JOURNAL FOR DERADICALIZATION

Fall 2019
Nr. 20
ISSN: 2363-9849

Linkages as a Lens: An Exploration of Strategic Communications in P/CVE.

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Abstract
Strategic communications for the purpose of countering violent extremism have become widespread in recent years, especially given the communications revolution which has amplified the messages of violent extremists and those that wish to counter them. Despite this, there is little-to-no research which collects message data and analyses its design in a systematic way. In this article, we collect data from 10 social media multi-message campaigns and undertake an exploratory analysis of their design using a methodology developed from Ingram's "Linkage-based" framework for countering militant Islamist propaganda. Our findings include: a prevalence towards highlighting the atrocities of violent extremist groups rather than strategies which challenge their competence; a priority to messages which seize the narrative agenda; differing emotional or rational pulls depending on the language in which the message is delivered; a range of different tactics employed depending on the target audience; as well as a wide range of deployments of different themes of positive and negative messages. We offer a number of possible explanations for these findings, before undertaking a cluster analysis of the data to aid the construction of Weberian "ideal type" campaigns, which offer a contribution to the field for the purposes of future research and exposition.

Article History
Received May 20, 2019
Accepted July 18, 2019
Published Sept 27, 2019

Keywords: P/CVE; Strategic Communications; Linkages; Counter-Narratives; MENA

Introduction

Strategic communications have been utilised in conflicts for several thousands of years; potentially as far back as the cave paintings of brave warriors that appeared in the Mesolithic and Epipaleolithic periods (Ingram 2016a). This is even more resonant within the modern

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We are grateful to Haroro Ingram, members of Swansea University's Cyber Threats Research Centre, and members of the Hedayah Center for providing valued feedback on early drafts of this paper.

context of terrorism, given the inherently communicative aspect of the act itself; the notion of "terrorism as theatre" (Jenkins 1974). Furthermore, as we have entered a communications revolution with the advent of the Internet and social media, terrorists have learned to adapt to the new environment (Watkin & Whittaker 2017). This is particularly true in the case of Daesh (also known as the Islamic State, ISIS, ISIL), who became renowned for one of the most sophisticated strategic communications campaigns by any violent extremist group in history (Winter 2015; Ingram 2016c; Ingram 2014; Berger & Morgan 2015).

Given the threat is steeped is strategic communications, it follows that responses are too. Often this comes in the form of network disruption (Conway et al. 2017; Reed et al. 2017; Europol 2017), but also it comes in the form of persuasive communications which either counter or posit an alternative to violent extremist narratives. This field of research remains in its infancy and there remains a sizable knowledge gap regarding the effectiveness of such messaging (Hemmingsen & Castro 2017; Briggs & Feve 2013; Ferguson 2016). Despite this, strategic communications to prevent and counter violent extremism (P/CVE) have been signalled out by the UN Security Council in Resolution 2354, which includes a framework for member states to "counter" terrorists' narratives (UN 2017). It is, too, a key component of many Western governments' strategies in P/CVE; the US State Department's "Global Engagement Center" works with a number of regional actors, including the Sawab Center in the United Arab Emirates and the Regional Digital Counter-Messaging Center in Malaysia (Reed et al. 2017). Similarly, the Global Coalition to Defeat Daesh, which comprises of 75 member states and five institutions (the Arab League, the EU, INTERPO, NATO, and SEN-SAD) focuses heavily on strategic communications to degrade Daesh and highlight military efforts (Global Coalition 2019). The UK Foreign Office provided an investment of £10 million in setting up the Daesh Coalition Communications Cell, bringing the coalition partners together and to share expertise on strategic communications (UK Parliament 2016).

This research adds to the nascent research in the field of strategic communications in P/CVE by offering an exploratory analysis of over two hundred messages from ten multi-

message campaigns. It draws from the campaign and message design framework offered by Ingram's A "Linkage-Based" Approach to Combating Militant Islamist Propaganda and develops a coding methodology to analyse the content of messages. The results offer insights into "what is out there" in the dissemination of messages for the purposes of P/CVE and possible explanations are offered for them. Finally, we undertake cluster analysis to group messages by common themes and create "ideal type" campaigns that can be utilised for exposition and future research.

Ingram's Linkage-Based Approach to P/CVE

In his *A "Linkage-Based" Approach to Combating Militant Islamist Propaganda* Ingram outlines a two-tiered framework which is designed to aid practitioners in synchronising campaign and message design as well as providing a fresh insight into categorising and collecting message data (Ingram 2016b). The following section summarises the theoretical framework behind militant Islamist propaganda before moving on to the linkages framework.

Competitive System of Meaning

At the heart of Ingram's approach is what he calls the "competitive system of meaning" that is central to violent extremist propaganda. It draws from the growing literature that focuses on in-group and out-group dynamics, highlighting the importance of a crisis of identity within the in-group, which is caused by an identified out-group, which can only in turn be solved by the in-group (Ingram 2016d). A typical example of this is the Islamist narrative that that the West is war with the *Ummah*, creating an obligation for "true" Muslims to fight. This dynamic is aided by a degree of uncertainty within its intended audience, for which there is a growing base of literature linking to extremism (Pruyt & Kwakkel 2014; Esses et al. 2013; Hogg et al. 2013; Federico et al. 2013; Hogg & Adelman 2013; Mcgregor et al. 2013), which is exacerbated by the violent extremist narrative which provides certainty

'via commitment to the in-group identity, its ideology (inevitably framed as "true" Islam) and its socio-political agenda' (Ingram 2016d, p.13). These factors form a vicious cycle:

> The more that dichotomised in- and out-group dynamics are respectively imbued with positive and negative values so perceptions of crisis will become increasingly acute and the urgency of implementing solutions more desperate. In turn, as increased perceptions of Other-induced crises fuel the need for in-group generated solutions, so the bi-polarity between in- and out-groups becomes starker. (Ingram 2016d, p.14)

This creates a self-reinforcing cycle which further augments the violent extremist "system of meaning," as can be seen in Figure 1. This is achieved by three important types of violent extremist narrative: value-, dichotomy-, and crisis-reinforcing (Ingram 2016d). The in-group are viewed as morally superior and a zero-sum game is propagated, and those who do not support the in-group's worldview are condemned as traitors; an example of this is the use of *takfirism* within militant Islamism (Ingram 2017).

Figure 1: The cyclically reinforcing violent extremist "system of meaning"



Linkage-Based Approach

Ingram's solution to the "system of meaning" of violent extremists is to attack the linkages that cause the self-reinforcing cycle using a two tiered strategy. The first tier, targeted primarily at those who have yet to adopt a violent extremist "system of meaning," uses a combination of negative messages which attack the linkages between violent extremists and their proposed solutions, as well as positive messages which emphasise possible solutions to crises beyond violent extremists. The second tier is aimed at those already within the cycle and uses negative messaging as a disengagement strategy as well as network disruption strategies (Ingram 2016b).

