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**Faith-Based Organizations and International Development in a Post-Liberal World**

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Since the late 1990s, scholars and practitioners have recognised the international reach and significance of faith-based organizations (FBOs), (including United Nations-facing religious non-governmental organizations (RNGOs)) and the positive role they can play in international dialogue and exchange concerned with international development. Like other development-focused agencies, United Nations (UN) agencies such as the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) now see FBOs and RNGOs as valuable interlocutors and partners, reversing their traditional antipathy to organised religion and the erosion of church-state boundaries. The recent advent of a post-liberal order, however, raises new challenges for development agencies and for FBOs and RNGOs alike. In this chapter, I consider key patterns of conservative nationalism in the context of international development, and their implications both for UN development agencies and for FBOs/RNGOs with which they engage.

1. **Introduction**

Many of the largest religious non-governmental organizations (RNGOs) registered with the United Nations Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC) are active in the field of ‘international development’, promoting improved human well-being in low and medium-income countries through the provision of aid and associated measures. These include the big four faith-based development NGO networks: *Coopération International pour le Développment et la Solidarité* (CIDSE, International Cooperation for Development and Solidarity), the ACT Alliance, World Vision International (WVI) and *Caritas Internationalis*.[[2]](#endnote-1) These networks rank among the largest and best-resourced civil society networks involved in international development, due not only to co-funding from official development agencies but also to generous support from the faithful, making them less dependent on official funding than their secular peers, and better able to mobilise supporters or volunteers.[[3]](#endnote-2) Although this book focuses on RNGOs, I use the term ‘faith-based organizations’ (FBOs) in reference to organizations which represent the focus of this chapter, firstly, because the term has acquired a wide currency in the international development literature and policy world and, secondly, because some of the organizations registered with ECOSOC, and explored in this book, are faith-based, rather than religious (a distinction explained further below). As much as possible, I discuss FBOs which are ECOS0C-registered but I also discuss other FBOs whose activities frame the context in which ECOSOC-registered FBOs work across the globe. To distinguish between them, ECOSOC-registered FBOs mentioned in the discussion below appear with an asterisk symbol (\*) following their name.

Since the late 1990s, FBOs active in the promotion of international development have benefitted from a revision or erosion of the secularist policies of multilateral organizations and of the Western governments which provide much of their funding. Today, many multilateral and bilateral agencies have dedicated staff, policies and programmes to sustain relationships with faith communities and with FBOs. This comparatively new ‘faith and development’ interface was challenging for development agencies and for faith communities alike. Prior to the breakthrough, Western official donors were largely ambivalent about the relationship between faith and development and about the activities of most FBOs.[[4]](#endnote-3) Heavily influenced by the separation of church and state in liberal democracies, they felt that religion and faith were largely counter-developmental, that religious discourses with strong historical resonance were relatively inflexible and unyielding in the face of social and political change.[[5]](#endnote-4) The antipathy was often reciprocated. Faith leaders invariably saw themselves as defenders of traditional moral values amid the onslaught of secular modernity and many were wedded to a paternalistic view of poverty and the poor, ready to advocate the charitable obligations of the faithful but less willing to advocate for political and social change that benefitted the faithful as citizens as much as dutiful believers. With notable exceptions, the main faiths emphasised the spiritual and moral dimensions of poverty at the expense of the material, and representative organizations avoided poverty-focussed social engagement and dialogue with governments and donors.

Today, the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) count among the leading multilateral organizations committed to engagement with faith communities. As significant multilateral organizations, the Bank and the UNDP sometimes function as epistemological rivals in their competing efforts to influence the international development community. The World Bank was the first prominent multilateral to engage with FBOs in the context of international development but as the Bank has retreated, so the UNDP has become more prominent in sustaining the evolving faith and development dialogue. Building on the Bank’s ‘Faith and the Environment’ programme which ended in 2005, for instance, the UNDP has established a close relationship with the Alliance of Religions and Conservation (ARC) since 2009, working to involve faith communities in support of the environmental targets associated with the UN Millennium Development Goals (2000-2015) and their successor, the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).[[6]](#endnote-5) Other UN agencies have also sought dialogue with FBOs on the post-2015 development agenda or on the subsequent SDGs (see, for instance, UNFPA 2014 and UNFPA 2015), much of it conducted through the UN Inter-Agency Task Force on Religion and Development, established in 2007 (see, for instance, IATF-RD 2015 & 2016).

Today, plenty of issues divide secular-minded and development-focused official agencies from their faith-based interlocutors and partners. For official, including UN, agencies, these include the sexual and reproductive rights of women, appropriate measures to fight the spread of communicable diseases and to support those affected; proselytizing by Christian and Islamic organizations; the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender individuals and communities; and the necessary civic or peaceable basis of public religion (issues where a minority of ECOSOC-registered FBOs adopt contrarian positions). For FBO leaders and representatives, they include a continuing lack of faith literacy in development agencies, the enduringly secular language used in initiatives such as the UN SDGs, the liberal or cosmopolitan attack on traditional family values, and competing emphases on the non-material (including spiritual) versus the material dimensions of poverty, deprivation and exclusion. For the most part, these issues define the sharp edges of the faith and development interface. In practice, this means that FBOs such as World Vision International\* can be mediators in some contexts (eg. in the provision of support to communities) and polarizers in others (eg. opponents of the sexual and reproductive rights of women in particular contexts). Secular-minded and development focused agencies, including UN agencies, must therefore negotiate an organizational landscape in which FBOs vary according to their organizational characteristics, religious mandates and programmatic activities.

As I argue in the sections below, however, these tensions have been amplified in recent years by the rise of conservative nationalism and by the parallel retreat from multilateralism and from transnational dialogue based on the language of tolerance and respect. In section 2, below, I argue that FBOs come in many institutional forms and deploy faith-based or religious values in different ways in the context of international development. In section 3, I explore the rise of conservative nationalism and the contributory role of strident religious discourses before considering, in Section 4, the implications for organisations most closely associated with the ‘faith and development’ interface. In Section 5, my conclusion, I explore some of the distinct challenges for official development agencies and for FBOs arising from the emergence of a post-liberal world. In keeping with the aims of the volume, the chapter explores variations in the role of FBOs as mediators or polarizers through reference to their own characteristics and mandates and through an exploration of the wider and changing political environment in which they operate.

