the specific circumstances of Nigeria in 2015 were present too, in line with the hybridisation lens. The data further revealed a general perception among APC respondents about the use of the web contributing to their eventual victory. A good number of respondents stated that digital campaigning was integral to the APC's campaign success, especially given their opposition status. The APC's use of the web is consistently cited by party officials involved in the campaign and campaign staffers as having been vital to the success of the APC at the ballot box. For instance, a member of the presidential campaign council remarked that:

> It was impossible to have delivered our party's success if we did not use the web, especially the social media particularly Facebook and Twitter, victory would have been impossible.

It is apparent from the statement that the APC attributed its success to the use of the web. Below are statements made by certain members of the presidential campaign team.

> Our campaign was unprecedented. We knew that the PDP had held onto power because the machineries of government were in their power and control, not because the people wanted them, and so we had to use any means which they had no control over that was the social media to campaign.

> The APC had so many volunteers willing to join the campaign, and their domain was the web, young people projected the candidacy of president Buhari. There has never been such a time like this in the history of Nigeria a that such participation from the youths, even though it didn't translate to voters turn out… the conversation on the web was phenomenal.

A member of the presidential campaign council respondent also commented that:

> Even our opposition the PDP acknowledged and talk about what we did online and on the social media platforms, so it must certainly have had an effect on the outcome of the election.

The claim made by the campaign organisation that the campaign was unprecedented appears to be true. The campaign seemed to appreciate voters' individual efforts in campaigning. The campaign was largely supported by large number of volunteers. While voluntarism is not new in campaigns, the use of the web has furthered facilitated voters' contribution by allowing self-organising individual participation. This was discussed in chapter 2. Although the use of the internet was pioneered in the USA it has evolved as a general trend globally. However, the rationale for the use of the web was the contention that other forms of media were controlled by the incumbent government. A cross section of views from members of the presidential campaign team regarded the use of Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp as fundamental tools, which influenced the fortunes of the party. However, amongst these social media platforms, it was agreed that Facebook was the most widely and powerfully used. A member of the presidential campaign council commented:

> I think the most effectual was Facebook, it played a very important role, and the reason is because Nigeria accounts for over 10% of Facebook population. You know that Nigeria is the most populous black nation and we have well over 170 million of that number, a large chunk of that population resides on Facebook, so the battle was taken to Facebook.

He furthered explained the reason why most people preferred Facebook to Twitter.

> Twitter was restricting in the number of words we could convey. The use of Twitter was restrictive. Twitter does not provide you with the luxury of voluminous writing, because your words are restricted to 140 characters.

When questioned about their perception of the use of web campaigning, several activists were also enthusiastic about the effects of the campaign's digital strategy. As outlined above, the APC realised quite early that there were substantial advantages of using the web to complement the traditional forms of campaigning in Nigeria of 2015. One activist commented:

> The APC understood the issues that the voters were concerned about much at an early stages, they knew that the way to get the youths involved was to get their attention on social media, and we did, the APC and the campaign message dominated the narrative all through the campaign.

Another activist focused on the difference between the APC and PDP campaigns, arguing that their respective opposition and incumbency status had explanatory power:

> Even though the PDP and their supporters used the web it was kind of lukewarm, they felt the power of incumbency and everything was already in their pocket, so they didn't have to so much, or rely on communicating to ensure victory, but the APC had to push.

This reasoning cannot be entirely faulted, the PDP had won every election since 1999, while the presidential candidate of the APC had unsuccessfully made several attempts at winning the presidency. From an interpretive perspective, these quotations have to be taken with a grain of salt. Although I had little reason to doubt the sincerity of these actors, it is far easier to assert that a given factor influenced a campaign's outcome than to prove it conclusively (Johnston et al., 2006).

As the next chapter will show, however, the digital campaign was a clear area of advantage for the APC over the PDP and it is highly likely that it was an important factor (among many others) in their eventual victory. The relevance of this 'digital advantage' to the theoretical frameworks explored in this thesis will be more fully fleshed out in the chapter comparing the two parties' online campaigns. We now move to a discussion of how the various actors interviewed provided insight into the functional uses of the web in the 2015 campaign by the APC.

6.5 Functional uses of the internet in the 2015 campaign.

The study found that the web used to perform the campaign function of information dissemination, marketing of the candidate, mobilising supporters and financial resource generation. The traditional use of any media in an election campaign involves information dissemination, and several APC respondents discussed this aspect as having occurred via both the campaign website and its associated social media account. The indicative quote below by a member of the presidential campaign council gives a flavour of comments on this topic:

> The effective thing that the party did, was that the party updated their activities on the party's official website. The party's manifesto was on the website and it was easily accessible not the kind we traditionally had in Nigeria, where you could go there and not be able to find the kind of information you are looking for.

The statement illustrates the basic function of the web, which is the provision of information. The subsequent comments illustrate the party's efforts in disseminating information during the campaign. A respondent stated:

> The party had a long list of email addresses of party members and these were used in bulk sending messages. Messages on meeting dates and agendas were sent through these platforms.

A member of the presidential campaign council team commented that:

> We interacted with bloggers that had huge traffic and followers to prompt them to cover certain topics and aspects of our campaign. which in turn gets the attention of the traditional media, who covers these aspects of our campaigns. So, you find a symbiotic relationship between the web and the traditional media.

These comments indicate that the internet was primarily used for spreading information. The campaign organisation clearly recognised the power in the number of followers and the impact of inadvertent audiences. The team stated that they used these web tools to interact with bloggers that had huge traffic and followers for example Linda Ikeji and Nairaland (popular blogs in Nigeria) to influence them to feature their campaign , which in turn gets the attention of the traditional media which subsequently, covers those aspects.

The aspect of supporting mobilisation among a vast and geographically dispersed population was highlighted by the comments put forward by several elite respondents, who (in various quotes listed below) stated that:

> The major thrust of my directorate was on reaching out to people who we had observed were very influential on the web, the people who were committed to change. People who would work for the party not for the usual pecuniary benefits that the PDP offered but because of a commitment to seeing a new wave of leadership in Nigeria.

A member of the presidential campaign council was explicit in the process of enabling support for the campaign.

> We identified, appointed and trained election agents in 155 000 booths across Nigeria, in over 3000 wards in 774 local governments area…

The above comment demonstrates the campaign's organisational process in calling to action supporters. Another member team of the presidential also commented on the mobilisation process.

> In Nigeria we have 36 states, in a presidential election, the president has to visit all the states, before the general election and so even as much as we used the traditional media, to let the people know that the president will be coming to a particular location, we also used the social media.

As a member of the presidential campaign council pointed out:

> Sometimes we go live there were live feeds so if you weren't aware that the president was going to come, you would get a live feed that the president was in town, and you mobilised your group to join so it was a veritable platform for mobilisation…

A campaign staffer also described the process of mobilising support:

> During the campaign, when we were going for rallies, there were people who were given updates on what will happen, and they posted this information in a bid to mobilise people.

It was also interesting to note that some members of the presidential campaign council reported using their own high online profiles to mobilise supporters:

> One of the greatest thing the party did was to use the internet for political mobilisation, for example if the party had to do rallies in Port Harcourt of course the internet was used to send out messages and, for example, someone like me who has over 12 000 followers on Facebook (…) any message I post , those who follow me will get the message and act accordingly.

In that regard, you can say that the party used the internet as a platform for mobilisation. An activist also stated that:

> Being an influencer with a wide following on Facebook and Twitter I was able to use my position to influence and mobilise certain segments of the voters on who to elect during the election…

Another member of the presidential council explained how they also used supporters with large online followings to facilitate mobilisation.

> The campaign targeted influential people on these social networks. People who a large number of followers on their social networks and could possibly influence the outcome of the election.

An activist also stated that:

> We were dealing with opinion leaders, moulders and influential persons in many cases, on the various social media platforms.

The party recognised the importance of two step influence. This is quite significant in Nigeria, as personalities who hold the most influence are those of certain positions, mostly seasoned politicians and traditional rulers with recognised offices. Some of

these influential people are referred to in Nigerian parlance as 'Godfathers' those that have great influence in choosing candidates and sponsoring their candidacy.

As one respondent describes it:

> We shared party activities to voters, members and these people were in turn reaching people in ten's and thousands of numbers who followed their page, it was a major networking tool which was beneficial to our campaign in facilitating the spread of our campaign messages and tasks we wanted volunteers to participate in…

While the campaign team where aware of the necessity of mobilising support, they were also aware that the apparent support must be translated to votes. This was demonstrated by the quote below:

> The APC presidential campaign council specifically stressed that in mobilising support, the ultimate goal was that supporters should register as voters and, on polling day, cast their votes for the APC's candidate….

The campaign stated one of the ways in which they went about the process:

> The campaign team made attempts to collect phone numbers of their supporters using the web platforms such as Facebook and kept in contact with these persons up until election day.

A campaign staffer further explained the efficacy of the process.

> The social media did most of the job for the party, beyond the physical mobilisation and they work hand in hand because if you are calling people to come out, once you use the social media you see them coming out in numbers because they are aware of what is going on and people came out and participate…

Another member of the presidential campaign council, focused on the web being used to support coordination, remarking that:

> The web was used to send information to various campaign co-ordinators in the various states to inform them of their duties.

Another member of the presidential campaign council respondent provided more details on the process:

> We have 36 states and we had state coordinators, the most effective thing we did was to engage them on the web through the internet, we also used the WhatsApp, we had a group on the WhatsApp where we sent messages across regularly to instruct our coordinators.

A consultant to the APC presidential team commented in the same vein:

> The web was a key tool for us. There were several platforms on the web. One was this group called General Muhammmadu Buhari (GMB), a social media page organised by volunteers for Buhari, and social media was the primary means of co-ordinating support across the states.

He explained the process:

> We used it to inform people on where rallies were going to take place, what time, what activities, who would be speaking at the campaign ground and those that wanted to join the rallies came.

A very interesting statement, and one much more in-line with the hybridisation perspective, came from a member of the presidential campaign council, who made the following comment about the campaign's online mobilisation tactics:

> In spite of all the advances this country has made we still are a traditional society, where the bond of tribalism still prevails over competence, even though the campaign team did not officially create social media pages that evoked a sense of tribalism, some of our volunteers opened Facebook pages that evoked tribal sentiments in order to garner supports from their tribes' men and women. The content of a page on Facebook is shaped by its members, so you find members in certain group who align based on different reasons, tribalism is something that is incarnate in our politics... so yes people developed pages based on tribal sentiments to invoke support for our candidate. As a party we didn't establish such sites, but we were aware of such sites, we couldn't really control what was not our domain to control.

This is particularly insightful, as support for a candidate in Nigeria is partly perceived by the crowd of people a candidate can attract to a political rally. The study also found that as well as popular support, the element of financial support was a key functional use of the web by the APC campaign:

> We attempted to raise funds by launching an online scheme using the mobile phones scratch cards across the network providers in Nigeria, which allowed the electorates recharge their mobile phones with a provision for donations to the APC party (see figure 6. 2 below)

Figure 6.2. Image of mobile scratch card.

Note: Screen shot taken from APC Facebook page

Another member of the campaign council also remarked that:

> Yes, we did, we were the only team that did that, we asked Nigerians to help contribute to our campaign, that we were only going to take money from the public and not from rich men, so people contributed. I cannot tell you how much we generated but it was successful.

The above statement is quite telling. The emphasis that they were not just going to take money from rich men, indicate that there is little history of raising soft monies for politics in Nigeria. Another member of the campaign council also stated how the funding raising process was thwarted by the incumbent government.

> We were able to raise some funds until our opposition used their might in ensuring the court ordered us to stop using the platform. However, it must be noted that this was the first in the history of Nigeria's political campaigns in which ordinary citizens where able to contribute to the APC campaign.

The mention of the opposition using their might indicates the form of government that is still evident in Nigeria whereby the power of incumbency is sometimes abused in pursuing a singular goal. Nevertheless, they also pointed to the conventional fundraising approaches, with one respondent noting that:

> The party also raised funds using the traditional method whereby stakeholders, businessmen and citizens donated to the campaign.

When asked about interacting with voters online, the respondents overwhelmingly stated that interactivity was an advantage in using the web and the most effective tool were the social media platforms as opposed to sending emails. A member of the

presidential campaign team stated that they were able to utilise the web in interacting with the electorates because of the interactive features of these platforms. The following comment illustrates the point:

> Not much attention was given to our website as a means of interact with the voters; we knew that the social media was the place to reach out to the young voters, so we concentrated on it…

Two campaign staffers commented:

> You can only get those that are interested in politics, mostly registered members going to look at the party's website , and we don't have a large number of card carrying members even though we have large followers, so why bother with the web sites other than providing information…

> Because of the social nature of the medium, it was easier to pass across messages and explain what you mean. When messages are posted on these platforms, they start trending and in reading comments, we replied to questions and interacted with the voters, you are able to further explain, which is something the traditional media does not provide.

Furthermore, a member of the campaign council demonstrated the nature of interactivity that the campaign provided. He stated:

> We had live online chat sessions between member of the campaign team and the voters at various times. Even though our presidential candidate did not take part in this, the directors of the various departments in the campaign council did.

While some respondents alluded to the fact that they interacted with the voters, the statements above lay bare the fact that the presidential candidate did not participate in interaction over social media platforms but suggested that directors of different departments did. While the literature points to media interaction as the preferred form of communication as against human interaction, the findings from both campaigns, but more so from the APC suggest that the campaign preferred human interaction. However, what was assumed to be interaction is doubtful, mainly because most Nigerian politicians have special advisers on social media who are in charge of their social media pages and thus whatever form of interaction transpired with the electorate may not necessarily be that of the politicians but their associates. A consultant also stated categorically he oversaw the presidential candidates' personnel pages. This is established in the subsequent comment:

> We developed a website for the candidate www.Buhari.Com which was the candidate's official campaign website. I personally managed the Facebook, Twitter and Instagram account.

This is a clear indication that what appeared to be interaction was not necessarily interaction. However, this was not surprising considering the age of the presidential candidate. A range of issues emerged under the sub-theme of use of the web as an aspect of the campaign's candidate marketing strategy. Over the course of several interviews with members of the presidential campaign, the members of the presidential campaign committee stated that the internet was used as a means of eliciting public opinion and reactions and feeding this back into the campaign in order to encourage message discipline were repeated several times. Below we present a series of quotes that reflect this theme. A member of the presidential campaign council stated that:

> We had conducted polls, and continued to conduct polls online, we knew what the people wanted and when our candidate went out for political appearances, he said very little things and he made sure he never went out of those three key policies: corruption, security and restoration and issues that had emerged from the polls we had conducted…

A campaign staffer inferred that the result of the polls was significant in message development:

> You see you might think they are certain things that are the priority of the people but when you put it in an opinion poll model, you will discover that what you think is important is not, so it was through this system we realised the priority for the election.

An activist of the APC also concurred that the polling results guided the crafting of the campaign message.

> Our campaign focused on three things corruption, security, and the restoration of the economy. So, whatever we did we were mindful of these three elements they were always attempts to derail us from our message, but we kept on disseminating these messages, it was all over the social networking sites…

A member of the presidential council acknowledged the opportunities the web afforded the campaign.

> The social media allowed the campaign team to receive immediate feedback from the voters on various issues and promises. Which was vital in decision-making. As we factored their responses in the furtherance of our campaigns.

The APC understood the necessity of having and monitoring their social media feeds, thus they went beyond just establishing a social media unit but ensuring that it was regularly monitored. A member of the presidential campaign council noted that:

> …the media committee engaged the social networking sites, which provided interaction and maintained a 24hour vigil on these media platforms to provide response and feedbacks to questions posed.

The campaign appeared to understand the necessity of sticking to a clear political message. Furthermore, the study found that the web was used in marketing the personality of the candidate. Specific pictures of Muhammadu Buhari, in the attires of the major tribes of the country were posted on the various platforms. This makes sense in the above-explained context of the candidate's austere and historically complex image. As a consultant recall:

> The candidate had always had an image problem. (It was felt) that he was inaccessible and detached from ordinary Nigerians. So, we used the tools to humanise him and personalise him and communicate the personal aspects of his candidacy.

The campaign understood the necessity of image management. They understood the importance of representing the candidate in the image of the three major Nigerian ethnic groups. The candidate had never appeared in any attire other than his traditional attire -the kaftan- synonymous with the North and his military fatigues. The consultant further stated:

> We posted pictures of him in suits and other attires that set the tone of the campaign, so people began to see him like every other Nigerian, that sent a message to the people that this was a different campaign.

A member of the presidential council commented on the process of image management.

> We posted pictures of him making him appear more accessible to younger voters, because of the stories they probable had heard from their parents or older people concerning his leadership when he was the military head of government.

Beyond that, an activist for the APC remarked that:

> Pictures were taken during campaign rallies and were posted on the social media platforms to amplify what the candidates were doing. So, you see people taking pictures on the streets and posted them on their pages.

Several members of the presidential campaign team also buttress this comment (which is further supported in the images taken from APC's social media output in Figure 6.2, below:

> The social media was used in laundering the image of the APC and that of the presidential candidate, we marketed him as someone who identifies with all tribes in the nation .We adorn him in the attires of different tribes in Nigeria, a precedent for the candidate as he is always seen in the traditional attire of the North. For example when he went to the south of Nigeria , we adorn in our southern attire the 'iwoko' , when he went the north he wore his traditional 'kaftan' and we wore him a suit to appeal to the those who favoured the western attire.

Certain attires are identified with certain tribes, in Nigeria. In other to demonstrate the all-embracing characteristics of the candidate, he was made to wear the attires of the three largest tribes in Nigeria, the Hausas, Yoruba's and the Igbos.