Recognising and tailoring messages towards the correct target audience is central to Ingram's framework. He offers five categories:

1. Antis: Those against violent extremists and can help disseminate effective messaging.
2. Curious: Those who consume violent extremist propaganda.
3. Engaged: Those who adhere to a violent extremist "system of meaning" and may be engaged in such networks.
4. Tacit Supporters: those who express support for violent extremist groups, disseminate their messaging, and regularly engage in their networks
5. Active Supporters: those who have, or are planning to, engage in violence, or to support or facilitate such actions. (Ingram 2016b, p.10)

Although the whole range of audiences should be targeted, it is important that messages are aimed at the appropriate tier, as shown in Figure 2. Note that these are "Primary" targets; it may be useful in some circumstances for Tier 1 to tailor messages to Tacit and Active supporters, just as it may be fruitful to disseminate negative messages to Antis for further dissemination. Ingram notes that 'the two tiers are complementary. As Tier 2 efforts disrupt violent extremist networks, this slows the dissemination and even production of

their propaganda this creating opportunities for Tier 1 efforts to fill the void' (Ingram 2016b, p.9).

Figure 2: Audiences with appropriate tier targeting



A further important element to Ingram's framework is the tailoring of messages to implement a rational- and identity-choice within its target audience. This is based, in part, on the research from the field of psychology and behavioural economics which highlights the different ways in which the human mind processes information, described most famously be Daniel Kahneman as "automatic" and "deliberative" thinking. The former operates instinctively and makes effortless judgement, while the latter is slower and more logical (Kahneman 2012). Ingram notes that:

> Militant Islamist propaganda seems to be largely geared towards corralling automatic thinking in its audiences by manipulating mental models, driving, cyclical processes of cognitive reinforcement, increasing perceptions of crisis and fuelling cognitive biases. This then primes its audiences for engagement with material that is largely geared towards more deliberative thinking – e.g. *fatwas* that lay out a jurisprudential case. (Ingram 2016d, p.8)

To combat this two-pronged threat, Ingram suggests that messages ought to be divided into two key categories. The first is messages that instil an identity-choice within the audience, for example, messages that highlight the importance of community, family, or values. The second category is messages that instil a rational-choice which highlight a tangible cost/benefit analysis for the audience. An example of rational-choice messaging is highlighting money invested by government actors as a response to the perceived crisis at the heart of the "system of meaning." This categorisation 'ensures that all messaging is geared towards leveraging one or even both of these powerful motivational drivers in its target audiences' (Ingram 2016b, p.12).

A further consideration for message designers is whether messages are offensive or defensive; whether the message sets the agenda for a narrative or is aimed at countering that of an extremist. This is very similar, but not necessarily the same, as the distinction made by many P/CVE scholars and practitioners between counter and alternative narratives. Both distinctions rely on who controls the narrative; although it is sometimes stated that alternative narratives ought to positive in nature (Elsayed et al. 2017; Briggs & Feve 2013; Rothenberger et al. 2016; Baaken & Schlegel 2017; Radicalisation Awareness Network 2018) which is not the case in Ingram's framework.[2] It is important to reiterate that this refers to control of a *narrative*, not actions. Reed highlights this point in his example of the 1979 UK General election "Labour isn't working" poster by the British Conservative Party poster and the ensuing series of responses from the Labour Party. The Conservative Party responded to the perceived actions (or inactions) of the Labour Party, but set the battleground for the debate (Reed 2017). Similarly, messages that highlight the atrocities of violent extremists are offensive unless they contain a response to a specific narrative.

[2] Furthermore, the phrase "counter narrative" is conceptually ambiguous. Sometimes it is meant as a catch-all for anything which tackles a violent extremist narrative (i.e. offensive or defensive), and sometimes it is specifically responding to a violent extremist narrative (i.e. defensive). For examples of this confusion, see: (Briggs & Feve 2013), who include the catch-all "counter narratives" in the title of their report, as well as a breakdown of the distinction between "counter narratives" and "alternative narratives."

When designing messages, one should use both offensive and defensive messages, but the former should outweigh the latter: 'while defensive messaging is important to counter violent extremist propaganda, an important indicator of success in the "information battle" is reflected in who is producing more offensive messaging and eliciting the most defensive messaging from their adversary' (Ingram 2016b, p.16). This is congruous with many other scholars within the field of P/CVE strategic communications who warn against the danger of giving too much oxygen to extremist narratives and therefore allowing violent extremists to control the debate (Briggs & Feve 2013; Radicalisation Awareness Network 2018; Reed 2017; Reed et al. 2017).

Beyond the notion outlined above that messages should be either positive or negative in nature, Ingram goes deeper by presenting five key themes of both positive and negative messaging. The themes of positive messaging are known as the 5As: Absorb, Advise, Activate, Anchor, and Assure and the themes of negative messaging are the 5Ds: Divided, Disabused, Disillusioned, Directionless, and Discouraged (Ingram 2016b). Each of the ten themes offer different tactics to persuade the audience and further description can be found in Figure 3 below. Both the 5As and the 5Ds can be used to both instil pragmatic- and identity-choices in their intended audience, and ought to be deployed both offensively and defensively. Importantly, if the 5As and 5Ds are 'deployed effectively and across a coherent campaign plan, [they] may have a self-reinforcing effect that can deliver beneficial returns' (Ingram 2016b, p.13). A simple example of this could be a number of negative messages which highlight the atrocities of Daesh (Disabused – Pragmatic), which are augmented by positive stories which highlight community resilience to these atrocities (Absorb – Identity).

Figure 3: The 5As of positive messaging and the 5Ds of negative messaging

5As	Purpose of Theme
Absorb	Target audience is part of a positive and worthwhile community (emphasis on collective identity).
Advise	Clarity about how pertinent issues/events affect target audiences.
Activate	Promote how participation in collective/community has benefits for individual and collective.
Anchor	Target audiences are characterised by a range of individual identities and behaviours that are positive and worthwhile (emphasis on individual identity).
Assure	The facts support the positive claims/activities of the messenger (e.g. government).

5Ds	Purpose of Theme
Divided	Violent extremists disagree on key elements of movement.
Disabused	The facts undermine our view of the violent extremists.
Disillusioned	Participation in violent extremism does not deliver on promises.
Directionless	Violent extremists do not have a clear and tangible agenda.
Discouraged	Violent extremist ultimately cannot win.

The factors outlined above form the principles of message design for Ingram's framework: instilling pragmatic- or rational choice; offensive or defensive deployment; and positive or negative messages (with the themes of the 5As and 5Ds respectively), summarised in Figure 4. These should be applied based on the message designer's assessment of the target audience, i.e. if one's target is a curious audience then messages should be split between

positive and negative, as well as pragmatic and identity, and priority given to offensive over defensive messages. However, if one is targeting active supporters, priority should be given to negative messages, split between pragmatic and identity, and a higher prevalence towards defensive messages (Ingram 2016b).

Figure 4: Message categories, subcategories and themes.



Beyond the fundamentals of message design, Ingram also suggests that one of the most important parts of an effective campaign is leveraging the "say-do" gap; a fundamental part of strategic communications in which one 'exacerbate[s] the disparity between an enemy's words and actions whilst showing the close alignment of one's own words and action' (Ingram 2016b, p.7). The clearest contemporary example of this is raised by Archetti, who notes:

> Could the very existence of the Guantanamo Bay prison and the killing of civilians resulting from the increasing use of drones in Muslim countries be undermining "our" own narrative? How credible, in the light of what is happening in Cuba and Afghanistan, is the claim that Western countries are democracies that value individual freedoms and human rights? (Archetti 2015, pp.55–56).

This requires messaging to not stand alone, but to be coordinated with actions, such as P/CVE initiatives on the ground, and moreover, to be aware of how one is perceived as a message deliverer. Ingram notes that 'Western government-led … efforts that focus on "reconstructing" Muslim identities and even Islamic ideology are more likely to be counter-productive… [But] it is important for Muslim practitioners to attack the jurisprudential credibility of violent extremists' (Ingram 2016b, p.15). This is in line with many academics and practitioners who advise, when designing campaigns, to choose a credible messenger (Ingram 2016b).