1. **Faith-Based Organizations and International Development**

The term ‘faith-based organization’ (FBO) comes from the United States and in contrast to the term ‘religious organizations’, encompasses a range of spiritual traditions such as Rastafarianism, Confucianism, the Church of Scientology, Zoroastrianism or the *Falun Gong,* represented in the UN by organizations such as Federation of Zoroastrian Associations of North America\* and the International Rastafari Development Society\*. These faith traditions sit alongside the established and carefully codified ‘book’ religions, such as Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Sikhism, Jainism, Buddhism, Shinto or Daoism, which account for the majority of ECOSOC-registered RNGOs and FBOs. For the purposes of the analysis below, the term ‘FBO’ refers to any non-governmental organization (NGO) which derives inspiration and guidance for its activities from the teachings or principles of the faith or from a particular interpretation or school of thought within the faith (Clarke and Jennings 2008: 6), and the analytical focus here is on organizations involved in: (1) public policy debates and associated political contests in the context of international development; (2) social and political processes that impact directly or negatively on the global poor; and (3) direct efforts to support, represent or engage with the global poor (Clarke 2008: 24-25). Figure 1, below, sets out a typology of FBOs that are relevant in this context and many of these institutional types, as Section 3 reveals, have played a direct or indirect role in the recent rise of conservative nationalism, either as polarizers or as mediators.

Charitable or development organizations are the most immediately significant in the context of international development because of their close programmatic and funding-based relationships with official donors and include UK organizations such as Christian Aid\* or Islamic Relief\*, German organizations such as *Misereor* or *Brot für die Welt\**, or significant international networks such as World Vision International\*. Representative or apex bodies are important as interlocutors of government and of official development agencies alike and include, in a UN context, the World Evangelical Alliance\*, the World Jewish Congress\* and the Baha’i International Community\*. Most ECOSOC-registered FBOs fit into one of these categories, but beyond them sit a range of other institutional forms

**Figure 1**: **A** **Typology of** **Faith-Based Organisations**

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| ***Faith-based representative organisations or apex bodies:*** rule on doctrinal matters, govern the faithful and represent them through engagement with the state and other actors;***Faith-based charitable or development organisations:*** mobilise the faithful in support of the poor and other social groups, and which fund or manage programmes which tackle poverty and social exclusion;***Faith-based socio-political organisations:*** interpret and deploy faith as a political construct, organising and mobilising social groups on the basis of faith identities but in pursuit of broader political objectives or, alternatively, promote faith as a socio-cultural construct, as a means of uniting disparate social groups on the basis of faith-based cultural identities; ***Faith-based missionary organisations:*** spread key faith messages beyond the faithful, by actively promoting the faith and seeking converts to it, or by supporting and engaging with other faith communities on the basis of key faith principles;***Faith-based radical, illegal or terrorist organisations:*** promote radical or militant forms of faith identity, engage in illegal practices on the basis of faith beliefs or engage in armed struggle or violent acts justified on the grounds of faith.  |

Source: Clarke 2008: 25.

which official donors can find challenging to engage productively. Socio-political

organizations, for instance, are often based on significant membership and hold potential to

influence government policy as well as the views of their constituents. They can also be

important providers of social services such as education. But their stridently partisan

political nature can also prove challenging for official development agencies keen to avoid contentious politics. These include Saudi-based organizations promoting Wahhabi and Salafi currents of Sunni Islam across the globe, including the International Islamic Relief Organization\*, an affiliate of the Muslim World League\*.

Missionary organizations (in the Christian tradition) or those committed to *daw’ah* (spreading the word of God) in the Islamic tradition can be problematic interlocutors of official donors since they can work closely with the poor to provide desperately-needed public goods and services but their commitment to proselytizing directly challenges the secular nature of official donor policy and its commitment to non-discrimination (where it leads to helping people on the basis of *creed*, rather than *need*).[[7]](#endnote-6) Radical, illegal or terrorist organizations are the most difficult to engage but can be important where the extreme poor, the current focus of international development (via the UN SDGs), are concentrated in fragile and conflict-affected states. The close relationship between poverty and fragility in such countries makes it essential that official donors *understand* (at minimum) the organizations that are relevant on the ground and look for opportunities to productively *engage* with them directly or through intermediaries, for instance, to negotiate food or medical supplies to vulnerable civilians or to extract refugees or civilians in need of medical attention.

Beyond this institutional typology, it’s also important to recognise the different ways in which FBOs deploy faith-based values in their activities. Figure 2, below, sets out a typology of ways in which faith is used in the work of FBOs relevant in the context of international development. UK organizations such as Christian Aid\* or Islamic Relief\*, for instance, wear their faith fairly lightly. Faith is used to mobilise the support of the faithful but plays almost no role in the provision of support to beneficiaries or in the hiring of staff, defining features of the *passive* stance. In the *active* case, organizations such as World Vision\* or Tearfund\*, inspired by evangelical or Pentecostal discourses (for instance), can

try to influence staff or beneficiaries religiously or spiritually and the distinction between

**Figure 2: The Use of Faith in the Work of FBOs**

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| --- |
| ***Passive*:** Faith is subsidiary to broader humanitarian principles as a motivation for action and in mobilising staff and supporters and plays a secondary role in identifying, helping or working with beneficiaries and partners. ***Active*:** Faith provides an important and explicit motivation for action and in mobilising staff and supporters. It plays a direct role in identifying, helping or working with beneficiaries and partners, although there is no discrimination against non-believers and the organisation supports multi-faith cooperation. ***Persuasive*:** Faith provides an important and explicit motivation for action and in mobilising staff and supporters. Plays a significant role in identifying, helping or working with beneficiaries and partners and provides the dominant basis for engagement. Aims to bring new converts to the faith or to advance the faith at the expense of others;***Exclusive*:** Faith provides the principal or overriding motivation for action and in mobilising staff and supporters. It provides the principal or sole consideration in identifying beneficiaries. Social and political engagement is rooted in the faith and is often militant or violent and directed against one or more rival faiths.  |

Source: Clarke 2008: 32-33.

*need* and *creed* can become operationally blurred. Missionary or *daw’ah*-inspired organizations, such as the Ghana-based God’s Harvest Foundation\* or the Saudi-based World Muslim League\*, deploy faith in a *persuasive* manner, combining the provision of

services such as health, education or microfinance with active proselytizing. Donor organizations usually require them to strictly separate these two distinct aspects of their

work, with donor support of the service delivery mission but with contractual prohibitions on public funding for proselytizing activity. In practice, however, relevant FBOs can find it difficult to maintain these distinctions in their operations.