Figure 6.3. *Images of Muhammadu Buhari in various Attires*

Note: Adapted from the internet by Statecraft (2015)

The study noted that the strong emphasis on candidate personality and, especially, humanisation strongly echoes American campaign patterns. For instance, in Figures 6.4 and 6.5 I juxtapose a Buhari photo disseminated widely through the party's digital

channels with an example of a famous image of Barack Obama, and the similarity is striking:

Figure 6. 4. *Image of Buhari and a Boy*

Note: Adapted from the internet by Statecraft (2015)

Figure 6. 5. *Image of President Obama a boy in the Oval office.*

Note: Adapted from the internet by Souza (2011)

Furthermore, these comments below from an array of respondents are good examples of how the APC was able to market their candidate via digital media:

> The campaign deployed content and messages that showed our candidate's zero tolerance for corruption and had earned the title of 'Mr Integrity' and his quote 'If Nigerians do not kill corruption, corruption will kill Nigeria' was frequently repeated, so we made a big deal of that and posted this on the various social media sites…

This statement was meant to portray what the candidate was offering to Nigerians if elected.

As a member of the presidential campaign council remarked:

> We used his military background as a selling point to campaign, that he would fight Boko Haram because it was within his career experience… the election was during the pervasive menace of Boko Haram...

An activist stated:

> Most Nigerians vote based on their feelings, unlike in other countries were we you have the people who are aligned to the left, or right ideology or centre approach, in Nigeria, most voters are not aligned to a particular ideology, members of the APC, where once members of other parties, so we couldn't brand ideology, we rather appealed to their emotions…

The latter comment indicates an interesting take on the specificity of the Nigerian context, as perceived by members of the campaign team, and all of the substantive issues raised point at the particular intersection of the Nigerian political context and the tools of cyber-campaigning. Party defection is a known fact, and while parties would like to align to certain ideologies the history of political parties tells a different tune.

An activist indicated that the social networks and level of trust among peers on social networks, indicating an element of peer-to-peer marketing was also discernible in the APC's digital campaign.

> We launched several schemes, in which we tasked ourselves to convince our friends and family to interact with people giving reasons why they should vote for APC and we did it and it worked….'' We took phones numbers from people on the web, sent text messages, especially towards the day of the election.

A member of the presidential campaign team also indicated that this type of approach was structured into the APC's campaign:

> We conducted conferences inviting volunteers where we taught these volunteers on how best to sell their candidates using the web platforms.

Finally, the discussions of the tone of the campaigns revealed smear and negativity. However, according to our respondents, the APC's use of this was relatively limited (in the context of Nigerian politics). For instance, some members of the presidential campaign argued that the campaign was issued-based, in the sense that the APC highlighted the ineffectiveness of the government as they perceived it.

> We posted on the various social media platforms information of corruption, the information that the president lacked capacity. The APC council attacked the PDP -led governments in failing to provide security for the people.

They further argued:

> The party has also been highlighting what it considers the corrupt practice of the PDP led government, the recklessness, the wastefulness, cluelessness and general underperformance of the current PDP-led administration.

However, there were still traces of negative campaigns in my review of the digital outputs of the campaign and campaign *reportage*, indicating that my respondents may have been loath to mention such tactics. For instance, a very common phrase was used to describe the president in the party's online outputs; he was often referred to as 'Clueless'.

Nonetheless, while critical, Mahmud (2015:7) concurs that the APC mixed negative campaigning with substantive criticism to a greater degree than the PDP when he concludes that:

> The APC (…) cannot be exonerated from these underhand tricks. Though it has focused more on discussing the core issues it set out as its priorities if elected − national security, revamping and diversifying the economy, waging an effective war on corruption, and promoting youth employment − the party has also been highlighting what it considers the corruption, recklessness, wastefulness, cluelessness and general underperformance of the current PDP-led administration.

6.6 Factors that led to the uptake of the internet as a campaign tool

The study found an array of factors as driving the APC toward the adoption of the internet as a part of their campaign. These factors include resources (human and financial resources), intrinsic value of internet, technological infrastructure (rate of internet penetration, power supply, the rate of users and the demography of users, challenger status, media system and campaign regulation were all found to be determinants in the use of the web. An overwhelming number of senior party officers associated with the campaign were keen to point out the comparative cheapness of the web as a tool for campaigning. This was by far the strongest and most consistent reason that emerged from my interviews for using the web. As a member of the presidential campaign council commented:

> The traditional media is expensive, whether it is television or adverts on new papers, in comparison to the web. You have to have money to access the television and the radio stations.

Another member of the presidential campaign council also stated:

> The APC could not keep up with the PDP's use of these platforms. social media's access was free as long as you have a broad band you can make videos and post them and it goes viral, so all we needed was a good broad band access and we were fortunate that we had a donor who had installed a big broad band at the campaign office so it worked for us...

More explanations were given by a member of the presidential campaign council explaining the necessity of using the web.

> We didn't have a big budget and couldn't afford to be on prime television as frequently as the PDP. The traditional media provides for slots, there are peak times and there are non-peak times, the peak time cost more money. We couldn't pay for more slots on prime television.

Campaign staffers in particular were aware of this advantage, acknowledged in the following statement:

> They stated that they didn't have a big budget, and the traditional media such as the television provided for transient publicity. Political news is aired at particular times and these citizens may not be watching their television or listening to the radio at that time and as such could have missed the news item…

The disparity of resource power between an incumbent government and a challenger is very vast in Nigeria. This is mostly because of the centralised power accrued to a

sitting president and the lack of effective campaign regulations especially as it concerns funding of political parties. The comment below illustrates this:

> We were the opposition, running against a sitting government there was no way we could match the financial muscle of the sitting government in paying for advertisement and campaigning through the traditional means.

An overwhelming number of respondents echoed the following sentiment:

> The web allowed the campaign to direct the narrative, we could state what we wanted on the various social media pages without interferences from the media or editors choosing what they feel is more compelling…

The time-bound nature of traditional media mentioned in the first of these comments is a particularly interesting point. From a modernisation perspective, it illuminates how a technological advantage, once presented, is likely to be seized upon by a campaign. However, the expense of traditional media access, and the relatively lesser financial muscle of the APC's budget point in a direction more consistent with a hybridisation lens. As a member of the presidential campaign council noted:

> With the advent of the internet and the social media revolution, almost everybody has a mobile phone connected to the internet, so you have information on the go.

The comment reveals an understanding of the ubiquity of mobile phones. Thus, using the internet was a necessity. Further comments buttressing the importance of the use of the web was espoused by various member of the campaign council. As one of them commented:

> Communication is better and faster using the web because the reach is enormous. The campaign team could get information quickly, and we could address issues immediately.

Two other members also provided their reasons in support of the use of the web stating that:

> The web also allows for permanency in comparison to the traditional media such as the television and radio, which provided for fleeting publicity. If a political commentary is broadcasted or aired at a particular time, and the voters or even party members are not watching their television or listening to their radio, they could have missed the information.

> But on the web, Information is retained on these platforms for a long time as long as you go to the Facebook page you can look at what is trending, and you get to see the information we have disseminated.

One campaign staff added that with the use of the web, the APC could hold meetings online, which further reduces the cost of campaigning.

> The social media transcends space and time, it helped in crowd management, people could hold virtual meetings on the web, which is cheaper than organising meeting in town halls and party secretaries, which requires you to think of logistics and other issues, such as refreshments and more, which will cost you so much money.

Beyond cost-efficiencies, the APC campaign team felt that the PDP took advantage of the power of incumbency and that the government-owned stations did not give equal opportunities to their campaign. Thus, in order to circumvent the inadequacy of these government owned media houses, they had to turn to the web.

As a member of the presidential campaign council stated:

> In Nigeria, the media is controlled by the government of the day and as such the opposition is not given as much time and opportunity on air as the ruling party…

Another goes even further, alleging censorship of their campaign messages. The campaign staffer noted:

> some of our messages were not published by certain newspapers houses but with the advent of social media, we were able to publish what we wanted… so when the government media propagates false information, we were able to response to these issues using Facebook, Twitter and released press statements on our website…

The quotes below revealed the disparity in coverage of the campaign. A member of the presidential council revealed:

> On a particular night, I had one-minute advert slot that I wanted to buy on the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA), they had 16 of such slots on the one-hour news bulletin. All the 16 had been bought by the ruling party the PDP there was none for us. So, that was what we were confronted with.

Another member agreed, noting that:

> We didn't have access to the government media, we didn't have the money to buy airtime on the independent TV and the radio and so therefore Nigerians were talking to themselves on the social media platforms taking the word around…

A campaign staff stated:

> In a place like Nigeria, we had to make use of the social media, it gave the campaign team the latitude to disseminate information that would not have been in the public domain. So when the government media propagated false information, the web allowed us to provide alternative independent information...

The statement, seemed to ascribe a form of dictatorial government, though its form of democracy had been described as fair by freedom house index (2015). As a member of the presidential council stated:

> the directors of these station are appointed by the government in power so naturally they put the government of the day's interest as priority over all others. Though, there are privately owned stations that Nigerian's prefer to watch than the national television authority (NTA), if we were to use them they would cost us more, even though we did use them.

While ownership of media organisation is a combination of private and government ownership, the comment above seem to allude to the national television station as the preferred choice for news consumption. The data revealed that incomplete coverage of traditional media due to literacy issues and infrastructure further motivated the campaign team to look online, with a senior member of the campaign organisation noting:

> Infrastructural development in terms of electricity is very poor. There is no steady supply of power, so the television could not serve as the only means of communicating, because the shortage of power meant that citizens do not get to hear information when broadcasted and for you to maximise the information you have to pay for another slot for your information to be aired .

The early literature speaks of internet penetration in terms of access to technology as a determinant factor. Beyond that, the campaign team of the APC recognised the challenge in concentrating only on television broadcasting because of the problem of power shortage. The issue of electricity supply is a factor that is still a challenge in a developing country like Nigeria. For voters to be able to watch their television they had to have electricity running.

> The traditional media was not enough, even the tv, people consume tv online these days… people do not sit down to watch programmes on the television because they know that they can go online and downloads these programmes and watch them.

The campaign portrays an understanding of the necessity of adapting to the changes in the media structure, this speaks to the hybridisation of media, the use of the old media and the new media during campaigns.

> We were aware that the users of the web are mostly urban dwellers, more of the educated male populace, we felt it necessary to try and get as many votes from them as possible.

The respondent alludes to the effect of digital divide and the use of the web is contingent upon the access. The APC campaign team indicated that voters' access to technology was crucial in their decision to embark on the use of the web during the campaign. The team noted that the increasing access to the Internet in the country was a defining factor. Nigerians could access the web in sufficient numbers at affordable prices. This sentiment was shared by the founder of a consultancy firm hired the APC. He asserted that:

> For us to be able to control the message and share our messages at your own time irrespective of the dominant narrative it was priceless as a tool and we provided immediate response to counter the negativity and share our messages on our terms.

The APC embarked on the use of the social media in reaching out to eligible voters, but most importantly to reach out to the youths. The majority of respondents echoed this. One member of the presidential campaign council stated that:

> It is a no brainer; a huge percentage of the young influencers are on the social media. Social media is now the most important tool and measure of influence on the youths.

In the same vein, two other members commented:

> Young engaged educated people with audiences, young influencers basically people who had capacity to amplify our message, people who when they speak on these social media people listen to them. Other people share their opinions and people respect their authority…

> When you talk about the use of the web it is most used by the youths and mostly found in the urban areas although people in the rural areas use these… but if you want to get to the market women or women leader you cannot use the web you have to go to the wards, the states, so we had to continue with our traditional forms of campaigns….

In sum, this section has presented an array of factors as driving the APC toward the adoption of digital campaign tools as a part of their campaign. These factors include resources (human and financial resources), intrinsic value of internet, technological

infrastructure, rate of internet penetration, the rate of users and the demography of users, incumbency status, media system and campaign regulation were all found to be determinants in the use of the web.

6.7 Effect of the web on the campaign structure

The most puzzling set of interview evidence that I analysed was under the theme of the effects of web on the APC's internal campaign structure. There were a series of diverse and often divergent perspectives from my respondents under this topic. There was evidence of both high levels of centrism and parallel lines of authority running along the campaign hierarchy. The study found a decentralised form of campaign organisation alongside a centralised organisation. Perhaps this makes sense given the context of the APC discussed above juxtaposed against the high degree of power afforded to the president in the Nigerian political system. The study found an extensive decentralisation of the digital campaign with relatively little adaptation of the formal campaign. I will elaborate on and evidence these ideas below.

The first issue is the centrality of the presidential candidate to the decision-making structures of the campaign, albeit this is off-set by the role of parallel structures within the campaign. Some members of the presidential campaign council made the following comments on the nature of the campaign structure:

> You can't do anything without the approval of the party leader… So even though there was a campaign council it wasn't independent from the party, it still had to consult with the party leadership.

Another member stated:

> The party is the backbone of all politics, it wasn't just about the presidential candidate we had other candidates to cater for, yes the presidential seat was the ultimate but we had other candidates for other positions and that is why there was a presidential campaign council …

> You see in a presidential election, the focus is on the presidential candidate he has his own campaign structure, though different from the party, this duly constituted committee is independent of the party.

However, in order to achieve a functional web campaign a large cadre of volunteers was needed. As one campaign staff recalled:

> We wanted volunteers to become involved in the campaign on our terms. So we offered them trainings on how best and provided them with templates on responding to question posed by citizens. We had conducted several polls; we

knew what the people wanted so we had responses to these and develop messages to attract certain segments of the society.

While the above quote placed emphasis on the party's desire to keep their volunteers 'on message', the number of volunteers needed and the resources that would be necessary to fully monitor their output meant that the balance ultimately tipped towards a largely uncontrolled set of affiliate campaigners producing a diverse array of content. The party also made a particularly bold decision in accepting volunteers who were not formal party members, and thus largely outside of their capacity to sanction. These dynamics are elaborated in the statements below from some members of the presidential campaign council.

> We did not make membership of the party a criterion to be a volunteer for our course. We were just interested in how these volunteers could be beneficial to our team. They weren't party members, we only tried to make sure that they were all registered voters.

> …because the campaign was ad hoc, it was not necessary that they had to be members of the party as soon as the election were over the presidential campaign council was dissolved…

Several statements of members of the presidential council further outline this point:

> Why should we bother with if they were members or not? The fact that they were willing to volunteer for our campaign was good enough, and most time it had nothing to do with the party or even the campaign council they initiated ideas on their own…

> We encouraged people to volunteer. We did not make party membership a pre-condition to be a member of the media committee, rather, we looked at their knowledge of journalism, and communication and how they could be useful to us. Quite a number of persons where independent journalist who had, perhaps reported for major international news organisations on freelance kind of basis…

> You know our campaign was exceptional we didn't have money to induce people to give their time, people were willing just for the change we promised them, they were willing to help and the social media was a wonderful way in helping the campaign especially for the youths….

A member of the presidential council stated that:

> Let me tell you what happened in the course of our campaign young people in the country siezed the campaign, they took it over as their own, and they pursued it because they were yearning for the change that our government promised. As a (REDACTED – replaced by member) I can't take credit for all the effort that went on using the social media platforms, we didn't have the

money, we didn't have the energy to drive that massive effort that we all witnessed.

Several members of the presidential council recalled how they found it increasingly difficult to monitor and control the activities of volunteers as the digital campaign took off:

> Because of the numbers of volunteer who were willing to work for the campaign, we had the biggest challenge in getting these teams to work together in synergy. Nonetheless, the people who we identified and recruited, we were able to put in a database and provided guidelines and templates on how we wanted them to response to issues, while others who were not directly under our control were difficult to control.

This was further supported by another member of the presidential campaign council team, also commented that:

> There was a problem of coordinating the messages and because of the adoption of professional media tools and social media tools it is a very new development in Nigeria's politics. We are still experimenting on how best to coordinate these large numbers of volunteers who participate in campaign activities.
>
> We did have a database for our volunteers, not as advanced as some of the developed countries, but we were able to manage data of a subset of people. The problem with allowing autonomy is that we couldn't keep track of their activities, even when we may not have approved the message they were disseminating, it was hard to keep track….

A similar dynamic of formal centrism (this time in the hands of key campaign executives) alongside functional autonomy was observable when we discussed the campaign with a digital consultant hired by the APC:

> I am a managing partner of company X which was one of the campaign communication agencies for General Muhammadu campaign, we provided 360-degree media services TV radio, prints events online, outdoor the entire communication engagement with the public using the media.

As such, the campaign took a bold and risky step in accepting 'outsiders' into the outer layers of the campaign team and giving them significant control over the messages that were associated with the party during the campaign. At the same time, formal consultants controlled key information hubs and were directly accountable to party elites. As such, this presents a tension between a high degree of formal centrism and a substantial functional decentralisation. The hybridisation lens is particularly useful in examining this phenomenon – because this particular configuration is very much

driven by party and national factors, but also by the technical necessities of running a digital campaign on a relatively small budget.

However, there were mixed views on the extent of organisational stasis versus decentralisation of the campaign. In terms of assessing the extent to which adoption of a significant digital campaign led to a decentralisation or centralisation – we found evidence of two opposing views among our respondents. Some party elites who discussed this issue with us tended to focus on how little the campaign affected the overall structure of the party as a whole. See the following quotes for examples of this line of thinking:

> You know, the party is the primary organ in politics, the presidential campaign council is just ad-hoc, so their activities do not have an effect on the party structure, rather the campaign council as a whole have to comply with the directives of our party…

> We sought to create an interactive campaign. We encouraged our supporters to join online discussions and even organise events. We allowed these volunteers to be proactive in contributing to the campaign of the APC, however it didn't affect the campaign structure, they were an add on not the main campaign, so their action had no direct effect on the internal structure.