A final relevant suggestion that Ingram offers is the collection of messages for the purposes of monitoring, measurement, and evaluation (MME). He advises that the message categories described above are appropriate for the collection of data and can be subdivided inter-thematically to assess the amount in which categories are produced within an individual campaign (e.g. divided/pragmatic or disabused-identity) (Ingram 2016b). Dichotomising message data in 'a framework of interlocking elements facilitates metric collection across message categories and themes help[s] improve decision making' (Ingram 2016b, p.15). That is to say, it offers a possibility to define metrics for success and to make comparative assessments to guide campaigns and message design strategies. These categories could, for example, be analysed alongside metrics for reach and impact to identify type of messages resonate with different target audiences. As outlined below, much of the literature in this field offers practical advice on the creation of strategic communications, but few offer as much depth as Ingram's framework, meaning that using the campaign tactics as variables in MME may offer a deeper understanding of the effectiveness of strategic communications in P/CVE.

This framework is best-suited as a lens for exploration for two reasons. Firstly, it is sophisticated and nuanced, offering a large number of campaign principles, which can be used as data points to code, creating the potential for more depth and larger explanatory power. A good example of this is, as discussed below, the different sub-themes of positive and negative messaging, which allow for unique depth in assessing the composition of messages. Secondly, there is a growing body of literature which utilises Ingram's framework (discussed below). So

far, this has been done in either a theoretical or prescriptive manner; this research adds an empirical and descriptive element, while also creating a theoretical construct of campaigns which can be utilised in future research and monitoring, measurement, and evaluation (MME).

Previous Research

Analyses of strategic communications in P/CVE

Despite the growth of strategic communications within P/CVE, the knowledge as to the efficacy of messages remains limited (Lindekilde 2012; Briggs & Feve 2013; Macnair & Frank 2017; Reed et al. 2017; Mattei & Zeiger 2018) and that it is possible that they may be counter-productive in certain circumstances (Alava et al. 2017; Hemmingsen & Castro 2017; Ingram 2016b; Schmid 2013). Ferguson notes that:

> Today there are numerous NGOs pursuing CVE counter-narrative projects, and many are doing so without research-driven position papers, an evidence base, or even a theory of change that sets out measurable objectives. (Ferguson 2016, p.9)

This is a problematic place for message designers; there is little knowledge as to the efficacy of campaigns and our underlying ethical norms should always be "first, do no harm".[3] To fulfil this ethical norm, campaigns must be able to effectively monitor, measure, and evaluate to ascertain whether their interventions are doing more good than harm. To make matters more difficult, Mattei and Zeiger note that not only is there a lack of resources dedicated to MME, but that where it does exist, a lack of an international framework makes comparison between different initiatives difficult (Mattei & Zeiger 2018)

[3] The authors accept that there is a complex debate, beyond the scope of this research, as to whether doing nothing is also a moral decision.

There are some data-driven studies which analyse the design and content of messages. However, those that do exist tend to focus on good practice rather than investigations into the manner in which themes are deployed. Examples of this can be found in three of the reports of the Hedayah Center; Zeiger (2016) and (2018), and Elsayed, Faris, and Zeiger (2017) compile P/CVE strategic communications specific to three regions – South-East Asia, East Africa, and the Middle East and North Africa respectively – to create compendia of existing communications to go alongside a nine-step "How-To" guide. Messages are demarcated according to the suggestions in the step dedicated to developing the content and logic of messages, such as "Positive or Alternative Narratives," "Emotional or Ethical Narratives," "Exposing Myths and Misinformation," "Humour or Sarcastic Counter-Narratives," and "Religious or Ideological Narratives." The compendia contain both single-messages and larger, multi-message campaigns and offers qualitative descriptions using in-depth case studies to 'to provide guidance and insight for practitioners, policymakers, governments and civil society organizations… to inform and inspire these actors to utilize the most effective methods and strategies' (Zeiger 2016, p.1). The case studies are further demarcated by target audience, messenger, medium, as well as a qualitative description.

Similarly, the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) offers a range of approaches and practices to P/CVE including "Delivering counter – or alternative narratives." As with the Hedayah reports, the RAN research is focused on providing best practices for would-be message designers, this time offering a five step guide of important factors (Radicalisation Awareness Network 2018). It offers eighteen different practices which are reviewed with a qualitative description as well as demarcated categories for message design such as "Approach" and "Target Audience." This is offered for the practice itself, rather than individual campaigns. This mirrors the work for Briggs and Feve, who in their review of counter-narratives offer a number of practices with a qualitative description and demarcated in three types (alternative narrative, counter narrative, and government communication) (Briggs & Feve 2013). Similarly, both Reynolds and Tuck (2016) and Ramalingam (2014) offer reports pertaining to strategic communications in P/CVE, while offering case studies

which are described qualitatively. In a report assessing the MME of three counter-narrative campaigns, Silverman et al (2016) collect data on multi-message campaigns, while too focusing on the differences between individual messages, which are described qualitatively. As with the Hedayah reports, these pieces of research do not seek to quantitatively analyse a corpus of P/CVE strategic communications, yet they remain the best outlets for the grouping of existing messages.

From the small amount of empirical research in this field, some inferences can be drawn. Firstly, there is a small amount of acquired knowledge as to the effectiveness of P/CVE strategic communications campaigns which has a negative effective on the ability to robustly monitor, measure, and evaluate. Secondly, there are a small number of studies that collect and organise message data, but they mostly group data into descriptive categories. Thirdly, despite these categorisations, no research has yet sought to analyse the data quantitatively to assess the techniques that messages use as part of campaigns. Fourthly, most publications on this topic come from practitioner authors, rather than academic ones. Finally, where data are collected, there is often a conflation between single messages and full campaigns. If full campaigns are demarcated into the same categories as messages, then the potential for understanding nuances within campaigns is lost.

Ingram's "System of Meaning" and Linkages

There has been a growing body of research which draws from the idea of a "competitive system of meaning" in recent years. Ingram develops the concept fully in his 2016 ICCT research paper *Deciphering the Siren Call of Militant Islamist Propaganda: Meaning, Credibility & Behavioural Change,* also using it to analyse Daesh information operations (Ingram 2015b; Ingram 2016c; Ingram 2018; Reed & Ingram 2017), as well as analyses of the messaging in the online magazines of the Taliban, Daesh, and al-Qaeda (Ingram 2015a). The concept was also used as a part of Berger's *Extremist Construction of Identity,* in which examines the ideological shifts in the history of a white supremacist movement (Berger 2017c). Finally, Reed and Dowling use the concept to explore historical

propaganda narratives in the context of Islamist groups, white supremacist groups, and the Irish Republican movement (Reed & Dowling 2018). There has been little empirical research pertaining to Ingram's linkage-based approach. Beyond the research in which he sets out the framework (Ingram 2016b) and another which outlines the strategic logic (Ingram 2017), Berger draws from it in for analyses which deconstruct and undermine Daesh propaganda (Berger 2017b; Berger 2017a). There is no research which develops Ingram's framework into a methodology and empirically analyses existing P/CVE strategic communications, and as a result, nor any which creates theoretical constructs from such findings.