The final category can be the most difficult and problematic since relevant organizations can be significant providers of public goods and services and can establish fruitful relationships with operational partners. But the work of strident organizations such as Samaritan’s Purse (a multi-national evangelical Christian relief agency) can stimulate inter-faith tension in local contexts and complicate the work of FBOs committed to inter-faith dialogue.[[8]](#endnote-7) Similarly, exclusivist organizations such as the multi-national Barnabas Fund, supporting persecuted Christians around the world, can militate against inter-faith dialogue by supporting one community relative to others, fostering resentment or criticism.[[9]](#endnote-8) As the following sections reveal, FBOs of all hues, regardless of how they deploy faith in their work, have been directly and indirectly affected by the rise of conservative nationalism with consequences which are explored in the conclusion.

1. **Polarising FBOs and the rise of Conservative Nationalism**

The rise of conservative and populist nationalism in the aftermath of the international economic and financial crisis of 2008 has significant implications for FBOs. In section 4, below, I explore the impact on charitable and development FBOs operating internationally, many of which serve as mediators in the context of international development. In this section, however, I explore the role of key representative organizations, socio-political organizations and radical, illegal or terrorist organizations which have contributed directly and indirectly to its rise. These organizations therefore serve as examples of polarisers and their activities, ostensibly confined within national boundaries, resonate transnationally and internationally, propelled by media reportage and the aggressive social media campaigns of some governments, complicating the role of FBOs which act as mediators within the UN or in other multilateral fora. Conservative nationalism arises in the context of a distinct rage against the global, against the economic, social and political aspects of globalization which have, or which are perceived to have, upset domestic orders and caused wrenching social dislocation, especially in the period since 2008-09. A key phenomenon in this regard is the putatively relentless march of secular modernity, often perceived to be a universalising and totalizing ideology which erodes the national sense of *amour propre*, and its cultural distinctiveness and uniqueness.

This nationalism is invariably *atavistic*, seeking a return to a romanticized and an idealised past when the nation was reputedly great and its culture homogenous, proud and distinct. Conservative, populist and atavistic nationalism comes in various combinations but it invariably challenges liberal political arrangements in democratic or democratising nation-states, through disruptive politics or the discrediting of politics-as-usual, through the simplification of political diagnostics, through the coarsening or hardening of political language and through the invocation of victimhood and the demonization of distant others. The phenomenon, arguably, can be traced to the breakup of the former Yugoslavia from the late 1980s and the rise of Slobodan Milošević, a fiery Serbian nationalist leader charged with war crimes for his role in the violent persecution of national and religious minorities in Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo before he died in a prison cell in The Hague in 2006.[[10]](#endnote-9) Milošević’s close links to leaders of the Serbian Orthodox Church during his years in power helped to consolidate his social and political powerbase during the years of violent nationalist, ethnic and religious conflict that followed the breakup of Yugoslavia.

In contemporary times, Milošević’s style of rule and promotion of religious conservatism as an adjunct to a political strategy of conservative and atavistic nationalism is most closely reflected in the rise of Vladimir Putin as Prime Minister and President of the Russian Federation.[[11]](#endnote-10) Putin was relatively distinctive on the world stage for much of the 2000s,[[12]](#endnote-11) but the phenomenon of conservative nationalism took root towards the end of the decade, after the global economic and financial crisis began in 2007-08. Benjamin Netanyahu, for instance, was elected Prime Minister of Israel in 2009, Xi Jinping became the Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012, Narendra Modi became Prime Minister of India in 2014, and Donald Trump was elected President of the United States in 2016.

Following Trump’s election, three of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council are currently in the grip of conservative nationalism (Russia, China and the US). Add to this mix a Brexit-era United Kingdom and four out of five permanent members were ruled in 2017 by leaders committed to conservative nationalism and to a variable retreat from multilateral commitments. Further add to the mix leaders such as Viktor Orbán in Hungary (elected in 2010, for the second time), Recep Erdoğan in Turkey (elected as President in 2014), Beata Szydło in Poland (elected 2015) and Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines (elected in 2016) and it becomes evident that across the world the liberal order of the post-World War II period is under threat amid the emergence of a distinct post-liberal model or regime-type, fuelled by a multi-faceted but distinct rage against the global.

 Religious nationalism has long been a significant phenomenon in national politics but it has taken on an increasingly international significance in recent decades as the global village becomes smaller and more connected. As the United Nations Development Programme argued in 2004,

Political activism for cultural domination exists in all major religions. In the United States, Christian extremists bomb abortion clinics. In India, Hindu extremists have formented anti-Mulsim violence in Gujarat, even as Muslim extremists have targeted Hindus. The Jewish Gush Emunim, a militant settler group, aims to recreate a Biblical Israel and has used violence to expel Palestinians. The Armed Islamic Group in Algeria threatens to kill those who do not pray and women who choose not to wear a headscarf. In Japan, the Aum Shinrikyo cult, which claimed to be associated with Buddhism, poisoned commuters on the Tokyo subway system in 1995 (UNDP 2004, p. 75).

As this suggests, religious nationalism has been a factor in international politics since the late 1970s,[[13]](#endnote-12) and accelerated in the early 1990s amid the collapse of Communism in the Soviet Union and allied states and in the rise of identity politics. It subsided in the first decade of the new millennium but it has risen again in recent years, serving as an important adjunct to conservative, populist and atavistic nationalism, with many conservative or nationalist FBOs in different national contexts helping to propel or consolidate the phenomenon. Putinism, the distinctive philosophy or ideology of Vladimir Putin, for instance, is a distinct form of Russian nationalism linked to a continuing process of de-Sovietization, and it is rooted in an increasingly symbiotic relationship between the government and the Russian Orthodox Church, where Putin provides state resources in return for political support (eg. through the return of public buildings owned by the Church in the pre-1917 period).[[14]](#endnote-13) Similarly in China, Xi Jinping’s tough approach to political dissent and his retreat from further economic liberalization has been grounded in a persistent invocation of political, moral and spiritual Confucianism, as he seeks to expound a distinct ideology of benevolent rule (much as Putin tries to foster a distinctly Russian form of managed democracy) and engage in further de-Maoification of the Chinese Communist Party.[[15]](#endnote-14) In the meantime, the rights of religious minorities, including Tibetan Buddhists, Uyghur Muslims and the Buddhist-inspired *Falun Gong*, are carefully circumscribed.