However, just as common a view was that a degree of decentralisation had occurred as a consequence of the exigencies of cyber-campaigning. The use of social media platforms suggests that supporters and activists were enabled to participate in campaign on their own terms, which reduced the control of the duly constituted campaign team over the campaign process and challenged the top-down, centralised mode of communication of yester years.

A member of the presidential campaign team noted:

> When it came to the digital media that is the new media, the campaign had a social media department. This department had autonomy to carry out certain functions, you know these forms of media is in real time, so we had to give them authority to respond to certain issues as they came up...

The empirical evidence as a whole revealed that the campaign was a combination of both control from the central party and a decentralised nature. The political elites realised that for their party to get the support they needed from these volunteers they had to devolve certain authorities to them. The campaign recognised that the use of the

web allowed for a decentralisation of powers concentrated at the headquarters of the campaign.

 A campaign staff member commented:

> We had so many volunteers online, that is people who were willing and created pages just for the campaign… most of them were only willing to participate on the web in sharing pictu.res retweeting and the liking the posts, like I said we had early enough identified a number of internet warriors, people who had large followers, people who tweets were always retweeted, and had large followers on Facebook, you know there are certain people whose opinions are quite important, in these instance these people online evoke a lot of influence there are like the elites only in this case there were online, you cannot start giving them directives on all matters.

As another member also stated:

> We discuss and tell them the direction they ought to go and leave the decision on how best to accomplish the task to them …. Because we wanted these volunteers to be effective, they had to have a bit of autonomy from the   official campaigns.

One member of the presidential council made the interesting observation that:

> Even though we had a large number of volunteers, we maintained our campaign plan and these volunteers managed the use of digital tools separately from the campaign team other than those trained and organised by the campaign team.

Elaborating on how the campaign sought to control key aspects of the campaign they stated:

> We established a situation room filled up with volunteers, who monitored our various social media pages. We forecasted questions and provided templates on how to respond to questions and comments.

6.8 Chapter Summary

This chapter has explored the conceptualisation and operationalisation of the use of the web by the APC during the 2015 Nigerian Presidential election from the perspective of the elites, which comprised of both directors of the presidential campaign council and political consultants and activist. The analysis suggests the inevitability of having a digital dimension to a major electoral campaign in contemporary Nigeria. The chapter reveals a prevailing norm of the ineluctability of

digital campaigning on electoral success in Nigeria at 2015 among members of the APC presidential campaign council. While the necessity of having some form of digital campaign infrastructure was largely accepted, disagreement about its primacy and relationship with other types of media based on the specific circumstances of Nigeria in 2015 were present too. The APC campaign predominately used various social media platforms in campaigning, with no specialised tool created for internal communication or members hub. In its functionality, the web was used in a multifaceted manner and seen generally as contributing to and expanding the offline campaigns being pursued. The internet was used to perform the campaign function of information dissemination, marketing of the candidate, mobilising supporters, promoting participation and resource generation. The APC used social media to reach out to eligible voters, but most importantly in reaching out to the youths. While targeting the youths, they also targeted social media influencers in order to amplify their campaign messages. The data revealed various interrelated factors as contributing to the use of the internet in campaigning. These factors include resources (human and financial resources), intrinsic value of internet, technological infrastructure (rate of internet penetration, the rate of users and the demography of users, challenger status, media system and campaign regulation were all found to be determinants in the use of the web. The study found a decentralised form of campaign organisation, with relatively little adaptation of the formal campaign and at the same time a centralised organisation. APC provided a decentralised form of campaign organisation, allowing and encouraging voters to participate and self-organise on behalf of the party. There was evidence of both high levels of centrism and parallel lines of authority running along the campaign hierarchy.

Chapter Seven: The People's Democratic party (PDP) Internet Campaign in the 2015 presidential election.

7. 1 Introduction

This chapter presents the key findings relating to the PDP's utilisation of the web during the 2015 Nigerian Presidential election. It is worth re-iterating here some of the introductory points made in chapter 6 – namely that, against the expectations of many think tanks and academics (Owen & Usman, 2015), the PDP ultimately lost the election to the APC. It is important to bear in mind that the interviews took place the year following this result, meaning that there was quite a different dynamic to the more triumphalist sentiments of the APC interviewees. Again, I seek to use my interpretive and reflective skills to minimize this unevenness of experience, without losing the texture and insight of the data that I gathered. Perhaps because of a 'blame game' dynamic, members of the presidential campaign council of the PDP were both more difficult to secure interviews with and somewhat more guarded in their responses to me. The chapter is structured to mirror chapter 6, in order to facilitate comparison (similarities and differences) across the two major Nigerian parties' use of the web in the 2015 campaign. As such, before delving into the depth and breadth of the empirical findings, this chapter will provide a synopsis of the PDP's history as a political party in Nigeria as well as details surrounding the candidate and campaign message. It is my hope that this discussion will provide the reader with a context that will make the interpretation of the original findings more intuitive. With this background established, I commence with the empirical analysis of the data that I collected through a series of interviews with party elites, campaign staffers and activists/volunteers. I begin this analysis with a section on respondents' general perception of the digital campaign in the 2015 Nigerian presidential elections, with a focus on perceptions regarding the PDP candidate's overall digital campaign performance. I then move to a discussion of the functional uses to which the web was put by the PDP candidate during the campaign, again splitting the discussion into a series of insights in support mobilisation versus candidate and party marketing. I then examine the factors cited by respondents as motivating and shaping their adoption of digital campaign tools. I finish the empirical section by asking whether and how the practices of cyber-campaigning

affected the internal organisation of the campaign, before summarising the main findings detailed in this chapter in a concluding section.

7.2 Background of the PDP

The PDP had maintained its position as the ruling party, securing the presidential seat over the course of four national elections from 1999 starting with President Olusegun Obasanjo victory till Goodluck Jonathan in 2011 (Katsina, 2015). It operates on a six level of party organisation, namely national, zonal, state, senatorial district, local government and ward. Alongside the party's website www.peoplesdemocraticparty.com.ng, the party had an official Facebook book and Twitter page. Visitors to these social networking websites interacted with the campaign team through comments and discussions mostly on the social networking sites. Its slogan is "Power to the people". However, during the presidential campaign, it introduced "transformation" " as the party's campaign slogan for the 2015 general election. Officially, the presidential campaign council consisted of a number of departments and personnel. Nonetheless, the presidential candidate maintained several separate online teams with various professionals and volunteers contributing to the campaign.

Like the APC, the PDP's emergence as a political force in Nigeria was the result of a merger of pre-existing parties and factions struggling to contest power with a dominant leadership. In the PDP's case, its formation was part of the birthing pains of the Nigerian fourth republic – motivated by a widespread belief in the Autumn of 1998 that General Sani Abacha would sew up the first set of democratic elections in order to resume his presidency, which Ojukwu and Olafia (2011) label Abacha's 'self-succession project' (p. 26).The PDP was formally created on August 19th, 1998 by the G.34 Committee, which was led by a former Nigerian Vice-President in the Second Republic (ibid.). The party brought together a coalition of politicians who were either banned from registering for the election or frozen out of Abacha's coalition with members of the People's Democratic Movement (PDM), headed by General Shehu Musa Yar'adua (Aleyomi, 2013). As with the APC, the coalitional nature of the party and Nigeria's federal political system is reflected in a geographically diffuse party organisational structure, which Figure 1 represents on the basis of a close reading of the party's constitution.

Figure 7.1: *The organizational Structure of the PDP*

Source: Adapted from PDP Constitution, 2017

However, a closer reading of the literature indicates a disjuncture between the decentred ideals of the party's formal structure and a de facto centralised political operation. Aleyomi (2013) details the lack of intra-party democracy that beset the PDP across many of its years of rule. He argues that the party's flawed internal democratic structures and practices were exacerbated by a lack of ideological coherence within the party. Again, the centralising nature of Nigerian politics, particularly in the office

of the president, undermines attempts to spread power evenly across parties, even when these parties are in effect coalitions of actors with different bases and interests. This dynamic was particularly visible in 2015, as Goodluck Jonathan's decision to run for re-election violated a norm of rotation between different regions known as 'zoning' (Owen & Usman, 2015). This decision, taken in the context of severe economic, security, and governance problems facing the country as a whole, struck at the very foundations of Nigeria's hitherto dominant party.

7.3 Jonathan and his campaign message

The PDP was the dominant force in 21st century Nigerian politics up to the 2015 elections. Between 1999 and 2011, the party had won every presidential election in Nigeria's fourth republic, producing three presidents as well as the candidate seeking re-election in 2015: Goodluck Jonathan. His emergence as the candidate was without any competitive, transparent and credible primaries. He was ("anointed" as known in Nigerian political discourse) by some party leaders and rubber stamped by the party. The party's slogan is 'Power to the people'. However, during the presidential campaign, it introduced 'transformation' as the party's campaign slogan. Like the 'change' motif adopted by the APC, this hints at an acknowledgement of the issues plaguing Nigeria in 2015.

The theme of transformation suggests change within the existing political order, rather than a replacement of that order, but it also signalled the incumbent's difficult position going into the campaign. Set against this, however, were the various formal and informal resources enjoyed by a ruling party in Nigeria's fourth republic, including significant control over traditional media outlets and widespread support garnered through the President's discretionary allocation of both offices and resources (Ojukwu & Olafia, 2011). As the campaign progressed, however, it was noted that incivility and negativity plagued the campaign, with the focus turning from issues to personal attacks (Owen & Usman, 2015). The campaign was replete with ethnic tensions, characterised by negative campaigning, and even outbreaks of violence being encouraged by the first lady, who said at a campaign rally: 'anybody that comes at you and tells you change, stone that person' at a campaign rally (ibid.) This re-echoed the more tried and tested methods of campaigning, which are all too familiar in the Nigerian context (see Nigerian context chapter for a full accounting).The candidate,

Goodluck Jonathan, had the following endearing features 'he appeared a simple man — shoulders hunched, brows crinkled, eyes misty. He told of poor beginnings, hinting at the possibility of his country, too, rising from nothing' (Olisakwe,2019, np). However, four years later, the same writer judged that Mr Jonathan had proved 'cold and ineffectual' in office. As the incumbent, Goodluck Jonathan was associated with both breaking the zoning arrangements of the PDP and mismanaging currency inflation, endemic corruption, and the abduction by Boko Haram of over 200 schoolgirls. The use of the social media was not novel to the PDP, the presidential candidate had announced his presidency in 2011 on Facebook and had a good number of followers on his page which he regularly updated and engaged with citizens. Similarly, the party had well-established official pages on Twitter and Facebook. In terms of the party's campaign structure, this consisted of a number of departments and personnel. The duly constituted presidential campaign council comprised of several embers in various departments members. The full list was obtained from a newspaper publication. The number of people who comprised the council is suggestive that there were merely there to accommodate party elites and patrons with the expectation that they will ensure victory.

As in the previous chapter, in order to balance between respondent anonymity and the context of the data being reviewed, I label data as coming from party elites, campaign staffers, consultants, and campaign activists/volunteers. The party certainly had all of the visible tools of cyber-campaigning: alongside the party's website www.people'sdemocraticparty.com.ng, the party had an official campaign site with associated Facebook book and Twitter pages. In the sections that follows, we examine how's these tools were conceived, put to use, and supplemented by the PDP, as well as looking at what motivated the PDP to undertake these behaviours and how it affected their campaign structure.

7.4 Perceptions of the role and necessity of web campaigning for the PDP.

The section presents the findings from the PDP presidential campaign's perspective of the use of the web during the Nigerian presidential election of 2015. A first major theme was the necessity of being online to signal a campaign's modernity and credibility. Some members of the presidential council made a series of statements that suggest this interpretation:

> It's kind of expected that you have a website and use the social media. I think it was a bandwagon effect, everyone was online, it's what is necessary for campaigns … So, we did it.

> At the end of the day all 'politics is local' the grassroots is the place, your constituencies, if you are on the web all the time and not going to your ward to canvass for votes… forget it… you can never win…. However, we had to use the web, it's a new media form so we used it…

As a member of the presidential campaign council puts it:

> I have a Twitter account and Facebook account because it is the order of the day. You have to go along with the times…

Another member of the presidential campaign council further stated:

> Of course, we had to use the social media, we are the biggest party in African we have followers in millions, we had been in power for over 16 years, of course we used it. The ICT department has been in existence for that period of time and in every election that is their function.

While the sentiments alluded to the necessity of using the internet, there was also a widespread sense that digital campaigning was deprioritised during the PDP's campaign. It was widely stated that the party had no dedicated online team for the presidential candidate during the 2015 election. There were no changes made to the existing information communication department and it continued as part of the workflow of their regular staffs. It was after the election that a new media team was created by the party. An insight along these lines came from a member of the party and campaign elite, who commented on the relative priority given to digital versus traditional media, in a comment that accords with APC accounts in the previous chapter of the dominance of the PDP on traditional (especially broadcast) platforms in Nigeria.

> Yes, we had a website and used the social media platforms, the websites were used for press releases, newsletters and such, the social media platforms were mainly used to post pictures of our candidate and the campaign activities that had taken place or was going to take place……

Another member of the presidential campaign council also stated:

> We did not use it to engage the public, to attract a lot of people to the activities of the party or getting a lot of people to be attracted to the party. It was not utilised as a campaign material, as a way of catching mechanism. It was just there to fulfil all righteousness…

This statement appears to be the opinion of someone who ascribed the result of the PDP's failure during election to the less effective manner in which the internet was used.

> Even though the PDP used a lot of the social media platforms to sell our candidate's achievement, the Nigerian television authority (NTA) 9pm news remains the most informative. We all wait for the 9pm news. People of my age all watch the night news and that is where you see pictures of the achievements of the PDP, the social media is mostly for the youths.

Another member of the presidential campaign council also described the process:

> We engaged in television programs and granted interviews on Tv where we talked about our campaign policies and addressed issues.

When the PDP activists gave their opinions about the nature and efficacy of cyber campaigning in the 2015 elections the case study revealed that there was an issue of complacency, largely due to incumbency and having a large degree of control over traditional media outlets, as well as a general lack of prioritisation of new media.

> We did all we could to help the campaign of passion and people under my team did it voluntarily for the president and the party. They were not under any form of inducement these where just dedicated people who were passionate about the president and liked what he represented, and the value he held.

The various comments by volunteer activists below buttress this point:

> The PDP as a party did not take the use of the web and the social media seriously. I think it's one of our undoing, we did not have the will, unlike the APC, our leaders did not believe in the new media. It was always subsidiary; it was never looked at as a something that will bring out votes…

The campaign demonstrated their emphasis on the use of traditional media. As a member of the presidential campaign council commented:

We spent a lot of money on campaigning, rallies, posters, radio, television and newspaper. The government television and radio were in the party's pocket. They had to give the PDP preference over the APC…

An activist stated that:

The PDP used the web but you see it was more or less a tail end approach, it was more or less, a crash approach, last minute bombardment, and it doesn't work that way, when you give room especially on the web, with the manner in which information travels, narratives and opinions are formed quickly and when this happens it becomes difficult to change the narrative…

Another activist further emphasised the lack of priority given to the web by the PDP.

PDP dropped the ball on the use of social media. They did not take it seriously. They felt they will just use the traditional media they had the money; the social media would have been cheaper and more effective at the end of the day…

These themes are highly interesting from a theoretical perspective. The lack of emphasis on either American examples or consultants is striking, suggesting that the Americanisation perspective has relatively little explanatory power. Modernisation plays into the discussion in two ways. In the first place, in the recognition of the necessity of having a digital campaign in a contemporary society, but also more subtly in the last comment's indication that the PDP recognised that its shortcoming in the digital campaign had to be addressed for the next election – supporting Kreiss's (2016) 'prototype party' hypothesis that losing parties often modernise in order to play 'catch up' with parties that make better use of new campaign tools. The hybridisation lens is also revealing – as the relative lack of emphasis on digital campaigning is largely presented as a result of the PDP's incumbency advantages, track record of electoral dominance, and a culture of 'arrogance' within the party that this dominance would continue to hold in 2015. We now move on to a discussion of the functional uses to which the web was put by the PDP during the campaign.

7.5 Functional uses of the web in the 2015 campaign

A first major theme that emerged upon analysis of the empirical data was that the candidate of the PDP employed a series of social media platforms (Twitter, Facebook, blogs) to strengthen the orthodox patterns that already existed within the context of Nigeria. The data revealed that the internet was used to perform the campaign function of information dissemination, marketing of the candidate, mobilising supporters and promoting supporter participation. As was the case with the APC candidate, one of the

uses of the web was for information dissemination. The campaign team of the PDP also alluded to the use of the web as a means of disseminating information. They went further in specifying the platforms they appraised as the most effective. A member of the presidential campaign team stated:

> The most effective channel was the Facebook; it was effective in disseminating our campaign message because that is where you find most Nigerian's discussing politics.

Two other senior members of the presidential campaign council disagreed about the efficacy of Facebook and noted that a diverse array of web platforms was used to disseminate information about their candidate:

> Twitter was the more intellectual ground for people to communicate. Though the number of people on Twitter are fewer than those on the Facebook in Nigeria, the literate people still tend to pay more attention there and for some reasons the message on Twitter sets the narrative and it filters down and gets to the grassroots.

> On Twitter, we coined a range of trending topics to transmit political messages, images, and tweets about the elections, campaign activities, and party manifestos.