Methodology

The aim of this research is to explore a corpus of P/CVE strategic communications within the fundamentals of Ingram's linkages framework to ascertain whether valuable insights regarding the delivery of campaigns can be gained. To this end, data are selected from a range of campaigns in the period 2014-2017; a codebook created drawing from the Ingram's framework; and data are analysed using descriptive and bivariate statistical tests. From this data, a cluster analysis is employed to help form "ideal types" of strategies which are used in campaigns.

Exploratory Research

The research is exploratory in nature – this is not a theory of Ingram's that is being tested, nor is there a single or set of hypotheses. Rather, it is a way of assessing whether Ingram's set of principles offer a lens into the ways in which P/CVE strategic communications are delivered. Stebbins notes that 'researchers explore when they have little or no scientific knowledge about the group, process, activity, or situation they want to examine but nevertheless have reason to believe it contains elements worth discovering' (Stebbins 2001, p.6) The above mentioned lack of scientific knowledge regarding the efficacy of P/CVE campaigns has been well-documented as a problem within the field (Briggs & Feve

2013; Macnair & Frank 2017; Lindekilde 2012; Reed et al. 2017; Mattei & Zeiger 2018). Exploration is the first of a multi-stage process in which the researchers inductively derive generalisations about the phenomenon being observed (Stebbins 2001).

Data

Data are identified in in the "Counter Narrative Library," hosted online by the Hedayah Center. The library is, to our knowledge, the largest collection of counter and alternative narratives in existence, providing practitioners with relevant resources and promoting good practice (Hedayah Center 2019). Within the library, two sections were drawn upon for selection, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and the Daesh Defector collections. A report on the MENA collection, written by Elsayed, Faris, and Zeiger (2016) was also consulted for further information about the data. A large number of the resources in the library are singular messages and not explicitly mentioned as part of a larger campaign. However, as Ingram's framework outlines a strategy for campaigns rather than single messages, data are selected on the basis of being multi-message campaigns.

There is a degree of ambiguity with regards to what is meant by the word "campaign" within strategic communications. Firstly, the lengths of time for which a campaign can run often differ dramatically: some campaigns are short and well-defined as such, while others may last for years and are open-ended. Secondly, in a similar vein, some campaigns have dozens of messages while others have few. Thirdly, different campaigns use a number of online platforms, while others do not. Fourthly, campaigns utilise different languages, and fifthly, campaigns stem from a number of different types of messenger. Given that the analysis is exploratory in nature, campaigns are selected on the basis of diversity for the following factors: a variety of different lengths of campaign (both in relation to time and number of messages); use of online social media platform (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, or a combination); language (English, Arabic, or both); and by messenger (governmental and civil society actors). This method of selection is not representative, however, Stebbins argues that 'to explore effectively a given phenomenon, [researchers] must approach it with two special

orientations: *flexibility* in looking for data and *open-mindedness* about where to find them' (Stebbins 2001, p.6). Given this, campaigns are selected on the basis of fulfilling the above criteria.

In total, data for ten campaigns are collected (Table 1, Annex); a total of 197 unique messages or 219 messages including English/Arabic duplicates.

Coding

For this research, we developed a codebook from the analytical framework from Ingram's "Linkage-based" approach, identifying 21 different variables relating to the intended target audience, as well as a number of tactics which are employed in message design.

Data are collected via online messages and therefore are more focused on the first of the two tiers of Ingram's framework. The public and open nature of social media platforms support 'address[ing] a broad target audience spectrum from "antis" to "engaged"' (Ingram 2016b, p.8) Although the second tier does utilise strategic communications, it does so both online and offline, and also uses 'disruption strategies against online and offline violent extremist networks' (Ingram 2016b, p.9). It is worth noting that this research only discusses publicly available online counter-messaging and therefore is not a full interpretation of Ingram's framework.

The variables in the codebook were created on the basis of the strategies offered by Ingram for creating resonating messages. Firstly, the intended audience of the message is identified and graded on a five point scale (Antis, Curious, Engaged, Tacit Supporters, Active Supporters). Secondly, it is discerned whether the message utilises positive messaging, and if it does, whether it uses any of the five As (Absorb, Advise, Activate, Anchor, Assure). Thirdly, whether the message utilises negative messaging, and if so, whether it uses any of the five Ds (Divided, Disabused, Disillusioned, Directionless, Discouraged). Fourthly, it is established whether the message is designed to instil a pragmatic choice in its intended audience, and fifthly, whether it offers an identity choice. Sixthly, it is established whether the message is offensive or defensive in nature. Finally, it became apparent when collecting data

that campaigns were predominantly two languages; English and Arabic. We conjecture that there may be instructive findings based on the language in which the message is delivered so we coded for this too.

The intended audience, the 5As, and 5Ds are all multiple response sets. It is also worth noting that many variables that may seem at first glance to be dichotomous are not; messages can instil both pragmatic and identity-choice techniques; they can be both positive and negative; and they can be intended towards multiple targets. The only variable for which this is not the case is offensive/defensive. We judge that that any response to violent extremists' narrative causes the whole message to become defensive because the premise of the message is still set by the original narrative; this is discussed in more detail below. An example of the codebook can be found in Table 2 (Annex).

In order to effectively code the data the researcher must be able to determine whether a criterion is fulfilled without excessive ambiguity; as such, to code in favour of one variable it must be explicitly stated in the text, video or represented visually. For example, to code the positive messaging variable "Absorb", which focuses on the audience's collective identity being worthwhile and positive, the message must mention the community specifically and explicitly mention something positive. This strategy has a limitation; messages are often effective *because* they are subtle and not explicit. This is particularly the case with identity-choice messaging. Despite this limitation, we believe that a criterion of explicitness is the only way data can be collected in a systematic manner. Put simply, a coder is too likely to project many of their own biases into interpreting what a message means beyond what is explicitly stated.

In a similar vein, to code a message as "Defensive" rather than "Offensive," the message must be a response to a stated and explicit violent extremist narrative, rather than specific actions. Messages that respond to actions – such as an infographic highlighting the number Muslims Daesh have killed – are "Offensive" because they do not respond to a stated violent extremist narrative. This creates a number of potential grey areas in which messages could be construed as responses to well-known violent extremist narratives – for example, the

above example could be offered as a response to the well-established Daesh narrative that life in their occupied territories is better for Muslims. As with the wider dataset, to code a message as "Defensive," it must explicitly state the narrative to which it is responding. Again, although some narratives are well-known, to code for unnamed narratives would place too much discretion in the hands of the coder. By way of an example, while the above example is "Offensive," if it were to state: "Daesh claim they are helping Muslims, but they have killed thousands since 2014," it would be "Defensive." Again, the authors understand that a degree of nuance is lost using this method. However, given the vast array of violent extremist narratives, it would be too easy to code any message as a response.

Finally, messages were coded by both authors. The first three campaigns were coded together, and further campaigns were coded separately. However, the coders sat next to each other throughout the process and remained in open dialogue throughout discussing difficult cases until they came to agreement.

Methods

To analyse this corpus of messages, we use descriptive and bivariate statistical tests. Firstly, the frequencies with which each of the categories occur, offering a view of whether any of the variables are represented to either a high or low degree within the sample. Secondly, bivariate tests are used such as Pearson's chi-square test and Fisher's exact test (where appropriate). These tests compare the frequencies between two categories to the frequencies which one might expect given a random distribution (Field 2018), testing the relationship between different variables.