The pattern is replicated in other major powers. In Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has used his years of office (from 2003), first as Prime Minister and then as President, to roll back the secular nationalism associated with Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the contemporary Turkish state, and to promote a creeping Islamization of society and the state. In doing so, he has skilfully played on voters’ resentment at decades of secular rule by pro-European elites, popularly known as ‘White Turks’, when Islamic practices, such as the wearing of the head scarf, were restricted and disparaged (Shaheen 2017). In the process, Erdoğan parted ways in 2013 with former colleague Fethullah Gülen, a US-based cleric closely associated with a moderate and cosmopolitan form of Islam with which Erdoğan became increasingly disenchanted.[[16]](#endnote-15) Following a clumsy military coup attempt in July 2016, which Erdoğan blamed on Gülen and the supporters of Hizmet, the Gülenist social movement (estimated to have the support of 10% of the Turkish population (Beaumont 2016)), a systematic purge led to the arrest of 50,000 and the sacking or suspension of 100,00 people in one year (Kingsley 2017), including journalists, academics and military or police officers, and the closure of organizations, including schools, colleges and universities suspected of membership of, or association with, Hizmet or its US off-shoot, the Alliance for Shared Values. Erdoğan’s victory in the April 2017 constitutional referendum heralds the introduction of a new constitution that will expand Presidential power and potentially keep him in office until 2029, consolidating conservative (including religious) nationalism and the roll-back of the secular state in Turkey.

Similarly in India, Narendra Modi became Prime Minister in 2014 through the consistent invocation of *Hindutvah*, or sectarian Hindu nationalism, and through the *Sangh Parivar*, an alliance of *Hindutvah* organizations, including the ruling *Bharitiya Janata Party* (BJP), the *Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh* (RSS, translated as National Volunteers’ Corps of Self-Help Organisations)(a mass membership and right-wing socio-political organisation); *Rashtra Sevika Samiti* (a women’s organisation committed to traditional Hindu notions of femininity); and *Sewa Bharti* & *Sewa International* (the ostensibly charitable and development arms of the RSS).[[17]](#endnote-16) Leader of the BJP and a member of the RSS, Modi was Chief Minister of Gujarat state during the inter-communal riots in 2002 when up to 2,000 people were killed and 150,000 driven into refugee camps, and his state administration was directly implicated in the riots (Nussbaum 2009, pp. 50-51). In office, Modi has been careful not to inflame secularist passions but in early 2017 he provoked controversy in appointing Yogi Adityanath as Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, India’s most populous state with over 200m people. A firebrand Hindu spiritual leader, Adityanath heads the *Hindu Yuva Vahini* (HYV), a Hindu nationalist youth movement accused of stoking religious tensions between Uttar Pradesh’s 40m Muslims and its Hindu majority. In office, Adityanath has been accused of targeting butcher’s shops and abattoirs, mostly run by Muslims, to discourage consumption of cow and buffalo meat, in a state where the slaughter of both animals remains legal, while the HYV has been accused of discouraging inter-religious relationships, especially between Muslim men and Hindu women, and of attacking Christian organizations suspected of proselytizing (Safi 2017).

In the US, Donald Trump was barely aware of Modi’s example in India when campaigning for the office of President in 2016, but his campaign bears brief comparison with that of Modi and the BJP. As the candidate of the Republican Party, Trump reached out to disaffected conservatives and anti-liberals, through social media, the ‘alt right’ (alternative right) press, and through ‘super-PACs’ (independent political action committees (PACs) formed to support a particular candidate and offering anonymity to donors). This included disaffected religious conservatives from a variety of traditions but rooted especially in outsider organizations associated with the evangelical and Pentecostal churches which have flourished in recent decades. Trump reached out successfully to born-again Christians, evangelical outsiders and advocates of the controversial ‘prosperity gospel’ (as well as more mainstream Christians) and secured the support of prominent televangelists including Jerry Falwell Jr and Joel Osteen,[[18]](#endnote-17) as well as ‘super-PACs’ targeted at evangelical voters such as ‘We Serve USA’, and allied advocacy groups, such as InService USA or Concerned Women of America.[[19]](#endnote-18) He did this by promising to appoint conservative and anti-abortion justices to the federal benches and to the Supreme Court, to restore the Reagan-era ‘global gag rule’ (or the ‘Mexico City policy’ of 1981) (prohibiting federal funding of organizations which putatively promote abortion or sterilization through services to support the sexual and reproductive rights of women), and to repeal the 1954 ‘Johnson Amendment’ which limits the ability of religious leaders to participate in partisan or personality-focused political campaigns. The ‘Johnson Amendment’ allows Church ministers, for instance, to condemn abortion from the pulpit as a contravention of scriptural command, but it forbids Ministers from commanding ‘Don’t vote for candidate X because s/he supports abortion’. The Amendment was partially repealed by Executive Order on 5 May 2017, partly as a result of lobbying by the Beckett Fund for Religious Liberty\*,[[20]](#endnote-19) potentially paving the way for new ‘super-PACs’ committed to faith-based lobbying and advocacy, dragging faith leaders further into the milieu of partisan and contentious politics, and provoking faith-based tension between moderate and strident faith groups and their leaders.

1. **Conservative Nationalism and its consequences for Mediating FBOs**

The rise of conservative nationalism has significant consequences for a range of FBOs

committed to international development, exacerbating the challenges which they already faced in 2017, including the challenge of mediating the different forms of international cooperation and dialogue on which international development depends. These challenges arise in significant part from the juxtaposition of two diametrically opposing trends. On the one hand, the international community faced a series of unprecedented humanitarian crises. Compounding the humanitarian crisis in Syria, in which 6.3m people were internally displaced and 5m lived in besieged cities and hard-to-reach areas,[[21]](#endnote-20) an additional 20m people were at risk of starvation due to conflict or drought in four separate countries: Yemen (7m people), Somalia (6.2m), South Sudan (4.9m) and northeast Nigeria (1.8m) (Pilling 2017). According to Stephen O’Brien, UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, ‘At the beginning of the year [2017], we are facing the largest humanitarian crisis since the creation of the United Nations’.[[22]](#endnote-21) This further compounded a deteriorating global humanitarian situation which challenged the institutions of global governance. In his opening remarks at the first-ever World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul in May 2016, for instance, the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon issued a global call to action in the context of unprecedented challenges in the new millennium:

The world is at a critical juncture. We are witnessing the highest level of human suffering since the end of the Second World War. Nearly 60 million people, half of them children, have been forced from their homes due to conflict and violence. The human and economic costs of disasters caused by natural hazards is also escalating. In the last two decades, 218 million people each year have been affected by disasters, at an annual cost to the global economy that now exceeds $300 billion.[[23]](#endnote-22)

But in opposition to this unprecedented humanitarian need, levels of official development assistance (ODA) have been falling in real terms since 2013,[[24]](#endnote-23) aid fatigue and aid scepticism have become engrained in many Western countries,[[25]](#endnote-24) and both personal and corporate donations to leading charities have been falling (DFID 2016, p. 9). The problem of rising demand for humanitarian relief amid declining supply of funding and public support for it, however, is exacerbated by the contemporary rage against the global and the rise of conservative nationalism.