A member of the presidential campaign council stated that the limited number of words allowed by Twitter was quite effective.

> Research has shown that people don't have time to read a lot, that is why you see a 140-character statement on Twitter influences a lot of people's perception.

Two members of the presidential campaign council though that the blogs were more efficient, they stated that:

> We used more of the blogs we did stories and sent information to a lot of on online blogs and online newspapers. We had blogs especially created interest blogs, which had traffic, these blogs did not belong to the campaign team but belonged to persons who were supporters of the PDP. So, we used these blogs to channel positive information about the president ahead of the election…

> The PDP engaged with the very popular blogs, quite a number and we had a mail list and there was no press release that PDP did that no news agency in Nigeria did not include in their article. So, we had that synergy, obviously we were the government in power, every news agent was interested in whatever we had to say, and even more interested when the campaign officially started.

The web was used to achieve information dissemination online and two major strategies were deployed, with both indicating the PDP's superior financial resources (relative to the APC). The first involved online paid advertising. A member of the presidential council stated that the web was used to complement traditional media and did not take preference over the traditional media forms of campaign (rallies, radio, jingles, television), however monies were spent paying for adverts online.

> We did adverts on Google and Facebook, we tried everything possible to advertise on Yahoo, Yahoo said it was against their policies to allow for political advertise.

A member of the presidential campaign council commented on how monies were spent paying for adverts online.

> In fact, we were ready to pay whatever amount if they had accepted but they refused. Furthermore, Facebook had this broadcast facility which you could pay for, and they broadcast you message to a selected audience in Nigeria. So it didn't matter where Nigerians were. It popped up on their timeline, so we used these kinds of facilities.

He further stated that the social media platform was mostly used in conveying their campaign message.

> We had advertisement facilities on Twitter also, so we basically used Facebook and Twitter, because that is where most Nigerians discuss politics.

This comment was buttressed by the recollections of a campaign staffer:

> We paid for adverts on news portals, we paid for adverts on Google, we paid for adverts on popular blogs in Nigeria like Linda Ikeji platforms, Pauls, Nikes, they were engaged by our campaign team. We were very much aware of the traffic these sites had and the number of people who went to these blogs to receive information. So, we felt if we advertised on these platforms, we were going to get a better reach on voters.

The empirical data revealed that while citizens-initiated campaigns in support of the campaign, the campaign also involved recruiting paid volunteers. These people were provided with key messages to disseminate via their social media feeds. The process underlying the recruitment and payment of these volunteers was recalled by one senior campaign staffer:

> a lot of people worked and supported the media via the social media and it was also an opportunity for the youths to be hired, I told you 250 people worked under me they were paid they were not just volunteers and these were not

working from one location, they were working from different locations, some I never met until after the elections because what we did was, that is my directorate.

A member of the presidential campaign team described the reasoning behind their choice of personnel's driving the campaign.

> We began to study people's social media profiles on Twitter Facebook, we checked how well you certain people deliver narratives and had large followers, we contact you and we ask if you would like to work for the team and you provide your account number and we put you on an email list and on a WhatsApp group and you start getting content, directive and start working on it

A campaign staffer also spoke in detail about the process:

> Let me tell you of one case, there was a man we brought from Ghana he is a Nigerian who resides in Ghana, he was very effective on Twitter, he had over 100000 followers, so we spoke to him and brought him to Nigeria all expenses paid.

Another campaign staffer recalled that celebrities were used to (and, in some cases, paid) to endorse Goodluck Jonathan:

> We had so many celebrities who used the social media platforms to endorse our candidate, they posted short videos on you tube, their personal pages on their Twitter handle for their followers, these were liked, shared and retweet so it was a very good way of marketing our candidate.

Some were paid, others volunteered because they believed in our candidate. This is not surprising, while money is essential in politics everywhere, its influence in Nigeria, is great. The incumbent president is perceived to have a lot of funds at his disposal so while people may be willing to endorse his candidacy because they believe he is the right candidate, others could have received funds for their endorsement.

From the perspective of the campaign staffers and members of the presidential campaign council, the web was also seen as a tool that offered the campaign team an opportunity for interaction and engagement with the electorate. For example, the campaign team could upload videos of candidates in real time. In the same vein, the council members stated that the web created a chain of conversations using the internet, party official and the campaign council members could communicate and interact with citizen, even if it was not in their official pages, we used our personal

pages and interacted with the voters. The extent of interaction was widely mentioned by both campaign staffers and activists, who made the following comments:

> Before now, some people were not interested in politics, but when you go online you are confronted by political post, especially towards the election. This arouses interest and sometimes translate into participation...

> Before now there was a lot of apathy before now people go on social media to post pictures of themselves, but these days people are using their platforms to talk about their political views and being friends with such person, you can see these post and comments, it influences participation…

> The youths participated actively, they took picture of themselves in campaign rallies, posted their voters cards which encouraged others, so it tells you that the online activities were guiding their actions.

Voters' participation was enhanced by the use of the web, especially for the young ones. For example, people who were not interested in politics were exposed to the political views of their friends and associates on the web, through comments and pictures that were pro agenda of the party they were in support of which saw the erosion of apathy.

One activist recalled that there was an element of targeted interaction, whereby influential and supportive social media accounts were identified and engaged with.

> Some of us identified social media influencers, who were ardent supporters of President Jonathan, by looking through their comments on different social media platforms. We contacted them and started interacting and posting contents to their pages and sent them messages in order to extend our message coverage.

Similarly, several activists recalled the party's voter participation initiatives as among the most successful aspects of the PDP's digital campaign:

> The PDP used the social media to inform Nigerians to register to vote and because the PDP then had an official Facebook and Twitter page , which I had access to because I was one of those handling it, we constantly posted messages encouraging people to register to vote and people should stay back and defend their votes to make sure their votes count and there was a campaign 'one man one vote' campaign. That your vote must count…

> the campaigns that we ran 'vote or die', 'your vote is your right' you must vote and for me I believe it was able to galvanize more people than ever before….

The evidence suggests that PDP used the web in mobilising support. PDP had the opportunity of incumbency, being in power for 16 years, and with the proliferation of

technological development that was taking place the world over, social media platforms started to become synonymous with political campaign. To keep up with the times, the party had developed and opened pages in these platforms. Some of these pages were opened by supporters of the party. After the campaign council was constituted these pages where informally incorporated as part of the campaign organisation.

As a member of the presidential campaign council and a campaign staffer (respectively) remarked:

> We had several social media group platforms online; some had been in existence since the 2011 election. We had so many volunteer groups, Goodluck support groups, which had pages on Facebook (…) prior to the general election there was a group called Transformation ambassadors of Nigeria (TAN) which conducted rallies in every region of the country, it was called Tan Mega Rally and majority of our members and supporters who attended this rally actually got the information from the internet.

These TAN rallies were announced, and timetables were made available on various Facebook pages and Twitter handles and people got information from the web…

> I remember transformation ambassador of Nigeria (TAN) in various attempts to mobilise voters conducted promotions online whereby people won T shirts and all of that so there was a lot of mobilisation via the internet…

The campaign team of the PDP espoused the functionality of using the web to mobilise support for their campaign, several comments were made in buttressing their point.

> The web became a very functional tool for mobilisation, because like I told you, it is where we have the most enlightened demography of Nigerians and the most enlightened and active group of Nigerians are on social media…

> We had a good number of volunteers, so we segmented them, those who were influential on the Twitter, we emphasised that they keep on utilising their account and mobilising the subsets of people who were their followers and the same thing with the Facebook…

-support mobilisation and coordination efforts:

> You know we used the traditional media as well as the new media, many people do not have the time to physically attend rallies and the various programmes organised by political parties, because of the demands of life and security concerns but with the internet people were able to keep abreast with the campaign and information which we were able to provide them live coverage during important campaign events.

As an activist stated:

We had some physical meetings but there were not as regular as meetings on Facebook, on the internet we get directives from the party and there were zonal coordinators, state coordinators and ward so whatever instruction is passed from the national, we transmitted to the various coordinators.

A party elite respondent stated that they attempted to harness the politically engaged and promote voter participation:

The social media allowed citizens to participate in the campaign process by voicing their opinions, encouraging friends to join the campaign, some even opened pages in support of our campaigns. They held online meetings and so forth. We had Google meetings, meetings on live chat. They were like online town hall meetings and there like 100- 1000 people on Twitter you know. My directorate my team engaged with citizens, we had live meetings, online meetings with our supporters.

A range of related issues emerged under the use of the web as an aspect of the campaign's candidate marketing strategy. The PDP used the web in marketing their candidate by espousing his achievements all through the campaigns. This theme is echoed in the following quotes from campaign staffers:

'Good luck to Good luck'; these groups were created by supporter and activists whose messages focused on the personality of the candidate, we listed out his achievements and posted pictures of his infrastructural accomplishments…

The respondent espoused that citizens-initiated campaigns to support the campaigns. One of them was the support group 'Good luck to good luck'. This peer- to -peer marketing assisted the campaign in driving support for the candidate. The respondents also explained the meaning and significance of the slogan used during the campaign.

The Goodluck Jonathan's campaign was mostly based on his slogan transformation, and transformation was about changing Nigeria for the better, so under transformation the government had a lot of achievement…

Another respondent also explained how the campaign used the web as a marketing tool:

We were basically using the social media to transmit the achievement of the government via transformation. His achievement on agriculture, his achievement on power and energy in education, in infrastructure in building schools, roads.

In explaining how the campaign was conducted. A member of the presidential campaign council described the content of the messages.

> Our campaign focused on selling his achievements online. we started with things that would sound attractive to the youths, they were actually targeted at the youths and we started posting videos of different youths talking about him , a lot of youth activist and influencers , youth leaders were featured on videos and we felt if the youth could see these people talking about the positive things the president had done, it will sell his candidacy ….

The conceptualisation and operationalisation of marketing in political campaign may imply application of different facets. To understand the relationship between marketing and the use of the web in a political campaign entails being open to the contextual occurrence of the campaign. As we saw above, the PDP's presidential campaign team primed their candidate on two major elements: Infrastructure development and transformation. Regarding the former theme, as discussed above, the campaign team ran adverts to showcase the infrastructure development that were undertaken by the PDP government during the period of their candidate's tenure with the hope that it would entice the electorate to validate the claim in changing (i.e., transforming) the socio-economic status of the country. One member of the presidential campaign council was clear that:

> We sought to maintain an issued based campaign, so we focused on the transformation agenda of the candidate.

The campaign focused on the message that the government had built many schools in the northern part of Nigeria, and these were heavily featured in online advertisements. The campaign team portrayed their candidate as a man that came from a modest background in order to resonate with the less well-off. In marketing, the most important thing is the market, before the product the place where there is an interaction, where we could sell the candidate and it was in the social media especially Facebook, he was already popular because he had declared his intention on that platform in 2011, so we sold his achievement on the platform a lot…

This was revealed in the following statements from campaign staffers:

> Being someone does not from the typical elite class, you know he had a poor background went to school without shoes and all and rose to political stardom, and had done so well for the Nigerian economy, we tried to sell these qualities…

However, the study revealed several activists felt that that the people were tired of and discontented with the government in power, they pointed to in the insecurity in the

North (Boko Haram), unemployment, and poor economy and the ever increasing gap between the rich and poor. There was some divergence on whether the PDP produced content targeted at different demographics, with one party elite respondent stating that:

> We tried to reach out to the different crowds, so we produced different contents for the different platforms.

However, this was contradicted by a senior campaign staffer, who recalled:

> was no differentiation and targeting of messages to voters. Most Nigeria's want the same things infrastructural development, jobs and so forth. So we disseminated the same message of transformation.

The fact that senior members of the presidential campaign council could differ on such an important aspect of the campaign marketing strategy reveals a lack of coordination within the campaign organisation, a theme that we will revisit in the final section of the empirical analysis. A widespread, agreement among activists suggested PDP's use of the social media platform was not as effective as that of the opposition, that they lacked momentum, and that their message resonated less well with a dissatisfied public than that of the APC. This is illustrated in the following quotes from interviews with PDP activists:

> The PDP used the web but the momentum was not good enough to match the wave, the tsunami of the opposition, the APC messages was amplified by the dissatisfaction of Nigerians on the web and there was one reason why Jonathan did not look popular after 2013 . It's because most Nigerians on the web did not think that Jonathan was doing well and that was why I said that failure of PDP in 2015 was because the PDP was not able to match the wavelength of the message of the opposition online…

> I must give credit to the opposition party, at the time; they used the tools fantastically well. Because there was so much dissatisfaction, a lot of things were slow they were not happening at the speed that people they though it would happen…

> We couldn't all be speaking in the same voice, but let there be a semblance because the APC was speaking in the same voice, the APC had a situation room, they had co-ordinating centres and they were all on WhatsApp together they had different platforms where their leaders were there so, ours we could not even convince the leaders to join these groups…

> we tried to control the narrative that is what ensure victory, unfortunately the APC was louder for example the gaffe by the presidential candidate's wife [the comments about attacking APC supporters described in the context section of

this chapter] …… the footage found its way to YouTube and it was played over and over

The web was used to highlight the achievements of the government. It was not used strategically to mobilise support for the candidate, rather it was used to address issues and react to allegations…

One area where the PDP made no discernible use of the web's affordances as a campaign tool was in the mobilisation of financial support. Several of our elite respondents definitively stated that they did not seek to fundraise online:

We had raised a whole lot of funds from a funding raising dinner we organised and even beyond that we had friends of the candidates, and the various governors contributing to the campaigns.

No, we did not. The PDP was in government, the ordinary citizen won't want to donate to a sitting government. The opposition used it through the Buhari support group they marketed rechargeable cards and it worked.

We raised enough money from donations, we did not need to ask people to donate.

Overall, then this section can be viewed as pointing to a rather partial and underdeveloped use of the web by the PDP campaign. However, the indications from our interviewees are that one of the web's most valuable affordances (fundraising) was not taken up by the PDP campaign. This anomaly, and many others revealed in this section, point to the power of the hybridisation perspective. Because of the unusual extent of incumbency power in Nigerian politics, and the long reign of the PDP, it would appear that there was a far greater reliance on paid features of web campaigning – notably with regard to advertising and the payment of volunteers and celebrities. One activist respondent summed up the situation in this regard when talking about the offline campaign as follows:

Even though we have a lot of volunteers, you had to go to the wards and because we had been in power for so long even our supporters were asking for monies to go door to door….

The tone of many of the discussions was that the PDP's dominance had caused it to under-develop its web campaign, relative to the APC. Furthermore, the evidence deduced from the case study of PDP demonstrated that the web was also seen as a tool that offered the campaign team an opportunity for interaction and engagement with the

electorates. For example, the campaign team uploaded videos of the candidate's appearances in different rallies in real time. In the same vein, the media team created chains of conversations using the internet. Party officials and the campaign council members could communicate and interact with citizens, even when it was not on their official pages, they used their personal pages to interact with voters.

7.6 Factors that led to the use of online campaigning

The data revealed that the level of internet penetration and the demography of users was one of the reasons the web was considered a necessary tool. The campaign also considered the intrinsic value of the web which allowed for the speedy dissemination of information as a significant factor in its use. A group of respondents commented that the Internet penetration was a technologically progressive development that is taking place in Nigeria and as the country embraces its affordance, its use will grow and become sophisticated in nature. These activists stated that:

> There is an ongoing penetration of the Internet and mobile phones in Nigeria, we have more GSM service providers with a huge number of people having a mobile phone. According to the statics from the Nigeria Communication commission the (NCC) 93.5, we have about 93.5 million internet users in a population of 150-160 million people.

> People do not read the newspaper as such. The sales of newspapers on the streets on newsstand, has been on the plummet everyone is going online, going to the web. Most people own a mobile phone, with data being relatively cheap they go on their social media pages and the information is there, just go on Twitter and the information is trending.

A member of the presidential campaign council also stated that:

> Nowadays almost everyone has a smart phone, almost everyone is on social media so it was very useful in the sense that just one information posted on a social media platform within minutes it is already in their faces of people compared to the traditional media which the information only gets to the middle- and upper-class persons who can afford to buy the newspaper or watch their television.

Other campaign council members also commented on the affordances of the web.

> When it is broadcasted on the television, one person hears it, and it is by word of mouth, you want to transmit by mouth, so you don't transmit effectively but in social media you are able to transmit because on social media it is either written or visual you see that . So, you transmit your information in the original version.

The campaign alluded to interaction, with a member of the presidential council commenting:

> you know apart from grassroots campaigning, going from place to place, even then we speak to crowds generally you don't get to speak to people one on one but with the social media, you do, we got feedback immediately on specific issues therefore we factored that in our campaigns.

Other members of the presidential campaign council attributed the use of the web to the nature and characteristic of its features. One of these benefits is the speed at which information can be disseminated and the associated easiness in communicating huge amounts of information to a wider audience within the shortest period. This was further seen as a transformative nature of the web in the political campaign sphere.

> The social media is the easiest way to communicate messages and that is why during the presidential campaign we had a whole section of people that were responsible for that.

Another also stated that:

> It was crucial for us to find a way to disseminate information immediately and also to be able to put videos online on YouTube and to be able to send information on twitter for it to trend on social media.

Additionally, members of the presidential council appeared to understand the demography of users they were targeting in their use of the internet. As a member of the presidential campaign council stated:

> not too many people engage on social media, we have an exposed educated e-crowd on social media, so we had to do rally's to reach out to the people in the rural area some of the elderly ones who don't know and have no idea about the internet, and social media.

> we have at least 60% of Nigerians using the internet. Now this for every market, political marketer, or campaigner, or political strategist, is a huge number, because it is an instrument or two which you can use to easily reach out to significant number of people.