After bivariate analyses, we undertake a cluster analysis, which explores datasets 'to assess whether or not they can be summarised meaningfully in terms of relatively small numbers of groups…which resemble each other and which are different [from other clusters]' (Everitt et al. 2010, p.13). In other words, cluster analysis is an exploratory technique which can be used to generate hypotheses, rather than testing them (Pell & Hargreaves 2011). In this

regard, systematising groups of messages allows us to discover discernible patterns which we can develop into Weberian "ideal-type" campaigns. Ideal-types are formed:

> By the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged accordingly to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct (Weber, quoted in Macdonald, 2008, pp. 267–268)

Ideal-type campaigns can be used both as grounds for future research into CVE strategic communications as well as typographically for exposition. For example, practitioners can create campaigns within different ideal type archetypes and judge their effectiveness as part of MME.

For this we use SPSS's two-step cluster analysis, which relies on a log-likelihood distance measure to place a probability distribution on the variables. As we do not know in advance how many clusters are to be determined, clustering analyses such as *k*-means are inappropriate, and, according to IBM, two-step clustering should be favoured over hierarchical clustering for binary-valued data because, for the latter, 'the resulting clusters tend to be arbitrary, and are sensitive to the order that cases are present in the file.' (IBM 2016).

The clusters on their own will, however, not constitute ideal-types. Rather, as emphasised in the quote above, they are a pure theoretical construct created both from the qualities that present within the clusters, as well as what is *not* present compared to other clusters. As such, a qualitative interpretation is required to accentuate the features of the ideal types from the results of the cluster analysis.

Results

Descriptive

With regards to target audience, we observe that the messages are skewered towards the less-radical end of the intended audience scale. In fact, there are fewer messages in each category. Of the 197 unique messages, we deem 100% to target Antis,[4] 85.8% for Curious, 46.7% Engaged, 12.2% Tacit Supports, and 0.5% Active Supporters. The prevalence of the messages towards less-engaged is somewhat intuitive given we collected public social media message data, which is predominantly in Ingram's first tier. The second tier, which typically targets Tacit and Active Supporters, is focused around network disruption and face-to-face interventions, rather than public message campaigns (Ingram 2016b). This suggests that the message designers of this sample hold a similar belief that a social media message campaign is unlikely to dissuade anyone mostly or fully committed to an ideology, but can be more effectively used to raise awareness or dissuade those on the periphery.[5]

We find there to be an exactly equal distribution of Positive and Negative messages: 132 instances in total each (67%). Breaking that number down, there is a relatively even distribution of the 5As – all five are present between 21.8% and 34.5% of the time, suggesting a range of different techniques used to deliver Positive messages. On the other hand, the 5Ds of Negative messages were very heavily slanted towards one technique – Disabused – which was present in over half of the messages, while the other four were all used less than in 15% of cases. We find this to be instructive because it suggests that where messages are critical of violent extremists, they focus on their evil actions, rather than their incompetence or dishonesty. Given the unprecedented terror threat to the MENA region at the time from Daesh

[4] The reason for this is that Ingram suggests that 'effective messaging may be supported or disseminated by antis.' That is to say, even when messages are clearly targeted at those already engaging in 'a violent extremist "system of meaning," Antis can be involved in spreading the message. (Ingram 2016b, p.10)
[5] The question of the best audience to target CVE interventions is an interesting one. McCants suggests that law-abiding and incarcerated, rather than currently active, supporters of extremist groups may be the most appropriate target, but is pessimistic about the possibility of changing minds that, in Ingram's words, have already adopted an extremist system of meaning (McCants 2012).

and Jabhat al Nursa, highlighting atrocities seems to make intuitive sense. However, it is also plausible that this low-hanging fruit could be counter-productive. At the heart of this question is Jenkins' seminar argument of "terrorism as theatre", in which he argues that such violence is not mindless or random, but are 'carefully choreographed to attract the attention of the electronic media and the international press…[it] is aimed at the people watching, not the actual victims' (Jenkins 1974). To put it in Ingram's terms, violent extremist groups' solutions to perceived crises is usually to commit violence against the out-group. To highlight this may be doing their communicative job for them; Reed and Ingram suggest that a "first rule" of P/CVE strategic communications should be "do violent extremist propagandists no favours" (Reed & Ingram 2019). On this reading, message designers should be concerned with inadvertently amplifying acts of terror within their target audience.

We also observe a large majority of Offensive (85.8%) messages over Defensive ones (14.2%). This suggests that message creators seem to heed the prevailing wisdom within P/CVE strategic communications that warns of giving too much "oxygen" to extremist narratives and allowing violent extremists to control the debate (Briggs & Feve 2013; Braddock & Horgan 2016; Ingram & Reed 2016; Reed et al. 2017). This is an important finding because, in recent years, some campaigns have been criticised for being too reactive to extreme narratives. An example of this is the US State Department's "Think Again Turn Away" campaign in 2013, which openly debated Daesh and al-Qaeda supporters on Twitter, offering them a sizable platform and responded to questions on issues such as Abu Ghraib prison, which is undoubtedly a poor strategic choice of topic for the US Government to engage (Katz, 2014). We believe that our sample not relying on Defensive messages is an optimistic finding and is theoretically sound.

Bivariate[6]

An important bivariate finding is a significant correlation between the language of the messenger and whether the message attempts to instil an Identity or a Pragmatic-choice. English language messages are 5.39 times more likely[7] to be Pragmatic and 0.33 times less likely to be Identity.[8] The opposite holds for Arabic language messages, which are 2.37 times more likely to instil an Identity-choice[9] and 0.37 times as likely to be Pragmatic.[10] In short, messages in English tend to be Pragmatic, while messages in Arabic tend to be Identity. We are optimistic about this finding too; it is a long-established norm that narratives ought to be delivered by a credible messenger (Elsayed et al. 2017; Tuck & Silverman 2016; Briggs & Feve 2013; Ferguson 2016; Comerford & Bryson 2017). While language itself is not a messenger, it is a messenger's tool that is related to identity at the most fundamental level. There is a linguistic hegemony of the English language around the world that is related to both British and American interventions around the world, especially in the Middle East. Given this, it seems prudent to carefully construct campaigns so that Arabic messages speak to issues of identity, while leaving English messages, where appropriate, to deliver facts and cost/benefit scenarios relating to the temporal world, so long as they are aware of the "Say/Do Gap".

The relationship between the target audiences and Positive and Negative messages also reveals instructive findings. Although the response of Antis tells us nothing of statistical importance (because 100% of messages were deemed to target that group), we find that messages becoming increasingly less Positive the further they move from Curious through to Tacit Supporters, while, at the same time, become more Negative. We feel that the message-creators in this sample are of a similar persuasion to Ingram, who suggests that Tier 1 – aimed primarily at Antis, Curious, and Engaged – should be a mix of Positive and Negative

[6] For full reporting of all significant correlations with X^2 values, p values, and odds ratios, see Tables 3-7 in appendix.
[7] ($X^2 = 17.80$, $p < 0.00$)
[8] ($X^2 = 5.74$, $p < 0.017$)
[9] ($X^2 = 7.77$, $p < 0.005$)
[10] ($X^2 = 6.89$, $p < 0.009$)

messages, while Tier 2 – targeting Tacit and Active Supporters – should rely on negative messages to trigger behavioural changes away from support (Ingram 2016b).