In the UK, for instance, Brexit will adversely affect faith-based relief and development agencies, potentially drawing them into alignment with UK conservative nationalism. First, with the change of government following the EU referendum of June 2016 has come a significant reform of relationships between the Department for International Development (DFID) and associated civil society organizations, including FBOs (Ibid). Under these reforms, CSOs are now expected ‘to deliver results for the world’s poor *and* for the British public’ (my italics) (DFID 2016, p. 6), a significant new focus on the national interest. CSOs will also be expected to compete to a greater extent for funding, with large CSOs losing access to ring-fenced and policy-based funding. Four large faith-based relief and development agencies (Christian Aid\*, the Catholic Fund for Overseas Development (CAFOD), World Vision\*, and Islamic Relief\*), for instance, will lose access to upfront unrestricted core funding through Programme Partnership Agreements and will now compete with other CSOs for DFID funding against a backdrop of declining support from the British public and from corporate and institutional donors (DFID 2016, p. 9).

 Secondly, UK withdrawal from the European Union in 2019 will potentially cut the EU’s development cooperation budget, including the 13% which it courses through NGOs.[[26]](#endnote-25) UK faith-based relief and development agencies will potentially lose access to EU funding while other EU-based FBOs may also see their funding cut. Together, the EU and its 28 members states constitute the world’s largest supporters of international development, providing over half of international aid,[[27]](#endnote-26) while the EU’s development cooperation spending makes it the world’s largest source of multilateral aid, providing more than twice the aid funded, for instance, through the World Bank’s International Development Association facility.[[28]](#endnote-27) The UK provides approximately 11% of the EU’s total budget,[[29]](#endnote-28) and 14% of the EU’s development cooperation funding.[[30]](#endnote-29) The loss of this funding , if it happens, will hit both European and developing country FBOs supported by the EU and undermine EU programmes in fragile and conflict affected countries in which inter-faith cooperation is central to peace-building and a resilient social fabric.

 In the United States, however, the consequences for FBOs have been more far-reaching, following the election of Donald Trump as President and his assumption of office in January 2017. Trump’s attempts, in his first year in office, to limit travel to the US from a number of Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East, to temporarily suspend refugee movements from the region and to favour asylum applicants from members of religious minorities in the Middle East (i.e. non-Muslims) have been stalled by the courts but they have also provoked widespread opposition from US-based FBOs involved in refugee resettlement or international humanitarian action.[[31]](#endnote-30) In addition, many FBOs, including mainstream Protestant and liberal Jewish organizations, have opposed the restoration of the ‘global gag rule’ (and the broadening of its scope to all US-funded global health assistance), prohibiting the award of American government funding to NGOs working overseas which provide information on abortion as a family-planning option. The restoration will primarily affect secular NGOs, especially the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF)(the world’s largest non-governmental provider of reproductive and sexual health care services to women in low and medium income countries), and Marie Stopes International (MSI) but it will also affect the work of IPPF and MSI partners in at least 30 countries, faith-based and secular alike. [[32]](#endnote-31) The ban, for instance, will cost the IPPF an estimated US$100m over four years and endanger the lives of millions of women and girls unable to secure reliable access to contraceptive services (Sengupta 2017, Mutiga 2017). The wider scope of the ‘global gag’ rule became apparent in early April 2017 when the State Department announced the termination of US funding to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) because, it claimed, the organization ‘supports, or participates in the management of, a program of coercive abortion and involuntary sterilization’, a claim denied by the UNFPA.[[33]](#endnote-32) US funding, the UNFPA responded, ‘has saved tens of thousands of mothers from preventable death and disabilities’, suggesting that its termination will endanger the lives of women around the world.

 A more existential concern arises, however, from Trump’s outline budget for the first full financial year of his administration forwarded to Congress in March 2017. This proposes a 24% *per cent* cut in the budget of the State Department, including a 32% reduction in budget of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (a State Department agency) and in US funding to the United Nations, including support for the UN SDGs, an ambitious plan widely supported by most ECOSOC-registered FBOs or RNGOs (Tabuchi 2017, Gnanaselvam 2017). A proposed cut of 31% in the budget of the Environmental Protection Agency, including the proposed termination of the $70m Climate Protection Program, will also involve less US funding of measures in support of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the associated treaty signed in Paris in December 2015 (Tabuchi 2017). Allied to a significant proposed increase in Defence Department spending, the budget involves an anticipated pivot in US diplomacy, from the projection of soft power to a renewed assertion of hard power. These moves threaten to roll-back the significant work of US and other international FBOs to promote international public policy to fight poverty and fragility and to tackle global collective action problems.

 Threats to the effective collaboration between FBOs and multilateral donors, however, are evident in developing as well as developed nations. In Indonesia, for instance, the moderate Islamic social movements *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU) and *Muhammadiyah\** havetens of millions of members or beneficiaries each and function as socio-political organizations (campaigning on issues such as human rights and democratic reform) and as social service providers, delivering health and/or education services (See, for instance, Hefner 2000). They’ve helped to maintain a relatively liberal political culture in which, for instance, it is possible to be both Muslim and gay (or transgender).[[34]](#endnote-33) Both have been adversely affected, however, by the conflict between traditional Indonesian Sunni Islam and contemporary transnational Islamism (or radical political Islam), based on Wahhabi and Salafi schools of jurisprudence indigenous to Saudi Arabia and other countries in the Gulf region. *Muhammadiyah\**, for instance, implements projects for the benefit of women and children in partnership with the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund and lobbies for greater respect in Indonesia and abroad for the rights of women enshrined in international human rights law. It depends on a democratically-constituted public sphere to engage in lobbying and advocacy but finds this space constricted by rising religious tension, for instance, Islamist opposition to the former Governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (commonly known by his Hakka Chinese nickname as ‘Ahok’) and to demands that he be convicted on charges of blasphemy and of insulting Islam.[[35]](#endnote-34)