> Nigeria on the web, is more or less the Nigeria of tomorrow, because that's where you have most people who are literate, almost every one online are literate, literate on different levels and some have broken the barrier of being ethnic and tribal and all of that… so that is the target of people we aimed at using the web.

Specifically, the campaign team regarded the internet as a fertile area in targeting the youths. The youth are more associated with internet use through their smart phones

and computers in comparison to the adults. therefore, the targeting of the youth was advertently pursued by the campaign. This was demonstrated by several statements below.

Two members of the presidential campaign council made the following remarks:

> If you want to reach out to people especially the young people you have to use the social media because it has a wider and better coverage than any other medium. The traditional media what is called the press has a limited number of people who read and the young one don't even read them at all so the circulation is very low and you can get to many people by just using the web.

> you know young people are always on their foot and usually far away from their televisions, so it became a very major tool and that's why you see a lot of Nigerian stream online on social media because they understand the web.

A member of the presidential campaign council recognised that even the traditional media and the television stations also have a presence online. The campaign team appeared to understand the ecosystem of the media and how different forms of the media organisation have evolved with the passage of time.

The comment below demonstrates this:

> This day newspaper has a website right now, Sahara reporters has a television now, channels news, every program, whatever the program as soon it finishes minutes later, it is online, Africa independent television (AIT) is doing the same thing, National television authority (NTA) is doing the same thing it just tells you how powerful and the web platforms have become .

7.7 Effects of the web on the campaign structure

The study found for that there was a decentralisation of the presidential campaign of the PDP, with relatively little adaptation of the formal campaign. Several directors remarked that there was a duly constituted social media team which was functional. However, details of how it was organised, and run was elusive. A Director stated that a consultant was employed to facilitate the operation of social media platform.

> I was the director of …… the social media was directly under my directorate, we employed these consultants specifically for the purpose of social media and though they were employed by my directorate they were independent and had authority to carry out their assignment in the best way they could.

It follows that there was a decentralisation of the digital campaign with relatively little adaptation of the formal campaign. Members of the campaign team commented on the nature of the campaign council:

> We were essentially representing the PDP, and we collaborated with them all the way, but we were independent.

> We did not integrate the online activities with the other departments, so they were parallel. Even though other departments had some form of social media presence, we had a social media department under the directorate of media and publicity whose sole function was the use of the social media platform in pursuance of campaign goals.

Several members also highlighted the possibilities that the internet offered to supporters and volunteers in independently contributing to the campaign through their overall structures. As one member stated:

> We had been in power for 16years we had a large following, volunteers who were passionate about the presidential candidate and had been supporting him ever since then, so naturally they kept at it. We also have our political structure, so we used it independently of the party structure to disseminate the campaign messages.

> You know the web is virtual, that is what makes it different, you do not need to have an office to use it. The social media team could choose to work with the party or not.

> It affected the party structure by enhancing it, we helped the party organs especially in the zone and the state levels in performing their function of campaigning for the president.

These recollections of an activist give an indicator of the nature of volunteer structure.

> For instance, I was south west coordinator of one of the biggest PDP social media group for president Good luck Jonathan, we had over 300 000 thousand Facebook group members under my zone which was the South West. We had Lagos, Osun, Ekiti, Ogun, Ondo, and Oyo. Our Facebook group were our meeting points.

> We were having regular constant meetings on Facebook and whatever decision were made in the national we transmuted on Facebook and seek to actualised on ground at the grassroots level everywhere both Lagos, Osun, Ekiti there were executive members executive in each of these states….

Another member of the presidential campaign council also made a comment on the nature of volunteerism was:

> We had some physical meetings but there were not as regular as meetings on Facebook, on the internet we get directives from the party and there were zonal coordinators and state coordinators whatever they get from the national we transmit it up to physical grassroots not just social media.

Several directors also spoke of self-organised groups that promoted activities and training detached from the party but established for the of the purposes of assisting with the campaign. For example, Transformation Ambassadors of Nigeria (TAN) trained about 10000 volunteers paid for by a supporter of the presidential campaign which had a Facebook page but also conducted rallies across the country in support of the party's Presidential candidate, President Good luck Jonathan.

> You know, we were loved as a party, we had people who campaigned on behalf of our candidate. The social media gives people the ability to communicate with a network of friends, so naturally if you interested in politics and willing to speak and post about it, and you choose to speak about our candidate you are in a way contributing to the campaign. So, we had lots of these ……

In addressing what influence these self-organised groups had on the campaign, several directors stated that they did not have any influence on decision making.

> You know the presidential campaign council is ad-hoc, so the web could not have affected the party structure. Our job was just for a time being after the election, the campaign team was dissolved.

7.8 Chapter Summary

This chapter has explored the conceptualisation and operationalisation of the use of the web by the PDP during the 2015 Nigerian Presidential election from the perspective of the elites, which comprised of directors of the presidential campaign council and political consultants and activists. The study found that the PDP regarded the web as a necessity in signalling campaign's modernity and credibility. The analysis suggests that the candidate of the PDP, employed a series of social media platforms (Twitter, Facebook, Blogs) in a multifaceted manner in supplementing the orthodox patterns of information dissemination, mobilisation of support, marketing of the candidate that already existed within the context of Nigeria. While the sentiments alluded to the necessity of using the internet, there was also a widespread sense that digital campaigning was deprioritised during the PDP's campaign. The data revealed various interrelated factors as contributing to the use of the internet in campaigning.

The level of internet penetration and the demography of user was some of the reasons the web was considered a necessary tool. The campaign also considered the intrinsic value of the web which allowed for the speedy dissemination of information, which was regarded as a significant factor in its use. The study also found that the PDP provided a decentralised form of campaign organisation, allowing and encouraging voters to participate and self-organise on behalf of the party.

Chapter Eight: Discussion of the findings

8.1. Introduction

This chapter brings together the empirical data (chapters six and seven), the reviewed literature (chapters two and five), and the Nigerian context (chapter three) to provide a full picture of the effect of the internet on the campaign practices of the APC and PDP in the 2015 Nigerian Presidential election. To address this overarching research question, I return to the three sub-questions identified in chapter 1. I begin the discussion by focusing on the adoption and adaptation of the internet by the two campaign teams. I then assess how the campaign teams perceived the role of digital campaigning, where it sat alongside other campaign tools, and what campaign functions internet campaigning fulfilled. As the discussion will reveal, online campaigning played a substantial role in the 2015 Nigerian presidential election, although the campaigns' use of the internet fell short of exploiting its full range of potentialities. I present commonalities in adoption and adaption patterns across the PDP and APC, before outlining how they diverged.

This leads to the next question: to what extent did the internet campaigns practices of the presidential candidates of the PDP and APC vary, and what factors help to explain this? Here, I examine a series of party-level factors, including party age, level of resources, and incumbency – but note that their relevance to addressing this research question can only be understood by their operation within the broader Nigerian national electoral context. The chapter then moves on to the final sub-question, focusing on the effects of internet campaigning on the intra-campaign organisational dynamics of the PDP and APC. Here again, I note similarities that were observed across both parties, before discussing notable differences.

Throughout the discussion, I explore the data through the lenses of the three theoretical frameworks outlined in chapter 4 – namely Americanisation, Modernisation or Hybridisation. I show that all three lenses shed insight on the overarching research question but note that a hybridisation approach is particularly vital to understanding

many of the findings across all three sub questions. This sets up the final thesis chapter – which will present the major conclusions of the thesis regarding the overarching research question and discuss ways forward for this research agenda.

8.2 How was internet campaigning adopted and adapted by the campaign teams?

The findings from the study reveal that both the APC and the PDP embraced changes in their communication repertories, as both parties adopted and adapted to the internet during the 2015 presidential campaign. There were several similarities between how the APC and PDP in this regard. Both parties recognised the necessity of online campaigning, especially the use of web 2.0 tools. In particular, the campaign teams of both parties were focused on the campaigns' social media presence and demonstrated a similar understanding of the necessity of having a digital campaign infrastructure as part of modern Nigerian electioneering. For both parties, their use of the web was strongly related to changes in the media landscape brought about by technological development and a response global trends in electoral campaign practices. Thus, the use of the web during the electoral campaign was a decision that required little reflection, but grew out of an organic process, that corresponded to trends in global campaign practices.

Nevertheless, while the necessity of having some form of digital campaign infrastructure was largely accepted, its subsidiary role in relation to other types of media based on the specific circumstances of Nigeria in 2015 was also espoused. Both parties, while acknowledging the importance of online campaigning, emphasised that traditional forms of campaign were important and still relevant. The internet did not supersede traditional forms of campaigning and these traditional campaign practices were pursued during the 2015 presidential campaign. The PDP and APC carried out large-scale rallies, with local campaigns carrying out door-to-door visits, mounting billboards and posters, delivering public speeches, and attending meetings to communicate with the electorate throughout the country. Both parties emphasised that the web was used in highlighting these traditional forms of campaigning and coordinating their volunteer support network.

One source of significant divergence was the two campaigns' perception of the importance of the web as a tool for vote maximization. The PDP's campaign team where less optimistic about the web's merits and did not think the web would have a significant impact on victory. Thus, there was a widespread sense that internet campaigning was deprioritised during the PDP's campaign. This finding is in contrast with the analysis of the APC's campaign, which revealed that the use of the web was consistently cited by party officials involved in the campaign and campaign staffers as having been vital to the success of the APC at the ballot box.

The analysis revealed that the PDP considered being online necessary in signalling the campaign's modernity and credibility. For both campaign teams, the use of the internet was a given and was necessary as part of repertories of electoral campaigning. The PDP emphasised that it had been in power for over 16 years and had used the internet as a campaign tool in previous elections, so they continued with the practice. As for the APC, since it was a newly formed party prior to the election, the internet was naturally incorporated in their campaign strategy.

The analysis revealed that the web was used to perform certain campaign functions. These functionalities include information dissemination, mobilisation, marketing, and interacting with voters, which are consistent with the literature on the role of the internet in political campaigns (Bimber & Davis, 2003; Foot & Schneider, 2006; Lilleker & Vedel, 2013). However, with only the APC's campaign organisation took advantage of the internet's affordances for financial resource generation. While these elements identified are trends in American campaign practices, supporting new research indicates that the internet is used in carrying out these functions as a feature of modern campaigning, with the use of social media being a common tool in contemporary campaigns. Nevertheless, the nature and manner in which these campaign functions were utilised revealed a hybrid style, combining the use of the internet and the historical manner in which campaigns have been conducted in Nigeria (Esser & Strömbäck, 2013). This brings to the fore the significance of culture and context in campaign practices in examining the process of innovation diffusion (Karlsen, 2009; Nord, 2006; Plasser & Plasser, 2002).

In terms of the functional uses made of online campaigning, there were certain similarities across both parties' campaign teams, though the extent and depth of use for certain functions varied. The study found that both APC's and PDP's campaign teams used the web for information dissemination and demonstrated that the web offered a means of disseminating information. Information dissemination was achieved in various ways, with both parties using their websites and various social media platforms to provide information to users. Examples of this function are widespread and range from the official campaign pages to pages created by citizens in support of the campaign. The study also revealed that both campaign teams interacted with bloggers who had many followers and generated huge traffic. The APC sought to prompt blogs to cover certain topics and aspects of their campaign, which in turn got the attention of the traditional media. This is consistent with what Chadwick (2011) refers to as a political information cycle where there is an interaction between political actors, journalists, and citizens in the evolving convergence of political events. Both campaigns understood the interdependence of the media and how campaigners had to use the media tools at their disposal. While both parties utilised the available repertories of campaign tools in disseminating information, the emphasis by the APC in using the web to disseminate information was mainly due to the lesser exposure the campaign had in mainstream media. The PDP campaign, on the other hand, considered the use of the web as supplemental to traditional media exposure. Nonetheless, the web was used to provide and distribute information about the presidential candidates, policies, and the itinerary of the campaign specifying dates and places where rallies and other campaign activities would take place.

Beyond providing information about the campaigns, the study also found that negativity and incivility were very much a feature of the online campaigns of both parties. The web was used in smearing the image of both presidential candidates. Negativity persisted in the use of the social networking sites, and attacks were published on various pages and platforms. This was hardly surprising, as election campaigns in Nigeria have rarely been issue based. These negative connotations made the rounds might be viewed as an instance of Americanisation - however it is arguable whether such practices can be understood as a vector of American influence or the continuation of a highly aggressive Nigerian political tradition.

Both campaign teams realised using social media involved losing control of campaign messages, but this did not appear to generate too much concern. Both campaign teams recognised that the significance of using various social media platforms was the opportunity for users to contribute to the campaign. The APC team was convinced that the number of party supporters on-line would be able to counteract any ambiguity in their campaign messages. This is inconsistent with the literature which argues that campaign favoured media interaction above conversation because the candidates fear loss of control of messages and the ambiguity over communication (Lilleker et al, 2011; Stromer-Galley, 2000). It appeared there was no closely controlled internet campaign by both parties. There was little effort by both parties, except for the training offered by the APC campaign team to target messages to electorates. As for the PDP, although training was offered to volunteers, it was not by the campaign itself but a party donor. This suggests that the use of the web was regarded as less significant by the campaign team in comparison to the party's traditional campaign practices. The PDP focused more on the traditional mass media, which provides for the top-down approach in communication as opposed to conversation which is facilitated by these social networking sites. The PDP appeared to be more concerned with controlling the narrative and the campaign messages, with its focus on the mass media, which is largely a top- down approach.

Nevertheless, as the study revealed, the PDP campaign also engaged the services of activists with huge following in disseminating information on the web as it concerned the campaign. Various forms of input from volunteers are common in recent elections, facilitated using social networking sites. American electoral campaigns have revealed that citizens actively contribute to campaigns, starting from Howard's 2004 campaign (Kerbel & Bloom, 2005). The Obama campaign revealed that the number and form of citizens participating in the campaign through social media was unprecedented. This co-creation of campaign content is supported by the literature that the 2008 Obama campaign offered an unprecedented form of campaign co-creation in a political campaign (Lilleker & Jackson, 2010; Stromer-Galley, 2010). Nevertheless, American campaigns have sought to closely monitor and control their online messaging. Obama's 2008 and 2012 presidential campaigns are examples of an effective online campaign, especially the development of my Boo, a specialised tool that served as a

hub for the campaigns. This form of co-creation though initiated from American electoral campaigns is not limited to America, and there has been a growing trend of co-creation in other countries. Citizen-initiated campaigns were evident in the UK, though have not been as successful as that of the Obama campaign (Gibson, 2015). This study revealed that during the 2015 Nigeria presidential election, there were online campaigns initiated by citizens, but unlike the Obama campaign and its specialised website My Boo, there was no such website created by either of the parties.

The findings of the study reveal that, by and large, volunteers were willing to support their party online without pecuniary benefits, though a few others stated that these volunteers were paid. It is not surprising that divergent and conflicting discourse were inferred from respondents on the nature of the mobilisation practices of the PDP. As chapter 3 demonstrates, Nigerian political and electoral history shows that there has always been an emphasis on winning supporters through the provision of material benefits. This goes alongside vote buying which is an open secret. Nevertheless, regarding voter-digital engagement, this was quite variable across parties – and the relatively greater emphasis placed on this aspect by the APC appears to have been driven by necessity, rather than consciously designed (a point to which I will return in the next section).

Another important common finding regarding the functionality of the web, was its use in supporting the mobilisation of activists and voters. The campaign teams of the APC and PDP both used different social media platforms in mobilising support from a wide range of voters. While both parties indicated the use of the web in mobilising support, the emphasis on mobilisation through the traditional forms such as rallies was regarded as highly important. The popular adage 'all politics is local,' is very apt in Nigeria, and powerful politicians, and strong financier (godfathers) play substantial roles in determining the viability of candidates. The reliance on these personalities and on their power, influence and resources is a constant during campaigns. There was no significant difference between both parties in the use of the web in mobilising support. Both parties' mobilisation campaign strategies were geared towards piggybacking on the social media presences of supporters with large followings. Both campaigns

recognised that they were dealing with opinion leaders, moulders, and influential persons on the various social media platforms.

The campaigns' use of social media allows for the drawing in of energised super-supporters, who are mobilised for the purposes of sharing information with their friends and co-workers to promote the candidate's agenda (Stromer-Galley, 2014; Kreiss & Welch, 2015). The is reminiscent of the two-step flow (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955) in the time of the mass media (Stromer-Galley, 2014). The focus of both campaigns was mostly on social media platforms, especially Facebook and Twitter, and the opportunities the provided for a network of supporters to share content and retweet messages. Both campaign teams developed content to target their followers and friends on these social media platforms. Both parties agreed that Facebook and Twitter were the most popular platforms used during the campaign. This is consistent with the literature that various platforms offer various opportunities that influence its use (Bosetta, 2018). Nigeria being a heterogeneous country provides the impetus for campaigners to experiment with various tools in appealing to voters. While they targeted mass audiences, at the same time both parties disseminated information specifically targeting opinion formers - people who are very influential and had large followers. However, both parties also noted that the internet was subordinate to the traditional media in terms of efficacy.

As elaborated in chapter 3, historically, targeted forms of messages appealing to ethno-regional sentiments have been deployed in Nigeria during electoral campaigning. The networking effect of the web further enhanced this practice of targeting campaign messages. The study revealed that while campaign messages were broad based appeals, they were also targeted to people based on ethno-regional sentiments mostly through networks of friends and associations. This bears the mark of the political culture of campaign practices in Nigeria, consistent with the theory of hybridisation, where the use of the internet was adopted in a manner that was appropriate to Nigeria (Plasser & Plasser, 2002).