Bivariate analysis of the 5As and 5Ds show why having a nuanced framework with a number of variables can be advantageous in understanding messages. As discussed above, Positive messages appear in two-thirds of messages and the 5As are roughly evenly split between frequencies of 21.8% and 34%. However, the relationship between Pragmatic and Identity-choice shows that the 5As are being used in different ways. Two are significantly correlated with Pragmatic-choice,[11] while three are with Identity-choice.[12] While it may seem at first glance like the 5As are being used equally, they are being deployed to achieve separate goals. We also observed that these messages can work together in tandem; during coding we observed that many messages are both Advise and Assure. From a strategic communications perspective this makes intuitive sense, first 'offering clarity about how pertinent issues/events affect target audiences' (Ingram 2016b, p.13) before offering 'facts [which] support the positive claims/activities of the messenger' (Ingram 2016b, p.13). In other words, it is a "one-two punch" that highlights facts relevant to the community while highlighting that a friendly partner is helping.

With regards to Negative messages and the 5Ds, the interesting finding relates to the Offensive/Defensive dichotomy. For Negative as a whole, messages are 15.7 times more likely to be Defensive.[13] When looking at the distribution of the 5Ds, we can see that four of the five variables (Divided, Disabused, Disillusioned, and Directionless) are significantly correlated with Defensive (Discouraged had no significance with either). This makes sense; when it is appropriate to respond to a violent extremist narrative, one should be negative in nature. However, because Disabused makes up such a large part of the sample of the 5Ds (51.8%), it is worthy to note that being Negative is spread across most of the variables, rather than the whole corpus being skewered by Disabused.

[11] (Advise $X^2 = 19.63$, $p < 0.00$; and Assure $X^2 = 12.49$, $p < 0.00$)
[12] (Absorb $X^2 = 34.55$, $p < 0.00$; Activate $X^2 = 21.17$, $p < 0.00$; and Anchor $X^2 = 44.37$, $p < 0.00$)
[13] ($X^2 = 12.14$, $p < 0.00$)

Cluster Analysis

Next, we undertake an exploratory cluster analysis to ascertain whether specific combinations of variables can describe the data and help in the creation of ideal types of P/CVE strategic communication campaigns.

The analysis yielded five clusters ranging from 51 to 25 messages. The results are displayed in Table 8 (Annex). In terms of importance, the Offensive/Defensive distinction and whether the messages contained Positive elements or not were most influential in sorting the clusters. Least important were the high and low frequency variables such as being targeted at Active Supporters and Antis.

The largest group of messages, Cluster 1 (displayed in Figure 5), is entirely Offensive, and contains no Positive messages. Not only are the all the messages Negative, but are almost entirely Disabused. The messages are overwhelmingly Pragmatic, but the majority are also Identity. The first three levels of target audience are well-represented (Antis, Curious, and Engaged), but is also the highest number of Tacit Supporters in any of the clusters, and the only appearance of Active Supporters. Given the above discussion of the use of Disabused tactics on general populations, it makes sense that when used, it targets the more extreme end of the spectrum. Both English and Arabic-language messages appear in a majority of messages.

Cluster 3 (Figure 6) is overwhelmingly Offensive and entirely Positive, but almost half the messages are Negative too. All of the 5As are present, but Activate is used in almost every message. The most utilised of the 5Ds is Disabused, which appeared in most of the Negative messages. Both Pragmatic and Identity are present in the vast majority of messages. This cluster is almost entirely in English and fewer than one in five messages are in Arabic and primarily targets Antis and Curious.

The third-largest group is Cluster 4 (Figure 7); it is entirely Offensive and entirely focuses on Pragmatic-choice. It does this by using Positive themes in every case and Negative themes in two-thirds. It does this by using the one-two punch of Assure and Advise in almost every message. This is augmented by using Disabused and Discouraged in around half of the

Negative messages. This sample is entirely English and not Arabic and targeted at Antis and Curious.

Cluster 2 (Figure 8) relies on Defensive messages, which are also entirely Negative. All of the 5Ds are present, but Disabused and Directionless are the only two that appear in the majority of messages. Half the messages are Positive, which are made up of Anchor, Activate, and Absorb. It targets up to Engaged audience members in almost every case. The cluster uses both Pragmatic and Identity in a large majority of messages, and they are primarily in English. Finally, Cluster 5 (Figure 9) is almost entirely Offensive, Positive and is barely Negative. Every message contains Identity-choice techniques and only a fraction instil a Pragmatic-choice. Unlike, Cluster 4, which focuses on the Assure/Advise combination, this group draws primarily from Anchor and Absorb, as well a large minority from Activate. Both Arabic and English messages are well-represented and the first three audience levels are represented in a majority of cases.

Ideal Types

From this descriptive analysis of factors which are present in each cluster, we qualitatively form five distinct ideal types. Rather than simply the aggregation or average of the existing variables, we seek to construct the purest theoretical forms that are present in each of the clusters both from what is present and what is missing. Hence, we name the five clusters as follows:

Cluster 1: “Aggressive”

Cluster 2: “Argumentative”

Cluster 3: “Assertive”

Cluster 4: “Know it all”

Cluster 5: “Identity-builder”

Cluster 1: "Aggressive"

The ideal type that is accentuated here is centred around the strategy of highlighting an opponent's atrocities by any means necessary, playing on both rationality and pragmatism. It does not respond to violent extremism narratives, but it does respond to *actions*. This strategy does not hold back from speaking to those that have adopted a violent extremist "system of meaning" and is the only ideal type that speaks to those that may be actively supporting violent extremist groups.

Cluster 2: "Argumentative"

This is the only cluster which relies on Defensive messages, and as such as the defining feature of this ideal type. It identifies and states a violent extremist narrative and explains why it is wrong. These responses are negative, highlighting an array of reasons why the narrative and actions of the group are flawed. However, this is augmented with some messages of positivity and appeals to both identity and pragmatism are utilised.

Cluster 3: "Assertive"

"Assertive" is a strategy which employs a mix of positivity and negativity, but with priority being given to the former. As with "Aggressive", it highlights the atrocities of violent extremist groups, but it counteracts it with a call to action of average people to engage and flourish within their community. Rather than trying to dissuade those on the verge of engagement with violent extremism, it is more broadly focused on the general population and those who may be vulnerable to it.

Cluster 4: "Know it all"

The defining feature of this ideal type is the complete reliance on a rational cost/benefit analysis that it attempts to instil in its audience. It highlights the problem and the solutions and in doing so, tries to sell to its audience – which does not consist of those who

have engaged with a violent extremist system of meaning – that they should throw their support behind the messenger.

Cluster 5: "Identity-builder"

"Identity builder" is, in many ways, the opposite of "Know it all". Where the latter instils a cost/benefit analysis, the former is focused on instilling a sense of identity in its audience. These are messages of positivity that may not even make mention of violent extremism, but rather focus on stories about the empowerment of the target audiences' community or highlighting the range of different individual characteristics.

These five ideal types are not necessarily exhaustive – rather they point to a way to describe the results of an exploration into a corpus of messages. However, creating such typologies offer a contribution to the field as a part of MME, which is discussed below.

Future Research and Practice

The purpose of this research is to offer insight and mechanisms to improve knowledge and methods within the field of P/CVE strategic communications. Below we offer three ways in which this research can be built upon by others.