Elected in 2014, Ahok contended with significant opposition to his position as the first non-Muslim to hold the powerful role of Governor of Jakarta. In a speech at a rally in September 2016, he referred to Verse 5:51 of the Quran,[[36]](#endnote-35) arguing that it neither prevented him from holding office as a non-Muslim nor obliged pious Muslims to vote against him.[[37]](#endnote-36) In response, Islamist organisations, including the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), organised a large anti-Ahok rally in Jakarta in November 2016, accusing him of blasphemy and of insulting Islam, and generating popular pressure which forced the authorities to press charges against him. Due to the resultant court case, Ahok was unable to contest the Jakarta gubernatorial elections of February and April 2017 and in May 2017, he was sentenced to two years in jail. The jailing of Ahok and the wider anti-Ahok movement has destabilised the government of President Joko Widodo (popularly known as ‘Jokowi’) and polarised a society noted for its moderate and civic Islam. Since his election, Jokowi has moved to the right, in some respects, to secure his position (for instance, by lifting a moratorium on the execution of people convicted of capital offences), but his government is not conservative nationalist and it has avoided recourse to conservative religious values to broaden its appeal or shore up its support base. The case of Indonesia under Jokowi, however, illustrates the role of conservative religious populism in undermining the legitimacy of democratically-elected governments which labour to defend the cause of religious pluralism.

1. **Conclusion**

In an episode of the fictional US TV series, *The West Wing*, the President’s expected quiet morning is ruined by media reports of American ‘hostages’ in Sudan, after 12 US aid workers are detained on charges of proselytizing.[[38]](#endnote-37) Later that day, a Congressman with two constituents among the 12 pleads their case with the President, arguing that they were working for an American relief NGO and that they were not proselytizing (acknowledging the illegality of Christian proselytizing in Sudan). In discussion with the President, however, he concedes that his constituents are ‘religious’. ‘If someone asks them what it means to be Christian’, he explains, ‘of course they’re gonna answer’. Later, a report from US diplomats on the ground notes that the Congressman’s constituents were in possession of 18 bibles and a video of the lives of the apostles when arrested. ‘Did the NGO know about this?’ asks the President of his Chief of Staff. ‘They never identified themselves as evangelists’, the latter replies. ‘Undercover agents?’ asks the President. ‘Spies for Christ? Yeah’ comes the weary response, as the Chief of State contemplates the diplomatic tussle ahead.

 The storyline highlights a profound challenge for Western governments and for international development, including UN, agencies: how to harness the latent empathy of the faithful for the plight of their brethren in developing countries while maintaining the impartiality, and the respect both for national sovereignty and the cultural (including religious) diversity of host and beneficiary communities, which they are usually charged to uphold. This challenge is particularly apparent in the present climate. In recent years, the focus of international development efforts has changed significantly. From fighting extreme *poverty* in low-income countries, the focus is now on promoting social stability and institutional *resilience* in fragile and conflict-affected countries. In this context, the concern of this volume to distinguish between the role of FBOs as mediators and as polarizers is particularly relevant, since the shift in focus from *poverty* to *fragility* creates new challenges for faith-based and secular organizations alike, as religious conflict, and wider ethno-cultural conflict, threaten stability and resilience in fragile states. Mediating FBOs which have long played an important role in fighting poverty are now challenged to help promote this resilience by supporting inter-religious dialogue and respect for the rights of religious minorities. Recent initiatives such as ‘Christian Witness in a Multi-Religious World: Recommendations for Conduct’ (2011),[[39]](#endnote-38) which seeks to replace the traditional focus of Christian missionary organizations on *proselytizing,* or bringing new converts to the faith, with a new focus on *witnessing*, or standing in solidarity with host and beneficiary communities, or the 2016 Marrakesh Declaration, calling for the respect of religious minority rights in Muslim-majority countries,[[40]](#endnote-39) can play a significant role here, by promoting ideational change and new norms of behaviour which allow some proselytizing FBOs to move from being polarizers in specific national contexts, to mediators, helping to promote solidarity and understanding across national boundaries.

 The contemporary rage against the global and the rise of conservative nationalism however, endanger these efforts and add a new dimension to the challenge. Over the last 20 years, official development agencies have sought dialogue and partnership with faith communities and associated organizations and a distinct ‘faith and development’ policy interface has developed over that time, contributing new ideas, new funding streams and new institutional mechanisms to the international development effort. Today, however, donor agencies and FBOs alike face significant challenges as a result of the rise of conservative nationalism and the retreat from multilateral commitments which it entails. In the case of the United Kingdom, for instance, projected exit from the European Union in 2019 may well entail the termination of British funding to the EU’s development cooperation budget, worth UK £976m (EU €1,141m) in 2016 (Stevens 2017). This will undermine the EU, the world’s largest provider of multilateral development assistance, with a potential fall of about 14% in its development cooperation spending following Brexit. This will adversely affect both UK and EU FBOs which avail of EU funding and may cut EU funding to fragile and conflict-affected countries where FBOs work to promote peace and interfaith dialogue through their relief and development interventions. In the case of the United States, a projected cut of 28% in the budget of the State Department for the 2018 financial year will lead to substantial reductions in allocations to the United States Agency for International Development, and to the United Nations, including support for the UN Sustainable Development Goals. The US has already announced the termination of official funding to the United Nations Population Fund, worth US$75m in 2015 (Solomon 2017), with further announcements expected in due course. The restoration of the ‘global gag’ rule (or ‘the Mexico City policy’) (the justification for the termination of UNFPA funding), will harm secular NGOs predominantly and strengthen strident FBOs, or polarizers, campaigning against reproductive and sexual health-care services for women in low and medium income countries, endangering their lives.

While the rise of conservative nationalism in Western contexts (for instance the United Kingdom and the United States) threatens to damage the relationship between development and faith communities built up over 20 years, its rise in non-Western contexts presents a more formidable range of challenges. As development policy becomes increasingly concerned with institutional fragility in weak and conflict-affected states, policies of conservative, populist and atavistic nationalism pursued by governments in medium and low income states threaten to divide societies and to sow ethnic, cultural and religious divisions which increase fragility in already weak and conflict-affected states or which undermine the delicate social fabric in countries where progress and stability has been inter-connected and hard-won.