The difference between both parties perhaps was the extent to which they recruited and paid activists in supporting their mobilisation strategy. Beyond the campaign team developing message content for campaigns, the PDP targeted voters based on social

media sponsored advertisement from technology companies such as Facebook, Twitter and Google. Kreiss (2016) notes that American electoral campaigns collaborate with gigantic media companies' firms such as Facebook, Twitter, and Google that allows for sponsored advertisements in furthering their campaigns. The disparity between the parties was in the volume of sponsored advertisement, as the APC could not afford to pay as much as the ruling PDP for adverts on these portals. This form of microtargeting has been particularly demonstrated during American campaigns, in a manner referred to by Owen (2018) as hyper-personalised. American campaigns have revealed levels of micro targeting that have been unprecedented, and mostly successful. The various forms of micro targeting in American politics are facilitated by data availability and regulation, which allow campaign teams to use data from various sources in targeting voters. This is limited in some European countries, as data regulation does not allow use of personal data, thereby restricting targeted messages. American campaigns are enabled by data infrastructure of political parties and the possibility of purchasing data to target voters. In the study, a consultant of the APC did admit to having a database of a subset of volunteers which they targeted regularly with messages to maintain message consistency. However, this can scarcely be described as Americanised, as even the more financially viable party the PDP, did not admit to having a digital infrastructure that enabled targeting other than the freely available social networking sites and the sponsored adverts on Facebook, Google, and Twitter. This demonstrates the orientation of the party towards the effective use of the internet, as money did not appear to be a factor that restricted the PDP from developing a more sophisticated digital infrastructure.

The networking effect of social media enabled more targeted messages and personalisation of candidates. Thus, the hyper-personalised campaign (Owen, 2018) a feature of Americanisation was not very visible in the campaign of the APC and the PDP due to the unavailable resources required to effectively utilise 'big data' and the campaigns orientation towards its benefit. There was little evidence of research conducted by both campaign teams into voters needs and preferences, except for the polls campaign teams conducted. Both campaigns conducted several polls before and during the campaign to find out the needs of the electorate. While the study found instances of polling online, there was nothing like the same level of emphasis and

resources as the American case during campaigns have demonstrated. The internet enabled this practice, as polls were also conducted online. The result was in part used to develop campaign messages and create content that targeted voters' needs. APC had conducted polls and held focus groups, which identified the priorities of the electorates, and these were identifies as: tackling corruption, the economy and security. These were used to develop messages and the campaign built on the prevailing mood of the citizens prior to the election in creating their campaign messages. The APC was able to capitalise on these emotions and created campaign messages that resonated with the general populace. For example, the electoral slogan of 'change' was quite apt, as it portrayed the need for things to change and profiled the nature of the campaign environment prior to the election. The PDP also conducted polls to gauge the mood of the people towards its governance. While the study found instances of PDP conducting polls online, there was little indication that this was used in developing campaign policies for the PDP. Nevertheless, the use of the slogan 'transformation' by the PDP was a reminder of the infrastructural development that had been made and the promise of the continuation of the 'good work'. The analysis thus demonstrates an increased but partial realisation of a modern model of campaigning by both parties.

As with every electoral campaign, parties seek to portray their candidate and policies in a manner that would attract the support and votes of the electorate. Thus, both campaigns focused on marketing the personalities of their candidates. Both parties used the web and its networking affordances in focusing on the personalities of the candidate. The APC focused on the support of an array of volunteers, in their bid to spread the candidate's message. In using social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter, the campaign of the APC placed its focus on the image and personality of Buhari, its presidential candidate. The campaign team realised that the electorate desired a stand on corruption and so they portrayed their candidate as a man of integrity and one who would take a stand against the perceived corruption of the government of the day. The APC built on the image of anti-corruption of their presidential candidate. The campaign assumed that the candidate's credential of being honest was an important selling trait and deployed content and messages that showed the candidate's zero tolerance for corruption. As noted in the literature, this personalisation of politics ensures that the personal qualities of politicians play an ever more important role in

campaigns as the use of various social media platforms has further led to the personalisation of candidate, even in party centred democracies (Enli & Skogerbø, 2013). The APC campaign team also had to reshape the image of their candidate, to appeal beyond his stronghold, which was the Northern part of Nigeria. This image management is particularly important in Nigeria, with its polarised political history, tainted with ethnic and religious cleavage. The campaign team adorned him in the attires of different tribes in Nigeria to portray him as all embracing. This emphasis on ethno-tribal sentiments were shaped by cultural norms and values acceptable to the people,

The PDP also used the web in marketing their candidate by espousing his achievements during his tenure. The PDP's presidential campaign team primed their candidate on two major elements: infrastructure development and 'transformation'. Being the incumbent government, the PDP's campaign promoted the achievements of the Jonathan government and the ongoing projects of the administration.

The emphasis on the personality of the candidates by both parties demonstrates the increasing focus on leaders, an element of modernised model of campaigning, as well as an element of Americanisation, starting from the days of the television to the present day of the internet. The need to appeal to or supersede tribal sentiments and the conscious effort by the APC campaign in seeking to appeal to a broader electorate by specifically developing images of their candidate that appealed to voters from the major tribes of Nigeria speaks to the political culture of campaigning.

The most significant difference between both parties was their orientation towards online fundraising. While this is one of the most heralded components of America's internet campaign, the study found that the APC made a conscious effort in seeking to crowd fund, specifically using phone scratch cards with in-built donations for fundraising and it raised a significant amount of money before a court order put a stop to their fundraising scheme. This was in contrast with the PDP campaign, in which the study also found a lack of emphasis by the PDP on online fundraising and a reliance instead on traditional means of raising funds. Fundraising on the web appeared to be the least important function of the PDP web campaigns. It was reported that the PDP had organised a fundraising dinner for its presidential candidate, in which it raised

more than 22 billion Naira (Ukase, 2015). This illustrates PDP's accrued financial strength, mainly due to its position as the incumbent government. Furthermore, the PDP raised funds from the electorate through the traditional routes of fund raising in Nigeria, by focusing on donations from specific people, consistent with the political culture of Nigeria. This supports a hybridisation approach, which emphasises that campaign practices are shaped by various contextual factors (Plasser & Plasser, 2009).

Overall, the use of social media thus demonstrates a move in the direction of Americanisation and modernisation. However, the extent of the uptake falls short of an American model of campaign and a modern model of campaign, as the use of the internet was based on a combination of the traditional forms of campaign with specific forms of internet campaigns. The analysis reveals that the nature of the use of the web was based on the specific circumstances of Nigeria in 2015, in line with the hybridisation lens. The specific realisation of the role of the web was constructed in a manner that aligned with the traditional forms of campaigns which was deemed effective in Nigeria. For instance, the use of innovations like phone scratch cards with in-built donations for fundraising by the APC campaign team, and the lack of use of fundraising opportunities by the PDP shows that such innovations were driven by specific party factor in a particular context. The study reveals that there was little innovative online strategy by both parties, with both parties using the web, particularly social media, in conducting pre-existing campaign practices. Nonetheless, the nature and form of the use of the web cannot simply be attributed to an imitation of an Americanised campaign practices.

The analysis revealed that the internet was considered a part of the repertoire of campaign tools that exists and thus had to be used. This points to similar campaign trends nationally. In line with the theory of modernisation. Both parties had similar opinions on how the web was used, except in using the web for fundraising. This finding accords with the theory of modernisation with its functional advantages to digital solutions to information-dissemination, interaction, marketing, and support mobilisation activities adopted by both campaigns. The study revealed that the nature

of the use of the internet, grew out of the pressures of modernisation and the differing levels of the intensity of use was developed in a manner suitable for Nigeria.

The literature reveals that American campaign has responded and successfully utilised the most in changes in media and marketing techniques during electoral campaigns (Plasser & Plasser, 2000). This advanced form of marketing and the use of the media was not demonstrated by both parties, as the study found a minimal form of market-oriented and professionalized campaign. Micro targeting of messages to different people was limited. The use of the web in supporting the mobilisation activities of the campaign was limited to targeting messages mostly to opinion influencers with various social networking sites providing a means to micro-target a subset of electorates.

There was little evidence of research on voters, data gathering, or a more general market-oriented approach to campaigning which was facilitated by consultants, all elements of modernisation and a feature of American campaigns. Certain elections, for instance Obama's campaign, have revealed that the way political parties and their candidates are willing to utilise these technical developments in media technologies and advancement in marketing techniques determines the significance of hiring certain experts. Thus, with American campaigns utilising these technological advancements there is a corresponding employment and involvement of political consultants playing significant role in American campaign practices.

While there was an element of professionalization in the 2015 Nigerian campaigns, such as the employment of consultants, it was not at the same level as in the American case. The services and specialisation of the consultant appeared to be limited, compared to the types of consultants that recent American election have demonstrated. For example, the idea of the photo ops came from a media firm. The consultants employed by the campaign team appeared to value the effectiveness of deploying pictures of their candidate in the attires of the three major tribes of Nigeria. There was no systematic computational analysis of large sets of personal data by the specialists who possess skills in data gathering and analytics, a feature of American campaign (Kreiss, 2016), neither was there any mention of American consultants employed during the elections. Similarly, various forms of micro targeting in American political

campaigns are facilitated by data availability and regulation, which allow campaign teams to use data from various sources in targeting voters.

The analysis reveals that while changes and adoption of the web by both campaigns, was based on the perception of its relevance, revealed by the decisions of parties' elites and those in charge of the campaign, these decisions hardly point to an imitation of American campaign practices. The existing political culture and organisational culture of both parties varied between across parties and affected the dynamics to which the internet affected the campaign output, in line with the theory of hybridisation, where selected practices of the internet was merger with parties' historical campaign practices (Esser & Strömbäck, 2013).

8.3 To the extent that the internet campaigns of the PDP and APC varied, what factors help to explain this?

While the necessity of online campaigning was largely accepted by both parties, the analysis revealed differences, determined by certain contextual factors, that influenced both parties' use of the internet. The study found there was disagreement about its primacy and relationship with other types of media based on the specific circumstances of Nigeria in 2015, a finding that is in line with the hybridisation lens. Following an analysis of the empirical data, the study found several factors influenced the variations in the use of the internet for campaigning between the APC and PDP.

Financial factors were by far the strongest and most consistent explanation provided by the APC as their reason for using the internet as a campaign tool. The APC found the use of the social media useful as an alternative method mainly because it was cheaper in comparison to the traditional media. This is consistent with findings in the literature that the ubiquity of web 2. 0 makes it affordable and relatively cheap to use in comparison to the traditional media and the creation of bespoke websites (Jacobs & Spiering, 2014). The APC employed these free platforms to create more visibility for their candidate and their campaign, as the use of the various social media platforms are comparably cheaper than engaging with the traditional mass media. Thus, APC had a good rationale to go on-line. As chapter 6 revealed, the APC placed more emphasis on the use of social media because it was relatively cheaper, and it did not require a large or more equipped organisational infrastructure to utilise it. The APC as

a political party were financially constrained in comparison to the established PDP. The analysis suggests that between both parties, the APC had a lesser budget, and this could be attributed in part to its position as a challenger. The disparity in financial resource between an incumbent government and a challenger is considerable in Nigeria. This is mostly because of the centralised power accrued to a sitting president, enabled by the lack of effective campaign regulations especially as it concerns funding of political parties. For instance, the power of incumbency was also demonstrated when the court ordered the discontinuance of crowd sourcing of funds by the APC using the mobile phones. Though a judgement of the Court rescinded the order and APC was awarded monetary compensations after the elections. This discontinuance also limited the APC campaign's chances of narrowing the financial resource gap between the PDP and the APC. Nevertheless, the APC was more visible online, with the campaign providing more interaction between the electorate, the campaign team members, and volunteers. It has been observed that smaller parties are most likely to adopt a more interactive paradigm of campaigning (Chen, 2010). This was possible in the APC campaign because of the numbers of volunteers the campaign appeared had many volunteers who were willing to contribute to the campaign without pecuniary benefits.

The study also revealed that the financial strength of the PDP's campaign team had a strong bearing on the choices the campaign team made in developing their online campaign. The study demonstrated that the PDP's choice on spending funds was concentrated more on the traditional media, but that their approach to web campaigning also had a substantial paid element; including sponsored advertisements and payments to volunteers in developing content on their social media pages.

The study found that the structure of the Nigerian media system also influenced the use of the internet. As chapter 3 reveals, Nigeria operates a media system that allows for private and public channels. This affords campaigns the opportunities to utilise the media of their choice for a fee. The APC campaign was even more at a disadvantage because the PDP could afford to pay for more advertisement slots and media coverage in privately owned media stations. The analysis revealed that the APC campaign emphasised they could not afford as much as the PDP, in paid advertisement or

campaign coverage in the traditional mass media. Beyond the financial resources gap between both parties, the APC campaign team felt that the PDP took advantage and benefited from its incumbency, with government-owned stations not providing equal opportunities for campaign coverage on their campaign. During the first and second republic political parties owned media stations, which served as mouth pieces for their campaigns. This was also true in the fourth republic with certain media houses owned by politicians, activists, and businesspersons, who identified with certain political parties provided a more positive campaign coverage to the candidate they were affiliated to. This favourable coverage was also revealed in government owned stations. The APC was at a disadvantaged position in the use of the public media. The analysis revealed that the APC campaign, as a challenger, was not afforded the same opportunities on the public media station as that of the incumbent PDP government.

The government media stations provided more coverage to the PDP in comparison to the APC. The report of the EU Election Observation Mission (EOM) 2015 and Commonwealth Observer Group Report (2015) collaborated the perception of the campaign team of the APC on how unfairly the public media corporation were to the APC. The report revealed how the government-owned Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) and Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN), the two leading media networks with the broadest coverage, both provided extensive coverage to the PDP to the disadvantage of the APC. With the PDP taking control of most of the slots for advertisement during news time, the APC had to utilise the web, in disseminating their campaign message. This finding concurs with Chen's (2010) observation that smaller parties are most likely adopt the use of the internet to compensate for the low attention mass media would award them.

As highlighted in chapter 3, weak regulatory frameworks in Nigeria's public institutions allows for the abuse of power by the incumbent. For example, the board of directors and personnel in charge of public mass media are appointed by the government at the national as well as state level, and the power to hire and fire these personnel are also in their hands of the incumbent presidents. This makes it difficult for appointees to maintain fairness and provide opportunities for the challengers. The history of Nigerian politics also tells a story of a system of reward that accrues to those

that contribute to the success of a campaign. This makes patrons and those in authority of these public institution abuse their official position in support of the government. The nature of its use was also the orientation of the parties towards the viability of its contribution to the success of the campaign. The study found that both parties recognised the increasing access to the internet by the voters in the country as a defining factor in the choice of both parties use of the internet. Both parties embarked on the use of the social media in reaching out to eligible voters, specifically in reaching out to the youth, as that was the demography of the most active population on the internet. Thus, if the youth were the target demography, it is suggestive that it could be a reason why the PDP was confident of victory, as that is the age grade of those who are less interested in voting.

The findings revealed that the use of the web was based mostly on the innate feature of the web, particularly 'the architecture of participation' (O'Reily, 2005), which allowed official campaigners and their supporters to engage with the electoral campaign on their own accord. Looking at these findings, it reveals that campaign practices are dependent on specific party factors based on a particular context. The choice of including the internet as part of the repertories of campaign tools and the degree with which it was utilised by each party was specific to the circumstances of the party. Overall, the extent to which parties differed in the use and approach to the web was shaped by the dynamic of Nigerian politics. This accords with the hybridisation perspective, which provides a framework that emphasises contextual, historical, and cultural factors as affecting the nature of the use of the internet (Karlsen, 2009, p. 220).

Both parties use of the internet were influenced by certain contextual factors. The status of the PDP as an incumbent ensured that the PDP had more exposure and coverage in the public broadcasting networks which is relatively cheaper and provided a wider audience range. This broad coverage on the traditional medium provided team resulted in the PDP's campaign concentrating more on the use of the traditional mass media. In contrast, the unfair coverage on the traditional media had consequences on the APC's campaign team's decision in the use of the internet. As stated, the APC had a lesser budget, was less established as a party and no governmental resources being a

contending party. It was thus a practical decision to add the web, which is largely an unrestricted medium to the traditional forms of campaigns in enabling their campaign.

8.4 How did the web affect the intra-campaign organisational dynamics of the PDP and APC?

The analysis of the findings from the APC and the PDP campaign revealed an extensive decentralisation of the digital campaign with relatively little adaptation to the formal campaign structure.

The formal organisation of both parties was designed so that there was a plural, widespread distribution of power within the party across different levels. The long existence of the PDP and the composition of the presidential campaign council was made up of high-profile politicians such as governors, ministers, senators, businessmen and women. Similarly, the APC also provided a composition of the presidential campaign council that consisted of high-profile politicians such as governors, ministers, senators, businessmen and women, though with lesser numbers compared to the PDP. The APC campaign team did not have as long a list as that of the PDP. Because it was a newly formed party, it could not boast of the number of influential politicians as the PDP. These numbers of national leaders also contribute to the spread of power within the campaign organisation. As indicated in Chapter 3, national leaders are quite important in campaigns as these leaders act as patrons and have secured loyalties through sectional interests that have flourished under the mechanism of patron-client networks (Joseph, 1987). Sectional interest has often been mobilised via pre-existing patron-client relationship through a system of reward for party loyalty (Post & Vicker, 1973). These personalities form the fabric of the party, are part of the parties' campaign structure and are relied on and during electoral campaigns.