Testing the findings as hypotheses in future research

This exploratory analysis has offered a number of tentative findings relating to the construction of campaigns. However, the sample was deliberately not chosen to be representative; it focused on one region; two languages; and selected data from a single source. The following findings can be tested as hypotheses against other samples to increase the knowledge of message design:

1. P/CVE campaigns have a tendency to highlight atrocities rather than the incompetency or hypocrisy of groups.

2. The vast majority of messages in campaigns are offensive, rather than defensive, in nature.
3. Arabic messengers appeal more to identity, while English-languages messengers appeal more to pragmatism.
4. Messages become more negative as they reach a more extreme target audience.

To establish whether these findings are present within this small sample or offer a greater insight across different parts of the world, languages, and violent extremist target groups will offer a stronger understanding of how campaigns and messages are constructed. While we believe Ingram's framework is a useful tool for this, testing these hypotheses can be done in a number of different ways.

Using the methodology for MME

As outlined above, there is a lack of scientific knowledge of the efficacy of P/CVE strategic communications, which creates ethical issues in implementing interventions. Furthermore, as Mattei and Zeiger observe, there is no international framework for practitioners to compare results against, which halts our ability to gain knowledge (Mattei & Zeiger 2018). By using Ingram's framework as a methodology for MME, practitioners can better categorise their efforts to establish which parts are effective and which are not. Ingram notes that:

> By placing messaging categories and themes into a framework, it then becomes possible to define metrics for success, collect data and make comparative assessments to guide campaign and message design strategies (Ingram 2016b, p.19)

Rather than testing whether a full campaign has led to a change in behaviour or belief, introducing specific message types will allow for a more nuanced understanding of messages within a campaign. For example, asking for specific feedback in a focus group on a range of

messages such as Disabused/Identity versus Assure/Pragmatic versus Disillusioned/Defensive. Establishing, specifically, what does and does not work will help practitioners better understand their target audiences, and as a result, create more ethical interventions.

Using ideal types as a part of MME

As well as being helpful at the granular level of campaign and message design, we believe that the use of ideal types can be valuable to MME at the theoretical level too. As noted above, exploratory research is the first of a multi-stage process (Stebbins 2001); utilising the data to form theoretical constructs is a useful second step. We identified five distinct ideal types that appeared within the corpus of messages that rely on a different combination of techniques from within Ingram's framework. Practitioners can create campaigns that conform to these, or other, ideal types that can be tested for efficacy. For example, pitting an "Aggressive" strategy – which is focused on highlighting a violent extremist group's atrocities, utilising offensive messages and both rationality and pragmatism – against an "Argumentative" strategy which is far more reliant on negative, defensive messages. It is worth reiterating that ideal types are loosely constructed and their purpose is to aid exposition by helping campaign designers explain what strategies and tactics they are employing according to their goals.

Conclusion and Limitations

P/CVE strategic communications remains a nascent research field. While there is a great deal of theorised advice or best practice as to the best way of constructing narratives and campaigns, there remains little research which collects and analyses such messages. We develop Ingram's *Linkage-Based Framework* into a methodology for an exploratory analysis of over 200 messages from 10 multi-message social media campaigns, offering a glimpse of

"what is out there". In some instances, campaigns seem to follow the strategic logic of Ingram and others, such as: the prioritisation of offensive messages over defensive ones; public social media campaigns being aimed towards less extreme target audiences; as well as becoming more negative when speaking to a more extreme audience. Other findings go beyond what is discussed in the literature, for example: a prevalence towards messages that highlight violent extremist groups' atrocities; the popularity of Arabic language messages which instil an identity-choice in their target audience and English language messages instilling a pragmatic-choice; as well as the breakdown of different types of positive and negative messages and their relationship to identity/pragmatic-choice and offensive and defensive messages.

We also use a cluster analysis to group together messages by different variables in an attempt to create Weberian ideal types –theoretical constructs of different campaigns we identify five distinct clusters which we qualitatively interpret into ideal types. These five ideal types are not exhaustive, but rather, different ways to typologise and describe the data which we analysed. This research has at least three useful contributions: Firstly, the exploratory analysis has created a number of testable hypotheses which can be answered in future research, which will aid the knowledge gap in how messages are created. Secondly, the methodology which is devised from Ingram's framework can be used by practitioners as a part of effective MME, and thirdly, the ideal types identified can be useful theoretical constructs for practitioners to describe and explain their different approaches to message design.

There are, however, a number of limitations that are worthy of mention. Our dataset was generated from a single source – the Hedayah Counter-Narrative Library – and focuses on campaigns that have generated enough interest to be included. As a result, it is skewered towards institutional forms of counter messaging and ignores more organic, informal messages (Lee 2018). The same limitation can be noted in relation to our decision to collect exclusively online messages. There are a number of P/CVE strategic communications – both institutional and informal – that exist beyond the world of social media that may paint an entirely different picture. More broadly, creating a quantitative codebook from qualitative

coding can be a blunt instrument. The authors only coded a variable as present if there was an explicit reason to do so. This can be problematic because an effective message may be so because it is subtle, especially if it is instilling an identity-choice. However, we deem this the only way in which we could code the data with any degree of rigour. Despite these limitations, we believe that the above analyses offer an important contribution to the nascent empirical field of P/CVE strategic communications.

Funding Acknowledgment:

The research for this article was supported by Santander's Universities Network Staff Mobility Award. Views given reflect the positions of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of Santander.

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Annex: Tables

Table 1: CVE Strategic Communications Campaigns

Name	Messenger	Date	Formats	Language	Platform	Number of Messages
Life Without Extremism	ETIDAL (Government)	15/06/2017 – 24/06/2017	Video, Text, Infographic, Picture	English	Twitter, YouTube	15
Iraq Stabilisation	Global Coalition Against	21/04/2017 – 27/04/2017	Video, Text, Infographic, Picture	English	Twitter	20

	Daesh (Government)					
Daesh Fraud	Sawab Center (Government)	10/07/2017 – 13/07/2017	Video, Text, Infographic, Picture	English, Arabic	Twitter	34
What British Muslims Really Do	Imams Online (Civil Society)	23/03/2017 – 14/06/2017	Video	English	YouTube	9
The Abdullah X Show	Abdullah X (Civil Society)	23/02/2014 – 12/10/2016	Video	English	YouTube	20
Mosul Liberation	Global Coalition Against Daesh (Government)	03/07/2017 – 29/07/2017	Text, Infographic, Picture, External Link	English	Twitter	38
Not Another Brother	Qulliam Foundation (Civil Society)	22/07/2015 – 12/08/2015	Video, Text, Infographic, External Link	English	YouTube, Twitter	14
What's Your Story?	Taadudiya (Civil Society)	Summer 2015 – Jan 2018	Video, Text	Arabic	Facebook, YouTube, Twitter	6
Imams Against ISIS	Imams Online (Civil Society)	11/07/2014 – 22/02/2015	Video	English	YouTube	8
Your Family Is Your Life	Sawab Center (Government)	25/10/2016 – 28/10/2016	Text, Video, Picture, Infographic	English, Arabic	Twitter, YouTube	35

Table 2: Codebook

Variable	**Response**	**If Yes**
Audience	1- Antis 2- Curious 3- Engaged 4- Tacit Supporters 5- Active Supporters	
Positive	Y/N	a) Absorb b) Advise c) Activate d) Anchor e) Assure

Negative	Y/N	a) Divided b) Disabused c) Disillusioned d) Directionless e) Discouraged
Pragmatic	Y/N	
Identity	Y/N	
Offensive/Defensive	O/D	
English Language	Y/N	
Arabic Language	Y/N	