In his 2011 autobiography, former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair predicted a twenty-first century characterised by novel forms of conflict, including religious conflict:

[H]ow different faiths and different cultures relate to each other, learn to work and live with each other, will quite possibly be *the* determinative issue of the twenty-first century…[T]his century is unlikely to see the repetition of the clashes of fundamental political ideology which so marked and scarred the twentieth century, but it could easily be a century shaped by clashes of cultural or religious ideology’ (Blair 2011, p. xlii).

In some respects, the prediction seems alarmist, echoing Samuel Huntington’s controversial 1997 thesis of an emerging ‘clash’ of religiously-rooted ‘civilizations’ (Huntington 1997). The recent rise of conservative nationalism, however, appears consistent with such predictions, not least in highlighting the central role of religious nationalism in contemporary international affairs. Conservative nationalism comes in many forms and in each of the countries in which it is evident, it has its own dynamics. But invariably, religious nationalism is a component part. In the United States, for instance, Christian conservatives oppose the construction of mosques or burn down existing ones. In Israel, the coalition government of Benjamin Netanyahu includes religious parties such as United Torah Judaism, Shas and Jewish Home variously committed to the establishment of a Jewish state and the expulsion of Palestinians. In Sri Lanka, the government, representing the Sinhalese Buddhist majority, has refused to make substantive concessions to Muslims or to Hindu Tamils since the end of the civil war in 2009, hindering reconciliation and consociationalism. In India, the Hindu nationalist government is empowering sectarian Hindu leaders in heartland states such as Uttar Pradesh. In Saudi Arabia, despite tentative reforms, the government continues to tolerate the export of Wahhabi and Salafi doctrines by organizations and activists, fuelling tension among Muslim communities in other countries.

Contemporary conservative nationalism, and its corollary, religious nationalism, threaten much of the progress achieved over the last 20 years as a result of formal dialogue and partnership between development agencies and faith communities, and the work of mediating FBOs. It also threatens important UN initiatives, including the Sustainable Development Goals 2016-2030. Conservative and populist nationalism now challenges faith communities and associated FBOs afresh to build bridges in place of walls, or in the language of political scientist Robert Putnam, to promote bridging (inclusive) in place of bonding (exclusive) forms of social capital (Putnam 2000, pp. 22-23). Amid the emergence of a distinct post-liberal order in international relations, the compact between development agencies and faith communities may need to be reformulated and remade anew. Priorities for UN agencies, for instance, include reaching beyond the development and representative organizations that deploy faith in a passive or active manner, the focus of donor engagement efforts to date, and to engage with other organizations, including socio-political, missionary (proselytizing) and radical organizations which deploy faith in a persuasive or exclusive manner (see Figures 1 & 2, above), organizations which can function as polarizers in the context of international relations. But this requires sustained dialogue and creative normative and institutional approaches to engagement that will test the capacity of UN agencies. The challenge, however, is as important as it is huge.

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1. I’m grateful to the editors of, and contributors to, this volume for valuable feedback on the first draft of this chapter at a workshop in the Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt, in March 2017 and to the editors for helpful suggestions on subsequent revised draft. I’m also grateful to my departmental colleagues Emel Akcali and Eugene Miakinkov for helpful comments. I remain responsible, however, for any errors of fact or omission here. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. CIDSE is a coalition of 17 official Catholic development agencies committed to social justice, whose members usually draw inspiration from the Vatican II reforms and from liberation theology; ACT Alliance is a network of over 150 Protestant church, humanitarian and development agencies, mostly associated with mainstream/mainline Protestant churches affiliated to the World Council of Churches. It replaces the former Association of Protestant Development Agencies (APRODEV); WVI is a network of World Vision national organizations in North America, Europe and Australasia inspired by evangelical and Pentecostal branches of Christianity and active in relief, development and advocacy activities; and *Caritas Internationalis* is a network of Catholic agencies which is more conservative than CIDSE and more directly influenced by orthodox Catholic social teaching. For further details of each of these organizations, see their websites: CIDSE: <http://www.cidse.org/> ; ACT Alliance: <http://actalliance.org/> ; WVI: <http://www.wvi.org/>; and *Caritas Internationalis*: <http://www.caritas.org/>.

 [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
3. See, for instance, Clark (2003: 131-136), in which these agencies dominate the top ten international NGO networks by volume of ODA received, occupying, for instance, three of the top five places. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
4. This paragraph draws on text in Clarke & Jennings 2008: 1. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
5. Illustrating this position, Alastair Campbell, Chief of Staff to UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, famously remarked in 2003 that ‘We don’t do God’. Highlighting the ambiguous nature of the assertion, however, he did so to stop his boss talking about his Christian beliefs in an interview with a reporter (See Brown, 2003). [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
6. In November 2009, UNDP and ARC held a meeting (‘Many Heavens, One Earth’) at Windsor Castle, England, in which representatives of nine major faiths made 31 long-term commitments to environmental action; in 2011, in a meeting in Nairobi organised by ARC, ARC partners from 11 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa agreed a series of long-term environmental action plans; while in September 2015, a UNDP-ARC meeting of faith representatives in Bristol, England (‘Faith in the Future’), led to agreement of ‘the Bristol Commitments’, or ‘Faith plans for a sustainable future’, a series of commitments in support of the UN SDGs. See ARC (2017).