The reliance on these campaign structure allows for a decentralised form of campaign as power is distributed among these personalities through levels of organisation structure. Thus, while the campaign organisation appears to be organised in a hierarchical form, there was evidence of both high levels of centrism and parallel lines of authority running along the campaign hierarchy. This structure of campaign organisation is also a result of the distinctive characteristic of the Nigerian national

political landscape. The federal system of Nigeria (as described in the Nigerian context chapter), implies a multi-level party organisational structure for both the APC and the PDP. These levels of party organisation allow for a decentralised and considerable autonomy in election campaigns. The findings revealed that in keeping with the times, both parties established information communication technologies (ICT) departments that was functional. The very nature of the internet allows for decentralisation and the study found that the use of the internet especially the use of various social media platforms allowed for different forms of engagement and self-initiated campaigns leads to a decentralised form of campaign organisation.

The campaigns' decentralisation manifested itself in a variety of forms. The use of social media platforms suggests that supporters and activists were enabled to participate in the campaign on their own terms, which reduced the control of the duly constituted campaign team over the campaign process and challenged the top-down, centralised mode of communication of previous election cycles. The study revealed that both campaign teams were aware of the self-organising provision of web 2.0 and sought to benefit from it by encouraging non-members to self-organise independent of the party. This form of volunteer organising campaign events has been supported by various scholars such as (Stromer-Galley, 2013; Kreiss,2012; Vaccari & Valeriani, 2016) who suggests that the use of the web by campaigns allow different forms of support initiated by citizens in furtherance of the campaign. Given the little or no form of control of the activities of volunteers, it implies that these voluntary actions did not have any effect on campaign organisation.

Nonetheless, while parties used the web, the APC and PDP appeared to follow different methods in their campaign strategy. As indicated in chapter 3, the APC appeared to be more involved in the use of the web and encouraged volunteer to participate more. Thus, while there were self-organised campaigns organised by citizen in furtherance of the campaign, the APC campaign also offered training and support to some of these volunteers. Thus, the campaign sought a hybrid form of campaign, that allowed the campaign, be both nationally coordinated with campaign volunteers and staffers provided with templates in answering questions and inquiries in maintaining message consistency. It was also decentralised at the same time,

allowing volunteers to interact with the electorate on their own terms. This is consistent with the literature that campaigns can be both nationally coordinated and locally organised, which has led to a hybrid form of campaign communication (Kreiss, 2012).

The study found that there was no methodical or deliberate act by the PDP to train volunteers in assisting the campaign. Nevertheless, the study found that certain party members organised volunteers, based on social ties and patron/client relationship on behalf of the campaign. An example was the Transformation Ambassadors of Nigeria (TAN), which trained about 10000 volunteers paid for by a supporter of the presidential campaign. It had a Facebook page but also conducted rallies across the country in support of the party's presidential candidate, President Jonathan. This coordinated action by volunteers occurred outside the management of the campaign organisation, thus outside the control of the party.

While both campaign organisation appears to be organised in a hierarchical form, it was also filled with a network of unsteady party membership. Campaign organisations have demonstrated how the web creates a networked model of organisation that allows for various forms of membership (Scarrow, 2014). This is also evident in the party membership in the APC and PDP. As highlighted in chapter 2, the lack of ideological stand of political parties in Nigeria, leading to less committed members. The promise and the expectation of benefits are mostly the driving force of party loyalty. Both parties made a particularly bold decision in accepting non-party members as volunteers, since they were largely outside of their capacity to sanction.

Nevertheless, the analysis revealed that the APC not only offered training to volunteers, but the campaign also created a hub, which served as a situation room where these volunteers met and monitored social media feeds. The campaign provided these volunteers with templates on how best to answer questions and inquiries to maintain message consistency and control of the campaign message. This has been noted by Dulio and Towner (2010), who observe that parties establish specialised campaign departments, often with a physical decision-making and nerve centre being created in the form of a campaign 'war room'. There was no evidence that pointed to the PDP establishing a hub, similar to that of the APC that served specifically for the social media operations. However, there was an already established and staffed ICT

department of the PDP. Both parties employed the services of media consultants who were in charge of certain aspects of the campaign and had full control of these aspects. This was also an attempt by the parties to nationally coordinate the campaign. The study found that the APC placed more value on the expertise of media consultants, than the PDP, and only partly coordinated their activities. The consultants' activities were not coordinated with the campaign team and functioned as a separate independent unit. The nature of the role of the consultants employed by the PDP campaign team was elusive. This is not surprising because as indicated earlier, the composition of the council, filled with various influential politicians and the long history of campaign dynamics suggest that the input of these professionals may not have been deemed necessary or effective by the PDP. This speaks to the organisational and institutional factors that provides the background context that the campaign took place. The campaign was stuck with historical forms of campaigning that had previously yielded results with little changes in campaign organization, and a reliance mostly on the network of patrons, based on client and sectional interest that had guaranteed it success in previous elections. The lack of emphasis on the use of the internet as indicated earlier could not be because of a lack of financial resources. The PDP's long history of existence could have provided the campaign with established digital infrastructure which could have been utilised. The lack of innovation by the campaign suggests that these professionals did not contribute to technical services and perhaps were only instrumental in the campaign message which did not require substantial changes to the structure of the campaign organising.

This finding aligns studies that suggest that the nature of professionalised campaign practice takes different forms in different contexts (Farrell & Webb, 2000). In Europe, campaigns are mostly party-centred campaign and campaign professionals are more likely to be integrated into the party organisation as full-time employees (Farrell, 1996). In America, professional consultants are employed into the services of the campaign for a fee and are mostly in control of the campaign strategies, taking centre stage and make decisions concerning resources and campaign content (Kreiss, 2016; Owen, 2018; Nielsen, 2012).

It is evident in this study that these consultants, could not be described or regarded as being in control of the entire campaign strategy. The consultants employed by the APC campaign appeared to have had a defined purpose which suggests they oversaw the communicative aspect of the campaign and functioned as a sperate unit in the campaign organisation. This demonstrates that while consultants were employed, the manner in which these consultants functioned is a result of organisational and cultural factors - what is regarded as important by the party and what the party feels would be acceptable by the voters. This aligns with the hybridisation model in which the specific realisation of the role of the web was constructed in a manner deemed effective in Nigeria.

The use of the internet also allowed diverse participation by volunteers, and their activities did not appear to affect the structure of the campaign organisation. As earlier stated, while both parties could boast of an array of volunteers in different degrees, providing different forms of online participation, their activities had little impact on the decision-making process of the campaign. Chadwick (2006) argues that grassroot participation does not significantly affect the organisation because they are not involved in the decision-making process of the organisation. From a hybridization perspective, it is clear again that political context was of high importance. The federal system of government provided for a decentralised model of campaigning that allowed for more innovative use of the web, yet no significant evidence of innovative use was demonstrated by both parties. Overall, the analysis revealed an extensive decentralisation of the digital campaign with relatively little adaptation of the formal campaign structure.

8.5 Conclusion

This chapter brings together the discussion of the effect of the internet on campaign practices in Nigeria. The findings of the study were discussed in relation to the theoretical framework. The study reveals that the APC and the PDP adopted the internet, though the extent and depth of the use of the internet varied for both parties. The study found that the use of the internet by the APC can be understood in relation to the modern trends in electoral campaigns. The APC as a party was established at a time where the use of the internet was a given. Thus, starting from its inception as a political party, it established an ICT department with paid staff. The PDP was an

already established party at the time and had an ICT department. In addition, both campaigns operated a social media department during the campaign. The study demonstrated significant similarities, yet differences in the extent and in the way the web was used in information dissemination, mobilising supports for the campaign, marketing their candidates and interacting with voters.

The nature of the adoption did not follow a direct imitation of the campaign practices of the US, rather, the adoption of the internet grew out of an organic process that aligned with the trends in campaign practices globally. Both parties espoused the subsidiary role of the internet in relationship to other traditional forms of campaign practices based on the specific circumstances of Nigeria in the 2015 presidential election. This is in line with the hybridisation model in which the specific realisation of the role of the web was constructed in a manner deemed effective in Nigeria. In other words, a hybrid style of campaign has proved to be the best fit in understanding the changes associated with using the internet for electoral campaigns.

The most significant differences between both parties were their orientation towards online fund raising. The PDP made no conscious effort to raise funds using the internet, and this could be attributed to its status as an incumbent and the culture of personal donations to political parties' campaigns being an anomaly in Nigeria's politics. Significantly, losing control of campaign messages by using social media generated little concern for both campaign teams. The campaign team of the opposition party (the APC) remain convinced that the number of party supporters on-line was an advantage to their campaign and could counteract any ambiguity in their campaign messages. The PDP focused more of its attention on the use of the traditional media. The study found that both parties recognised the increasing access to the Internet by voters in the country as a defining factor in the choice of their use of the internet. Both parties embarked on the use of the social media in reaching out to eligible voters, specifically in reaching out to the youth, as that was the demography of the most active population on the internet. This provided a significant market for both parties. While both parties agreed that the increase in the use of internet user was a significant factor, other factors reveal reasons for differences in the degree of their use during the electoral campaign. Most significantly, the study revealed that the financial strength

of both campaign team had bearings on the choices they made. The analysis revealed that the APC campaign emphasised the affordability of the web was a factor in their use of the internet. The APC as a political party were financially constrained, in comparison to the established PDP. The analysis suggests that between both parties, the APC had a lesser budget, and this could be attributed in part to its position as a challenger. The campaign could not afford as much as the PDP, in paid advertisement or campaign coverage in the traditional mass media. The analysis also revealed that beyond financial resources gap between both parties, the structure of the media system and   the   status of the candidates   was also an influence in the use of the internet. The APC campaign team felt that the PDP took advantage and benefited from its power as the incumbent, with the government media stations provided more coverage to the PDP in comparison to the APC. The power of incumbent was also demonstrated when the Nigerian telecommunication restricted the fund-raising mechanism deployed by the opposition party (APC). These restrictions demonstrated the institutional factors that the campaign faced, thus the selective use in the degree and manner of the use of the internet.

Finally, the analysis of the findings from the APC and the PDP campaign revealed an extensive decentralisation of the digital campaign with relatively little adaptation to the formal campaign structure. The decentralised nature of the internet further allowed both parties to maintain a decentralised form of campaign structures. coordinated campaign   and decentralised campaign structure.

The structure of the Nigerian electoral system also reveals the necessity of a multi-layered organisation in party structure, allowing for multiple mobilisation processes by allowing non-party members to organise support campaigns for parties using the internet. The Nigerian electoral system also makes centralisation of campaign organisation less likely in the use of the internet, whilst seeking to maintain a centralised organisation, where party supporters offer training to a subset of volunteers to maintain message consistency and a coordinated field work.

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Chapter Nine: Conclusion

9.1 Introduction

This chapter summarises the thesis of this study and concludes on the findings, speaking directly to the research question to provide an understanding of the role of internet campaign in the 2015 Nigerian Presidential election. As shown in Chapter 1, this study is especially important because of the context, exceptionalism, and significance of the 2015 Nigerian Presidential election. As the detailed grounding of the thesis in the existing literature in Chapter 2 shows, studies on internet campaigning have concentrated on the adoption and use of the web 2.0 in developed countries, with an absence of a sustained focus on Nigeria and Sub-Saharan Africa more broadly. This is despite the growing penetration of the internet and the increasing importance of political campaigns in the region. The study presents the most comprehensive study based on original research material provided by over 50 interviews. This thesis has come up with empirical findings that are unique and specific to the research location but also speak to the research topic more broadly. The cross -case analysis of the empirical data in Chapter 8 offers similarities as well as difference between both political parties interrogated through the three theoretical lenses outlined in chapter 4, and insights are drawn across each of the three subsidiary research questions. The thesis contributes both novel empirical knowledge on Nigerian campaigning, as well as fresh insight into the broader impact of the internet on campaign practices. It offers new insights into campaign organizational changes.

The central question of this thesis as set out in chapter 1: How can we best understand the effects of internet campaigning on the campaign practices of the PDP and the APC in the 2015 Nigerian Presidential election?

Three subsidiary questions unpack the subject of this thesis. (a) How was internet campaigning adopted and adapted by the campaign teams? (b) What factors help to explain variations in the internet campaigns practices of the presidential candidates of the PDP and APC? (c) How did the web affect the intra-campaign organisational dynamics of the presidential candidates of the PDP and APC?

The study found indications that the use of the internet by the APC and PDP could be ascribed as a combined process of modernisation and hybridisation. The study found that the use of internet was a process of modernisation, resulting from an adaptation to technological development and the necessity of having to utilise all necessary and available tool. Nonetheless, while the necessity of having some form of internet campaign infrastructure was largely accepted, disagreement about its primacy and relationship with other types of media and traditional campaign practices based on specific circumstances of Nigeria in 2015 were present too. The analysis also shows a hybridisation model in which the specific realisation of the role of the web was constructed in a manner deemed effective in Nigeria by both parties.

I argue that Nigeria offers an unfamiliar context when compared to the political systems that have dominated the literature on electoral campaign practices and this study consequently holds the potential to expand our understanding of the internet/campaign nexus. Focusing on the Nigerian case empirically and theoretically, using qualitative evidence and methodology, the study concludes that the Nigerian context contributes significant knowledge to the broader campaign literatures in a number of ways.

9. 2 Implications of the Study

As shown in Chapter 1, this study is especially important because of the context, exceptionalism, and significance of the 2015 Nigerian Presidential election. The 2015 Nigerian presidential election was significant in many ways. First, and most importantly, it marked the first time that an incumbent president lost a re-election in Nigeria's history. Second, there was a dramatic increase in the use of the internet in the election campaigns, particularly social media. Third, a candidate who had lost three previous elections emerged as a frontrunner. Fourth, a hastily put together coalition won against a well-funded incumbent party. As the detailed grounding of the thesis in the existing literature in Chapter 2 shows, studies on internet campaigning have concentrated on the adoption and use of the web 2.0 in developed countries, with an absence of a sustained focus on Nigeria and Sub-Saharan Africa more broadly. Despite the growing penetration of the internet and the increasing importance of political campaigns and campaign practitioners in the region.

Throughout the discussion in chapter 8, the findings were examined through the lens of Modernization, Americanization, and Hybridization, each of which served as theoretical lens through which the empirical data was analysed. The analysis found that multi theory approach provides a well-grounded understanding of the thesis research question. Each approach provided the study with a different set of analytical emphases and sensitising concepts that enabled the interpretation and analysis of the empirical data gathered. It is through this multi-theoretic framework that the study arrived at a deeper understanding of the research question.

The parties considered the internet as an important tool and recognised the additional functions that the web provided for the campaign, nevertheless, both parties emphasised the supplementary role of the internet in electoral campaigns. Both parties considered the use of both the web and the traditional grassroots campaigning as highly important. The emphasis on the supplementary role of the web suggests a continuum of traditional forms of campaign practices. While both campaigns admitted to the use of the internet, the nature and role that it performed were based on the party's orientation on their usefulness and utilised in a manner most suitable for the Nigerian context. Thus, in certain ways, the parties use of the internet was based on context.

The adoption of a qualitative approach to the study, allowed for the exploration of the perspectives of those involved in the campaign and allowed for a detailed and nuanced picture of campaign practices in the internet age. The case of Nigeria thus offers an insight into the changing practices of political campaigns more broadly. Central to this is an acknowledgement that it is necessary to prioritise the role of context in order to understand the influences of the internet on campaign practices.

9.2.1 The Importance of national Context

To understand the role of the web requires an understanding of the context within which it is used. The study revealed certain contextual factors that influenced both parties' use of the internet and the variations within their use. The primacy of the web and its relationship with other types of media and traditional practices based on the specific circumstances of Nigeria in 2015 were present in line with the hybridisation lens. This dissertation extends the literature on the use of the internet in electoral campaigns, by providing a detailed analysis of presidential campaign in a country with

electoral, cultural, political, and legal context that is in deep contrast with that of developed nations. This study consequently holds the potential to expand the understanding of the internet/campaign nexus. The theory of hybridization was not only useful in revealing the manner in which the parties infused the web into their traditional campaign practices, it also provided contextual constraint that led to the use of the internet. For example, the media regulatory frameworks and control over the Nigerian telecommunication regulations authority allowed for the abuse of power by the incumbent government, parties could not afford the same opportunities to utilise the public media as the incumbent party. The regulation on campaign finance is also a significant determinant in the manner in which campaigns are conducted. The courts order of the discontinuance of crowd funding enabled by telephone mobile network providers, depicts how campaign regulations have consequences in campaigning and how the internet can be used as a means of raising campaign funds. These factors highlighted above had consequences in campaigning and how the internet was utilized. The initial introduction of crowd funding for a candidate during an election through the use of scratch cards was most significant, as funding had usually been by donors with special intertest. Thus, the possibilities for political parties to raise substantial money through crowd funding may offer other smaller parties in Nigeria, opportunities to participate in the electoral process. Thus, the use of internet was borne out of necessity in the interplay of these contextual factors. Nonetheless, the most significant factor was the disparity in financial resource between the incumbent government and the challenger. The affordability of the use of social media was by far, the strongest and most consistent explanation provided by the APC as their reason for using the internet as a campaign tool. The emergence of the APC's victory, thus, demonstrates the unravelling of the incumbency power, which is significant, as the loss of an incumbent government, with its array of resources at its disposal could signal the possibilities of minor political parties being able to change the narrative on the literature on electoral competition in Africa, where incumbents mostly win.

This thesis contributes both novel empirical knowledge on Nigerian campaigning, as well as fresh insight into the broader debate on Normalization and equalization and its impact of the internet on Party competition. Recognizing the factors that informed

party use of the internet and the effect of its use, calls for further studies within other African countries to understand the trends of changes emerging.