Table 3: Significant correlations of primary variables

Variables Tested	X^2 Value	Significance	Odds Ratio
Pragmatic * Negative	15.75	.000	4.31
Identity-choice * Defensive	5.31	.021	3.15
Identity-choice * Offensive	5.91	.015	0.30
Negative * Offensive	12.78	.000	0.06
Negative * Defensive	12.14	.000	15.70

Table 4: Significant correlations of Language and primary variables

Variables Tested	X^2 Value	Significance	Odds Ratio
English * Positive	5.77	.016	2.55
English * Pragmatic	17.80	.000	5.39
English * Identity	5.74	.017	0.33
Arabic * Positive	18.28	.000	0.25
Arabic * Pragmatic	6.89	.009	0.37
Arabic * Identity	7.77	.005	2.37

Table 5: Significant correlations of target audience and primary variables

Variables Tested	X^2 Value	Significance	Odds Ratio
Curious * Positive	9.87	.000	0.13
Curious * Pragmatic	4.72	.030	0.14
Engaged * Negative	9.89	.002	2.70
Engaged * Positive	51.57	.000	0.08
Engaged * Identity	18.08	.000	3.72
Engaged * Pragmatic	14.17	.000	0.23
Engaged * Offensive	23.78	.000	0.08
Engaged * Defensive	23.78	.000	12.00
Tacit * Positive	31.32	.000	0.07
Tacit * Negative	13.45	.000	n/a
Tacit * Identity	4.50	.034	0.40

Table 6: Significant correlations of 5As and primary variable

Variables Tested	X^2 Value	Significance	Odds Ratio
Absorb * Pragmatic	10.16	.001	0.30
Absorb * Identity	34.55	.000	n/a
Advise * Pragmatic	19.63	.000	24.95
Advise * Identity	17.97	.000	0.27
Advise * Offensive	13.83	.000	17.74
Advise * Defensive	13.83	.000	0.06
Activate * Identity	21.17	.000	5.61
Anchor * Pragmatic	42.08	.000	0.09
Anchor * Identity	44.37	.000	n/a
Assure * Pragmatic	12.49	.000	9.32
Assure * Identity	30.34	.000	0.17
Assure * Offensive	13.95	.000	n/a
Assure * Defensive	13.95	.000	n/a

Table 7: Significant correlations of 5Ds and primary variable

Variables Tested	X^2 Value	Significance	Odds Ratio
Divided * Offensive	25.57	.000	0.08
Divided * Defensive	25.57	.000	13.90
Disabused * Pragmatic	18.43	.000	5.96
Disabused * Offensive	7.05	.008	0.31
Disabused * Defensive	7.05	.008	3.10
Disillusioned * Offensive	44.70	.000	0.50
Disillusioned * Defensive	44.70	.000	21.88
Directionless * Offensive	57.83	.000	0.05
Directionless * Defensive	57.83	.000	19.15
Discouraged * Pragmatic	6.11	.013	n/a
Discouraged * Identity	4.50	.034	0.40

Table 8: 2 Step Cluster Analysis

Cluster 1 – 51 Messages (25.9%)	**Cluster 3: 48 messages (24.4%)**	**Cluster 4: 47 messages (23.9%)**	**Cluster 2: 26 Messages (13.2%)**	**Cluster 5: 25 Messages (12.7%)**
Offensive – Yes (100%) *Importance: 1.00*	Offensive – Yes (97.9%)	Offensive: Yes (100%)	Defensive – Yes (100%)	Offensive – Yes (96%)
Positive – No (100%) *Importance: 0.90*	Positive – Yes (100%)	Positive: Yes (100%)	Positive – Yes (50%)	Positive – Yes (96%)
Assure – No (100%) *Importance: 0.74*	Assure – No (75%)	Assure: Yes (95.7%)	Assure – No (100%)	Assure – No (92%)
Advise – No (100%) *Importance: 0.74*	Advise – No (56%)	Advise: Yes (97.9%)	Advise – No (100%)	Advise – No (96%)
Activate – No (100%) *Importance: 0.72*	Activate – Yes (91.7%)	Activate: No (100%)	Activate – No (80.8%)	Activate – No (52%)
Pragmatic – Yes (92.2%) *Importance: 0.61*	Pragmatic – Yes (95.8%)	Pragmatic: Yes (100%)	Pragmatic – Yes (73.1%)	Pragmatic – No (92%)
Engaged – Yes (80.4%) *Importance: 0.60*	Engaged – No (85.4%)	Engaged: No (97.9%)	Engaged – Yes (92.3%)	Engaged – Yes (76%)
Anchor – No (100%) *Importance: 0.49*	Anchor – No (58.3%)	Anchor: No (100%)	Anchor – No (61.5%)	Anchor – Yes (88%)
Negative – Yes (100%) *Importance: 0.46*	Negative – No (54.2%)	Negative: Yes (66%)	Negative – Yes (100%)	Negative – No (92%)
Identity – Yes	Identity – Yes	Identity: No	Identity – Yes	Identity – Yes

(56.9%) *Importance: 0.37*	(81.2%)	(85.1%)	(80.8%)	(100%)
Absorb – No (100%) *Importance: 0.34*	Absorb – No (58.3%)	Absorb: No (95.7%)	Absorb – No (84.6%)	Absorb – Yes (68%)
Disabused – Yes (84.3%) *Importance: 0.32*	Disabused – No (60.4%)	Disabused: No (59.6%)	Disabused – Yes (80.8%)	Disabused – No (100%)
Directionless – No (90.2%) *Importance: 0.31*	Directionless – No (85.4%)	Directionless: No (100%)	Directionless – Yes (61.5%)	Directionless – No (100%)
Disillusioned – No (88.2%) *Importance: 0.28*	Disillusioned – No (100%)	Disillusioned: No (100%)	Disillusioned – No (53.8%)	Disillusioned – No (100%)
AR Language – Yes (51%) *Importance: 0.26*	AR Language – No (81.2%)	AR Language: No (100%)	AR Language – No (88.5%)	AR Language – Yes (60%)
Eng Language – Yes (74.5) *Importance: 0.25*	Eng Language – Yes (97.9%)	Eng Language: Yes (100%)	Eng Language – Yes (88.5%)	Eng Language – No (56%)
Curious – Yes (96.1%) *Importance: 0.23*	Curious – Yes (56.2%)	Curious: Yes (91.5%)	Curious – Yes (96.2%)	Curious – Yes (100%)
Tacit – No (66.7%) *Importance: 0.19*	Tacit – No (100%)	Tacit: No (97.9%)	Tacit – No (76.9%)	Tacit – No (100%)
Divided – No (90.2%) *Importance: 0.16*	Divided – No (100%)	Divided: No (100%)	Divided – No (69.2%)	Divided – No (100%)
Discouraged – No (92.2%)	Discouraged – No (91.7%)	Discouraged: No (68.1%)	Discouraged – No (96.2%)	Discouraged – No (100%)

Importance: 0.11				
Active Supporters – No (98%) *Importance: 0.11*	Active – No (100%)	Active: No (100%)	Active – No (100%)	Active – No (100%)
Antis – Yes (100%) *Importance: n/a*	Antis – Yes (100%)	Antis: Yes (100%)	Antis – Yes (100%)	Antis – Yes (100%)

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ISSN: 2363-9849

Editor in Chief: Daniel Koehler