 [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
7. The principle of non-discrimination, or helping people on the basis of need, not creed, is also enshrined in the Red Cross Code of Conduct (1995), although the Code does not prohibit proselytizing. [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
8. Samaritan’s Purse can work effectively with secular organizations, including UN agencies, but its strident approach to proselytizing can also provoke inter-faith tension. In El Salvador, for instance, it has provoked tension between the Catholic majority community and local Protestant evangelical churches. According to Dr Paul Chiles, Samaritan’s Purse country director in El Salvador, ‘We are first a Christian organization and second an aid organization...We can’t really separate the two’ (Gonzalez 2001). [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
9. The Fund has criticised Muslim refugees for persecuting Christian refugees in the Middle East and has recently been accused of anti-Semitism as a result of its support to Eritrean Christian refugees (See <https://barnabasfund.org/news/Barnabas-Fund-statement-on-recent-criticism>). A similar organization, Christian Solidarity Worldwide, has been consistently (and controversially) denied accreditation by the UN NGO Committee (See <https://forbinfull.org/>). [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
10. Milosevic served as President of Serbia from 1989 to 1997 and as President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) from 1997 to 2000 (the FRY later broke up to become the separate states of Serbia and Montenegro). Milosevic was first charged with war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1999. He was arrested by FRY officials in 2001 and extradited to The Hague to face trial before the ICTY. [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
11. Putin served as Prime Minister from 1999 to 2000 and again from 2008 to 2012. He served as President from 2000 to 2008 and again from 2012 to the present. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
12. His closest peer being perhaps Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey (see further below). [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
13. Especially with the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the parallel rise of the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
14. In early 2017, for instance, negotiations were underway between the Governor of the region of St. Petersburg and officials of the Russian Orthodox Church for the return of St. Isaacs Cathedral in St Petersburg, one of the most beautiful buildings in the city and currently a state museum. The Governor is expected to act, however, on instructions from Moscow (Luhn 2017). [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
15. See, for instance, ‘Confucius Say, Xi Does’, *The Economist* magazine, 25 July 2015, and Page 2015. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
16. Until 2013, Erdoğan had been content for Gülenists to infiltrate state institutions, believing that this aided his objective of purging these institutions of Kemalist secularists. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
17. On the *Sangh Parivar* and its component parts, see Jaffrelot 2008. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
18. See, for instance, Elizabeth Dias, ‘Donald Trump’s Prosperity Preachers’, Time.com, undated, <http://time.com/donald-trump-prosperity-preachers/> [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
19. Jonathan Easley, ‘Carson allies to target evangelicals with pro-Trump super-PAC’, TheHill.com, 4 June 2016, <http://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/282150-carson-allies-to-target-evangelicals-with-pro-trump-super-pac> [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
20. Daniel Burke, ‘Donald Trump’s big bizarre religious day’, CNN.com, 5 May 2017. <http://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/04/politics/trump-religion/index.html> [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
21. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Syria appeal, <https://www.icrc.org/en/where-we-work/middle-east/syria> [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
22. Ibid. [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
23. Ban Ki-moon, opening address, World Humanitarian Summit, 23-24 May 2016, Istanbul, <http://www.unfpa.org/events/world-humanitarian-summit>. [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
24. ‘Development aid stable in 2014 but flows to poorest countries still falling’, Press release, 8 April 2015, Paris: Organizations for Economic Cooperation and Development, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/development-aid-stable-in-2014-but-flows-to-poorest-countries-still-falling.htm>. [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
25. In the UK, for instance, aid fatigue has been evident since 2010, in reaction to the global economic crisis of 2008/09 and the atmosphere of austerity which it induced in many countries. A DFID survey in February 2010 revealed that 35% of people supported further aid spending, down from 49% in 2008, while 53% believed that most aid is wasted’, up from 47%. See DFID (2010: 2). [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
26. See [www.seekdevelopment.org/seek\_donor\_profile\_eu\_april\_2012.pdf](http://www.seekdevelopment.org/seek_donor_profile_eu_april_2012.pdf). UK funding to the EU’s development cooperation programme may, of course, survive Brexit, not least because it will be difficult for the government to reallocate almost UK£1 bn. of spending, although this currently seems unlikely given the current popular political climate in the UK and to the antipathy both to the EU and to foreign aid spending. [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
27. Kevin Watkins, ‘What would a Brexit mean for EU development assistance’, Devex.com, 6 June 2016. See <https://www.devex.com/news/what-would-a-brexit-mean-for-eu-development-assistance-88265> [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
28. Ibid. [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
29. The UK provided 11% of the budget for 2007-2013. See Cipriani 2014: 20. [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
30. An estimate, based on extrapolating the figure for UK contributions to the European Development Fund budget for 2008-2013 ($3.4bn or 14%) to the EU’s total development cooperation spending during this period (of which the EDF accounted for 44%). See [www.seekdevelopment.org/ seek\_donor\_profile\_eu\_ april\_2012.pdf](http://www.seekdevelopment.org/%20seek_donor_profile_eu_%20april_2012.pdf) [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
31. For a list of these FBOs, see Jack Jenkins, ‘The List of FBOs opposing Trump’s new Muslim Ban’, ThinkProgress.org, 7 March 2017. See <https://thinkprogress.org/faith-groups-opposing-new-muslim-ban-d88a75caea#.odlhbl52c> [↑](#endnote-ref-30)
32. See, for instance, ‘Effects of the Global Gag Rule: Examples from Around the World’, Population Connections & NARAL Pro-Choice America, 1 January 2017, https://www. prochoiceamerica.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/2.-Effects-of-the-Global-Gag-Rule.pdf [↑](#endnote-ref-31)
33. Reuters report, ‘U.S. Witdraws Funding for U.N. Population Fund’, *The New York Times*, 3 April 2017. See also: <https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2017/04/03/us/politics/03reuters-usa-un-populattionfund.html>.

 [↑](#endnote-ref-32)
34. Although the terms ‘gay’ and ‘transgender’ are invariably seen both as Western and as inherently political and thus are largely avoided by gay and transgender Muslims in Indonesia. [↑](#endnote-ref-33)
35. Interview with Dr Nur Azizah, Head of the Department of International Relations, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta (UMS), Swansea, 9 February 2017. [↑](#endnote-ref-34)
36. ‘O you who have believed, do not take the Jews and the Christians as allies. They are [in fact] allies of one another. And whoever is an ally to them among you – then indeed he is [one] of them. Allah guides not the wrongdoing people’. [↑](#endnote-ref-35)
37. In the process, Ahok touched on a wider debate among Muslims, whether to interpret individual verses of the Quran in isolation or contextually (in the context of the Quran as a whole) (Azizah, interview, *Ibid*). [↑](#endnote-ref-36)
38. In Episode 9 of Series 5, first broadcast in 2003, titled ‘Abu El Banat’ (Arabic for ‘Father of Daughters’). [↑](#endnote-ref-37)
39. A joint initiative of the World Council of Churches, the World Evangelical Alliance and the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue. See for instance, <https://www.oikoumene.org/en/resources/documents/wcc-programmes/interreligious-dialogue-and-cooperation/christian-identity-in-pluralistic-societies/christian-witness-in-a-multi-religious-world>.

 [↑](#endnote-ref-38)
40. An initiative of the Moroccan King and government and of supportive Sunni Islamic scholars. See ‘The Rights of Religious Minorities in Predominantly Muslim Majority Countries: Legal Framework and a Call to Action, Marrakesh, 25-27 January 2016’, <http://www.marrakeshdeclaration.org/>. [↑](#endnote-ref-39)