9.2.2 Changes in Campaign organisational Structure

The study revealed a combination of both a centralisation and decentralisation of digital campaign. While the campaign organisation appears to be organised in a - hierarchical form, there was evidence of both high levels of centrism and parallel lines of authority running along the campaign hierarchy with relatively little adaptation to the formal campaign structure this supports the hybridisation argument that the distinctive characteristic of the Nigerian national political system could be seen in the structure of the campaign organisation. The formal organisation of the party was designed in such way that there was a plural, widespread distribution of power within the party across different levels along the campaign hierarchy.

While the innate possibility of the web allows for participation, the political parties further allowed and encouraged the use of the web in enabling participation by offering training and directing in part certain campaign practices. This contributes to the existing literature on broader implication of citizen supporter networks for political organisation and the evolution of citizens participation in election campaigns in the age of various social media platforms. While the literature reveals the possibilities of the web in allowing citizens' participation, it allows reveals the possibilities of political consultants taking a more prominent role in directing future campaigns. This increase in voters' participation in the electoral functions could be a possibility in deepening democracy in Nigeria. Which could have an impact on the wider continent of Africa.

9.2.3 Implications of this research For Campaign Practitioners

The victory of the APC is a warning against complacency in the uptake of online campaigning. In a context where campaign funding is largely unchecked with the huge coffers at the disposal of the PDP. The success story of the APC implies a change from the influence of traditional victory mechanism of inducing success through various forms of malfeasance practices such as vote buying, violence and vote rigging. The study revealed the importance of the web and its contributory effect to vote shares.

Thus, APC's victory has further implications on the strategic and organisational dynamics of future Nigerian electoral campaigns and electoral campaigns in other

African countries. Consequently, this unexpected result and the nature of the use of the internet could serve as a model for other African countries and indigenous political consultants can export their trade to these countries, for instance a consultant employed by the Buhari campaign was State Craft Inc, a media consultancy firm was also employed by the presidential candidate of Ghanaian party, New patriotic party (NPP) during 2016 presidential campaign to direct its campaign message and also took part in the campaign of incumbent president of Senegal. These media consultants who were in charge of certain aspects of the campaign and had full control of these aspects. Future studies should research on the role's consultants play and the diffusion of campaign strategy from Nigerian to other countries. The study thus argues that the victory of APC could serve as a prototype for future elections in Nigerian and more broadly in other Saharan African countries.

While most studies have focused on Western democracies and have developed a theoretical framework that best explains the campaign practice of these Western democracies. In offering an analysis of changes brought by the internet to campaign practices, this study adds to the literature on changes in campaign practices in developing democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa. The theories of Americanisation and Modernisation, like so many other theories have all originated from studies based on Western Societies, and do not offer a robust framework that can be applied to non-Western societies. As studies of the use the internet expand into unfamiliar context in the literature, theories that are more context-based should be developed for useful research, rather than a dependence on Western frameworks in understanding campaigns in developing countries.

9.3 Limitation of the study

There are a number of limitations to the study. Therefore, the factors discussed in this study should not be considered exhaustive and the generalisability of the empirical finding is restricted. For instance, the choice of qualitative approach bears well known limitations, in its lack of hypothesis testing and its limited external validity. However, this study sought to compensate with the number of interviewers conducted in the study. It also acknowledges the difficulty of eliciting sensitive (and potentially politically damaging) information through the interview method, as well as the limitations of a single election focus. Furthermore, campaign practices and factors

influencing the use of the internet as a campaign tool are likely to continue to emerge based on several reasons, including advancement in technology, evolution of political parties and the introduction of an alternative theoretical lens.

9.4 Further Research

The victory of the APC implies that the web may be a priority in other future elections in Nigerian and in other Saharan African countries. This means that the next logical step in this research agenda is to develop a longitudinal perspective within and outside of the Nigerian case study. Further study should undertake a wider comparative adoption focusing on sub–Saharan African countries. The research employed a qualitative single case study, specifically examining the effect of political campaign practices in the 2015 Nigerian presidential election, thus difficult to generalize the findings.

Future research should integrate a wider range of methods including quantitative methodological approaches that allows for the analysis of the digital outputs of Nigerian campaigns, alongside interviews and develop perspective by extrapolating the findings of this study into developments in subsequent elections. This would provide an opportunity to triangulate the findings of the qualitative research conducted here with behavioural evidence capturing campaign activities.

Finally, future scholarship could build on the thesis to advance an understanding of changes in campaign practices and party organisation dynamics in developing countries as a fuller understanding of the effects of the internet on campaign practices are likely to emerge over a series of campaign cycles, other studies could determine the impact of internet campaigning unfolding over multiple campaigns.

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Appendices

Appendix A

Table 1

Results of the 1959 Federal Elections

Region	Political party	Total vote received	Percentage of total vote (%)	Number of seats won
East	NCNC-NEPU	1,246,984	64.6	58
	AG	445,114	23.1 14	141
	NDC	237,626	12.3	1
West	AG	933,680	49.5	33
	NCNC-NEPU	758, 462	40. 2	21
	NPC	32960	1.7	-
	Small parties and independents	162, 107	8. 6	7
North	NPC	1,994,045	61.2	134
	AG	559,875	17.2	25
	NCNC-NEPU	525,575	16.5	8
	Small parties and independents	179,022	5.5	7
Lagos	NCNC-NEPU	61,608	55.9	2
	AG	48,137	43.8	1
	NPC and small parties	189	0.2	-
	Independents	138	0.1	-

Source: Ojo (2010)

Table 2

The 1979 Presidential Election in Nigeria

STATE	GEOGRAPHICAL ZONES	GNPP Waziri Ibrahim	UPN Obafemi Awolowo	NPN Shehu Shagari	PRP Aminu Kano	NPP Nnamdi Azikiwe	TOTAL VOTE
Anambra	South	1.6%	0.75%	13.50%	1.20%	82.58%	1,209,038
Bauchi	North	15.44%	3.00%	62.48%	14.34%	4.72%	998,683
Bendel	North	1.23%	53.23%	36.19%	0.73%	8.60%	669,511
Benue	North	7.89%	2.57%	76.39%	1.35%	11.71%	538,879
Borno	North	54.04%	3.35%	34.71%	6.52%	1.35%	710,968
Cross River	South	15.14%	11.76%	64.40%	1.01%	7.66%	661,103
Gongola	North	34.09%	21.67%	35.52%	4.34%	4.35%	639,138
Imo	South	3.06%	0.64%	8.80%	0.89%	86.67%	1,153,355
Kaduna	North	13.80%	6.68%	43.12%	31.66%	4.72%	1,382,712
Kano	North	1.54%	1.23%	19.94%	76.41%	0.91%	1,220,763
Kwara	North	5.71%	39.48%	53.62%	0.67%	9.57%	354,605
Lagos	South	0.48%	82.30%	7.18%	0.47%	9.57%	828,414
Niger	North	16.50%	3.69%	74.88%	3.99%	1.11%	383,347
Ogun	South	0.53%	92.11%	6.23%	0.31%	0.32%	744,668
Ondo	South	0.26%	94.51%	4.19%	0.18%	0.86%	1,369,547
Oyo	South	0.57%	85.78%	12.75%	0.32%	0.55%	1,396,547
Plateau	North	6.82%	5.29%	34.73%	3.98%	49.17%	548,405
Rivers	South	6.82%	5.29%	34.73%	3.98%	49.17%	687,951
Sokoto	North	26.61%	2.52%	66.58%	3.33%	0.92%	1,348,697
TOTAL		10.02%	29.23%	33.82%	10.32%	16.70%	16,846,633
		1,686,489	4,916,651	5,688,857	1,732,113	2,822,523	

Source: African Elections Database

Table 3

Result of the 1999 Federal Election

Political party	Candidate	Total number of votes
People's Democratic Party (PDP)	Olusegun Obasanjo	18,738,154
Alliance for Democracy (AD) & All People's Party (APP)	Olu Falae	11,110,28

Source: African Elections Database

Table 4

The 2003 Nigerian Presidential Election.

Presidential Candidates	Political Parties	Total Votes	Votes (%)
Olusegun Obasanjo	People's Democratic Party	24,456,140	61.94
Muhammadu Buhari	All Nigeria People's Party	12,710,022	32.19
Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu	All Progressives Grand Alliance	1,297,445	3.29
Jim Nwobodo	United Nigeria People's Party	169,609	0.43
Gani Fawehinmi	National Conscience Party	161,333	0.41
Sarah Jubril	Progressive Action Congress	157,560	0.40
Ike Nwachukwu	National Democratic Party	132,997	0.34
Chris Okotie	Justice Party	119,547	0.30
Balarabe Musa	People's Redemption Party	100,765	0.26
Arthur Nwankwo	People's Mandate Party	57,720	0.15
Emmanuel Okereke	All People's Liberation Party	26,921	0.07
Kalu Idika Kalu	New Nigeria People's Party	23,830	0.06
Muhammadu Dikko Yusuf	Movement for Democracy and Justice	21,403	0.05
Yahaya Ndu	African Renaissance Party	11,565	0.03
Abayomi Ferreira	Democratic Alternative	6,727	0.02
Tunji Braithwaite	Nigeria Advance Party	6,932	0.02
Iheanyichukwu Godswill	Better Nigeria Progressive Party	5,987	0.02
Olapade Agoro	National Action Council	5,756	0.01
Pere Ajuwa	Liberal Democratic Party of Nigeria	4,473	0.01
Mojisola Adekunle-Obasanjo	Masses Movement of Nigeria	3,757	0.01

Source: African Elections Database

Table 5

The 2007 Presidential Election Results

Political Parties	Presidential Candidates	Total votes	Votes (%)
People's Democratic Party (PDP)	Umaru Yar'Adua	24,638,063	69.82
All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP)	Muhammadu Buhari	6,605,299	18.72
Action Congress (AC)	Atiku Abubakar	2,637,848	7.47
Progressive People's Alliance	Orji Uzor Kalu	608,803	1.73
Democratic People's Party (DPP)	Attahiru Bafarawa	289,324	0.82
All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA)	Chukwuemeka Odimegwu Ojukwu	155,947	0.44
Alliance for Democracy (AD)	Pere Ajuwa	89,241	*0.25*
Fresh Democratic Party	Chris Okotie	74,049	0.21
African Democratic Congress (ADC)	Patrick Utomi	50,849	0.14
Hope Democratic Party	Ambrose Owuru	28,519	0.08
African Liberation Party	Emmanuel Okereke	22,677	0.06
African Political System (APS)	Lawrence Adedoyin	22,409	0.06
National Democratic Party	Habu Fari	21,934	0.06
Citizens Popular Party (CPP)	Maxi Okwu	14,027	0.04
Better Nigeria Party	Bartholomew Nnaji	11,705	0.03
National Conscience Party	Emmanuel Obayuwana	8,229	0.02
National Action Council	Olapade Agoro	5,752	0.02
Nigerian Masses Movement	Mojisola Obasanjo	4,309	0.01

Source: African Elections Database

Table 6

The 2011 Nigerian Presidential Election Results

Parties	Candidates	Votes	%
People's Democratic Party (PDP)	Goodluck Jonathan	22,495,187	58.89
Congress for Progressive Change (CPC)	Muhammadu Buhari	12,214,853	31.98
Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN)	Nuhu Ribadu	2,079,151	5.41
All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP)	Ibrahim Shekarau	917,012	2.40
People for Democratic Change (PDC)	Mahmud Waziri	82,243	0.21
Peoples Progressive Party (PPP)	Lawson Igboanugo Aroh	54,203	0.14
African Democratic Congress (ADC)	Peter Nwangwu	51,682	0.14
Better Nigeria Progressive Party (BNPP)	Iheanyichukwu Nnaji	47,272	0.12
Fresh Democratic Party (FRESH)	Chris Okotie	34,331	0.09
National Conscience Party (NCP)	Dele Momodu	26,376	0.07
National Majority Democratic Party (NMDP)	Akpona Solomon	25,938	0.07
African Political System (APS)	Lawrence Makinde Adedoyin	23,740	0.06
United National Party for Development (UNPD)	Ebiti Ndok	21,203	0.06
National Transformation Party (NTP)	John Dara	19,744	0.05
Mega Progressive Peoples Party (MPPP)	Rasheed Shitta-Bey	16,492	0.04
African Renaissance Party (ARP)	Yahaya Ndu	12,264	0.03
Hope Democratic Party (HDP)	Ambrose Awuru	12,023	0.03
Social Democratic Mega Party (SDMP)	Patrick Utomi	11,544	0.03
Liberal Democratic Party of Nigeria (LDPN)	Chris Nwaokobia	8,472	0.02

Source: African elections database.

Table 7

Summary of the 2015 Nigerian presidential election results

Party	Candidate	Votes in Numbers	Votes %
Action Alliance (AA)	Anifowoshekelani, Tunde	22,125	0.08
African Democratic Congress (ADC)	Ahmad, Mani Ibrahim	29,665	0.10
All Progressives Congress (APC)	Buhari, Muhammadu	15,424,921	53.96
African People's Alliance (APA)	Adebayo, Ayeni Musa	53,537	0.19
Allied Congress Party of Nigeria (ACPN)	Galadima, Ganiyu	40,311	0.14
Alliance for Democracy (AD)	Salau, Rafiu	30,673	0.11
Citizens Popular Party (CPP)	Eke, Sam	36,300	0.13
Hope Democratic Party (HDP)	Owuru, Ambrose	7,435	0.03
Kowa Party (KP)	Sonaiya, Oluremi	18,220	0.06
National Conscience Party (NCP)	Onovo, Martin	24,455	0.09
People's Democratic Party (PDP)	Jonathan, Goodluck	12,853,162	44.96
People's Party of Nigeria (PPN)	Allagoa, Kelvin	24,475	0.09
United Democratic Party (UDP)	Okoye, Godson	9,208	0.03
United Progressives Party (UPP)	Okorie, Chekwas	18,220	0.06

Source: Independent National Electoral Commission, 2015

ALL PROGRESSIVES CONGRESS

20th July, 2017

APC/HNDQ/NPS/017/51

ATTN: Members, All Progressives Congress (APC) 2015 Presidential Campaign Council.

Letter of Introduction

I bring you compliments of our great Party, the All Progressives Congress (APC).

I wish to introduce to you **Mrs. Bibobra Aganaba**. She is currently a PhD student at Swansea University in Wales, United Kingdom.

Mrs. Aganaba is pursuing research that focuses on the use of internet communication technologies (ICTs) in the 2015 Nigerian Presidential election campaign. In conducting her research, the information she will obtain from our Party structure will be used purely for academic purposes.

I request that you to grant Mrs. Aganaba the courtesy of your time and attention.

Please accept the assurance of my highest regards.

Yours Sincerely

Mallam Bolaji Abdullahi
National Publicity Secretary

No. 40, Blantyre Street, Wuse 2, Abuja, Nigeria
www.apc.com.ng

Figure 1: Letter of Acknowledgment of research granted by the APC

To the National Secretariat of Peoples Democratic Party (PDP),

My name is Dr Matthew Wall and I am a Senior Lecturer in Politics at Swansea University. I am writing this letter to introduce Mrs Bibobra Aganaba, who is a PhD student doing research under my supervision.

Mrs Aganaba is enrolled in Swansea University's Media Studies PhD Program and is pursuing research that focuses on the use of internet communication technologies (ICTs) in the 2015 Nigerian Presidential election campaign.

In conducting her research, Mrs. Aganaba is interested solely in contributing to scholarly knowledge concerning the effects and dissemination of online campaigning – and is not working for commercial gain, nor is she working on behalf of any political party.

As such, I would ask you to grant Mrs. Aganaba the courtesy of your time and attention, as I believe that her work is important for better understanding how contemporary campaigns are being transformed by ICTs in the Nigerian context.

I am happy to discuss the nature of the research and procedures surrounding publication and dissemination and can be contacted via email at: m.t.wall@swansea.ac.uk or by telephone at 0044(01792602987.

Signed,

Dr Matthew Wall

Figure 2: Letter of Acknowledgment of research granted by the PDP

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Swansea University
Prifysgol Abertawe

Consent form for interviews

This is a consent form for ' the study of the role of the web during the 2015 Nigerian presidential election'.

Please tick the appropriate boxes	Yes	No
Taking part		
I have read and understood the project information sheet provided by Bibobra Aganaba.		
I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the project.		
I agree to take part in the project. Taking part in the project will include being interviewed and recorded (audio or video)"		
I understand that my taking part is voluntary; I can withdraw from the study at any time and I do not have to give any reasons for why I no longer want to take part.		
Use of the information I provide for this project only		
I understand my personal details such as phone number and address will not be revealed to people outside the project.		
I understand that my words may be quoted in publications, reports, web pages, and other research outputs.		
Please choose one of the following two options:		
I would like my real name used in the above		
I would not like my real name to be used in the above.		
Use of the information I provide beyond this project		
I agree for the data I provide to be archived at university of leicester/or other authorised archives.		
I understand that other genuine researchers may use my words in publications, reports, web pages, and other research outputs, only if they agree to preserve the confidentiality of the information as requested in this form.		
So we can use the information you provide legally		
I agree to assign the copyright I hold in any materials related to this project to Bibobra Aganaba.		

Your signature below indicates that you have decided to volunteer as a research participant for this study, and that you have read and understood the information provided on both the participant information sheet and consent form. You will be given signed and dated copies of the sheet and form to keep, along with any other printed materials deemed necessary by the study investigators.

Name of participant..Signature ....Date

Researcher: Bibobra Aganaba..............................Signature .... Date:

Figure 3: Consent form for Interviews